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Introduction 
In this project I try to cast a light upon the production and distribution of biological and 
medical knowledge in the late phase of modernity. I have tried to describe some central 
developments on the interface of science, medical practice and society and to situate these 
within broader modern dynamics. Within those dynamics, science and technology are both 
cause and consequence, made possible through the media of abstract bodies of standardising 
knowledge.   
 
I have done so by regarding life sciences and technologies from the perspective of social 
action as interpreted through philosophical hermeneutics.  I take this perspective to be 
important for two reasons. First, science and technology have severe implications, good and 
bad, for the ways in which we organise society, and for the ways in which we inter-act with 
each other and the world. Second: knowledge, the abstract medium of science and technology, 
comes about through concrete interventions carried out in experimental action. Biomedical 
science and technologies come about through the disciplined isolation of very specific aspects 
of nature, aspects that can only be cultivated through highly specialised actions on the hands 
of experts. In that state of affairs lays the origin of a paradox: actions centred on large scale 
purification of nature’s simple elements can only be brought about through what seems to be 
ever more complex modes of social organisation and through increasing costs and resource 
allocations to highly specific domains of action. Due to this state of affairs, the isolation and 
purification of nature’s resources may blind us to the wider social issues and interests for 
which they were brought about in the first place. As we probe deeper into nature, greater 
social complexity and political and moral dilemmas seem to follow (ecological crisis being 
the prime example).  
 
These are dilemmas that cannot be solved through the same mechanisms of social 
organisation as those which created them. The social good or bad resulting from science and 
technology cannot be assessed through the restricted scope of scientific or technological ways 
of relating to the world.  
 
As the socio-technological experiments of the life sciences are still young, and as their 
consequences are so complex and wide-reaching, it is impossible to assess their wider 
implications with anything approaching a sufficient overview. And, as the “total” 
consequences get increasingly harder to grasp and evaluate the need for doing so increases 
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inversely. This is, I take it, one main motivation behind the attempts to reclaim the social 
dimension of science and technology for common sense (as carried out in science and 
technology studies during the last thirty years). This is also my reason for trying to come to 
terms with the science and technology of medicine in terms of social action. As the 
consequences cannot be fully assessed, not to say, predicted, I take one step back and try to 
analyse some of the basic conditions under which action and choice undergo change along 
with the socialisation of medical technologies and the increasing importance of the life 
sciences. Because nobody can anticipate or oversee the total consequences of socialised 
science and technology, the need for developing broad mechanisms and institutions for policy 
making capable of incorporating a wide scope of views and interests emerges as a pressing 
matter.  
 
As argued already in 1959 by C. P. Snow, the sharp divide between the cultural and the 
natural sciences poses a decisive hindrance to that goal. The western production and 
distribution of knowledge generally takes place along sharply separated spheres of knowing 
and acting: the natural sciences thrive on the exclusion of any historical, sociological or 
aesthetic dimension, whereas the cultural and social sciences in general do not concern 
themselves greatly with the powerful forces of science and technology. The consequences of 
scientific and technological modernisation, of course, do not respect these divisions: the 
everyday worlds in which we live are deeply embedded within both cultural and technological 
structures. Hence, as diagnosed by Ulrich Beck: increasingly, the world in which we think is 
not the same as the one in which we live (Beck 1993). Between those two, we find the worlds 
in which we act and make judgements, which are constantly challenged by the opposition 
between thought and reality promoted by the dynamics of modernity. 
 
The project is structured around three action-organising principles: the central dogma of 
molecular-biology, the legal and political institute of patentability of living organisms, and the 
ethical and legal institute of patient autonomy. 
 
I have called these principles counterfactual organisers. Centrally, I have used this term to 
designate the fact that they are rational principles dealing with agency and causality that go 
beyond the merely experienced. They serve to structure the world not only according to 
experience, but also according to rationally established principles, and they use these 
principles also in the projection of future events, i.e. for the sake of policy-making.  
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In the case of the central dogma, the principle in question states the uni-directionality of gene-
protein interaction. Once these mechanisms have been sufficiently established, they may serve 
as basis for the present and future intervention with physiological processes of normality and 
pathology. Significantly, the central dogma promise to transform the boundary between such 
previously established categories on a broad basis with implications for the whole of health-
care. 
 
In the case of the patentability of living things, it is the general assumption that the promotion 
of commercially viable products in biomedical research will turn out for the better to the 
economy (industry) and to the health care system in general. The social good to be derived 
results from the ability of patentability to regulate and promote networks of exchanges of 
commodities, information and capital, that arise between actors within the new complex of 
academic-industrial relations.  
 
Last, but not least, we have the principle of patient autonomy, promoting an image of the 
patient as an agent capable of making rational decisions about medical interventions based 
upon correct information and sound medical advice during the course of the clinical 
encounter.  
 
Although it is only during the last thirty years or so that these principles have worked their 
way towards the centre of medicine and health care, they are not at all novel to the modern 
production of knowledge. Indeed, the notion of physiological function established on secure 
scientific principles cleansed of unwanted external influences, go right back to thinkers like 
Galileo, Descartes, Locke and Claude Bernard. The same, we may state, is the case with the 
notion of the rational agent. Indeed, the ethical notion of rational agency is directly 
correspondent to that of scientific certainty: ethically responsible action is action carried out 
on the basis of the best available (scientific) knowledge. The patentability of living things 
may also be traced back to this period and the establishment of the right to private property, as 
articulated by John Locke. The new situation, articulated with recourse to Ulrich Beck’s 
theory of reflexive modernisation, is that these principles come together in the organisation of 
the same issues. This was, until the last thirty or forty years, not the case: scientific knowledge 
of normality and pathology belonged within the sphere of medicine; patentability belonged 
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mainly within the sphere of industry, and autonomy was a general principle of the political 
and legal domains of action. 
 
The text should be regarded as being of an experimental character. As may be seen from the 
above remarks I have allowed myself of a certain interpretive freedom. When I have done so, 
it may have been out of a partial discontent with existing theoretical approaches in the field of 
science and technology, but it may also have been out of initial ignorance of many of the 
many approaches that there are. When I started on this project I did so from what I had at 
hand at the moment. Being a PhD student at the Senter for Vitenskapsteori1 in Bergen I found 
myself between two different theoretical alternatives. On the one hand there was the discourse 
theoretical approach of my then supervisor Gunnar Skirbekk, placed somewhere on a 
continuum between Richard Rorty and Karl Otto Apel, and with a strong emphasis on the 
works of Jürgen Habermas. This approach naturally tends towards political science and the 
humanities. This leaning was further strengthened by the influences from my second 
supervisor, Jan Fridthjof Bernt at the faculty of law in Bergen, where he and David Doublet 
have developed systems theoretical approaches to legal studies (especially Luhmann but also 
Habermas). On the other hand there were Roger Strand and Ragnar Fjelland, coming from the 
natural sciences and deploying methods taken more from Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) and phenomenology2. As I started to delve into the matter I came to realise that 
discourse theoretical or systems theoretical perspectives would be ill suited to describing the 
peculiarities of the natural sciences and their interactions with society. This influence was 
further strengthened as Gunnar Skirbekk retired and Roger Strand took over responsibility for 
supervising the project.  
 
At the same time, however, I felt that the STS approach would lack the abilities of articulating 
the normative issues involved found in discourse theory especially and political theory and 
ethics in general. This discontent was strengthened as I also came to take an interest in the 
discipline of bioethics.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Which in English bears the honourable name of The centre for the study of the sciences and the humanities. 
2 It should be noted that although this difference in theoretical approaches exist at the Senter for Vitenskapsteori 
they all co-exist in a harmonious manner, and so there was no problems if somebody should try and somehow 
mix the approaches. 
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About this time I got in touch with Ulrich Beck’s research group in Munich. This was a lucky 
strike, as it furthered the impetus to seek out a middle position with regards to the above 
mentioned approaches. Coming more from hermeneutics myself, but feeling that that field 
had lagged behind developments in the natural sciences (starting already in the middle of the 
previous century), I took an interest in the hermeneutic approaches and critiques of Scott Lash 
and Brian Wynne directed towards the theory of reflexive modernisation. I perceived the 
critique to be interesting but somehow mis-conceived, and I decided to read Beck’s theory as 
a sort of macro-hermeneutics, in the words of Charles Taylor (in his book on Hegel), a 
dialectical hermeneutics. During a stay in Munich I also had the opportunity of discussing this 
approach with Ulrich Beck, who welcomed such an interpretation and encouraged the 
attempt. This impression remained also during my second stay in Munich which took place 
towards the end of the project. 
 
At this later stage I had also come to learn about other interesting approaches, significantly 
that of the Co-production idiom of Sheila Jasanoff and the Social Epistemology of Steve 
Fuller. Concerning Jasanoff’s approach I felt that it already said many of the things I was 
trying to say, but that my somewhat more philosophical attempt could be worth it anyway. As 
to Fuller’s social epistemology (as far as I have understood it), I found it an interesting 
counterpoint and correction to STS, but not a substitute for the more case-oriented approach 
of these studies. Generally, however, it is my contention that hermeneutics should not be 
opposed to these approaches, but rather complementary to them. 
 
The thesis consists of ten chapters. In the first chapter I introduce the hermeneutic conception 
of Being-in-the-world as an alternative to the modernist anthropology that has been dominant 
since the times of Galileo and Descartes. I furthermore interpret Heidegger’s philosophy as a 
hermeneutic of action and I describe some elements of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology 
that will be used later, centrally that of material agency as a standing-reserve (Bestand). 
Following that I continue by giving an overview of relevant theories of science and society. I 
address some of the developments within science and technology studies (particularly those 
dealing with the laboratory), arguing the positive sides these approaches have over traditional 
philosophy of science (epistemology). Centrally, we need more sociologically oriented 
understandings, and we need frameworks that do not presuppose rigid divisions between 
culture and nature. However, I also argue that these disciplines may be lacking in institutional 
and normative aspects, and I suggest that the use of Ulrich Beck’s theory may prove one good 
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intake to these other dimensions. Because there is no explicit theory of action to be found in 
Beck, nor a theory of experimental action, in chapter three I turn towards the task of 
developing such a framework. For that purpose I use Rheinberger’s account of epistemic 
things as a supplement to the Heideggerian philosophy of technology.  
 
The third chapter finally issues in the exposition of action-organising principles as ways of 
dealing with responsibilities delegated to specific groups for the sake of organisation of 
action. These groups are either scientific disciplines or professions. Professions and 
disciplines, it is argued, are the legitimate representatives of the domains of nature and of 
politics. I thereby try for a socialised version of classical epistemology, one in which 
scientific objects and political subjects are not represented mainly by some idea or some 
concept (the signifier), but rather by disciplines or professional groups. The main rationale 
behind this move is to get to scientific disciplines and professional groups in ways that are 
primarily social and practical, not theoretical. We have to listen to what professionals say 
about their domains of expertise, but we also have to take a look at what they do and which 
consequences their actions come to have. These two aspects do not always converge. Insofar 
as policy formation frequently takes experts’ testimonies as their basis, this is a significant 
intellectual and practical problem.  
 
I then start to approach the main site of the project, which is constituted by the triangular 
relation between laboratory, clinic and life-worlds. I give a brief overview of the 
modernisation of medicine as centred on the instigation of experimentally established 
knowledge as the main basis of rational action. This is done through reference to Claude 
Bernard’s ethos of research and by an exposition of the therapeutic revolution in medicine 
that took place within immunology and bacteriology at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
 
In chapter five I turn to the description of some central moments in the creation of the gene as 
a principle for understanding heritage and physiological development. One significant part 
deals with the transition from a biochemical understanding of genetic mechanisms to an 
understanding of genetics as exchange of information as articulated in Francis Crick’s Central 
Dogma. The destiny of the dogma is then followed through the revolution in DNA 
technology, in which the industrial and commercial potential of molecular biology started to 
materialise, before I turn to the developments in sequencing and mapping technology that 
finally issued in the Human Genome Project. The historical description follows the 
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interpretive framework insofar as it starts with the experimental conception of the gene, then 
follows the transfer of the gene and its organising principle(s) into society. This also means 
that most of the project is concerned with developments in the USA, as that has been the 
country in which the main developments have taken place. 
 
The question is asked whether the central dogma (as understood through the new platform of 
genomics) as well as the technological objects issuing from it, can serve to organise a 
reorganisation of health care on a broad basis. So far genetics has been restricted to a limited 
scope of disorders (the Mendelian), but the ambitions of genomic medicine is to establish the 
genome at the centre of the understanding of most common diseases.  
 
I then (in chapters 8, 9 and 10) turn towards regulatory issues. Two problems are raised 
concerning the introduction of intellectual property rights into the life sciences: what happens 
to regulatory measures as the object to be regulated, the gene, is turned into an immaterial 
object of the information economy? And what can be said about the consequences of the 
strong commercial influence for the development of genomic medicine? 
 
Finally, in the chapter on autonomy, I try to gather the issues of the previous chapters and to 
see them in the light of emerging roles for the patient. It is argued that developments within 
genomics as well as bioethics work together in constructing the patient as a rational decision-
maker, and that these developments may lead to a transfer of risk responsibility from the 
health care system and to the single patient.  
 
Before starting I would like to emphasise that I do not believe to have succeeded with all the 
above ambitions. I do, however hope and believe that some of the perspectives developed 
may be sustainable, and that they may pose questions worth of future investigation. Aristotle 
said that philosophy is a venture into the unknown. I have tried to follow his dictum and to go 
beyond my own field. One important goal of such a move is to try to engage in a constructive 
dialogue with other disciplines about issues of a general concern. It should, however, be kept 
in mind that this is a work in philosophy, not in history or in sociology, and that the 
arguments should be judged accordingly.  
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1. Appropriating Heidegger 
 
The situation always prevails. In what the senses of 
sight, hearing, and touch convey, in the sensations of 
color, sound, roughness, hardness, things move us 
bodily, in the literal meaning of the word 
 
Martin Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art 
 
 
Martin Heidegger, a follower of Nietzsche, took his philosophy to constitute a radical break 
with the western tradition of thought, as practiced from Socrates and onwards. I would like to 
stress that this break was not, and could not be, total. From a hermeneutic point of view, this 
would be something of an impossibility. In many ways then, his thinking constitutes a 
continuation of the thinking of Aristotle, and parallels may also be drawn towards Spinoza 
and towards Romanticism.  
 
Anyway, if we take Descartes as the main figure of comparison, we will be on safe ground; 
Heidegger does indeed break radically with cartesianism. Not infrequently then, hermeneutic 
thinkers use the critique of cartesianism as an important momentum in the development of 
their own position (Rorty 1979; Bernstein 1983; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Taylor 1989). 
For the present purpose, this critique is especially significant from two points of view: 1) the 
understanding of the body, and 2) the understanding of knowledge. The two are not to be 
separated other than for analytical purposes, and they both find their main articulation within 
the framework of Being-in-the-World.  
Two anthropologies 
The main target of critique, we may state, is the image of the disinterested observer; the 
subject that stands over against the world in order to contemplate it through its objective 
properties. The subject, a construction of Descartes’, was not intended in the sense of 
subjective, as most commonly used today. On the contrary, the Cartesian subject could be 
established only as co-relative to objective reality. In the scholastic tradition, stemming from 
Aristotle, the subjectum was not represented as the person doing the thinking, but rather as 
that which was thought upon; the subject of the investigation.  
 
The Cartesian subject received its status through the re-establishment of the method through 
which truth was to be arrived upon. I will not consider the scholastic method in any depth, but 
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contend myself to quoting Aristotle on scientific methodology as diverse and context-
dependent: “Since there are many actions, arts and sciences, it follows that their ends are 
many too – the end of medical science is health; of military science, victory; of economic 
science wealth” (Aristotle 1955:63). Hence, the methodology depends on the end of the 
science, the craft or the action, as well as on the subject matter of investigation: “…it is a 
mark of the trained mind never to expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than 
the nature of that subject permits…” (ibid, 65). 
 
Descartes diverged radically from Aristotle. His universal method was closely connected to 
the new natural sciences and as such founded upon the ideal of mathematical geometry. Not 
only was Descartes the founder of modern philosophy, he is also regarded as having founded 
analytical geometry, and he applied the method thereby developed also to other sciences.  
Mathematics, then, was the foundation of the Cartesian subject: 
 
“Until Descartes, every thing at hand for itself was a ‘subject’; but now the ‘I’ becomes the special 
subject, that with regard to which all the remaining things first determine themselves as such. Because 
– mathematically – they first receive their thingness only through the founding relation to the highest 
principle and its ‘subject’ (I), they are essentially such as stand as something else in relation to the 
‘subject’, which lie over against it as objectum. The things themselves become ‘objects’” (Heidegger 
1978:303). 
 
The notion of the subject is dependent upon the notion of mathematical certainty. From 
signifying the ‘subject-matter’ at hand in the concrete case (Aristotle), now the subject-matter 
is in each and every case treated to and subsumed under the same methodology, namely that 
of mathematics, thereby to be represented to the subject in all its clarity and distinctness.  In 
the introduction to the Discourse de la Méthode, Étienne Gilson writes that 
 
“Une fois accoutumé aux exigences de la vraie méthode, l’esprit pourra les transporter dans d’autres 
domains que les mathémathiques, et concevoir par consequent la possibilité d’une mathématique 
universelle. Entreprise chimérique au premier aspect, parce qu’il semble impossible de tout réduire au 
calcul et de metre les problèmes de la métaphysique ou de la morale en equation. De fait, il ne sera 
même pas possible de réduire au calcul les problèmes de la biologie, de la chemie, et parfois de la 
physique; il restera cependant possible de les traiter mathématiquement” (Gilson 1946:11). 
 
How was it possible, Gilson asks, to reduce the objects in their many-sidedness to the clear 
and distinct ideas of mathematics? This was accomplished through a new ontology ascribing 
primacy to those properties of the objects that offered themselves to mathematical analysis 
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through objective operations of measurement, whereas those depending on the senses were 
relegated to a secondary position. 
 
These objective properties were what Descartes, following Galilei, termed primary qualities. 
By taking such a stand towards the world, the observer is capable of abstracting from any 
personal interest or aesthetic preferences that he may take in the world. Thus, by doing away 
with these secondary qualities, truth may be grasped in all its clarity and distinctness. The 
primary qualities were those properties of the physical and mechanical universe that could be 
analysed by way of quantification: length, breadth and depth, whereas secondary qualities 
would be those of smell, colour, tastes and the like. By this sharp division, the world is split 
into two dimensions; one is objective and external, the other is subjective and internal. 
Causally, the primary qualities relate to the internal as stimulus to respons. When I see 
something as red, or when I taste something as sweet, this is nothing but confused 
impressions of the objects that caused my feelings. Hence, the qualities of redness and 
sweetness do not exist as such, in an external entity, for instance an apple. They are nothing 
but “…the various dispositions of these objects [primary qualities] which have the power of 
moving our nerves in various ways” (Descartes 2003:book CXCVIII), thereby causing the 
inner representations/sensations of redness or sweetness. Hence, subjective feelings distort 
our understanding of objective reality. We therefore have to rid ourselves of the secondary 
qualities in order to arrive at the clear and distinct ideas of the primary qualities. 
 
If we turn to modern medical nomenclature, the division between primary and secondary 
qualities is most clearly expressed as the division between objective signs and subjective 
symptoms. The idea is that the symptoms, as experienced by the patient, are subjective 
expressions of the underlying objective causes, the signs3.  
 
What then, is the primary interest within the Cartesian attitude of dis-interestedness towards 
the world and the body? The answer is a strange one insofar as the purpose of dis-interested 
knowledge is that of gaining prediction and control, which undeniably must be linked to some 
interest4. 
                                                 
3 As will be argued at a later stage: In genetics, the relationship between primary and secondary qualities 
resembles the relationship between genotype and phenotype.  
 
4 One modern way of rationalising this seeming contradiction away, is to do as Rudolf Carnap, and relegate 
questions of interest to the domain external to science itself, to the pragmatic. In the analysis of Max Weber, 
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On the one hand, we have the relationship of the mind to the body: “This I (that is to say, my 
soul by which I am what I am) is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist 
without it” (Descartes 2001:6). On the other hand, this attitude is closely linked to man’s 
being-in-the-world. Through knowledge, man frees himself from the causal bonds that tie him 
to the world, and he gains control over himself and his environment: “To be free from the 
illusion which mingles mind with matter is to have an understanding of the latter which 
facilitates its control. Similarly, to free oneself from passions and obey reason is to get the 
passions under instrumental direction” (Taylor 1989:149). 
 
The reason behind this seemingly self-contradictory view lies in a pre-existing ontology in 
which the body and the world are perceived in terms of mechanics. What we have here is one 
of the first articulate moves towards what Max Weber, at a much later stage, was to diagnose 
‘the dis-enchantment of the world’: the emptying of the world’s naturally given meaning 
through its rationalisation.  
  
The universe is no longer seen as displaying a natural order, as found in the ancients, but is 
rather depicted as dead matter moved forward by mechanical necessity. In the universe of 
Aristotle or Plato, every thing and every organism tends towards its natural place within a 
larger whole. The organism, and not just the mind, is thus understood as having its own 
moving force within itself, rather than outside itself, and thus as moved by its own nature 
towards its proper place within the environment at large (Heidegger 1967). In the case of 
Aristotelian ethics, man is moved by an understanding of the Good already rooted in his 
socio-biological nature (not to be confused with modern socio-biology). Movement and 
understanding are therefore depicted in a circular, rather than a linear, manner: as tending 
towards its own completion and as seeking this on the basis of a prior understanding of its 
own goal. Thus, the moving cause, strange as it may sound, actually and factually comes into 
being after the movement caused, but only because there existed some prior understanding as 
to its desirability and reality5.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
mirroring Nietzsche, this state of affairs is responsible for the modern value nihilism: Rationality is objective, 
whereas value is subjective. 
5 For some modern, Aristotelian descriptions of the circularity of the understanding and the explanation of social 
action, see for instance (Collingwood 1956; Winch 1958; Skjervheim 1959; von Wright, 1971; Taylor 1971-
1972).  
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In Descartes, there is no longer such a proper place for man and there is no prior 
understanding of the Good whatsoever: Man is inserted into a physical and mechanical 
universe seemingly without pre-established order. The implications are, as mentioned, radical: 
 
“…this involves more than just the rejection of the traditional ontology; it also does violence to our 
ordinary, embodied way of experiencing. We have to disengage ourselves from this, for Descartes, 
irremediably confused and obscure way of grasping things. To bring this whole domain of sensations 
and sensible properties to clarity means to grasp it as an external observer would, tracing the causal 
connection between states of the world or my body, described in primary properties, and the ‘ideas’ 
they occasion in my mind. Clarity and distinctiveness require that we step outside ourselves and take a 
disengaged perspective” (Taylor 1989:146). 
 
The body is regarded as a closed-off mechanism rather than as an organism capable of 
establishing its own qualitative distinctions in interplay with the environmental order. Thus, 
the body was depraved of its inherent normative significance as well as its contextual 
dependence. Similar conceptions are highly operational in the genomic era, where 
physiological function is conceived as a “molecular machinery”. Take for instance the 
following quote from the Nobel laureate Jacques Monod, describing the cell as a biochemical 
system: 
 
“The entire system is totally, intensely, conservative, locked into itself, utterly impervious to any 
‘hints’ from the outside world. By its properties, by the microscopic clockwork function that 
establishes between DNA and protein, as between organism and medium, an entirely one-way 
relationship, this system obviously defies ‘dialectical’ description. It is not Hegelian at all, but 
thoroughly Cartesian: the cell is indeed a machine” (Monod 1971).  
 
It would be too easy to state that Heidegger turns the Cartesian analysis upside down. Rather: 
he entirely rejects its language. Still, we will not miss his point if we, as a preliminary, state 
that he does indeed inverse the logical order of investigation. The world, in which we, as 
bodily beings, find ourselves, is the place to start: “Ontologically, ‘world’ is not a way of 
characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather characteristic of 
Dasein itself”. It possesses a “pre-ontological existentiell signification” (Heidegger 1962:93). 
Centrally, this means that there will be no place to turn in order to rid ourselves of some 
interest we may take in the world, and that Descartes’ secondary qualities cannot be excluded 
by some primary reflexive move. In the last resort, Descartes’ disinterested observer does not 
exist, and there is no last ground for cognition, no being outside this world. It is this state of 
affairs that is expressed by the existentials of facticity and thrownness (ibid.): man always 
finds himself as thrown into this or that situation, and he cannot step outside of his factical 
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existence within a certain context. This is furthermore one in which he generally takes a 
particular interest. Therefore, also the position of the Cartesian observer must be understood 
as engaged in some project in which he takes an interest in the world: “…a state-of-mind 
implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that 
matters to us” (ibid., 138).  
 
This then, is the significance of Being-in-the-world as the primary phenomenon of 
hermeneutic analysis: we have to start with the relationship between man and world as it 
shows itself directly. We cannot, as did Descartes, abstain from the world in order to know it 
and ourselves. Rather, to give a description of the world as a phenomenon means to “…see 
what shows itself in ‘entities’ within the world” (ibid., 91). That which appears through this 
description of entities is not to be regarded as something fundamentally other than ourselves: 
“Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it – all these 
ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those 
particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves” (ibid., 26-27).  
 
Heidegger’s analysis opens up a way of asking about objects in the world that does not cover 
up their value-ladenness. The objects around which we organise our activities are ‘invested 
with value’. I will use the term “epistemic things” or “epistemic objects” for those objects that 
are established through knowledge-based practises of analysis or production (Rheinberger 
1997). According to traditional modes of analysis, such a conceptual construction may seem 
an oxymoron, with “episteme” normally belonging to method or procedure, and with “thing” 
as referring to the material aspect or even as making an ontological claim. From the 
perspective of being-in-the-world, however, there cannot be any such fundamental difference. 
Practices are “determined” by methodological considerations, by the “being” or the 
materiality of the object, as well as social conditions. As clearly as these different aspects 
cannot be reduced to one of the others, as clear is it that they cannot be regarded in absolute 
separation from each other. I will argue that the way to keep them all within a holistic view, 
goes by way of analysing both epistemological and ontological claims from the point of view 
of (social) action. This also entails that we will have to step out of the Heideggarian 
framework. 
 
The social organisation of objects, epistemic or otherwise, says something important about 
dominant values of the practice in question. These need not coincide with the dominant 
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legitimisations of the practice, but are rather to be regarded as functions of the ‘total’ 
environment of the object, of the interests and the resources necessary for the manufacture of 
the object. Values are, per se, embedded in the efforts to create epistemic objects. As such, 
they are both tacit and articulated (Polanyi 1967; Johannessen 1990). For instance, it need not 
surprise that the social ‘Being’ of the gene has been and still continues to be, a nexus of 
differing definitions and understandings (Fox Keller 1995). Although referring to the same 
scientific findings as the fundamental outcome of their activities, the validity claims of the 
pharmaceutical industry or biotech companies may be sharply at odds with those of publicly 
funded research (Krimsky 2003). 
 
In order to get at this problem complex, we need access to the gene or the antibody in ways 
that are primarily social, and not epistemological. Although this in many cases means that we 
do not go into great detail as concerns the epistemic characteristics of the gene, it does not 
mean that it is ‘black-boxed’. The central claim is that also epistemic objects are primordially 
social ‘Beings’ (Ziman 2000) because they have real social consequences. 
 
Insofar as we do not ask about the ‘Being’ of science or technology, as does Heidegger, we 
have to restrict ourselves to actions through which they are constituted and the actions that are 
made possible through objects of science and technology. Meanings are embedded in 
practices; they are what grant them coherence and intelligibility (or the lack of such). Hence, 
we may transcribe Heidegger directly: From stating that  
 
“..the Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity”, but rather “that which determines entities as 
entities”, to  
 
“The interactions with entities are themselves not entities, but that which determines entities 
as entities”.  
 
Epistemic entities possess their status only to the degree that it has been given to them 
through negotiations with material reality organised within the social sphere (hence the 
primacy of ‘historical epistemology’). Indeed: the social character of the epistemic object 
penetrates right into the sphere of the laboratory or the computer.  
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Heidegger’s procedure 
Even though Heidegger’s initial question is heavily metaphysical, it is designed so as to direct 
us towards the primacy of worldly affairs. Hence the centrality of the conception being-in-the-
world:  “Ontologically, ‘world’ is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein 
essentially is not; it is rather characteristic of Dasein itself”. It possesses a “pre-ontological 
existentiell signification” (Heidegger 1962:92). In a sense, we already know the answer to the 
question, and the question is given its shape and content on the basis of this prior 
understanding. The way to approach the problem, then, is not by abstaining from worldly 
interests, as did Descartes, but rather to immerse the analysis in the everyday world of human 
activity; to “see what shows itself in ‘entities’ within the world” (ibid.). 
 
The Cartesian notion of disinterestedness has no place within such a framework. The structure 
of caring (Sorge) for oneself through one’s (close) environment is the basis of any 
understanding of the world whatsoever: “The kind of dealing which is closest to us is, as we 
have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which 
manipulates things and puts them to use…” (ibid., 95). In the second part of Being and Time, 
the structure of care is unfolded as constitutive of the structure of anthropological time. 
Exactly because there is no privileged starting-point for the investigation of being, we always 
find ourselves as (f)actually existing within this or that ‘state-of-mind’ (Befindlichkeit). The 
English translation ‘state-of-mind’ is inferior to the German expression, insofar as it does not 
express the fundamental relatedness towards the world: we always find ourselves in situations 
in which something is at stake, namely our present and continued being-in-the-world. “It is 
essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that there is constantly something still to be settled 
[eine ständige Unabgeschlossenheit]. Such a lack of totality signifies that there is something 
still outstanding in one’s potentiality-for-Being” (ibid., 279). Human existence then, is 
fundamentally temporal in the sense that it is always (or at least, most of the time) caught up 
in networks of past, present and future events, some of which are taken to be more 
fundamental to our well-being than others. We inscribe certain options and courses of events 
with values and qualities essential to our feeling of self; to our identity and our belonging in 
the world. Hence, the world possesses certain meaning-structures through which we may 
improve our being-in-the-world6.  
 
                                                 
6 In passing: only in this manner does the notion of choice make sense, as taking place within a network of 
meaningful events that we inscribe with differing degrees of value or quality.  
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As already indicated, this structure of the world is constituted by the meaningful inter-
connection of useful things. Hence, the investigation starts with our dealings with the entities 
that are closest to us. Because these are the ones that we invest with the most value, they also 
serve as the necessary point of entry into the question of being: “ In so far as Being constitutes 
that which is asked about, and ‘Being’ means the Being of entities, then entities themselves 
turn out to be what is interrogated” (ibid., 25-26). As a common denominator, Heidegger uses 
the term equipment. We relate to the world through the use of equipment by that special mode 
of care that is called concern (Besorgen):  
 
“…having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, 
making use of something, giving up something and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, 
interrogating, considering, discussing, determining” (ibid., 83).  
 
 
The fundamental character of equipment is not that which we may get from a theoretical 
analysis of its properties; mass, weight, length, materiality and so on. We always first learn 
about equipment through practice. Equipment carries the special characteristic of referring to 
some further object; it exists within a chain of object-events as something ‘in-order-to’; as 
tools for achieving something else. One example used by Heidegger is the building of a 
house: I use the hammer in order to drive the nail into the board. I drive the nail into the board 
in order to build a structure of boards that can carry the roof of a house. In this way, each 
piece of equipment fulfils its purpose only in relation to a further piece of equipment, which 
again is used for the manipulation of some further object, and so on.  
 
This way of reasoning may also be applied to the more complex case of scientific activity: We 
mix DNA with nucleotides and polymerase enzyme in a test tube in order to put it on a heater. 
This we do in order to start a chemical reaction whereby two strands of DNA separate, then 
copy themselves in exponentially increasing numbers. These clones are in turn used for the 
effective sequencing of human DNA, which again may be used to detect infections, to make 
diagnosis, trace the human origins to Africa, to launch venture investments on Wall Street and 
so on.  
 
What is the final aim of these chains of object-events? For now, let us stick to the more simple 
case of the house. One answer would be: the house itself is the final purpose. This is 
expressed by the term ‘towards-which’ (das Wozu). When manufacturing relatively simple 
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entities, the goal of the process will be immanent to the single operations of the building 
process itself. But this would be a partial answer only, because it still somehow covers up the 
fundamental interest that is at the basis of the undertaking. In the end, this whole chain of 
events is instigated by me in order to care for that entity which I myself am. Hence, the house 
itself is not the final goal of the operation; it is me, and, in addition, whoever I plan to lodge 
inside it. Although the boards of the house may be measured, weighted and shaped according 
to strictly quantitative measures, the fact still remains that they are invested with value and 
interest, which in the last resort point back to me as the one doing the investing. Hence, the 
house is an important constituent of my being-in-the-world. Generally: houses are important 
constituents of our being-in-the-world, as fundamental meaning-structures of our inhabiting 
and feeling at home in the world. Whether one has a house in which to live or whether one 
lives on the street; these possible states of affairs usually make quite a difference for one’s 
state of mind (Befindlichkeit).  
 
The point of being-in-the-world is to situate the analysis in this world and not in some parallel 
or transcendent universe. Hence, even if the final goal of the undertaking is the understanding 
of Being itself, Heidegger starts out within our everyday environment: “In the disclosure and 
explication of Being, entities are in every case our preliminary and our accompanying 
theme…; but our real theme is Being”. The notion “in every case” should be remarked upon: 
Even though we proceed towards greater levels of generality, we also remain with the things 
that we already know. In the words of Kant: every concept should have as its counterpart a 
possible experience. The alternative is idealistic dogmatism, which is precisely the thing to be 
avoided. In short, Heidegger starts out with the thing-hood of the world, and he depicts it as 
chains or networks of meaningful action-events. Because these networks are not indifferent to 
us, but rather constitutive of the entities that we ourselves are, we always find ourselves 
(factically) as being in this or that state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit) or mood with regard to our 
further existence in the world. We project our future on the basis of the past and present.  
 
This understanding forms the basis for the understanding of anthropological time in part two 
of Being and Time: the action-events project the horizon from which past, present and future 
events receive their significance. From this derives the potentialities for authentic or 
inauthentic existence, and as such, there is constantly something at stake in our being-in-the-
world. Without pertaining to follow Heidegger all the way: from the understanding of the 
potentiality of authentic existence as grounded in the phenomenon of temporality, something 
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like an answer to the question of the meaning of Being is sought out.  
 
Next, I will raise the following question: Heidegger’s procedure is here situated within the 
context of building a house. But what if this was not our starting point, but rather the 
procedure of analysing DNA in a laboratory, as also described? I will try and argue that a 
context of increased complexity will require of us that we make the step from hermeneutics 
simple to what I, taking inspiration from Ulrich Beck, name “reflexive hermeneutics”. 
Towards sociology… 
Heidegger is often charged with being a too abstract, too deep and too metaphysically 
oriented thinker. For instance, at the same time as Habermas praises him for breaking with the 
solipsism of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, he criticises him for not completing the movement 
towards inter-subjectivity and for being too obsessed with essences and totalities.  
 
Indeed, this criticism has something going for it: Heideggerian analyses typically concern 
themselves with questions about the meaning of Being, the essence of truth, technology, 
modern physics or art. In one sentence: because he does not step down from the same 
metaphysical ivory tower that he so strongly has contributed to tearing down, his thinking 
ends in a peculiar position when it comes to questions traditionally belonging to what is 
termed practical philosophy.  
 
Intersubjectivity may be defined as ‘man’s relation towards himself as intermediated through 
his fellow beings and the common world in which he finds himself along with others’7. This 
definition should mean that a good working conception of intersubjectivity should also take 
the perspective of ‘the other’ into account so as to be flexible, dynamic and properly 
dialogical. Obviously, central elements in Heidegger’s writings fall short of such a demand; 
he prefers to stay within metaphysics in the classical sense of the word, a position which 
renders him a somewhat archaic presence in modern philosophy.  
 
Still, as pointed out by David Kolb, Habermas is mistaken if he takes this to be a decisive 
blow to the Heideggerian undertaking (Kolb 1992). In criticising Heideggers metaphysical 
leanings, Habermas himself relies upon a conception of intersubjectivity that is itself 
                                                 
7 This is an extended version of the treatment of intersubjectivity as given by (Skjervheim 1959). 
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questionable, and which has been thoroughly criticised, for instance by (Wellmer 1986)8. 
Because he is in a sense himself positioned in his own ivory tower, Habermas himself miss 
out on the potentialities for a properly working conception of intersubjectivity already present 
in Heidegger’s philosophy9. Hence, in criticising Heidegger’s obsession with totalities and 
essences, he himself remains situated within the point of view of an abstract and questionable 
‘totality’, that of the ideal situation of speech.  
 
Anyway: Kolb does not see this conflict of philosophies as decisive. Rather, he suggests that 
we recognise the obvious differences between the two projects, and that Heidegger’s approach 
may be retained while at the same time paying attention to the valuable parts of Habermas’ 
critique.  
 
Habermas regards intersubjectivity as a constant learning process arising in the life-worlds, 
and as intermediated through propositional claims to truth and validity in a community of 
investigators. The meaningful experience of truth (Sinn) has to be distinguished from truth 
propositions (Geltung). In this lays the opening for a conceptual and communicative 
ascendance towards truth and validity (Habermas 1981). For Heidegger, on the other hand, 
there can be no such dialectics of truth: truth is in a sense always already there. Still, this does 
not mean that the world is a static one, or that it does not in a sense depend upon regional 
interpretations. Also for Heidegger the world is dynamic. But it does not primarily change 
through culturally inflicted causal processes, i.e. intrusions from the system world or 
communicative learning; it changes because of its inherent temporality:  
 
“To talk about implicit concepts or propositions [as does Habermas] is to stay within the picture of a 
subject or a community that uses conceptual tools to organize its experience. Heidegger wants to 
undercut that picture by showing how beings are revealed as meaningful in the happening of lived 
time. That happening is not the secure appearance of something mobile before a stable self-present 
subject or community. Temporality is not a structure made available for a subject to use or reflect on; 
it is an event in which Dasein finds itself already stretched out in a particular coming together and 
going apart in a skein of presences made possible by absences” (Kolb 1992:688). 
 
                                                 
8 A critique that has been recognised in Habermas’ later writings. 
9 Without going further into the problematic here, I suggest that Habermas parts ways with Heidegger already in 
his conception of life-worldy action. In many ways, Heidegger’s conception of the life-world remains richer than 
that of Habermas, as Habermas comes to rely upon a conception of action taken from speech action philosophy. 
In that way, his understanding of life-wordly action remains closer to conceptions of rational choice than that of 
Heidegger or, for that matter, Wittgenstein. 
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Heidegger’s world, on the other hand, consists in “the matrix of meaningful relations among 
things in the world that reveals those things” (ibid.). I will return to this point in some length. 
First, however, I will follow Kolb’s resolution of the question of intersubjectivity in 
Habermas and Heidegger. The decisive point, he says, is that the world as portrayed by 
Heidegger does not possess ‘totality’ in the sense attributed to it by Habermas. This is so both 
in the unfinished part of Being and Time and in Heidegger’s later writings, where temporality 
is given primordiality over Being. Hence, Derrida’s conception of différance represents a 
logical continuation of Heidegger’s analysis of temporality (Derrida 1976). 
 
I will remain with the Heideggarian analysis of things/objects. But I will try and give them a 
somewhat more practical interpretation than does Heidegger himself, one which is more 
inspired by contemporary philosophy of science (for instance, Ian Hacking and Steve Fuller) 
and sociology (Beck). The point is this: in studying epistemic objects as social entities, it will 
not do to operate with strictly separated ontological domains: law, biology, medicine, 
industry, politics and so on.  
 
One reason for this is that the apparent exclusiveness of the object domains of these different 
regions are not as exclusive as may seem at outset. Only if we remain within a theoretical 
attitude towards epistemic objects do we fail to grasp this point, that is, if we continue to 
consider them in terms of theory, be that as pure “information” (Crick 1958), their ‘essence’ 
(Heidegger), or if we continue to aim for some final synthesis at the end of an infinite process 
of learning, even though it remains a regulative ideal (Habermas). Considered from the point 
of view of practical interaction, the questions arising from the integration of new technologies 
into society need to be posed in terms of the social being and meaning of epistemic objects 
(Ziman 2000). This point must be maintained as primordial in relation to questions 
concerning epistemic truth. Of course, this perspective is not foreign to Heideggerian 
thinking. But because he remains within his ‘metaphysical attitude’, he fails to regard the 
social destiny of technological and scientific objects: what happens to epistemic objects when 
they transgress the boundaries of the world in which they are created and in which they find 
their primordial validity qua epistemic objects? A passage from Georges Canguilhem, 
remarking upon the difference between the experimental context and the normal environment 
of living beings, makes for a good illustration: 
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“If we may define the normal state of a living being in terms of a normal relationship of adjustment to 
environments, we must not forget that the laboratory itself constitutes a new environment in which life 
certainly establishes norms whose extrapolation does not work without risk when removed from the 
conditions to which these norms relate. For the animal and for man the laboratory environment is one 
possible environment among other. Certainly, the scientist is right in seeing in his apparatus only the 
theories which it materializes, to see in the products used only the reactions they allow; he is right in 
postulating the universal validity of these theories and reactions, but for the living being apparatuses 
and products are the objects among which he moves as in an unusual world. It is not possible that the 
ways of life in the laboratory fail to retain any specificity in their relationship to the place and moment 
of the experiment” (Canguilhem 1991:148-149).  
 
Seemingly paradoxical: the conditions under which the epistemic object gains its universality 
is simultaneously the conditions that limit its validity. And, one further step removed from the 
experimental context: the initial conditions of the experiment; be they theoretical, 
instrumental, technological or economical, are themselves conditioned by social interests and 
validations, that may eventually be influenced by scientific developments resulting from 
experimental activities. Experimental activity, then, reside within complex fields or networks 
of feedback mechanisms. Insofar as we continue to consider scientific activity in terms of 
epistemic value only, or in terms of its metaphysical significance, these complex relations are 
covered up. 
 
A related, but somehow more philosophical reason why we have to readjust Heidegger goes 
as follows: it has already been mentioned that Heidegger’s writings underwent changes from 
the early to the late period. Whereas in Being and Time the phenomenon of Being-in-the-
world is constitutive for anthropological time, the order is so to speak reversed in his later 
writings, where temporality in a sense is prior to Being. Hence the critiques of such diverse 
thinkers as Habermas and Derrida. These critiques also indicate that Heidegger 
underestimated the value of language in his earlier writings. Time and language so to speak 
‘uproot’ the unitary phenomenon of Being.  
 
This may also be restated as follows: unless we want to remain within the essentialist and 
metaphysical position of Heidegger, it will no longer do to try and think time and place as 
unitary phenomena. In modernity, the two have become separated by globalising processes of 
standardisation, one early and significant event being the global distribution of mathematised 
time through the mechanical clock (Giddens 1990).  
 
For purposes of analyses of concrete societal processes then, we have to recognise the need 
for differentiation, and this must be situated within concrete socio-historical development: 
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from traditional society, possessing a relative unity of time and place, through the dis-
embedding of Being in modernity, up until the late modern condition, where a certain tension 
exists between standardising processes in globalised time and the need for localising, 
embedded and re-embedding processes in concrete space:  
 
”The dynamism of modernity derives from the separation of time and space and their recombination 
in forms which permit the precise time-space ‘zoning’ of social life; the disembedding of social 
systems (a phenomenon which connects closely with the factors involved in time-space separation); 
and the reflexive ordering and reordering of social relations in the light of continual inputs of 
knowledge affecting the actions of individuals and groups” (Giddens 1990:16-17). 
 
The tension may be formalised as follows: globalised and standardised time find their 
conceptual counterpart in the geometrical conception of empty space. But this is not the 
conception of space normally found within local communities and practices; these are by 
necessity situated in concrete places, and so they will also display substantial degrees of 
concrete time, in Heideggers terms, anthropological time.  
 
As will be seen, this tension between standardising knowledge situated in abstract time and 
space and the need for locally situated knowledge is the medium, or the stratum, in which 
reflexive modernisation takes place. The ambiguity of Being that is entailed therein is valued 
differently by different authors. For instance (Habermas1981) is critical of the ‘colonisation of 
the life-world’ by the system world. Still, it seems that he operates with a rather rigid 
distinction between them, and that this rigidity stems from a too linear view of the 
development of the system world(s) (Beck 1993). On the other hand, we find authors like 
Brian Wynne, emphasising the life-world as the only “real” dimension and downplaying the 
epistemic claims of expert systems as social constructs (Wynne 1996). 
 
Hence, the question cannot be one of either-or, standardisation or localisation; reflexive 
modernity is the time of the –and (ibid.). The interesting questions, then, centre on how best 
to deal with the tensions of late modernity, not of taking extreme positions. Admittedly, die-
hard proponents of the Human Genome Project do exactly that, insofar as they view 
integration of standardising processes of knowledge into the life-worlds as unquestionably 
beneficiary and as a rather one-dimensional process: efficient social action is regarded almost 
exclusively along the lines of scientific progress and utility. On the other extreme we may 
position a reactionary reading of Heidegger: as one refusing to make the step into modernity, 
preferring to deal with rather simplistic and archaic models of social action (chopping wood, 
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going to the market and so on), thereby retaining the unity of time and being, temporality and 
space. In the words of Ulrich Beck, this anti-thesis to the simple modernistic view, is 
characteristic of processes of Gegen-modernisierung (Beck 2002). 
 
The initial problem was this: the categories of the Heideggerian analysis are too loaded with 
metaphysical content. Insofar as metaphysics are desired, they must be ‘social metaphysics’, 
hence practices, and not metaphysics proper: “Writ large, metaphysical practice results in the 
schemes that societies design for classifying their members” (Fuller 1988:32)10. Law and 
medicine are prime examples of such practices, a different name for which would be ‘regional 
ontologies’. The integration of such ontologies into society at large will be dealt with in some 
more detail bellow; clearly any ontology will not do. As a preliminary: regional ontologies 
arise within relatively closed of systems of action that are centred around the methodological, 
technological and instrumental creation and reproduction of epistemic objects, or around 
categories of thought and action specific to that particular region (for instance the legal 
system). Both to the actors within the action systems and actors in their wider environment, 
these ontologies will, to a certain extent, take on naturalised and self-evident meanings. In 
order to achieve this, they require 
 
“…a restructuring of the physical environment and the addition of new technologies, all designed to 
make the signs of membership in the relevant classes more evident to the trained eye. This fact should 
come as no surprise, and indeed, it explains why a metaphysics worthy of the name must be social: 
namely, if a metaphysics is to appear as an account of ‘how things really are’, then its categorical 
distinctions should seem ‘natural’ even to the perception of someone who is unlikely to understand or 
accept the theoretical justification for that metaphysics” (ibid, 33).  
 
Now, given this wide, social interpretation, the following should be clear about regional 
ontologies: 1) the epistemic truth of objects, although a necessary component in their 
manufacturing, cannot do justice to their wider social function. For this purpose, we will do 
better to look for some of their basic social functions, in other words, the interests they are 
expected to redeem; 2) as already mentioned above, modernity is grounded upon a set of 
professionalized practices that do not merely deal with their own closed-off regions. 
Moreover, the different regions, for instance law, medicine, politics and industry, may also, in 
specific times and places in history, be said to support each other mutually, or to question 
each other’s claims to ontological validity. For instance, the establishment of medicine as a 
                                                 
10 Although no Foucauldian himself, Fuller’s conception builds upon Foucault’s idea of law as social 
metaphysics. 
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profession was only possible under conditions of the rule of law, which again presupposed a 
certain political climate supportive of medicine’s organisation into one coherent system 
(Porter 1997). Through the strengthening of medicine, the politics of the nation state were 
propelled forward; 3) from this, it seems to result that what has been naturalised may also be 
‘de-naturalised’, and that social ontologies may indeed be questioned. According to Beck, 
such ‘de-naturalisation’ of social ontologies may be regarded as intrinsic to the 
individualisation processes of reflexive modernity (Beck and Bonss 2001). 
 
Meanings of modernity 
Returning to Heidegger we may distinguish between five different layers of generality: 1) 
individual propositions, 2) reflective constructs (some theory, for instance that of the gene), 3) 
regional understandings/ontologies of different kinds of beings (art, law, medicine…), 4) the 
overall understanding of being that gives unity to an epoch, in modernity termed das Gestell, 
and, finally 5), the formal conditions of the understanding of being whatsoever (Kolb 1992) 
 
Although insisting that the problem was always the same, Heidegger dealt with category 
number five in different ways throughout his life (Mitcham 1994). As already mentioned, this 
level will be left out here. The question remains, then, of how to deal with the remaining four. 
 
One major contention of Habermas is that Heideggers obsession with totalities renders the 
critique of regional, theoretical or epochal understandings a futile task. As articulated by 
Kolb:  
 
“…there remains in Heidegger a one-way dependence of propositions on the prior revelation which 
makes them possible. As something like a transcendental condition, that revelation is not to be 
interfered with by any ontic activity…Understandings of being are not ‘transcendental’ in the precise 
subjectivist sense in which Heidegger employs the word, but they fit the more general sense derived 
from the neo-Kantians; they are conditions of the possibility, rather than conditions of the actuality, of 
individual propositions. They are distinct from and prior to both the logical analysis of presuppositions 
and the conditions studied by natural or social science” (Kolb 1992:691).  
 
 
Here the solipsism of Heidegger announces itself: there is a kind of philosophical 
understanding, prior to any scientific or lay understanding, sufficient to determine the overall 
being of an epoch or regional ontology, and this understanding goes altogether untouched by 
any individual proposition or validity claim: “Heidegger inserts a level more pervasive than 
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any philosophical school or scientific theory, but still determinate vis à vis other epochs in the 
history of being, and this determinate level functions as the condition of the possibility of 
individual propositions” (ibid). As an example, Kolb cites Heidegger’s reading of the 
Aristotelian theory of motion: in the hands of Heidegger, the theory is presented as a direct 
consequence of, indeed determined by, the more general Greek conception of the physical 
universe. But this cannot be, says Kolb. Even in his own time, Aristotle’s theory of motion 
was in dispute, and some of its major flaws were pointed out. And so there must have been a 
greater room for disagreement within the Greek understanding of the physis, and the ‘unity’ of 
the epoch will have to be somewhat more loosely defined.  
 
Heidegger cannot have it both ways: overall transcendental conditions and epochal unity 
containing sufficient specificity for a critical diagnosis of the epoch at the same time.  
There cannot be a simple, one-way relationship between the different layers of generality 
referred to above. Although recognising the necessity of different levels of generality and 
meaning, the interesting thing will not be their ‘essences’, considered as such and in isolation, 
but the interplay between them. This point resembles a previous argument: regional 
ontologies also depend upon each other. In that sense they are not closed off systems. Again, I 
suggest that the problem can be avoided if we remain with the social being of epistemic 
objects and action-organising principles rather than isolate ourselves within metaphysics. 
Importantly, metaphysics must be regarded as intrinsic to some organised pattern of action, as 
co-relative with the practices in which they inhere.  
 
Recall how the dynamics of the Heideggarian world depends not upon culturally and 
communicatively inflicted processes (Habermas), but rather upon that of temporality. To a 
greater degree then, development is something that ‘happens’, and not something that is 
instigated by human agency only. The primary characteristic of the modern age is that of the 
technological attitude towards the world, Gestell (Heidegger 1978b). 
Technology 
Gestell means something like a ‘framework’, or a ‘skeleton’. In accordance with the general 
structure of being-in-the-world, it is at the same time characteristic of specific properties of 
the world and a specific attitude of man towards the world. It is that particular attitude 
towards those properties of the natural world that allows for the world to become a resource 
for exploitation. Through this attitude nature’s resources are capable of being stored up and 
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kept as a ‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand). Man is ‘challenged forth’ by nature to ‘set upon’ its 
resources, to extract nature’s energies in such a manner as to be able to store them up, later to 
be used for some practical purpose:  
 
“Such challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is 
transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn distributed, and what is 
distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching 
about are ways of revealing” (ibid, 322).  
 
Through the unlocking of nature’s stored up resources, the power concealed in nature, the 
standing-reserve, is revealed. Unleashing the energies of a power plant in order to provide a 
city with light; starting up a jet plane and taking off; observing the effects of antibiotics 
distributed in an area struck by an epidemic. In all these cases the standing-reserve, that which 
has been stored up through the framework of the Gestell (‘enframed’), is revealed and the 
technological unfolds. The central importance of technology resides in its potentiality to re-
enter the world of practical affairs through action and agency: material agency that has been 
stored up can be released at will so as to merge with human agency and enhance its powers 
and its capabilities. 
 
This is a conception of technology that distinguishes itself from that of the pre-moderns: 
“…whereas premodern technology cooperated with nature to bring forth artefacts, modern 
technology imposes on nature, forcing it to yield up materials and energies that are not 
otherwise to be found” (Mitcham 1994:257). 
 
I do believe this to be a useful conception of technology, and as indicated I intend to use the 
conception of the standing-reserve in characterising modern medical technology. But as 
pointed out to us by Kolb, we cannot use such a conception for the causally and ontically 
primary determination of an entire period; this would indeed be ‘bad social analysis’ 
(Habermas 1987). On the other hand, it is not certain that the view ascribed to Heidegger by 
Habermas and Kolb is the one that he actually held:  
 
“Ge-stell is…presented as a historical destiny or fate that calls on humanity to act in a particular way. 
It is not, however, a fate that compels in some crude sense. Elsewhere, having contrasted calculative 
and meditative thinking, Heidegger suggests that associated with such ways of thinking are two kinds 
of consent” (Mitcham 1994:257). 
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Mitcham refers us to the essay Gelassenheit, in which Heidegger sketches an alternative to 
technological determinism. Because Gestell primarily is an attitude towards those properties 
of the world that allows for their exploitation, it is clear that we are to some extent determined 
by this technologically established relation towards the world. We are challenged (forth) by 
the world to set upon it in such a way as to extract its hidden powers through the framework 
of Gestell. But this is not to say that the world does not also contain different properties, 
different possibilities of relating towards it (and thereby also towards ourselves). One 
alternative is the attitude of Gelassenheit, in which we are freed from the technological 
imperative through releasing the things in the world: 
 
“…we can act otherwise. We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use also keep ourselves so 
free of them, that we may let go of them any time…But will not saying both yes and no this way to 
technical devices make our relation to technology ambivalent and insecure? On the contrary! Our 
relation to technology will become wonderfully simple and relaxed…I would call this comportment 
toward technology which expresses ‘yes’ and at the same time ‘no’, by an old word, releasment 
towards things [Gelassenheit] (Heidegger 1977:53-54). 
 
This is not a question of an either-or. Technology cannot simply be rejected; it is too much 
part of our being-in-the-world. As such, it does not simply exist ‘out there’, as a physical fact, 
and in our minds as intellectual representations; it is part of our bodily being, of our whole 
way of relating to the world:  
 
“The machines and apparatus are no more cases and kinds of enframing than are the man at the 
switchboard and the engineer in the drafting room. Each of these in its own way indeed belongs as 
stockpart, available resource, or executor, within enframing; but enframing is never the essence of 
technology in the sense of a genus. Enframing is a way of revealing that is a destining, namely the way 
that challenges forth” (Heidegger 1978b:335). 
 
 
Thus, as a way of comporting ourselves towards the world, technology is a process (a 
“setting-upon”) that is determining in the sense of a self-generating and accelerating process: 
it threatens to drag us into, so as to be encapsulated by, Gestell. Consequences may be 
alienation and blindness to the consequences of technology, and possibly also releasing the 
full destructive power of its ‘essence’, for instance the atomic bomb. As such, technology 
poses the ‘ultimate danger’, insofar as it threatens to cover up other essential aspects of our 
relating to the world: truth, art, questioning, freedom…Paradoxically, this ultimate danger 
also “harbors in itself what we least expect, the possible rise of the saving power” (ibid., 337). 
I will not pursue this point much further, but confine myself to noticing that on this account, 
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living with technology is not a matter of rational choice in the sense ordinary attributed to the 
word.  
 
Living with technology and its consequences can, however, be regarded as learning 
processes, although not in the Habermasian sense. More appropriate metaphors than those of 
the rational choice or discourse, is that of living through grief, the overcoming of pain: 
 
“The overcoming of technology must be lived through, extended and deepened, the way grief or pain 
can be lived through to the point that it becomes an observed grief or pain and thus in some mysterious 
way is set aside or transcended. When we suffer or are in pain, we are simply too close to what we are 
experiencing; we need distance, some self-knowledge, appreciation of who we really are and of our 
limitations. But this is acquired not through rejection or repression of the pain; it comes only with time 
and through naming the source of our pain by asking questions and talking about it…” (Mitcham 
1994:54-55). 
 
 
There is a peculiar fact of the matter, then, about using Heidegger’s conception of technology 
for the purpose of social analysis: temporality and dynamism is at the centre of his attention, 
and so the label of determinism should be ill-suited to describe the movement of his thinking. 
There is indeed something like alternative ways of being and thinking; every disclosure of one 
perspective is connected to the covering-up of other aspects of reality. Still, because he 
remains within his essentialist position, he does not allow for a sufficient plurality of 
perspectives and alternative voices to come fore.  
 
The possibilities for the opening up of technology, Heidegger says, lay hidden in the essence 
of the being of technology itself, and can be recovered through the practices of art, 
questioning and Gelassenheit. It is not so much that this approach should be regarded as 
wrong. Still, we should ask, along with Kolb and Habermas: where is political modernity? 
What about the role of law? Are these nothing but footnotes to technological modernity? The 
institutions of politics and law also have their own being, a relative autonomy, and indeed also 
their own “objects”, namely political subjects. These will not readily be subsumed under the 
ready-to-hand of equipment described above. Furthermore, the view should not be dismissed 
that these other spheres of action and thinking also have acted as necessary preconditions for 
the scientific revolution (Shapin 1999). In this respect, it seems that Heidegger, for the 
purposes of social analysis, by not stepping out of the metaphysical framework, approaches 
something like determinism. Therefore it may also be argued that he does not really complete 
the movement from the theoretical attitude into practical philosophy proper. It seems that 
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Heidegger also closes up the discourse that he initially has opened up. (In sum: the relative 
insecurity of a dialogical approach is necessary.) 
 
A preliminary conclusion should go something like this then: insofar as he takes the 
technological attitude to be at the basis of modernity, Heidegger’s ascribes a too central place 
to technology in the characterisation. In so doing, he makes the controversial claim that 
science is the result of the technological attitude (Gestell), and not the other way round. 
Whereas this move may be in order metaphysically speaking, it should be questioned for 
purposes of social analysis of science and technology. 
 
Science: The projection of nature through the mathematical?  
Heidegger uses a well-known quote from Kant’s introduction to the Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft as a way into characterising modern science. In order 
to appreciate the full relationship between mathematics and nature, I will quote Kant in some 
more length than does Heidegger: 
 
“…eine reine Naturlehre über bestimmte Naturdinge (Körperlehre und Seelenlehre) ist nur vermittelst 
der Mathematik möglich, und, da in jeder Naturlehre nur so viel eigentliche Wissenschaft angetroffen 
wird, als sich darin Erkenntnins a priori befindet, so wird Naturlehre nur so viel eigentliche 
Wissenschaft enthalten, als Mathematik in ihr angewandt werden kann” (Kant 1968:Band 9, 15).  
 
 
This does not mean, says Heidegger, that it is the concrete amount of mathematics, or the fact 
that we deploy numbers, which is to be taken as the measure of genuine science. Rather, it is a 
question of the mathematical projection that we bring with us into our analysis of things. 
Within this picture, the numerical analysis that we usually term mathematical is only the 
special case of the more general mathematical projection. The mathematical projection is 
based in the fundamental transformation of the experience of nature that started during the 
scientific revolution. It has at its basis the quite normal and everyday experience of the 
naturalness of numbers in describing experience: we all in a sense know that if we have three 
bricks of stone at our disposal and we use one, we will be left with only two. If we pick up 
two more bricks, we will have four, and so on. As such, numbers only explicate what we 
already know. It is this naturalness that is transformed into something more during the 
scientific revolution (what Husserl termed the ‘mathematisation of nature’). The self-
evidential inherent in the practical use of numbers is then identified with the counter-factual 
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representation of all things through axiomatic and certain knowledge; the transformation of 
experience onto one flat and indubitable plane. In so doing, the experiential basis of thinking 
is transgressed: “The mathematical is based on…the application of a determination of the 
thing which is not experientially derived from the thing and yet lies at the base of every 
determination of the things…” (Heidegger 1967:288). At the base of the mathematical 
projection lays a fundamental idealisation, and no possible experience. As an example, 
Heidegger uses Newton’s first law of motion: “Every body left to itself moves in a straight 
line”. But how can this be? The fact of the matter is that there can be no such thing as ‘a body 
left to itself’. Moreover, the conception of something moving in a straight line is only possible 
on condition of this initial idealisation. Hence, the thing and the straight line only exist as 
such, as idealisations, as projections unto a wholly abstract plane starting from the certainty in 
numbers found in ordinary experience.  
 
The mathematical projection, then, may be understood as the framework through which the 
requirement of absolute universality is ascribed to the raw material of experience. Such a 
description requires a privileged point of view; one that is uncontaminated by the 
imperfections of ordinary perception. How is this identification of the universal requirements 
of thinking with the particulars of experience possible?  
 
Only through the prior identification of the experienced with the thought. This is in turn 
‘accomplished’ through the self-evidentiality of the methodological. Husserl criticised this 
forgetting of the life-world through ‘apodictive’ evidence, and he tried to carry out a more 
fundamental synthesis within the realm of the phenomenological (Husserl 1960). But in so 
doing he tried to replace one method with another, which in its turn relied upon a different set 
of idealisations, in the last resort that of the transcendental ego (as did Kant). From the point 
of view of Being-in-the-world, however, no such final synthesis is possible. The cultivation of 
one methodological aspect inevitably ends up covering up other aspects and so on; the 
materiality of the object can never be encapsulated or exhausted by method. 
 
In the background of this scientific undertaking, lies some of the ontological presuppositions 
already pointed out (Cf. the section “Two anthropologies”). Fundamentally, nature is 
conceived of as a uniform structure that can be brought onto concept by the use of method. It 
is this metaphysical quantum leap that Heidegger terms the mathematical projection.  
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“If modern physics must resign itself ever increasingly to the fact that its realm of representation 
[Gestell] remains inscrutable and incapable of being visualised, this resignation is not dictated by any 
committee of researchers. It is challenged forth by the rule of enframing, which demands that nature 
be orderable as standing-reserve. Hence physics, in its retreat from the kind of representation that turns 
only to objects, which has been the sole standard until recently, will never be able to renounce this one 
thing: that nature report itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it 
remain orderable as a system of information. This system is then determined by a causality that has 
changed once again. Causality now displays neither the character of occasioning that brings forth nor 
the nature of  the causa efficiens, let alone that of the causa formalis. It seems as though causality is 
shrinking into a reporting – a reporting challenged forth – of standing-reserves that must be guaranteed 
either simultaneously or in sequence. To this shrinking would correspond the process of growing 
resignation that Heisenberg’s lecture [Das Naturbild in Heutigen Physik, KR] depicts in so impressive 
a manner” (Heidegger 1978b:327-328). 
 
Heidegger laments the one-dimensionality of modern science. To him, it has been reduced to 
a calculative reporting. As seen, one way to interpret this statement is that science has been in 
the service of the technological attitude from the very beginning. As this ‘truth’ unveils, 
science is progressively reduced along with technological advance. From this, we may begin 
to understand the dangers of the technological: the mathematical projection is, by definition, 
emptied of experiential basis, and so we cannot oversee the implications of the interventions 
projected through it.   
 
 I have given an exposition of technology and science as described by Heidegger. His 
analyses are informative insofar as they point us towards a practical dimension. Still, this 
dimension is not yet social. It remains “practical” only in a highly metaphysical sense. We are 
given no real conception of science as experimental, and the focus is upon the theoretical 
foundations rather than the larger environment within which science and technology are 
created and practiced. I will therefore try to change the perspective somewhat.  
 
I have pointed to the elements that should be retained in the further analysis: first and 
foremost the centrality of things in the organisation of the world, which again have to be 
understood from (within) structured action. In this context, the structuration of action and 
meaning is organised through those specific forms of knowledge called science and 
technology. From the perspective of societal action, technology may just as well be regarded 
as applied science, and not the other way around, as argued by Heidegger. This does not 
mean, however, that Heidegger’s view is discarded as such. But in directing our attention to 
the ways science and technology are organised socially, we cannot but defer the questions 
concerning their “essence”. Furthermore, the question of the essence, of the Being of science 
and technology, was to be replaced by the more modest questions of the many possibilities for 
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action that they may pose. These arise along with the production and organisation of 
knowledge within different social groups, and cannot as such be readily defined. In the terms 
of Charles Taylor, they have to be articulated (Taylor 1985; Taylor 1989).. The articulations 
in question, furthermore, are not ready-made, but must be localised within practices. 
Reflexive hermeneutics 
Along with Kolb and Habermas we saw that Heidegger operates with a too close connection, 
indeed a one-way directedness, between the different layers of generality or meaning in 
modernity. Not without reason, when applied directly to social phenomena, such a procedure 
grants for a “bad social analysis”.  
 
Recall how Heidegger proceeds in order to situate his analysis as Being-in-the-world. He 
starts out with the things that are ‘nearest to us’ namely ‘equipment’: “The kind of Being 
which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand”. Now, the Being of these entities is both 
a product of nature and of culture; the ready-to-hand is supported by nature as a means for 
caring for ourselves. Our caring for ourselves is grounded in our environment, which is 
neither purely nature nor purely culture; prior to these categorisations comes in either case 
that of Being. But the examples offered to us by Heidegger are always somewhat archaic in 
that they take this direct relatedness towards nature as their starting point: “The wood is a 
forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind ‘in 
the sails’. As the ‘environment’ is discovered, the ‘Nature’ thus discovered is encountered 
too” (Heidegger 1962:100). 
 
Even in the works on technology, this ‘simple’ relationship of work and nature is retained, 
although the storing up of the standing-reserve grants for the abstraction and covering-up of 
nature as its source. This relationship is also retained in the analysis of the mathematical 
projection and of physics as the paradigmatic science; it is always nature that is stored up 
through the framework of Gestell and the mathematical projection. I am not going to try and 
argue that this approach is wrong as such. But it is grounded in a different time and a different 
world than that of the present. In the words of Ulrich Beck: whereas we have moved on to 
second modernity, Heideggers analysis is situated within first modernity, and it does of course 
take its own time as its point of reference.  
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But how would it look if we returned to his procedure, but now situated it within second 
modernity? As a preliminary to the analysis of the following two chapters I will conceptualise 
the question in three steps, as differing but related thematic, each having to do with the 
production and distribution of knowledge. The first concerns the relationship between culture 
and nature, the second with the rise of biology, and the third with the up-scaling of the basic 
unities of research, the coming of “Big Science”. 
 
First and foremost: we cannot anymore, as did Heidegger, presuppose a simple relationship to 
nature. Whereas the meaning of the forest or the water-fall may strike us as immediate, this 
will not be the case with DDT, DNA, nuclear waste or nano materials. In the fifties, biology, 
apart from moving into the centre of attention in the scientific communities, also went from 
analytic to synthetic (Rheinberger 1997). Of course, this is not to state that nature; the 
materiality or even the essence, has been removed from the object of science. But the fact that 
the object is, to an increasing degree, also manufactured, involves that its meaning can no 
longer be regarded as simple to us.  
 
The meanings from which we start our analysis of the ready-to-hand are themselves 
constituted by other processes of manufacturing. A case in point would be the application of 
sequencing machines to the work of identifying genes in the human genome. At the outset, 
these machines were not primarily intended for the human genome, but for the DNA from 
more simple organisms. Craig Venter pioneered their application to the more complex cases 
of humans. One of the problems he had to face in order to achieve this went as follows: 
although the sequencing machines had no problems identifying human DNA, it could not 
single out the genes that were effective in the production of specific proteins. In short, the 
machines would produce a large number of false positives (Davies 2001:56). Venter’s 
solution consisted in feeding the machines with cDNA (complementary DNA) molecules that 
had already been in use by genetic engineers since the early 1970s. cDNA is distilled and 
stored in bacterial cultures from RNA that has already been expressed. Expressed RNA is 
transformed back into DNA using the enzyme reverse transcriptase. In this way, one would 
get to know the gene(s) that had been expressed, the information already being stored in the 
bacterial culture. Traditionally, these cultures had been used by engineers in order to produce 
single proteins. Venter’s idea was to sequence the whole cluster of cDNA stored in the culture 
so as to end up with a so-called ‘expressed sequence tag’, EST for short. These would in turn 
be compared to bases from already identified genes from other species, so as to be able to 
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determine the exact location of the gene on the chromosome (ibid., 58). As the example 
shows, Venter’s procedure took as its starting point materials (cDNA) that were already 
manufactured for use in a different context. In addition comes the sequencing machines, 
developed by Applied Biosystems, which again was the outcome of a rather complex 
procedure, involving venture capital and competition among biotech firms (Cook-Deegan 
1994), genetic engineering as an established practice, and so on. The rhetorical question 
announces itself: what, in this context, is the being of technology, and what is technology of 
being? The question is no longer stable. 
 
In many cases of late (second) modernity knowledge-based practices, the meanings from 
which we proceed at the outset, are already constituted by other meanings. In Latourean 
terms: they have already been inscribed. Hence, we get a sort of ‘double hermeneutic’ also in 
the case of the natural sciences. The meaning of the object does not readily announce itself; 
rather, it can be grasped only through processes of communicative and theoretical mediation 
and interrogation.  
 
For the purposes of knowledge-based processes of production and distribution of objects, this 
will be one version of what Ulrich Beck terms ‘reflexivity’; not primarily conscious reflection 
as traditionally understood within the social and human sciences, but rather meanings 
announcing themselves from within meanings originally perceived as simple. Taking the 
analysis one step further: where these meanings within meanings turn out to be of an 
altogether different character or quality than normally found within that practice, reflexivity 
utters itself as ‘un-intended side-effects’ (Beck and Bonss 2001) (Beck and Holzer 2004). A 
relevant example of this will be the appearance of ethical questions in the midst of what was 
taken to be purely ‘scientific’ or technological domains, as for instance seen in the case of 
stem-cell research and cloning procedures.  
 
One reason for such a relocation of meanings may be found within the sciences themselves. 
Whereas physics has been the model of experimental science since the beginning of 
modernity, this situation may today be changing as biology becomes more important. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, strong institutional and intellectual forces try to subsume biology 
under the older paradigm of physics. But will biology, or the living itself, readily give way to 
manipulations structured after physics? 
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Biology deals with beings that are closer to, or even continuous with, our selves. As such, it is 
not that easily relegated to the domain of “outer nature”, as may be the case with physics. As 
argued by Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, one important characteristic of biology is that it, in 
many cases (i.e., at least those dealing with animals and humans), has as its object lived 
processes, that are continuous or similar to the beings that we ourselves are: “…we are living 
organisms ourselves: we do biology essentially from the perspective of participant observers” 
(Rehmann-Sutter forthcoming). In classical terms (i.e. the Aristotelian conception of praxis): 
action that carries within itself an understanding of the values and goals of the action itself, 
may in many cases be seen to apply to biological development. In physics, however, the 
conception of poiesis, that of goal-directed action in which the final aim of the production is 
wholly external to the process itself, will in many cases be more applicable to the processes 
under scrutiny.  
 
For the sake of the later description of biotechnological practices in first and second 
modernity, I will briefly remark upon one further difference between biology and physics. 
The difference in question is one that has been central in biology since its very inception, and 
which continues to play a central role, both methodologically and practically, that is, in the 
application, clinical or otherwise, of biological research. What I am aiming for, is the 
distinction between specificity and generality in the explanation of biological and physical 
phenomena (Mazumdar 1995). The conception of species specificity has been central to 
biological explanation at least since the time of Darwin, and it continues to delimit and 
promote the possibilities inherent in bio-technological interventions with the living. For 
instance, diphteria anti-toxin would be effective against diphteria toxin, and not against 
anthrax toxin. Differently, it would seem that many entities of physics, for instance neutrinos, 
would be the same no matter where in the universe they are encountered. Hence, while 
biology may posit global validity, this validity will in many cases be seen to differ from that 
encountered within physics. Perhaps we may state that biological knowledge is at the same 
time global and local, insofar as it will only allow for specific interventions, be they directed 
towards some micro-molecular entity, a species, an organ, a tissue or even an entire eco-
system.  
 
These two mentioned factors by themselves should indicate that meanings originally 
stemming from different contexts than the scientific or technological, will be more likely to 
announce themselves within these practices or discourses themselves insofar as they work 
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towards the standardisation and instrumental manipulation of biological processes. As shown 
by (Canguilhem 1991) and (Merleau-Ponty 1962), the life sciences are more liable to 
immanent critique than is physics. This, however, in no ways guarantee that this is the way in 
which present-day biological research is actually carried out: 
 
Classical physics, here taken to mean physics up until Heisenberg and Bohr, would be 
grounded in a determinist and mechanistic world-view. After the Copenhagen interpretation 
of quantum mechanics, most physicists abstained from such claims to totality (Fjelland 2001). 
If such a claim is now dubious regarding physics, it will be even more so when applied to 
biology. Even so, there is no lack of scientists attempting such an undertaking:  
 
“…eventually one may hope to have the whole of biology “explained” in terms of the level below it, 
and so on right down to the atomic level. It is the realization that our knowledge on the atomic level is 
secure which has led to the great influx of physicists and chemists into biology” Crick quoted from 
(ibid., 87). 
 
 
 Hence, we see that the “paradigm” of classical physics has not been uprooted, and that it lives 
on also in the field of biology11. Still, the point is as follows: if this attitude would easily give 
itself to classical physics, it may be expected that the subject matter of biology resists such 
deterministic schemata of interpretation. In Fox Keller’s view, present-day “gene talk” has 
taken on something very similar to what Georges Canguilhem termed “scientific ideology”, 
and so runs the risk of countering it’s own goals: “For if…the term gene may in fact have 
become a hindrance to the understanding of biologists, it has perhaps become even more of a 
hindrance to the understanding of lay readers, misleading as often as it informs” (Fox Keller 
1995:148).  
 
Even if we leave out the question of the epistemic correctness of Fox Keller’s interpretation of 
biological genetics, the quotation still brings forth an important point: the goals and methods 
inherent in the practice of biologists cannot be regarded as external to the debate about their 
wider social responsibility. This is not only a question of responsibility corresponding to 
                                                 
11 In fact, it may be argued that this is the only place where the ideology of classical physics continues to 
flourish. As described by Fjelland (ibid.): following the Copenhagen interpretation, few physicists today will 
claim that their models represent “reality in itself”. The only scientific admission to reality we obtain through the 
use of instrumentation, models and theories. Furthermore, it is also questionable whether it is, as Crick claims, 
“the realization that our knowledge on the atomic level is secure which has led to the great influx of physicists 
and chemists into biology”. As claimed by Kay (2000), Abir-Am (1982) and others, disappointment with the role 
of physics in the construction of the atomic bomb was one important reason for the flux of physicists into 
biology. 
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publicly provided funding; it is even more so a question of the social consequences of science; 
of the co-production of scientific and social order (Jasanoff 2004). 
 
The above section provides a bridge to the last main development within the (social) role of 
science that is here to be remarked upon: the change from science as a relatively small-scale 
enterprise towards so-called Big Science.  
 
With “small science” is meant scientific activity performed in a close relationship to 
experimentation, with the individual researcher as the central actor, and requiring relatively 
scarce resources in the form of funding, laboratory equipment, assistance and so on. As a 
result, responsibilities and rewards are relatively easily located within the scientific 
community as centred round the individual scientist. As will be seen, the early days of 
biotechnological research (i.e. first modernity), fit well within this description. 
“Big science”, however, remains an historical outcome of the efforts within the US weapon 
laboratories following the research efforts of world war two (Pickering 1995). Big science 
requires large teams of scientists and technicians, and correspondingly huge amounts of 
economical support. Its work may be divided and spread across huge distances of space. 
Hence, it requires bureaucratic organisations as well as well-defined hierarchies of order to 
function. By and large, this phenomenon has been reserved for the physical sciences (space 
programs, high energy physics…), but with the coming of the Human Genome Project, the 
question is legitimately posed whether biology has also taken an important step towards Big 
Science (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2003).  
The significant point, which is yet to be described in some more detail, is this: biology has left 
the small-scale bench-style of its early periods, and entered upon new and complex ways of 
organising its activities. From holding a relatively autonomous position within academia in 
first modernity, in second modernity it finds itself within a rather complex organisational 
structure, consisting not only of the academic community; one in which the large majority of 
it’s practitioners in the USA finds him or herself as somehow connected to corporate and 
high-risk capital investments.    
It is developments like these that have led authors like Susan Wright and Sheldon Krimsky to 
talk about the academic-industrial complex of the life sciences, and to describe this new 
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“regime” as dealing decisive blows to the traditional research ethos of biology (Wright 1986; 
Wright 1994; Krimsky 2003).   
 
Between ourselves and Heidegger then, we find at least three major significant shifts within 
the production of knowledge: 1) the upheaval of the simple relationship to nature, to some 
degree corresponding to the upheaval of the nature/culture-distinction as a 
Basisunterscheidung of first modernity (Beck and Bonss 2001). In short, we get ‘knowledge 
processes processing other knowledge processes’, and not only knowledge processes 
processing nature. 2) The replacement of physics by biology as “the” science, and 3) the 
replacement of big science for small science. 
 
I now turn to a description of how these developments may be grasped in more sociologically 
oriented terms. I start out with a general description of the Wissensansatz of the theory of 
reflexive modernisation. As Beck’s theory does not address the production of knowledge as 
such, I also address a number of other authors ranging from classical philosophy of science 
and epistemology to the broader field of social studies of science and technology. 
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2. Socialised science and social theories of science 
Towards the end of the last chapter I described some central developments that have taken 
place in the relationship between science and society during the last part of the 20th century. 
In many ways, these developments may be seen as realisations and successes of the modern 
project: most parts of the western world are thoroughly imbued with the values, institutions 
and action patterns of science and technology. Decisions of broad significance are, by and 
large, based upon some specific type of knowledge; lay persons are bound to place trust in 
abstract expert systems, unable to perform basic activities without relying on the “black 
boxes” of engineers, scientists, medical doctors or lawyers (Giddens 1990; Wynne 1996).  
 
Still, as also contained in the description of the previous chapter, it is not self-evident that 
science as a dominant social institution is prepared for its responsibilities. A situation in 
which scientific activities increasingly become intertwined with other institutions, as those of 
industry or commerce, demands other, more complex ways of understanding the social role of 
science than those contained within the classical ethos of research, like Mertons norms of 
communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism (Merton 1973). Other 
examples are the positivist doctrines of Ernst Mach and Claude Bernard.  
 
The issue at hand is not just with the ethos of research, what Knut Erik Tranøy has termed the 
“internal norms of inquiry” (Tranøy 1976). More to the point, and still within the Tranøy’s 
terminology, it is with the “external norms” of research: “the norms and values required to 
legitimate science policies” (ibid.). But we should expand our scope even further: the central 
issue is the basic concepts (internal) through which we organise, science and the ways in 
which these are justified and legitimated (external) in the face of the applications and 
consequences of science and technology, on society and on nature (Nowotny, Scott et al. 
2001). These, I take it, should (optimally) be regarded both from the external and the internal 
perspectives. In spite of the success of the modernist program of knowledge and production, 
or, just as true, because of its success, socialised science also results in side-effects that were 
not considered in the original scheme. The central example in this respect may be the threat of 
ecological disasters resulting from human activities (Beck 1992). In medicine, the profession 
itself worries that the intrusions from other action systems may in the end turn out as 
disastrous for medicine itself: 
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“Physicians today are experiencing frustration as changes in the health-care delivery systems in 
virtually all industrialised countries threaten the very nature and values of medical 
professionalism…We share the view that medicine’s commitment to the patient is being challenged by 
external forces of change within our societies”, Charter on medical professionalism (European 
Federation of Internal Medicine, The American College of Physicians et al. 2002). 
 
 
Furthermore: one has become aware that medical treatment itself does carry with it significant 
and concrete side-effects. In 1975, Ivan Illich’ book Medical Nemesis stirred the medical 
community with its claims that medicine did more damage than good to society. Illich 
introduced the concept of iatrogenesis, by which he meant to signify physician-induced 
illness, or even death. The conception of iatrogenesis covered three levels: 1) the clinical, 2) 
the social, and 3) the cultural. The analysis of iatrogenesis on level 1) took its main premises 
from the medical litterature itself (medical journals, medical statistics). It did not by itself 
raise claims about empirical phenomena that were not already verified; it merely synthesised 
them in a new way, and so provided an argument that was hard to refute on a wholesale scale. 
As it turned out, levels 2) and 3), were of a more speculative kind, dealing with what Illich 
termed the „medicalisation of society and culture“. „Medicalisation“ means something like 
„the illegitimate transformation of social, political or cultural problems into medical 
problems“ (Aasland 1992). Although met with stark opposition, first and foremost because of 
its onesided condemnation of technological medicine, the claims put forward in Medical 
Nemesis about clinical iatrogenesis (level 1) may today be considered mainstream knowledge 
(Light and Aasland 2003).  
 
This chapter will start to adress the ways in which we may grasp some of the social tensions 
created by science and technology. I have already indicated the reliance upon the work of 
Heidegger and Beck. This in itself should require no further explanation: both deal with 
science and technology12. Still, there are other players in the field that may be considered even 
more relevant to the project at hand, and the choice of method requires some justification.  
 
Although it may have started out as such, with the Risk Society, Ulrich Beck’s theory of 
reflexive modernisation is not primarily about science (Lash 1992). In more recent times, the 
theory has instead come to occupy itself with the consequences of globalisation. Still, central 
                                                 
12 Admittedly, the combination of these two thinkers, so different in most ways, may seem strange. Still, I hope 
to convince the reader that it may be a fruitful synthesis.  Furthermore: I will point to similarities in their views 
on how to live with technology that make both thinkers amenable to bypass the worn-out opposition between 
modernist and postmodernist theories of technology. 
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parts of the theory concerns itself with modern society qua knowledge society. Before I 
continue to consider other theories, I will give a brief summary of what I take to be the central 
points of the Wissensansatz of Beck’s theory. 
 
According to the theory of reflexive modernisation, three socio-historical stages are decisive 
to the present state of social organisation: traditional society, modern society and reflexive 
modern society (second modernity/late modernity). The first two categories form one of the 
basic presupposition of classical sociology; namely the transition from Gemeinschaft to 
Gesellschaft (Tönnies). For our purposes, the significant moment here is the transition from 
traditionally situated and mediated action to knowledge-based and institutionalised action 
through expert knowledge (Giddens 1990; Beck, Lash et al. 1996). 
 
In pre-modern society, tradition is the basic source of legitimacy. In modern society 
knowledge, to a large extent, replaces tradition:  
 
“Der Wissensansatz reflexiver Modernisierung lässt sich –stark vergröbert – folgendermassen 
verbundeln. Erstens: Je moderner eine Gesellschaft wird, desto mehr Wissen erzeugt sie über ihre 
Grundlagen, Strukturen, Dynamiken und Konflikte. Zweitens: Über je mehr Wissen aber sie über sich 
selbst verfügt und dieses anwendet, desto nachdrücklicher wird eine traditional bestimmte 
Konstellation des Handelns in Strukturen aufgelöst, und an ihre Stelle treten eine wissensabhängige, 
wissenschaftsvermittelte Rekonstruktion und Restrukturierung sozialer Strukturen und Institutionen“ 
(Beck, Lash et al. 1996:290). 
 
In a phenomenological and hermeneutic language: important premises of action have been 
removed from the life-world, in which Gemeinschaft has its basis, and it has been replaced by 
organised and knowledge-based structures of action; i.e. by what is here called action-
systems. This is a relative, not an absolute difference; also traditional society was to some 
degree specialised, and tradition continues to carry meaning also in modernised society.  
 
The significant transition in terms of action is that it is connected to and situated upon bases 
of knowledge. This connection changed the whole conception of knowledge and action; what 
was previously Art, was to become Science, see for instance (Bernard 1957; Heymann and 
Wengeroth 2001). This also changed the life-worlds and their conditions in significant ways: 
although ‚specialised’, the different types of knowledge in pre-modern society were part of a 
natural order, handed down by tradition. In modernity, the „natural“ is constructed in a very 
specific manner, as it is turned into a scientific concept. In significant ways, the „natural“ is 
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now constituted by its opposition, through the reflective questioning of tradition and nature, 
and thereby also the decisive elevation of culture to the role of the master of nature. 
Knowledge is no longer bound to concrete persons within specific points in time and place, 
but is abstracted into systems in which it is acted out by professionals. The effectiveness of 
modernised knowledge has therefore come at a price: the dis-embedding of knowledge 
(Giddens 1990) from the life-world and its transposition into action systems. ‚Reality’, in 
terms of the scientific object or in terms of wider concepts like ‚health’ or ‚justice’ is to a 
large extent removed from the action domain of the life-world, now to be acted out and re-
embedded by the expert/the professional. 
 
But, says Beck, development does not halt at this: 
 
„Wissen erzwingt Entscheidungen, öffnet Handlungssituationen. Die Individuen werden freigesetzt 
aus Strukturen, und sie müssen unter Bedingungen hergestellter Unsicherheit in Formen und 
Strategien „reflektierter“ Modernisierung ihre Handlungssituation und Identität neu definieren“ (Beck, 
Lash et al. 1996:290). 
 
This is the thesis of individualisation: members of society come, to an increasing degree, to 
rely upon their own values as the basis of choice. When applied to knowledge: knowledge 
becomes, to an increasing degree, negotiable. Also expert knowledge may be questioned, 
either because of its social consequenses,  because of differing expert opinions, because of 
lay-peoples increasingly high level of education, or because of new and increased flows of 
information (Lash 2002), and so on. The central claim, first conceptualised in Beck’s Risk 
Society, is that socialised knowledge, to an increasing degree, turns up in the form of 
uncertainties and risks (Beck 1992). For instance: clinical judgement is increasingly caught up 
in evaluations of risks for the patient. This is not least due to an expansion of the medical 
system into new areas: preventive medicine by necessity deals in degrees of risk and 
uncertainty (Clayton 2003; Elmore and Gigerenzer 2005), insofar as it deals with that which is 
not yet: high blood pressure, cardio-vascular disease, susceptibility to inherited conditions and 
so on. 
 
At this point, I will take the time to pause upon a matter of dispute among theorists of 
reflexive modernisation that has been mentioned in the introduction and that will be of 
importance for the further analysis. Hermeneutically inclined theorists of reflexivity, 
particularly Scott Lash and Brian Wynne, argues that the above quoted account of knowledge 
and of individualisation is grounded in a „contractual“ image of social dynamics in general, 
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and of trust in particular (Lash 1992; Beck, Lash et al. 1996; Wynne 1996). A similar critique 
has been put forward by Michel Callon (Callon 1999), but I will concentrate mainly on the 
critiques of Lash and Wynne. Individualisation, so the critique goes, happens because lay 
persons observe the inner inconsistencies in the rationalities of experts, and so come to draw 
the conclusion that science cannot be trusted to deliver the goods anymore. On this account, 
individualisation is a matter of a rational choice made by social agents when they see that 
expert systems can no longer fulfil their part of the contract with society, i.e. to provide secure 
knowledge. The critique is directed at both Giddens and Beck, who are both deemed to 
present cognitivist and rationalist versions of reflexivity13. The critique may have something 
going for it in the case of Giddens, but in the case of Beck it is definitely wrong. Indeed, as 
described in the above passage, individualisation and the diversification of rationalities do 
take place (more or less) at the same time as second modernity unfolds. But their inner 
relationship is more complex than portrayed by Lash and Wynne.  
 
Whereas modernity ‚opened up’ traditionally situated patterns of action organisation and 
reposited them within knowledge-based structures and institutions, reflexive modernisation in 
its turn re-opens these action structures and institutions. The fundamental difference between 
the two stages lays in the claim that whereas the transition from traditional to modern society 
to a large extent was intended, the transition from modernity to reflexive modernity is not. It 
is rather a consequence of the cumulative, non-intended side-effects of action and production 
in modern society: 
 
(1) Je moderner eine Geschellschaft wird, desto mehr Nebenfolgen erzeugt sie, die, in dem Masse, in 
dem diese (an)erkannt werden, die Grundlagen industrieller Modernisierung in Frage stellen. 
(2) Auch Nebenfolgen sind also gewüsst. Die Frage ist nur: von wem und auf welcher Grundlage? 
Selbst der Begriff „latente Nebenfolge“ meint nicht kein Wissen, sondern ein Wissen, dessen 
Anspruche allerdings umstritten sind. Die rede von „Nebenfolgen“ kennzeichnet also einen 
Wissenskonflikt, einen Rationalitätskonflikt: die Ansprüche verschiedener Expertengruppen treffen 
aufeinander sowie auf die Ansprüche des Alltagswissens und des Wissens sozialer Bewegungen... 
(3) Dieser Konflikt verlauft nicht in klaren und eindeutigen Zuordnungen von Wissen und Nicht-
Wissen – entweder im Sinne der Expertenrationalität oder der Expertenkritik sozialer Bewegungen... 
(4) So diffus dieser Konflikt erscheinen mag, er entbrennt um ein Ziel: die Verteidigung oder 
Überwindung institutioneller Experten-Konstruktionen des Nicht-Wissen (-Könnens) über die 
„Neben“-Folgen organisatorischen Handelns für andere (Personen, Gruppen, Institutionen, 
Teilsysteme, Länder, Erdteile)... (Beck, Lash et al. 1996:298-299).  
                                                 
13 In this context, “reflexivity” does not mean “self-reflection” as for instance found within philosophical 
theories of modernity. It is a rather wide term that may be taken to mean something like “the transforming forces 
of second modernity”. Especially in Beck, it is institutional rather than intellectual, and it is first and foremost 
promoted by the non-intended side-effects of the modern mode of organising action and production (Beck and 
Holzer 2004). 
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Individualisation and reflexivity happens, not simply because expert knowledge and authority 
is rationally questioned, but rather because deeper changes in the organisation of action and 
production are not percveived (Beck and Holzer 2004). There is an increasing gap between 
the institutions of modernity and the reality (whatever that may be) which they are set to 
regulate. True, this promotes a widening gap between knowledge and reality because most of 
the time expert knowledge proceeds more or less according to old modern recipies (Beck 
1993). This, however, is more of a consequence than a „cause“, or promotor, of the deeper 
Strukturwandel of second modernity.  
 
In the present project this will become clear from the comparison between immunology (first 
modernity) and genetics (second modernity), where it is seen that much more is at work (and 
at stake) than simply the rational questioning of expert rationality. Genetics, it is argued, 
promotes individualisation because it lacks some of the action-organising capabilities offered 
by immunology (and bacteriology). Significantly: whereas immunology and bacteriology 
issued in almost immediately deployable techno-medical objects, i.e. therapies, this is not the 
case with genetics. Genetics is hampered by a „therapeutic gap“, i.e. well-developed 
diagnostic capabilities that are not backed up by corresponding therapeutic measures. In short: 
as we speak there are practically no efficient cures for genetically diagnosed diseases, and so 
there are no techno-medical objects in which to delegate action-organising capabilities. In 
stead, the genetic diagnosis typically issues in terms of information, to be deployed in the best 
(most rational) manner possible by the patient. This is a deep transformation in the action-
organising capabilities of the medical system promoted by a number of factors, but it is not a 
matter of chosen development instigated by the social agents (patients) themselves.  
 
The main reason why Lash and Wynne do not perceive this state of affairs, I take it, is their 
endorsement of „ethnometodology“, focusing mainly on the cultural aspects of reflexive 
processes. Interesting and relevant as that may be: it does not suffice as a substitute for the 
institutional analysis undertaken by Beck. One further reason why Lash and Wynne do not 
perceive of this state of affairs, is that they (especially Wynne) seem to pose the wider 
sociological question of social integration almost exclusively in terms of trust, which is a 
constituent of micro-sociological or ethnomethodological preferences. Such a move, however, 
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overlooks not only the institutional perspectives, but also, as indicated above, the material 
aspects of social organisation.  
 
It is not well conceived, therefore, when Lash and Wynne accuse Beck’s theory of being 
„cognitivist“ or „rationalist“. They are right when they say that there is a lack of (specifically) 
hermeneutic elements as well as a reflection upon cultural methodology in Beck. This, 
however, is merely to state the obvious, and is not really a „methodological“ consideration. 
Indeed, Beck’s theory is interpretatative, and as such fully amenable to hermeneutic 
reflection, as I intend to show in some more detail. That hermeneutic reflection, however, will 
not be microsociological, but is rather to be found at a mid-range level. There is, in general, 
no reason to assume that hermeneutic reflexion must be exclusively micro-sociological or 
ethnographic. This much should be clear from the previous account of Heidegger’s 
philosophy of technology.  
 
I will now start to turn to the question of the socio-material organisation of society in some 
more detail. I do this by first turning towards the theory of science. 
Theories of socialised science 
Before continuing the line of reasoning from the last section, I will start out by giving a brief 
account of some developments within the philosophy of science in the last half of the 20th 
century. One important reason for doing so, is to strengthen a point that has already been 
pointed out in connection with the analysis of Heidegger: philosophy of science should, in 
order to maintain its relevance, let itself inspire by sociological and historical analyses and 
methodologies. Furthermore, the analysis is meant to single out the more relevant and 
interesting works in the field. As the turn towards sociological and historical analysis 
indicates, these are not to be found within the mainstream philosophy of science.  
 
In the 1960s, philosophers like Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos sought out alternative explanations 
for scientific rationality in order to substitute the long prevailing account given by logical 
positivism. Along with Lakatos, Kuhn acknowledged the central role of historiography to the 
philosophy of science. The logical positivists, but also Popper, had sought out rigorous and a-
historical standards of rationality that may have gone well with logic, but which nevertheless 
gave poor descriptions of the ways in which scientific research was actually carried out. The 
most radical conclusions to be drawn from the critique of positivism seemed to come from 
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Thomas Kuhn. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he suggested that scientific progress 
was not a matter of linearly increasing rationality, but rather the result of scientific work 
carried out within pre-established “paradigms”. Paradigms were meant to signify contextually 
and historically situated frameworks of theory, instrumentation and research methods 
established through so-called “scientific revolutions”. Work within a paradigm, “normal 
science”, could only have its degree of success measured according to the standards 
established through these specific rules or frameworks, and so it made little sense to compare 
one paradigm to otherwise situated research paradigms with respect to truth value or 
verisimilitude.  
 
According to the normal reading of the history of philosophy of science, Kuhn may indeed be 
displayed as breaking radically with certain elements of the tradition. Still, already before the 
book was published, Karl Popper’s student Paul Feyerabend had criticised it for its 
conservative outlook on research (Fuller 2000). In Kuhn’s description, it seemed that the rules 
of each paradigm were almost carved in stone, and so it would be futile for the “normal” 
scientist to criticise the present paradigm in order to search for better solutions, less even so 
try and relate research to normative or political issues. Indeed, Kuhn’s book could be read as a 
return to historicism, vehemently criticised by Popper in his The Poverty of Historicism.  
 
Be that as it may. Central points of Kuhn’s critique should be taken seriously, significantly the 
need for placing science within its historical and social setting, so as not to lose sight of the 
landscape while reading the map (the philosophy of science)14. One valuable outcome of this 
has been the realisation that science can indeed be studied by the use of methods taken from 
the humanistic and social sciences. This is not a mere matter of theoretical or reflexive 
improvement: the socialisation of the sciences so dominant in second modernity corresponds 
temporally to the realisation that natural science should be studied by the use of socio-
historical methodologies, which again coincides rather nicely with the re-structuring of the 
nature/culture-divide described in the previous chapter, and so the relationship is a circular 
one15.   
 
                                                 
14 Indeed, this point would be better made with reference to Feyerabend, whose analyses were indeed better 
informed by and situated within, the history of science. However, the term Post-Kuhnian philosophy of science 
is already established (Nydal 2002). 
 
15 This is not to say that such tendencies are unique in the history of modern science. But an instance like the 
debates concerning science and ideology in the 30s and 40s cannot be considered here due to the scope of the 
analysis. 
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As this is a work in the hermeneutic tradition, I will briefly consider the position of 
hermeneutics in relation to the above-mentioned developments.  
 
In the case of modern hermeneutics, historicity was always essential (Gadamer 1960; 
Heidegger 1962; Taylor 1971-1972; Ricoeur 1981; Taylor 1985). Still, it seems that 
hermeneutics as practiced by prominent thinkers like Gadamer, Taylor and Ricoeur has placed 
itself in a rather awkward position by remaining with the social and human sciences only16, 
and by relegating the natural sciences to analytic philosophers and the (few) natural scientists 
that found the occasion and the interest to rise their head above the laboratory bench and 
consider the wider function of their science. The problem is primarily historical and not 
methodological. We know this from reading Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who all, 
in an earlier stage of modern hermeneutics, concerned themselves with different parts of the 
natural sciences. There has, of course, also been exceptions to the rule, and phenomenologists 
and hermeneuticians have indeed entered upon the study of the natural sciences (Ihde 1979; 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986; Fjelland 1991). Still, these remain exceptions.  
 
One important reason why the followers of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have 
swayed from this path goes as follows: a main concern of writers like Gadamer, Taylor and 
Ricoeur, but also Habermas and Apel, has been to defend the social sciences from illegitimate 
intrusions from methodologies shaped after the model of physics. Hence, they have been more 
than happy to leave out a number of questions central to the Wirkungsgeschichte of modern 
science, to the philosophy of science, and thereby also to hermeneutics itself. This they did by 
endorsing the position of metodological dualism. In short: Natural science is deductive 
nomological, human and social sciences are interpretive (Apel 1979)17. In Norway, Hans 
Skjervheim was a prominent protagonist of this view. 
 
If we for the moment leave out the highly heterogeneous group of scholars that may fit the 
description „post-Kuhnians“, the bulk of 20th century philosophers of science who have 
concerned themselves with the natural sciences have belonged to the analytic school of 
thought. Post-empiricist thinkers like Davidson and Quine have occupied themselves with 
                                                 
16 For a critique of Taylor’s position, see (Geertz 1994). For a more general critique of hermeneutics, see (Fuller 
1988). 
17 Karl Otto Apel once gave a talk at the faculty of natural sciences at the University of Bergen. After listening 
for two hours, a member of the audience raised his hand and commented: “So, you’re a positivist then”. Apel, 
who surely must have asked himself if this person had been listening at all, furiously denied this. But, from the 
point of view here taken, the interlocutor was in his full right (I heard this story from Ragnar Fjelland).  
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discerning the objective presuppositions inherent in any language, so as to secure the position 
and authority of the natural sciences, especially against the threat coming from the 
incommenurability thesis: paradigms are inherently different and cannot be compared, hence 
they are also incommensurable. These positions will not be considered here. Suffice it to 
notice that they: 1) do not recognise the social sciences as rational enterprises proper, hence 
they are not capable of appreciating the relevance of these disciplines to the study of the 
natural sciences; 2) fall within what we, following Ian Hacking (Hacking 1983) may term 
„representationalism“. Within the representationalist school, Hacking says, the task of 
philosophy of science is to carve out the logical structures of the natural sciences, even if the 
conceptual schemes thereby constructed corresponds rather poorly with the ways in which 
science is actually practiced.  
 
A powerful critique of representationalism that should also be mentioned is (Rorty 1979), not 
least because of its reliance upon Heidegger. Unfortunately, Rorty’s critique does not point us 
towards any interesting alternatives, remaining as he does within the abstract conception of 
„conversation“ as substitute for the „reality“ defined by the representationalists. Commenting 
upon James Dewey and his present-day follower, Rorty, Ian Hacking remarks that „He 
[Dewey] should have turned the minds of philosophers to experimental science, but instead 
his new followers [Rorty] praise talk“ (Hacking 1983:63). Indeed, the neglect of 
experimentation is only the starting point of Rorty’s ignorance. If representationalism is a 
problem worthy of serious discussion, surely it must have some relevance also outside of the 
philosophical discourse? When philosophy (or any discipline) has nothing to turn on except 
itself, it verges towards the pathological. The quality of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
thus seems to exist within a rather limited and, in a social context, idiosyncratic field of 
reference. In passing judgement upon its own discipline (which it performs with excellence!), 
it neglects the possibility that somewhere within this field, there might still be something of 
value and relevance to the (transdisciplinary) study of the sciences and society. The result is 
that any claims to validity is relegated to the division of labour between the single disciplines, 
informatics, psychology, linguistics and so on, an (anti-)reflexive move to which Steve Fuller 
has given the proper name of The Rorty Fallacy (Fuller 1988). One possible reason for this 
failure, which will be described later in a slightly different context, is Rorty’s fundamental 
reliance upon postmodernist, aesthetical categories. As will be argued, such a notion also 
disfavours the notion of aesthetics, insofar as aesthetics seem to become deprived of any 
rational content. 
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To sum up, then. The two main schools of philosophy of science, the analytical and the 
continental have, each in their way, taken on courses that make them ill-suited to the analysis 
of socialised science as here described18. To put it with C. P. Snow: the problem of the two 
cultures in science has been reproduced within the philosophy of science, and so it has ended 
up as incapable of conceptualising one of the main problems in the modern production of 
knowledge (Snow 1959). That this phenomenon is not simply existing in the heads of 
philosophers should furthermore have been amply confirmed by sharp level of conflict of the 
so-called science-wars, in which humanists and social scientists (social constructivists, ANT, 
STS..) stood against natural scientists in a debate about the basis and rationality of science 
(Fuller 2000). 
 
We must, then, turn towards „post-Kuhnian“ theory of science for analyses more relevant to 
the present project. First and foremost, we need analytical tools that do not easily accept the 
divide between the natural and social/human sciences. This is directly connected to the 
destabilisation of the nature/culture divide. A simple relationship to nature cannot any longer 
be presupposed, and culture cannot and should not, when dealing with science and 
technology, be regarded in separation from what we term „nature“ (Lau 2001). Furthermore, 
the turn from representationalism and towards science as practice entails that temporality is 
taken seriously, not primarily as an object of analysis in itself, but as constitutive of the 
workings of science (Callon and Latour 1992; Pickering 1992). 
 
I will now consider in more detail some important points from studies of science and 
technology, first and foremost the works of Bruno Latour. As already described, of primary 
importance are the attempts at overcoming and rethinking established nature/culture divisions, 
as we find them in the theory of science and in the social institutions. But it is also important 
to get a grasp of how Latour displays the manners in which the the scientific object is 
disseminated in society after its solidity, its „hardness“ as a fact, has been established. I am in 
no way aiming to give an exhaustive description of the highly composite and heterogeneous 
field of science and technology studies here, nor to give anything like a complete exposition 
of any single writer, significantly Latour. The main point is to position the present analysis 
methodologically, and in that process also to absorb some lessons that should be drawn from 
                                                 
18 Radnitzky (1968) and (1968a) gives an instructive overview of the topography here referred to. 
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STS and ANT. Although in other places I have adressed other parts of STS, significantly 
those having to do with expert/lay divisions and trust, I here address the branch of laboratory 
studies.  
Framing nature and culture 
Taking as our staring point an article from the (in-)famous „Chicken debate“ in (Pickering 
1992). Latour, together with Michel Callon, argues against two positions in particular. One 
the one hand, realist and representationalist interpretations of science, in which nature is seen 
to be the „cause“ of true knowledge. In the above exposition of the two traditions in 
philosophy of science, this would correspond to central trends within the analytic tradition: 
truth is legitimised with reference to nature, and false knowledge is explained as a 
consequence of mistakes on the part of the knower, hence relegated to culture. On the other 
hand, we find early versions of science studies, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), 
in which culture is not invoked in order to explain scientific mistakes, but rather in order to 
explain how science and its product, true knowledge, is formed and performed. On this 
account, supposed to constitute a symmetrical relation between true and untrue scientific 
knowledge, nature is a product of social interest, of culture:  
 
”What sociology of science provides is a third method, no longer subservient to accounts of the work 
of the scientists and technologists and the stories of philosophers but rooted in a special understanding 
of social life” (Collins and Yearley 1992). 
 
 
But if we endorse this point of view, we are committed to error, as the central point is not to 
explain culture from the point of view of nature, nor vice versa. Latour’s point is that falling 
down on either of these poles won’t get us anywhere, as it is exactly the construction of these 
poles that needs to be explained in the first place: 
 
“We take as progressive any study that simultaneously shows the coproduction of society and nature. 
The phenomenon we wish to describe cannot be framed from the two extremes on the SSK yardstick – 
nature out there and society up there – since on the contrary, “natures” and “societies” are secreted as 
by-products of this circulation of quasi-objects” (Callon and Latour 1992). 
 
 
In the previous section, I briefly touched upon the methodological necessity of a descriptive 
language that clearly distinguishes itself from that of the scientist. We can now start to see the 
appropriateness of such a move: culture and nature are co-produced in the scientific process, 
and so there are two starting points that cannot be accepted: 1) that of the scientist, who has 
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been socialised into a language framed in the tradition of scientific realism (this is not to say 
that the single scientist actually has to be a realist), or 2) that of the social and humanist 
sciences, in which the social is invoked to explain the occurrence of natural phenomena. 
Latour is up against the two cultures of science, and so he sees the need for constructing a 
new descriptive language. 
 
The attempt of such an overcoming, in the form of the “theory” of the actor-network, is 
therefore not supposed to form a new theory as such, but is rather to be seen as a form of 
provisory ontology (Nydal 2002) in which new descriptions of the coproduction of nature and 
society are constantly sought out. The perhaps most radical move taken by the theory is the 
transformation of SSKs methodological principle of symmetry to a general ontological 
principle. In SSK, the principle of symmetry was invoked through the methodological 
decision of explaining false scientific statements on a par with true statements (Bloor 1976). 
In the radicalised version of the actor-network theory, the decision becomes an ontological 
one, insofar as non-humans are treated on a par with humans. Hence, a scallop may be seen as 
no less an active agent (“actant”, “hybrid”, “quasi-object”…) than a fisherman or a marine 
biologist (Callon and Latour 1992). The main reasoning behind such a seemingly absurd 
move is to avoid classical explanations described above, in which one or the other pole on the 
nature-culture axis is regarded as causally dominant. In actual practice, however, things do 
not happen like presupposed in classical description: the movements of the scientist are just as 
determined by the materials/objects under scrutiny as the other way around, and frequently 
the language of the scientist or the engineer will also reflect this state of affairs. Therefore, the 
latter will be likely to grasp the new situation faster than the social scientist (ibid.).  
 
Somehow, we need to get to the Archimedean point in which the scientist and his object 
reciprocally define and are defined by each other. For this specific purpose, the traditional 
social analysis will always come too late. In the significant cases where scientific 
breakthroughs are also social breakthroughs, 
 
“The exact sciences elude social analysis not because they are distant or separated from society, but 
because they revolutionize the very conception of society and of what it comprises. Pasteurism is an 
admirable example. The few sociological explanations are feeble compared with the strictly 
sociological master stroke of the Pasteurians and their hygienist allies, who simply redefined the social 
link by including the action of the microbes in it. We cannot reduce the action of the microbe to a 
sociological explanation, since the action of the microbe redefined not only society but also nature and 
the whole caboodle” (Latour 1988:38). 
  57
 
Now, let us consider in some more detail how Latour proceeds to escape the dilemma of 
social science. To use an example: It is easily understandable when we state that this or that 
(social) rule, like in Wittgenstein’s language games, determines the use of some object, as for 
instance the two workers building with slabs described in the beginning of Philosophical 
Investigations. But we could also turn the situation around, and state that the slabs, their 
material composition, in important ways determine the actions of the two workers. If the 
materials were different, say, made of a stone that broke more easily, this would change the 
practice of the two workers, and so also the rules by which they abide (we easily see that the 
shape of the slabs cannot be used as example in this way, as shape is also a matter of 
culturally inflicted attributes. The material composition of the slabs however, is not:  we may 
imagine similar building practices (the two builders are globalised workers!), but operating 
within different natural environments where the same materials are not available). 
 
Just as social rules may facilitate and hinder certain modes of action and experimentation, so 
the material resists or gives in to the force of other actants, be they human or non-human. In 
this way, the question becomes one of describing the relations and constellations among 
actants rather than of ascribing causal primacy to “nature” or “culture” on the basis of old 
habits of speech: “The real is not one thing among others but rather gradients of resistance” 
(Latour 1988:159).   
 
In this perspective, it also makes sense if we state that the scientist or the engineer (or the 
farmer, for that sake), actually negotiates with the materials. The laboratory has come to 
constitute the privileged site of such negotiations in our society. Of course, such “negotiating” 
is not undertaken in order to reach a reciprocal agreement with the material, say, microbes, 
the point is to come to terms with the material world in such a way as to render it 
controllable:  
 
“…in every laboratory…phenomena are finally made smaller than the group of men who can 
dominate them. If this is regarded as simplistic, it is because of not understanding the extent to which 
the strategy of constructing laboratories obeys this simplification” (Latour 1988:74).  
 
 
In order to describe the process by which phenomena are made to obey the commands of the 
scientist or the engineer, Latour invokes the textual metaphors of inscription and translation 
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(Latour 1986). In the laboratory, the complexity of the world is translated into human terms 
by the use of inscription devices; instruments and machines are deployed by the 
experimenters in order to produce measurements, graphs and numbers that may, in the last 
resort, serve to stabilise the scientific object, to establish it as a fact. It is this process that, in 
Laboratory Life, is described as the production of facts, and it is during this process that 
inscription takes place; the object and the scientist are simultaneously inscribed during 
experimental activity; when the object resists or gives in to some manipulative action, the 
researcher is also transformed in the process, insofar as he is constrained (Galison) or 
facilitated in his/ her movements.    
       
This entails a process of combining phenomena that, initially or historically, had not yet been 
connected into stable (in-)formation. Stabilisation means that the information in question may 
be confirmed also in different contexts: first and foremost other laboratories, but also by other 
actors, for instance medical doctors or apothecaries, taking part in the same network of actors, 
what Latour (borrowing from Mary Hesse) terms “acting at a distance” (Latour 1987). Hence, 
enormous amounts of information are comprised into what eventually becomes a fact, 
typically represented by the scientific article. This, then, is one essential part of the process of 
translation: that ways of acting thinking and writing that were previously not related in any 
strong sense of the word, are now comprised, i.e. “black-boxed”, in the established scientific 
fact. Once a fact has been thus established, through repeated experiments, criticism from 
colleagues (peer-reviewed) and in the end been given general acceptance within the scientific 
community, the translation process is completed. This means that all the activities undertaken 
to establish the fact are no longer necessary, a short reference to the relevant fact, maybe also 
to its authors, is sufficient. At this point, the world has actually been transformed; at least the 
world of the scientists concerning themselves with the field in question. The next step, usually 
ignored by philosophers of science, consists transporting the fact out of the laboratory or the 
factory and into a more or less stable network of actants. This takes work, in which other 
actants are enrolled in the network of the laboratory:  
 
“papers, laboratories, new objects, professions, interest groups, non-human allies – so many, indeed 
that if one wished to question a fact or to bypass an artefact one might be confronted with so many 
black boxes that it would become an impossible task: the claim is to be borrowed as a matter of fact, 
and the machine or the instrument put to use without further ado. Reality, that is what resists all efforts 
at modification, has been defined, at least for the time being, and the behaviour has been made 
predictable, in certain ways at least” (Latour 1987:179). 
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In this way, translation is not only linguistic; it may entail serious re-structuring of the socio-
material order, in so far as that which was previously heterogeneous and non-controllable 
phenomena are now seen to be controllable, but only on the condition of first passing through 
the laboratory, then through the wider network. In the case of Louis Pasteur, the negotiations 
with the microbes in the end resulted in “a new object that retranslated the disease [anthrax] 
into the language of the laboratory” (Latour 1988:76). This object was next transformed into a 
socially powerful fact through Pasteur’s alignment with the hygiene movement. 
 
In some important cases therefore, the production of the fact does not halt at the doorstep of 
the laboratory; the fact may indeed transform the world. In order to achieve this, it is 
necessary that also other institutions are enrolled in the network. It is an old 
miscomprehension of the representationalists that scientists produce facts, and that true facts 
(mysteriously) find their way also into society at large (mainly because they are true). The 
point is that a whole range of mechanisms are also necessary in order to socialise the fact on a 
broad scale, so as not only to change the world of the scientist, but also that of the politician, 
the lawyer or the lay person. These translations take work. In The Pasteurization of France, 
this is demonstrated by portraying Pasteur as a master of being at the right place at the right 
time, possessing the right kind of knowledge. (In Latours story) Pasteur moves between 
disciplines and social groups (most significantly that of the hygienist movement) in such a 
way as to enrol many different actors (also the microbes) into one network, which language is 
that of the laboratory and experimental bacteriology. In other words: Pasteur skilfully 
responds to differing social needs by the construction of a language and a practice of which he 
himself is the master19.  
 
Explaining, understanding and... 
Let me now continue by explaining what I see as short-comings in Latours approach. The 
critique mainly turns on questions of the language deployed in the ANT analysis, but clearly 
the language itself is not the main issue. The language issue relates to the larger framework 
within which the analysis takes place, and so the question is ultimately one of self-reflection 
(Callon and Latour 1992), or, even more to the point: reflections on the pragmatic aspects of 
one’s own framework. 
                                                 
19 According to (Fuller 2000) this line of reasoning applies equally well to the success of the actor-network 
theory and its authors. 
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Speaking from hermeneutics, I argue that the Actor Network relies upon insufficient notions 
of action and (human) agency, which in the last resort may issue in a language ill suited to 
deal with some of the normative issues raised by the modern production of knowledge. The 
language deployed by Latour renders his analysis unstable, a state of affairs which may very 
well be intended by Latour himself, but which may easily lead to bad interpretations. In 
particular, this is connected to a lack of reflection upon action and (human) agency, which 
issues in a relation to the subjects/objects of study most peculiar to an anthropologist (such as 
Latour).  
 
Centrally, I argue, and here I also include authors like Andrew Pickering and Karin Knorr 
Certina: these authors, for all their emphasis upon “contextualising knowledge”, frequently 
operate with strangely limited notions of contextuality. This shortcoming is directly coupled 
to insufficient articulations (Taylor 1985b) of agency. Within contextualist conceptions of 
knowledge, rather a lot comes to rely upon the descriptions given and upon the understanding 
of agency brought into the analyses. Essentially: what does it mean to be an agent or an actor 
within a context?  
 
In the rest of this chapter I will therefore try to clarify the meaning of „analysing science as a 
social institution“. The main point is to position the analysis in relation to science studies. In 
the next chapter I will try and develop a hermeneutic version („reflexive hermeneutics“) of 
science studies based upon interpretations of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology and 
Beck’s analysis of reflexive modernisation. 
 
A distinction that has been central to the philosophy of science as described above, is that 
between explanation and understanding (von Wright 1971). Typically, the natural sciences 
„explain“ whereas the social and human sciences „understand“. Nevertheless, the social 
sciences, if not the humanist sciences, are not alien to the undertaking of explaning social 
forces. We may think of Max Weber’s analysis of the growth of capitalism, in which 
protestantism is invoked as  explanans and capitalism as its explanandum, or of Durkheims 
functionalist explanation of religion. But what can it mean when we state that social scientists 
„explain“ or „understand“ the works and actions of natural scientists? 
 
Let me start out with an interpretation that must clearly be wrong: 
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It cannot mean that the social scientist ascribes laws, or social explanations similar to those 
sought out in the works of natural scientists, to the actions of the scientist himself. This 
strategy, says Latour, has been attempted by early sociology of knowledge (SSK), and it has 
failed: „The issue is not to explain the natural sciences by using social sciences“ (Latour 
1988b). Rather, Latour’s strategy consists in displaying the work inherent in the socialisation 
of facts and artefacts, especially those with a strong explanatory and institutional power, for 
instance the central dogma in the introduction to (Latour 1987). The strategy is somewhat 
reminiscent of that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, when he states that we have to give up 
explanation and let description take its place (Wittgenstein 1953). Explanations, says Latour 
(and Wittgenstein) are inherently reductionist, and so stand in constant danger of reproducing 
the very same regimes they are about to criticise. Comparing his own strategy of 
„irreductionism“ to that of scientific explanation, Latour writes that:  
 
„...the first starts with equivalences without telling through which instruments and through which 
metrology these equivalences are obtained; the second starts from translations and tries to present the 
work of rendering elements equivalent by setting up new instruments and keeping long metrological 
chains in alignment“ (Latour 1988b).    
 
Latour then sets out to establish more „equivalent“ ways of displaying the work of natural 
scientists and engineers. For this purpose, he sees it as necessary to establish a wholly new 
language, one independent of that deployed by the scientists themselves:  „...to explain the 
science of the Pasteurians, we must describe it without resorting to any of the terms of the 
tribe“ (Latour 1988:8-9). Why does Latour, an ethnomethodologist, see it necessary to go to 
such lengths to distanciate himself from the agents he is describing? First of all, let’s specify 
the question somewhat more: in many of his books he does indeed bring quotes from his 
agents. Hence, he does rely upon basic modes of understanding action, what hermeneuticians 
term prejudice (Vorurteile) (Gadamer 1960). What he refuses to consider, however, is the role 
of scientific knowledge and prejudice about the world, a large part of which consists in 
explanations, and these are to be shunned by all available means: „we will carry with us no 
preconceptions of what constitutes knowledge“ (Latour 1987:13).  
 
Similar attempts has, as is well known (certainly also to Latour), been attempted carried out 
through the behaviourist program adapted to the philosophy of science (Naess 1936) and it 
has been amply demonstrated to fail in most respects, significantly because it does not make 
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explicit its own preconditions (Skjervheim 1959), hence also its role within the social scene of 
which it is part and which makes up the necessary frame of reference for any scientific 
activity whatsoever. This was the main topic of discussion in the biggest dispute in the 
philosophy of science in the 20th century, the positivism debate. It is also, within the 
philosophy of science as well as the sociology of knowledge (for instance Karl Mannheim), 
the old question of reflexivity, which is indeed an important part of the framework within 
which Latour is broaching the subject (Latour 1988b; Callon and Latour 1992).  
 
One reason has already been mentioned: Latour regards the social sciences as much a part of 
the problem as he does the natural sciences: „...we strongly reject the helping hands offered us 
by the social sciences; on the contrary, we consider them all part of the networks we want to 
explain“ (Latour 1988b). (In passing, we should also note how Latour, intentionally or not, is 
also using the very concept he wishes to escape, namely „explain“). The reason why he seeks 
to escape these disciplines has also been mentioned: He wants, by all means available, to 
escape not simply the modes of understanding that he describes, but also the institutions, the 
networks within which explanations thrive and grow: „Do we wish to offer more powerful 
explanations, that is, to transfer power relations from the setting studied to the centre of 
calculation studying them? Do we lust for power and recognition?“ (ibid.). If that is Latour’s 
intention, retrospectively we must deem his project to have been a failure, exactly because of 
its very success. In Paris alone, a number of universities are doing courses in Actor Network 
Theory, and it’s network has indeed been spreading worldwide (Fuller 2000).  
 
So much for preconditions and prejudice: even more than most, Latour cannot escape them, 
and I will not take more time to dwell on that part of his strategy. But we should ask: can we 
understand scientist without resorting to any of the language deployed by them? Will we be 
corrupted if we try and understand some of their intentions and something of what makes 
them tick? It is understandable if Latour, in fighting the hegemony of the natural sciences, 
goes out of his way to establish alternative ways of understanding science and society. But 
surely science already makes up central parts of our socialisation and surely it cannot be that 
bad to try and understand some of the concepts by which scientists work and by which they 
also understand their own work? And surely, taking into account the views of others from 
time to time must indeed grant a higher degree of symmetry than does imposing the construct 
of field ontology onto practicing agents.  
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Excluding scientists from the description of science may end up distorting central disciplinary 
issues involved in the production and distribution of knowledge. We have seen how Latour, 
first and foremost in Laboratory Life sought out the point of co-production of nature and 
society, and how he had to enter the actual site of that co-production, the laboratory, in order 
to get to that point. And, later, in following a scientific fact through society, he expands this 
perspective (Latour 1987). However: for most practical purposes, particularly in the politics 
of science, facts and artefacts do not represent themselves. They are represented by scientists. 
Scientists deploy ideas and methodologies in their negotiations with the material, and they 
also deploy many of the same ideas and methodologies in representing facts of nature to the 
wider society. We may miss out on important aspects of the production and distribution of 
knowledge if we do not take this into account. 
 
Two sligthly different strategies of contextualisation are those entailed by micro-sociological 
or ethnographical methodologies. Philosophically and historically, these positions may be 
connected to authors like the late Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, Alfred Schutz and Harold 
Garfinkel. In difference to the latourean strategy of field ontology the approaches of Andrew 
Pickering (1995) or Karin Knorr Cetina (1999) may be seen as more amenable to hermeneutic 
analyses, as the conception of action and intentionality is emphasised stronger by these 
authors. In a way similar to Latour, Pickering and Knorr Cetina understand their own 
theoretical enterprises as distinct from traditional sociological or anthropological anayses, 
insofar as material agency is ascribed a far more central role in the creation of knowledge. 
Hence the conception of „posthumanism“ (Pickering). Whereas Pickering will talk of „the 
mangle“ or the „dance of agency“ in describing the emergence of new constellations of 
knowledge (Pickering 1995), Knorr Cetina deploys the conception of „Wissensmaschinerien“ 
for the hybridised construction of knowledge. And so the main analytical problem becomes 
one of describing the knowledge processes thereby entailed.  
 
First of all, we should note how both of these authors aim to overcome what they (and many 
others) see as a decisive shortcoming in Latour’s conceptual apparatus. This is the already 
mentioned fact that Latour does not allow for genuine descriptions of (scientific) 
intentionality, although he cannot but presuppose intentionality when seeking to understand 
the actions of others. This move becomes even more absurd as he occasionally seems to find 
few problems with ascribing something close to intentionality to non-humans, as for instance 
scallops (Callon and Latour 1992). Hence, Pickering writes that  
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„I want to discuss an aspect in which symmetry between human and material agency appears to break 
down. I want to talk about intentionality –a term I use in an everyday sense to point to the fact that 
scientific practice is typically organized around specific plans and goals. I find that I cannot make 
sense of the studies that follow without reference to the intentions of scientists, to their goals and 
plans, though I do not find it necessary to have insight into the intentions of things“ (Pickering 
1995:17). 
 
Similar to Latour, Pickering also shuns explanations, be they taken from the natural or the 
social sciences. Also for him, „description must take their place“. The fear of copying the 
explanatory frameworks of natural scientists and sociologists, and thereby reduce the fullness, 
the real-time happening of the context, leads him to look for emergent patterns in the interplay 
between agents (scientists) and matter, patterns that cannot be explained or predicted, but that 
can nevertheless be understood:  
 
 
„This is my basic sense of emergence, a sense of brute chance, happening in time – and it is offensive 
to some deeply ingrained patterns of thought. The latter look for explanations – and the closer to the 
causal, mechanical explanations of physics the better – while it seems to me that in the analysis of 
real-time practice, in certain respects at least, none can be given. I can do nothing about this, but it is 
best to be clear about it from the start. The world of the mangle [i.e. the interplay between matter and 
intentionality] lacks the comforting causality of traditional physics or engineering, or of sociology for 
that matter, with its traditional repertoire of enduring causes (interests) and constraints. I must add, 
though, that in my analysis brute contingency is constitutively interwoven into a pattern that we can 
grasp and understand, and which, as far as I am concerned, does explain what is going on“ (Pickering 
1995:24).  
 
Here, explanation is subordinated to micro-sociological understanding. Also for Pickering it is 
important to demarcate his own enterprise clearly from that which he describes (the building 
of the bubble chamber in experimental particle physics, the search for the quark and so on). 
However, for the purposes of the following analysis, I should like to make the following 
remark: Pickering allows for the „plans and goals of scientists“, i.e. their intentions, to be part 
of the description. He does not, however, seem to be very much interested in those 
institutional plans and goals that also go to constitute scientific activity, as for instance, 
funding, the drive for patentable and marketable products, or political incitaments to undertak 
certain kinds of research and not others. I do not really intend this as a critique of Pickering, 
but I do wish to point out that there are few reasons why we should not expand the micro-
sociological scope to include other plans and goals20. In the end, one main goal of STS is to 
                                                 
20 In a later work (Pickering 2005) Pickering does indeed expand the scope of the analysis to include macro-
sociological modes of explanation. I refer to the above work of Pickering as an important instance of what I take 
as a wide-spread tendency; it is not necessarily as a strong critique of Pickering the author. However, also in that 
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describe science as a social institution. I see few reasons why we should restrict that 
undertaking to the activities and intentions of scientists only. Obviously, this hinges on what 
one wishes one’s analysis to show. Focusing on more of the „external“ issues of science will 
inevitably also lead to less detailed descriptions of what goes on in the laboratory. 
 
Another example of the micro-sociological shortcomings are found in Knorr Cetinas 
Wissenskulturen (1999/2002)21, in which the author undertakes a comparative study of two 
different „cultures of knowledge“: that of high energy physics (CERN) and that of molecular 
biology. Let me give some examples of how the normative dimensions of science are 
described (or rather ommitted) in this book.  
 
First, as to one of the main goals of the book, described in the introduction. Here, Knorr 
Cetina states that:  
 
„Die Betrachtung der epistemischen Maschinerien der Wissenserzeugung zeigt for allem eines auf: die 
Fragmentierung zeitgenössischer Wissensprozesse. Sie bringt die unterschiedliche Architektur 
empirischer Ansätze, die spezifischen Konstruktionen des Objektbereichs, die speziellen Ontologien 
technischer Instrumente und die verschiedenen sozialen Formen zum Vorschein, die in verschiedenen 
Wissensgebieten relevant sind. Anders ausgedrückt, sie weist die Existenz verschiedenartigster 
Wissenskulturen nach, und dies wiederum stellt die these von der Einheit der Wissenschaft infrage. Es 
widerspricht der mit dem Wiener Kreis der philosophie verbundene Annahme, dass es nur eine 
wissenschaftliche Methode, eine Art des Wissens und nur eine Wissenschaft gibt“ (Knorr Cetina 
2002:13).  
 
This is about as far as the normative commitment seems to go, and with respect to laboratory 
studies this perspective does not seem to have changed all that much since Knorr Cetina and 
others introduced it more than twenty years ago. When posed in this manner, there are no 
questions that cannot be answered by description, by demonstrating the manifoldness and 
complexity of even one single discipline, like that of high energy physics. In one section 
Knorr Cetina remarks upon the impact of of the human genome project on the research 
practices of molecular biology. The HGP, it is stated, will probably lead to processes of 
„Routinisierung und Standardisierung“ of research (ibid., 126). Being as it is one of the first 
lessons of laboratory studies that the laboratory effectively transforms the natural and social 
environment (ibid., 45), one could expect and hope for something more of a comment on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
later work Pickering remains committed to the description of emerging patterns. Insofar as normative 
conclusions are drawn, these are treated as internal sociological questions rather than questions relating to the 
wider field within which the sociology of knowledge operates.  
21 I quote the German edition which was published three years after the English edition. 
  66
subject from one of the pioneers in the field, but the analysis remains on the level of 
observation.  
 
One science that entails the full potential of transforming society once and for all, is high 
energy physics, the other experimental science described in the book. But the imminent 
dangers of the research are not mentioned. Neither are the exeptional scales, in terms of 
resources, scientists, engineers and technical equipment, that the discipline requires offered 
much critical reflection. Recalling the Heideggarian analysis of technology, it seems that the 
two sciences described in Wissenskulturen are emminent examples of experimentation put to 
the service of technological imperatives, in which ever more resources, natural and social, are 
at stake. On a very basic level, these are normative issues. But such generalisations 
presumably run counter to the pluralistic and descriptive methodological strategies entailed by 
Knorr Cetinas analyses. 
 
One reason for such strategies as the one mentioned above may go as follows: there exists, by 
many STSers, a distrust of generalisations frequently connected to a long-prevailing image of 
science: “The Baconian image of the man-made scientist interfering with the woman-nature 
…projected on to nature itself…central causal structures that dominated everything that 
happened” (Hacking 1988). This would be parallel to Latour’s distrust in explanations. As put 
by one author, the “unsplendid isolation of STS” may “in fact be a self-imposed exile from 
the terms and assumptions that inform the discourse of mainstream theorizing” (Bogen 1996). 
 
I have argued that proponents of contextualist knowledge in science studies, for all the 
importance and timeliness of their work (I most certainly want to emphasise this), often end 
up giving somewhat one-dimensional descriptions of contextuality. While keeping many of 
the valuable insights from STS, i would like to emphasise the importance of relating to 
disciplines that may be conceived as „too traditional“ by practitioners of these „disciplines“, 
significantly political theory. For the sake of this project this will be illustrated by the 
connection to bioethics carried out in a later chapter on autonomy. For now, let me just say 
something more about contextuality.  
 
The theoretical perspectives described above may be termed one-dimensional 
contextualisations, insofar as they seem to impose themselves on the agents (scientists) in 
ways that may render the descriptions given somehow decapitated, especially when it comes 
  67
to the normative implications of social studies of science. In the case of Latour, the actors are 
not really allowed to speak for themselves as he imposes his field ontology upon them. In The 
Pasteurization of France, for instance, Pasteur comes out as little more than a strategically 
clever power politician (which he may very well have been, but he most certainly must have 
been more as well). The analysis is certainly interesting and provocative, but it is far from 
communicative. 
 
In the case of Pickering and Knorr Cetina, the problem may easily become the opposite: 
although their projects may very well be carried out with a critical intent, this intent is never 
allowed to express itself because of the very fullness of the context: the mangle and the 
Wissensmaschinereien seem to be perfectly self-sufficient (perhaps also self-referential), and 
few or no external voices are let into the experimental setting22. We end up with the 
perspective of the scientist or the ethnomethodologist. Either, the ethnomethodologist accepts 
the epistemic authority of the scientist, or she denies it. In the last case, the sole frame of 
reference becomes that of ethnomethodology, and it is little wonder if the scientist remains 
incomprehensive, or even hostile. In the opinion of a reflected scientist, expressing himself 
about Knorr cetina’s analysis of high energy physics: 
 
„One reason for the controversy between science studies and scientists may be linked to the distinction 
between natural and social science as „hard“ and „soft“ science respectively. Though the validity of 
this distinction may be questioned (a strong social constructivist would probably deny it due to the 
claim that all science is social), it is difficult to avoid since natural scientists from the very beginning 
of their careers are thaught that what they deal with is most of the time brute facts. If, on the other 
hand, a career in social science implies professors and books which have a variety of ways of looking 
at the same subject, cultural clashes such as „Science Wars“ are to be expected“ (Zinkernagel 1996). 
 
…evaluating 
But surely, human experience consists of more than what can be offered by these two 
opposing perspectives only. For instance, we are all socialised into some kind of 
understanding of what constitutes a democratic institution. Coming from more or less the 
same cultures (not epistemic cultures), we are also able to share in and understand visions of 
the good life and constitutive values, even though we may not agree on the character of these 
or which implications to draw from them. Furthermore, we are capable of making qualitative 
valuations of their immanent values and goals. To put it with Tranøy: These valuations are 
highly likely to be related to “external” values, as for instance that of openness and 
                                                 
22 The term “critical” should also be taken to imply “self-critical” in a sense similar to the Kantian conception of 
critique. 
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transparency as both a democratic and a scientific value (Popper 1957; Feyerabend 1978; 
Fuller 2003). When put in this manner it becomes clear that it is not simply a matter of who 
supplies the most adequate account of scientific and experimental practice, the scientist or the 
epistemological realist with his explanations, or the social scientists with her description. It is 
also very much a matter of the social and environmental functions and consequences of the 
(natural) sciences and of technology, and of their relation to some evaluative standards 
supplied by us as citizens and scientists (in that order). 
 
This then, would point towards a normatively informed debate drawing on a wide range of 
arguments and perspectives in which the question of realism, so central to the science wars, is 
highly subordinate to practical concerns traditionally addressed by social philosophy and 
political science. Although the practical and performative dimensions of science have been 
underlined for years by STS (Pickering 1992) these concerns have not been adequately 
articulated. This is a central concern within a recent and promising turn within STS itself, the 
emerging idiom of co-production of scientific and social order, in which the normative 
underpinnings of science and technology studies as well as their relation to political science in 
the more traditional sense of the word is emphasised rather than suppressed (Jasanoff 2004).  
 
As shown by the quote from Zinkernagel: when the contextuality of scientific knowledge is 
adressed in the above described manner we risk ending up with incompatible perspectives in 
which we may never get any further than to state which is the best way of relating to the 
world: should we aim simply to describe it or should we aim to explain it? There seems to be 
little middle ground and few points of reference for communication from which to get started. 
At this stage we are getting close to Steve Fuller’s critique of science studies: as good 
followers of Thomas Kuhn many STSers seem to have accepted his thesis of 
incommensurability, stating that different disciplines or paradigms cannot meaningfully be 
compared as regards their value or their usefulness. Each paradigm to itself, each discipline 
and each paradigm is auto-referential and so external questions have little meaning and 
bearing on questions of methodology:  
 
“…the inquirer’s politics is largely a personal matter that lies outside the proper modes of STS 
inquiry. STS practitioners are forced to reflect methodologically on their status as political agents only 
once they are thrown into situations that require them to defend the integrity of their research” (Fuller 
2000:358).  
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In order to escape the dilemma of which perspective should be preferred, the explanative ideal 
of science or the descriptions offered by social scientists, we may have to make reference to 
such (“external”) values as for instance that of democratic openness. First and foremost, 
making reference to some value that is not the exclusive domain of either of the two 
disciplines renders the whole affair more open. This is to say that disciplines also contain 
some normative dimensions bearing on argumentative weight, not relying upon descriptive 
accuracy alone. Disciplines also rely upon important decisions about which aspects of reality 
should be studied and which should be excluded. One main contention of both social 
scientists and philosophers has been that neither science nor technology is value-free or 
neutral, as is often implied in dominant accounts. However, if we do not also recognise the 
fundamental normativity of our own undertaking as social scientists, we may simply end up 
reifying this old image.  
 
According to the philosophy of Charles Taylor this implies that we also allow for what he 
terms strong evaluations into the conceptual and methodological framework with which we 
approach science as a social institution (Taylor 1985b). Without pertaining to give a full 
analysis: Strong evaluations imply the reference to fundamental values as basis of choice 
between alternatives for action, and that the reference to such fundamental values is taken to 
imply some fundamental difference concerning qualitative worth: “strong evaluation is 
concerned with the qualitative worth of different desires” (ibid.), 16. As such, it may even 
imply the use of words like “good”, “base”, “righteous”, “undemocratic” and the like.  
 
Taylor’s conception is best understood with reference to its counterpart, weak evaluation. 
Weak evaluations are typically given through utilitarian calculus in which the main frame of 
evaluation is the desirability of this or that outcome: Will I enjoy my dinner more if I have the 
fish than if I take the meat? If I fly with KLM I get to Barcelona faster; if I chose Air Berlin it 
will take more time but it will be cheaper. Which company should I chose? In these cases, one 
desire will in the end override the other and the choice will be made. I switch from the one to 
the other quite easily, and in the end the case may be settled by a straightforward calculation 
(indeed the main precept of utilitarianism). Not so in strong evaluations. This is not as simple 
as to state that strong evaluation is qualitative whereas weak evaluations are quantitative. A 
strong evaluation can never be given in “value neutral” terms, and many weak evaluations 
bear on the making of qualitative distinctions, such as that between fish and meat. The main 
difference, as already indicated, consists in the reference to some value (allegedly) 
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fundamental to human identity and activity, and it will typically be expressed by reference to 
strongly value-laden terms. Furthermore, a strong evaluation may decide between alternative 
weak evaluations, but this does not work the other way round. A strong evaluation can only 
be changed for another strong evaluation which is, in the end, judged to carry more weight:  
 
“…when in weak evaluation one desired alternative is set aside, it is only on the grounds of its 
contingent incompatibility with a more desired alternative. But with strong evaluation this is not 
necessarily the case. Some desired consummation may be eschewed not because it is incompatible 
with another, or if because of incompatibility this will not be contingent. Thus I refrain from doing 
some cowardly act, although very tempted to do so, but this is not because this act at this moment 
would make some other desired act impossible, as lunching now would make swimming impossible, 
but rather because it is base” (ibid., 18-19).  
 
Now that we have become this much wiser, let us return to the issue at hand. If we accept 
strong evaluations as part of the context from the very outset, this will also have its bearings 
on our methodological choices. First and foremost, the question of who is “right” will not 
simply bear on the question of who gives the best account of scientific practice, the scientist 
himself or the social scientist, but may also be brought to bear on the wider issues of the goals 
of science, and also on its applications and its consequences. Indeed, this would be the full 
implication of the performative idiom in science studies (Nowotny, Scott et al. 2001; Jasanoff 
2004), or of the practical turn in social philosophy (Taylor 1971-1972; Habermas 1981). As 
forcefully argued by these philosophers this entails the giving of substantial reasons 
(Habermas), or on the articulation of strong evaluations (Taylor). Within such a conception of 
theoretical activity there is no absolute shelter, be it ethno-methodological or “field-
ontological”; reference has to be made to a wider range of sources. This is of course not to 
state that every description of scientific practice is supposed to imply some strong evaluation, 
which would indeed contain overcharging the context again, this time with what Hegel termed 
the moralistic world view. We are looking for decisive events and breaking-points in which 
significant decisions are made about the production and distribution of knowledge, and, where 
pertinent, we evaluate these according to what we take to be wider social interests. This also 
entails a specific kind of work, in which important issues are attempted transported out of 
more or less closed-off contexts and into a wider public and academic domain. Again, I would 
like to emphasise that this is what many STSers have been doing all the time. However, I also 
argued that these issues have not been reflected in the methods deployed in a satisfactory 
manner, and that this has something to do with notions of contextuality, of action and of 
agency. 
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If we accept these modifications of the contextualisation of knowledge practices we may still, 
as does Latour, speak of an “infralanguage” (Latour 1987; Latour 1988b), a language capable 
of travelling between contexts rather than operate from a perspective wholly external to the 
scientific practices. We must, however, accept: 1) intentionality as part of the practices as well 
as material agency (Pickering 1995), a point not reflected in Habermas or Taylor, and 2) that 
our infralanguage may also contain qualitative distinctions based on strong evaluations 
(Taylor 1985b) of the intrinsic values, goals, applications and consequences of scientific 
practice (Nowotny, Scott et al. 2001). Hence the notion of “reflexive hermeneutics”.  
 
I will now proceed by starting to sketch out how this expanded and hermeneutic view of “the 
context” may look when applied to science as a social institution. For the purposes of the 
following historical analysis the above remarks will entail the following: first and forermost 
the mode of analysis will be reconstructive, and it will not aim to give accurate, real-time 
analyses of experimental work or of the emergence (Pickering) of the institutional 
reconfigurations entailed by the experimental work. Compared to the descriptions of the 
microsociologists, the hermeneutic reconstruction may even be seen to impose logics to the 
historical happening that may not be accepted by the descriptive approach. Such impositions 
will have to be justified by reference to both descriptive accuracy and the normative concerns 
that informed our analysis in the first place. What may be gained is a perspective that does, 
after all, remain close to action and historical development, and which can be coupled to a 
more abstract perspective identifying specific sources and modes of acting and knowing that 
can be coupled more or less direct to the modern project. Relating to Beck, these are what he 
terms basic presuppositions of modernity (Beck and Bonss 2001). Relating to hermeneutics it 
is the qualitative understanding of specific modes of knowledge and of its organisation. In 
particular, hermeneutics adresses different modes of relating to the world, among which the 
ability to make strong evaluatiuon (Taylor) and give substantial reason (Habermas) are 
important assets. The point is, as already stated, to identify certain „breaking points“ in which 
questions of greater concern so to speak announce themselves from within the situation, as 
breifly alluded to in the Heidegger chapter as „meanings arising within meanings“. To give a 
central example from the following historical analysis: the articulation  of the central dogma 
(Crick 1958), in which gene action comes to be perceived in terms of transfer of information 
is one such significant event.  
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The chapter on autonomy and bioethics is one good place for broaching these more 
substantial questions, and so I have placed it towards the end of the book. The chapter on 
genetics and on patentability should also be regarded as identifications of some of the central 
issues involved, whereas in the autonomy chapter I introduce more „strong evaluation“ 
perspectives and try to adress the wider context into which genetics and genomic medicine 
enters. 
 
But before we can get to those issues, an interpretive framework has to be elaborated that tries 
to take into account the discussion so far. 
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3. An interpretive framework 
During the course of the last two chapters I have consulted a number of theoretical positions. 
It has been stated that the general approach of the project is hermeneutic, and I have sketched 
elements of Heidegger’s philosophy of Being-in-the-World and his later philosophy of 
technology. Through recourse to Habermas, Heidegger was criticised for an anti-social and 
indeed sociologically naïve position. The main problem, we may state with Habermas, is the 
total absence of making communication a subject, or, perhaps more accurately, of making 
barriers to communication a practical problem to be solved. As it is, communication turns out 
to be an essential part of both the problems of late modernity and to the articulation of 
possible solutions. 
 
The above opposition between Habermas and Heidegger may indeed be taken to indicate the 
scope of “hermeneutics”. Hermeneutics are not to be restricted to the Heideggerian 
framework, but must include a wider set of authors, like Habermas, Gadamer or Charles 
Taylor. I will use the Heideggerian analyses of Being-in-the-World and of technology, but it 
is indeed important to remain open also to those other authors, as they have recognised the 
importance and the necessity of making communication a subject of investigation. The 
question is how to embed communication. It emerges that it has to be embedded within 
structures of action. 
 
I then went on to criticise the methodological dualism of hermeneutics after Heidegger. 
Whereas Heidegger may have been largely ignorant of the communicative dimension, he was 
not unaware of the material basis of human existence and its significance for the organisation 
of social action. As this dimension has been by and large ignored by hermeneutics, as well as 
by the humanities and social sciences at large, I went on to point to the general soundness of 
the approach taken by science and technology studies during the last thirty years or so. 
However, science and technology studies have a certain tendency towards some of the 
problems noted in Heidegger, in the sense that the normative dimensions of the own 
undertaking often go unrecognised. This may turn out negative for the sake of the central 
issue at stake, namely that of projecting strategies of action and communication for the future.  
 
I now continue by sketching a framework of my own that attempts to overcome some of the 
above problems.  
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Transforming Heidegger’s philosophy of technology 
Two concepts of Heidegger’s are of central importance: Bestand, signifying the stored-up 
potential of technology, and Gestell, the intellectual framework through which that storing up 
becomes possible.  
 
Bestand signifies material agency as captured by modern technology. That mode of storing up 
which we call technology is rooted in some general capacity of nature and in our capacity for 
transforming and refining nature through intervention: nature has the propensity of being 
refined and of being stored up. A simple example that should also go well with the 
Heideggerian outlook on the world is that of chopping and storing wood for the winter. By 
cutting trees and making wood, we store up heat. The stock of wood makes for a primitive 
version of Bestand.  
 
But modern technology proper takes more than the physical refinement of natural resources to 
come about; it also takes the mediation of intellectual analysis, of quantification and 
explanation. This comes about through the framework of Gestell, originally served to us by 
mathematics and physics.  
 
However, Heidegger does not serve many clues as to how Bestand actually comes about 
through the intellectual medium of Gestell. Also here there is something to be learned from 
science and technology studies insofar as they direct the focus towards the actual 
experimental activity necessary for establishing technology. Ian Hacking (a philosopher) has 
also served important clues: intellectual representation, which may be termed a subgroup of 
Gestell, comes about as a result of material intervention achieved through experimental 
activity. This points us towards the material, technological and institutional configurations 
that make up the experimental contexts of scientists.  
 
Because this project aims for a mid-range perspective rather than a micro-sociological or 
ethnographic perspective, as found in many science and technology writers, the central 
emphasis is not upon the many experimental strategies and complexities that go to constitute 
the scientific object, but rather upon the drive towards establishing and stabilising the techno-
medical object as a socially powerful agent. Although experimental activity may be portrayed 
as almost infinitely complex and heterogeneous, I take it that one central and immanent 
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concern of most experimental activity is that of achieving standardised technological products 
(objects) capable of serving some wider social need, in this case that of promoting health.  
 
Hence, I wish to point towards the organisational capacities of the techno-medical object, and 
its potential for organising action on a broad scale and across distances of time and space. One 
central feature of the techno-medical object is its capacity for storing up material agency and 
to render agency transportable across time and space. This is only possible through isolation, 
refinement and standardisation of highly specific aspects of nature. Experimental activity 
aims for reproducible results, which, when repeated on a sufficiently broad basis, legitimates 
and makes possible the manufacturing of the techno-medical object. It is this that can be 
transported to other contexts and administered, also this in more or less standardised ways, to 
fulfil some practical purpose, like making a diagnosis or, even more powerful, to serve as a 
therapy. I will return to this in more detail below, where I will focus upon the different kinds 
of action facilitated through the techno-medical object. 
 
As briefly described, the technological object comes about as a result of intervention with the 
material, and it is aimed at refining and storing up material agency. Experimental activity, for 
all its complexities, has as one of its main purposes such storing up through standardised and 
repeatable action. Such action is only possible within an institutional setting that has been 
constructed to promote experimental intervention. Experimental apparatuses and materials, 
like Petri dishes and different reagents, and technological equipment, for instance mass 
spectrometers or computers, are situated within institutional settings designed to serve the 
purposes of experimentation: the laboratory. In the biomedical context, the main justification 
of the laboratory, we may state, is its close connection to the clinic (Bernard 1957). The 
techno-medical object finds its main application and legitimacy through its effective 
application to the clinical context, the main purpose of which is to promote health and human 
well-being.  
 
All along the way from experimental intervention to clinical application, the object is 
accompanied by some intellectual and linguistic representations of its workings, of the 
mechanisms guiding material agency. This representation has so far been described in terms 
of the Heideggerian conception of Gestell. However, in Heidegger, Gestell seems to be 
understood in some semi-mystical sense, in terms of epochal being or the like (Kolb 1992).  
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I now want to recast the Heideggerian conception of Gestell in more communicative and 
sociological terms. It must then be recognised that the proper representation of nature’s 
workings cannot be conceived of in terms of some historic entity that imposes itself on the 
(more or less) unknowing actors, but rather something that is constructed and negotiated 
within complex networks of social meaning and material agency. Experimental activity, to 
start at the beginning, is a matter of negotiating possible pathways with the material, but it is 
also a matter of negotiating social relations, and indeed the two cannot be wholly separated 
without losing sight of important issues involved. Furthermore, experimental activity is not 
carried out in isolation, it is a communal endeavour. In order to establish experimental 
relations and to refine material agency, a whole set of issues has to be agreed upon and 
established in advance: which materials and organisms to use, fundamental concepts and 
methodological framework, experimental outfit and design, how to organise work in the 
laboratory and so on.  
 
For these purposes, the medium of theory cannot be disregarded. Theory is organised 
representation of material agency, embedded within a complex field of experimental 
apparatuses and experimental institutions, which again makes up the central sites of the 
scientific community. In order to maintain the Heideggerian notion of technology as Bestand, 
we go by Hacking’s notions of representation and intervening as basically two sides of the 
same coin: we cannot have the one without the other. In order to focus on social action aimed 
at producing techno-medical objects, however, we have to further transform the notion of 
representation. In Hacking’s view, the notion of scientific realism boils down to the following 
statement: “if you can spray it, it is real”(Hacking 1983). Clearly, as the purpose of the 
techno-medical object is only fulfilled in the clinical context, Hacking’s statement, although 
pointing in the right direction, is not totally satisfactory. In the end, the techno-medical object 
proves its reality through its capacity for organising therapeutic or diagnostic intervention in 
the life-world of the patient. This notion, I take it, also captures some of the basic insights of 
Heidegger: the techno-medical object gains its importance for our Being-in-the-World 
through its capacity for storing up material agency, which can then be transported and 
released at will in order to fulfil some practical purpose (by merging with human agenct). 
Hence, the techno-medical object is real if it serves the purpose of promoting therapy or 
diagnosis.  
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The counterfactual organiser (I) 
I now introduce a concept of my own in order to: (1) keep the Heideggerian notion of Bestand 
(2) keep Hacking’s insight about the practical, contextual and instrumental character of 
representing that agency through intervention, and (3) adapting these insights to the context of 
the life-sciences. The techno-medical object is, I take it, is represented through what I will call 
the “counterfactual organiser”. As will be seen, counterfactual organisers that do not 
correspond “directly” to objects but “only” to the organisation of action as such are also to be 
found. These are legal, political or ethical principles rather than scientific principles. 
However, they are not to be regarded as absolutely separate: their reliance upon “scientific 
facts” is, in many cases, what establishes them as specifically modern categories of thought 
and action. And if categories of ethics, law or politics in many cases come to rely upon 
scientific representations of reality, they may just as often influence science or technology to 
move in desired directions, for instance by strengthening the professional monopolies of 
professional groups set to define, refine and operate “nature” within the modern 
differentiation of work, or by promoting research along specific pathways, for instance 
strengthening the search for powerful techno-medical objects. Hence, the social contract is not 
to be sought out along a symmetrical axis of consenting citizens only; it is also a matter of 
institutionalising nature. I will return to these issues. For now, I continue to follow the 
concept of the counterfactual organiser in its specifically scientific and experimental form. 
 
The conception of “the organiser” as a scientific concept was introduced in the 1930s in order 
to explain embryonic development. Its general signification was that of “…a specific 
embryonic tissue which upon transplantation could trigger the development of a whole 
biological system”(Abir-Am 1982). In appropriating the concept for my own purposes, I take 
it to mean an intellectual representation of nature’s workings that has come to be agreed upon 
by a wider community of researchers and which, although standardised, may take on a 
different meaning when transferred to a different context.  
 
Importantly, the representation in question is termed an organiser because of its capacity for 
organising social action: it is an agreed-upon hypothetical framework that serves to direct and 
make possible inter-subjective action and communication in communities of researchers or 
clinical practitioners. As such, the organiser is a communal decision about nature.  
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In the language of the philosophy of science, it may be more likened to that of Kuhn’s 
paradigms than to the hypotheses of Popper, but it is to be given a broader significance than 
both that does not differentiate sharply between science and non-science. This is important, 
because the main significance of the organiser resides in its capacity for organising social 
action, and thereby also of establishing social metaphysics. It is capable of defining the 
outlook on nature on a broad social basis. In genealogical (but not Foucauldian) terms, we 
may for the moment stick to the somehow simplified notion that the organiser, although not 
necessarily arising in the laboratory, gains its fundamental momentum through experimental 
action. It organises experimental action, but it is also rendered transportable to other contexts 
through standardisation: it makes possible standardised action also in other contexts than the 
experimental.  
 
Central examples to be deployed in this project are those of the specific action of micro-
organisms: the specificity of the antibody-antigen interaction and the central dogma of 
molecular biology. The central dogma, it may be stated, constitutes the scientific counterpart 
of present-day “gene talk” (Fox Keller 2000), and it makes up a necessary, though not 
sufficient condition for the strong social status that the gene has come to occupy. Centrally, 
the organiser operates on the interfaces between the experimental context, the clinical context 
and the life-world of the patient. Through its capacity for capturing material agency, it also 
achieves a strong social status. One early example of the organiser and its capacity for 
transforming social action was that of the lesion, established in the Paris clinics following the 
French revolution (Foucault 1973).  
 
Next, the organiser has something to do with causality. Indeed, the organiser, in its original 
environment, was introduced in order to account for “the causal dynamics of embryonic 
development” (Fox Keller 1995:6). This is where the concept of the counterfactual enters: 
Propositions about agency, mechanism or causality are contrary to facts, in the sense that they 
guide our thinking about the general workings of the world, the things and the people in it. 
Hence, they are action-guiding principles established through the hypothetic pronouncement 
of relations among entities, what Kant termed regulatory ideas. Regulatory ideas are 
necessary for structuring experience into a coherent whole, but they cannot be definitely 
proven. Counterfactuals do not contradict facts. Quite the contrary: they serve to structure 
facts into meaningful and coherent events. It is the anticipation of some effect occurring 
through the nature of things, the outcome and consequence of some agency. Agency, in this 
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context, may be both material and intentional, or it may be restricted mainly to one of those 
poles.  
 
In its most basic form, the counterfactual is a natural constituent of everyday behaviour. It is 
based in our everyday interactions with the world, the things and the other people in it, as 
carried out through ordinary bodily competences. It is the expectation or projection of the 
normal course of things to continue to move and function in the accustomed way (Hume 
1978). For instance, if I drop this glass, I know that it will fall and that it will probably break. 
The breaking of the glass, in the everyday sense of the word, is caused by my opening my 
hand and letting it fall. It is the carrying-out of action as if its normal course (learned through 
habit) will also prevail in the future. If I lock the door, the persons on the outside won’t be 
able to open it because of my intervention with the previous state of the door, and so on. If 
eleven persons go on a picnic together, nine of them eat the chicken salad, two do not, and 
then the nine persons that had the salad become ill, we infer that the illness was caused by the 
salad. This last case, it should be noted, is no longer as straightforward as those with the glass 
and the door; the latter case involves the knowledge that bad food causes illness. In this case, 
some scientific knowledge has inserted itself into our everyday reasoning (King 1981).  
 
Hence, the counterfactual is also different from the mere observation and correlation of 
phenomena. To take an early example: the medical teachings of Hippocrates mainly based 
themselves upon a descriptive gathering and correlation of facts that often or normally occur 
together. But the descriptive facts were not connected and organised internally through 
theory. Whereas Hippocrates would state that “A and B normally occur together”, modern 
science typically seeks to establish the stronger relation of “A caused B” (King 1981:195). 
The following quote from one early philosophical proponent of scientific biology, Ernst 
Mach, may illustrate the point: 
 
“Not all our ideas representing facts have the same constancy. Whenever we have a special interest in 
the representation of facts, we endeavour to support and corroborate ideas of lesser constancy by ideas 
of greater constancy, or to replace them by the latter. Thus Newton conceived the planets as 
projectiles, although Kepler’s laws were already well known, the tides as attracted by the moon, 
although the facts of their movement had been long ascertained. We believe we understand the suction 
of a pump, the flowing of a siphon, only as we add in thought the pressure of the air. Similarly we seek 
to conceive electrical, optical, and thermal processes as mechanical processes. This need to support 
weaker thoughts by stronger thoughts is also called the need for causality, and is the moving principle 
of all explanation in science” (Mach 1896:172). 
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This need for causality also makes itself remarked in other areas of action organisation. As 
will be seen, abstract principles of agency, in this project represented through autonomy and 
patentability, are also outcomes of the need for abstract principles for action that has been 
evolving along with the inner dynamics of modernity. When transferred into principles for 
action, counterfactuals typically issue in as-if propositions: we act as if the principle of 
physiological specificity is universally valid and equally applicable to all cases23. 
Sociologically, counterfactuals have played a significant role in the rationalisation and 
modernisation of society. In accordance with the above insertion of scientifically established 
as-if principles of rational action into the everyday character of counterfactuality, the need for 
abstraction and rational presuppositions for action has grown along with the transformation of 
society from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft. However, whereas counterfactuals during first 
modernity would issue in more or less reliable certainty for action, in second modernity, they 
typically issue in terms of risk:  
 
“Der begriff des Risikos ist grundlegend für unsere moderne Kultur, weil wir häufig in der Form des 
“als-ob” denken. Auf fast allen Gebieten des individuellen und kollektiven Lebens mussen wir die 
Zukunft gestalten, obschon wir wissen, dass ein solcher Entwurf selbst dessen Ausführung verhindert” 
(Beck, Lash et al. 1996:15). 
 
 
Turning to the biomedical sciences, very specific aspects of nature are singled out, isolated 
and manipulated experimentally in order to determine their mechanical, chemical or organic 
workings (Bernard 1957). The particular aspect of nature corresponds to some specific 
perspective on the side of the interrogating mind brought about through an objectifying 
attitude (Husserl 1960), or, more to the point, some intervention aimed at establishing 
objective knowledge (Hacking 1983). The purification of the mutual correlation between 
perspective and aspect is only rendered possible through the experimental isolation of causes, 
through intervention using some apparatus or other. In experimental science, there is no 
access to the things themselves other than through the manipulation of things by the use of 
experimental tools and technological equipment (Fjelland 1991). 
 
A great number of theories have been set forth to account for the nature of causality in general 
(Mach 1896; Keynes 1921; Mill 1963-1991; Mackie 1965; Hume 1978), in the biomedical 
                                                 
23 And, as will be argued: we do something similar when we presuppose the patient as a rational actor or the 
invisible hand of the market as rational bases of action. 
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sciences (Mach 1896; Bernard 1957; King 1981; Vineis 2000), in genetics (Rose 1997; Sober 
2000; Vineis, Schulte et al. 2001) and in the law (Hart and Honoré 1959; Mill 1963-1991). 
Obviously, in other disciplines, like the human and social sciences, we find different accounts, 
for instance those given in (Collingwood 1956; von Wright 1971).  
 
In hermeneutics, we may speak of causality in more or less rigid ways. But due to the 
historical embedding and character of human existence, hermeneutics can never be used to 
forward one universal notion of causality. Notions of causality arise within the different 
scientific disciplines, and are, qua universal theories, mainly restricted to the context in which 
they arise. This is not to deny them a wider validity. But we have to ask of them something 
more than theoretical universality pure and simple24. As stated above, we take as our principle 
of realism for the biomedical sciences that of functionality, be it therapeutic or diagnostic. 
There is little point in denying the (universal) workings of penicillin, even when administered 
by a person who does not even know exactly how it works. As will be seen, the antibody was 
also such an object whose reality could be defended on a broad social scale because of its 
undeniable effect, which could be theoretically justified under the counterfactual 
presupposition of the specificity of the antibody-antigen interaction (Silverstein 1989). 
 
Hence, denying, almost by principle, the notion of universal causality, for instance as offered 
in the physics of the early 20th century, is very far from proclaiming a universal scepticism on 
behalf of science, or endorsing “irrationalism”. Such allegations stem from misconceptions 
about rationality in general, and about causality in particular (Toulmin 2003). I have described 
some of these misconceptions in chapter 1 in dealing with the Cartesian versus the 
Aristotelian anthropologies and with the notion of nature following from the physics and 
mathematics of thinkers like Galilei, Descartes and Hobbes. Today we hear these 
misconceptions repeated in calls for a deterministic biology and socio-biology (Rose 1997).  
 
In fact, from the perspectives of most actors involved in the wider administration of the 
biomedical sciences, it is the social and material reality of the counterfactuals, it is what they 
allow us to do, which establish them as reasonable platforms for action. Although theoretical 
                                                 
24 Take mathematics as an example. Qua theory, mathematics is “universal” as long as restricted to its sphere of 
validity, i.e. mainly western societies or societies/cultures that recognise and understand the meaning of 
describing nature in mathematical terms. However, this universality remains empty and of scant authority as long 
as mathematics cannot also be applied for some specific purpose, for instance that of measuring the land or 
predicting the influence of the moon on the tides with greater accuracy than was previously possible. 
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and experimental mediation is clearly required, it is the possibilities granted to us within a 
social context, promoting health, which ultimately legitimates the interventions 
accommodated and made possible through counterfactual organisers.  
 
Counterfactual organisers in the biomedical sciences allow for the communal task of scientific 
intervention with material reality, which may in the end result in the successful production of 
techno-medical objects. This amounts to stating that, fundamentally speaking, they are 
historical entities. This should not defer us from taking them seriously as epistemic 
statements, indeed as “the best account” (Taylor) of agency and causation within their proper 
disciplinary domain.  
A hermeneutic of the techno-medical object 
So much for the “counterfactual” and “the organiser” considered as separate concepts. 
However, when put together, they are meant to illustrate the following: By singling out and 
isolating very specific aspects of reality to be investigated, they simultaneously serve to 
organise both material reality as well as the scientific community itself. The fundamental site 
of the negotiations of new socio-material pathways is that of the laboratory, or, in 
Rheinberger’s words, experimental systems (Rheinberger 1997). Although the conception of 
the counterfactual may direct our attention towards Popperian notions of science, such notions 
are to be avoided. According to Popper, science is a theory-driven undertaking in which the 
theoretician asks the fundamental questions and the experimenter performs the dirty work. 
But such conceptions of science are bound to lead us astray: “Every experimental scientist 
knows just how little a single experiment can prove or convince. To establish proof, an entire 
system of experiments and controls is needed, set up according to an assumption or style and 
performed by an expert”, Ludwig Fleck, quoted from (Rheinberger 1997:27).  
 
Rather than regarding counterfactuals as clearly stated hypotheses to be confirmed or falsified 
by experiment, they must primarily be regarded qua organisational principles embedded in 
communities and experimental systems. Rather than regard them as clearly stated propositions 
to be tested out, they should be seen as vague notions, not frequently invoked explicitly 
except from in basic textbooks and broad overviews of the field. As such, practitioners new to 
the field may need to revoke them qua basic theoretical presuppositions, but for the more 
skilled practitioner they will be second nature, internalised in the body through its many 
operations within the experimental system (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). Thus, the 
  83
“falsification” of the counterfactual organiser would not come about as the result of carefully 
designed questions posed to the material, but rather through their lack of ability to organise 
experimental action. That is: gradually, material or social anomalies would turn up that asked 
for serious restructuring of the experimental system as well as the theoretical framework 
through which experimental action is guided. One example of such a restructuring that will be 
described is that of the separation of embryology and genetics up until the 1940s. For a long 
time, they shared work between them: genetics dealt with transmission of heredity, whereas 
embryology dealt with the development of the single organism. However, in the long run that 
separation provided more questions than answers: there had to be a connection between the 
two realms of physiological function (Fox Keller 2000). With the identification of DNA as the 
hereditary material a reconfiguration of the two disciplines, hence also of the experimental 
system, was inaugurated, and by the 1960s the new discipline of molecular biology had 
established itself. A fundamental asset of molecular biology’s newly established authority was 
its alleged ability to bring the two aspects together within the fold of gene action. 
 
Hence: Specifically closed-off compartments of physical reality correspond with scientific 
activity as embedded in different experimental systems, dealing with different aspects of 
reality through the cultivation of specific perspectives peculiar to the single disciplines. The 
authority of the scientific discipline depends in important ways upon its capacity for 
representing and intervening with, manipulating and controlling, those specific aspects of 
physical reality. For that purpose, scientists deploy specific perspectives as embedded in the 
use of this or that specific methodological or theoretical framework, in its turn situated within 
a specifically constructed experimental system.  
  
In the (biomedical) sciences, counterfactual organisers are used in order to negotiate new 
relations with material reality in order to produce standing reserves. The standing reserve is 
deployed for some practical purpose, centrally that of curing disease. In so doing, we invest 
the technological product with agency and authority in matters social and medical. This 
investment could not come about other than through the intermediation of theoretical 
representation carried out in experimental action by the use of technological equipment. 
Through experimental action, the scientific community transform material and social reality. 
When successful, technological objects emerge that serve to facilitate and promote 
standardised ways of action for the purpose of promoting some social good. In this way, we 
delegate organisational authority to the techno-medical object.  
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If this analysis is accepted we may draw the following conclusion regarding the discussion of 
realism versus social constructivism: the scientific object is not represented through the 
signifier. It is represented by the scientific community. The community, furthermore, is 
situated within its institutions and its experimental systems. From this we may also draw a 
conclusion regarding the social and political legitimacy of scientific communities: legitimacy 
does not primarily depend upon the giving of correct representations of reality, but rather 
upon efficient manipulations of and control with reality. Somewhat simplified we may infer 
that the scientific community retains its legitimacy as long as it is capable of controlling and 
manipulating those aspects of reality that make up its specific domain of expertise.  
 
I will now proceed to expand somewhat the hermeneutic of the techno-medical object. In a 
sense, the reconstruction offered is genealogical, insofar as it is designed to follow the object 
from its inception in the laboratory, continue through its administration in the clinical context, 
where it is finally embedded within the life-world of the single patient. I do not profess to 
offer any “thick descriptions” (Geertz) at this point. Rather, the description is analytical 
insofar as it proceeds from the notion of specific “proto-objects”. The close intertwining of 
things (objects) and human agency has been emphasised from the very outset of this project. 
Hence, I continue by describing proto-actions through proto-objects: specific technological or 
scientific objects belong to some specific task to be performed at some stage of experimental 
or clinical work. Specific objects organise specific actions and vice versa. Perhaps the most 
clear-cut example of this will be the division between therapeutic and diagnostic objects as 
facilitating therapeutic and diagnostic action respectively. However, I start out by giving a 
short account of experimental action.  
The laboratory 
There is no right answer to the question: Which 
comes first, experiment, theory, invention 
technology, …? Ian Hacking, Representing and 
intervening 
 
Most of the things that I wanted to say about the experimental context have already been 
stated above. The rest, and indeed the main part, of what remains to be said will be carried out 
in terms of historical reconstruction rather than theoretical analysis. I therefore confine myself 
to a brief recounting of some analytical tools offered by Rheinberger, namely that between 
epistemic and technical things.  
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“Epistemic things”, says Rheinberger are “material entities or processes – physical structures, 
chemical reactions, biological functions – that constitute the objects of enquiry” (Rheinberger 
1997:28). As objects of experiment they are by definition indeterminate entities, they are the 
counterparts of the questions posed through the experimental system, possibly also through 
the projection of the counterfactual organiser. The object ‘in itself’ is nothing but the object at 
a certain stage (beginning, transitory or end) of the research process in which the object, 
considered in that specific aspect, from this specific perspective, from which the object can be 
kept under control by the apparatus, conceptual, technological or instrumental, which forms 
its milieu. The apparatus in question may be a simulation of the natural milieu of the object, it 
may intervene or manipulate with the natural object, or it may produce a new object, not pre-
existent in nature. This is of my articulation and not Rheinberger’s. But the fact remains that 
epistemic things appear more in the shape of the question than that of the answer. They are by 
nature vague, as they “embody what one does not yet know. Scientific objects have the 
precarious status of being absent in their experimental presence; they are not simply hidden 
things to be brought to light through sophisticated manipulations”, ibid. However, as the 
object emerges as a more strictly defined entity, it may to some degree be defined, -through “a 
list of its constitutive actions”, Bruno Latour, quoted from (Rheinberger 1997:28). Hence, the 
epistemic object is primarily what it does. As the characteristics of the object are gradually 
exhausted (in a relative, never absolute, way) it mat turn into a “technical object”. In that case, 
it has been sufficiently stabilised to serve as a tool for further research rather than to serve 
itself as the prime subject of research. In that way, the object becomes part of routine, it is 
“black-boxed”. I take it that only when objects come into focus in the above sketched manner 
can they merge with and make up a constituent part of the experimental system as well as the 
theoretical framework therein embedded. Hence, as the object is stabilised it may fall into 
accordance also with the more general framework of an organising principle. 
 
Technical objects serve the wider purpose of embedding researches into the unknown, i.e. 
investigations of epistemic things, within the experimental system. As such, they may be seen 
to reside in the space between experimental apparatus, models and model organisms, 
theoretical and methodological presuppositions and the epistemic object. One visually 
powerful example may be that of genetic and physical maps established through the hunts for 
single genes in the 1980s. Once established as more or less stable frameworks, these would in 
turn serve as important tools for the discovery of new genes, and, eventually they would also 
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be used to “anchor” the sequencing of the genome itself within what was already known about 
chromosomal and genetic structures. This obtained, the new and improved sequence maps 
could in turn be deployed to correct the initially used genetic and physical maps. This should 
also contribute to highlighting the relative difference only, between epistemic and technical 
things. They are involved in reciprocal negotiations in which one influences the other, and so 
are not absolutely separable, other than for analytic purposes:  
 
“…within a particular experimental system both types of elements are engaged in a nontrivial 
interplay, intercalation, and interconversion, both in time and space. The technical conditions 
determine the realm of possible representations of an epistemic thing; and sufficiently stabilized 
epistemic things turn into the technical repertoire of the experimental arrangement” (Rheinberger 
1997:29),. 
 
In addition to epistemic and technical things we should include a further dimension: the object 
that has been sufficiently stabilised so as to leave the laboratory and enter a clinical or 
commercial context. To return to the Heideggerian conception of the standing reserve: 
technological objects are stabilised and standardised so as to store up material agency that can 
be released at will. In the context of this project, such objects are primarily therapeutic, but 
they may also take the character of being diagnostic or preventive. In these latter cases the 
control with material agency is weaker and has to rely upon different measures. I will have 
some more to say about this below. 
 
 
Through the inclusion of technological objects we leave the experimental context as described 
by Rheinberger, and in so doing I would like to make a methodological and reflective note on 
that move specifically. Rheniberger’s notions of epistemic and technical things clearly owe 
something of their existence to the philosophy of Heidegger (as interpreted through Derrida). 
In a short note on that relation, Rheinberger makes an interesting note on “technoscience” that 
is highly relevant to the undertaking of establishing an analytic of techno-medical objects. 
Rheinberger cautions against the Heideggerian tendency towards assimilating technology and 
science. In Heidegger’s terms, science stands in the service of the technological imperative, 
and science will for that reason tend towards being enrolled by large-scale scientific projects 
with strong technological underpinnings. 
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A hermeneutic reconstruction of the experimental context 
 
 
 
 
To a certain extent, we may state that the Human Genome Project partially serves to prove 
Heidegger’s assumptions. Opposing that position, Rheinberger reiterates a point that has also 
been made earlier on in this project: “Let me claim, in contrast, that it is exactly the viewpoint 
of opposing philosophy to technoscience and identifying scientific knowledge with 
“technknowledge” that finally leads to the exile of the “theme” [Being] and to its surrender to 
Heideggerian “thinking” (Rheinberger 1997:31).  
 
While clearly not wanting to subtract from this point, I would like to make an argument in 
favour of my “mid-range” perspective as opposed to Rheinberger’s fundamentally “micro-
range” perspective. The main point has already been mentioned: Within the biomedical 
sciences there is a strong drive towards establishing techno-medical objects that serve the 
wider goal of promoting health. As the social influence and importance of biomedical 
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research increases, this point becomes more and more evident. We may, therefore, 
legitimately focus on those specific aspects of biomedical research aimed at establishing 
useful objects, first and foremost for the clinical context. Already Claude Bernard stated this 
principle as one of the main legitimating forces of experimental medicine. We may 
legitimately speak about a technological telos inherent in the life sciences (obviously also as 
related to agriculture). This perspective tends to disappear in micro-scale analyses such as that 
of Rheinberger, which typically tend towards deconstructing any notion of determinism 
inherent in macro-scale analyses through close descriptions of the complexity of research. The 
same would be the case with the “open-ended” becoming or emergence of the social and 
material as described in (Pickering 1995; Pickering 2005). 
 
That stated, however, the historical and sociological reconstructions carried out in the next 
part of this project agree with Rheinberger in the disapproval of Heidegger’s deterministic 
view of technoscience. However: both Rheinberger and Heidegger have that in common that 
they, in their analytical frameworks, overlook other forces that may exert their influences on 
experimental work. Such forces/institutions may be that of clinical utility and that of the 
increasingly strong influence of the economy. Hence, if a specific drive towards closure of the 
open experimental context is not to be found within experimental work itself (Rheinberger, 
Pickering), then it may be found in other structuring factors (Bloor 2005; Harwood 2005). 
 
Thus, I continue by expanding the scope of analysis drastically, first to the clinical context, 
then to the life-worlds and to regulatory bodies. However, in order to restrict the scope, I will 
remain, by and large within the conceptual frameworks of the counterfactual organiser and the 
techno-medical object. 
Technology transfer 
As the scientific enterprise expands, the object is socialised: it falls under the influence of 
different research communities, bodies of science policy as well as other action systems, as 
for instance economy and law. This means that the scientist may have to fight in order for his 
perspective to remain in correspondence with the relevant aspects of the object.  
 
The (particular) scientific community remains in power as long as its object remains stable. 
As long as the scientist and his community is capable of giving an account of the object which 
corresponds to the actions which it is set to organise, and as long as they are capable of 
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controlling and manipulating the object for the purposes for which it is organised, the 
scientific object remains ‘identical to itself’. Hence, it makes no difference that the object is 
changed by the progression of knowledge, and we do not need to presuppose an unchanging, 
geometrical or otherwise, universe, parallel to the perceived world, in which the object is 
finally made to correspond to its idea. The object remains (ideally) in correspondence with the 
actions it is set to organise. I now turn to that which is mainly considered the main 
justificatory context of application of the techno-medical object: the clinic.   
Clinical action: diagnostic, therapeutic and preventive 
Recall how, in the chapter on Heidegger, it was stated how practical interactions with material 
reality is the primary mode of constituting entities as meaningful to us. They fulfil some 
practical purpose or other. In the case of technological objects this happens through the 
merging of material and human agency. I now proceed with a short account of different 
actions made possible through the interactions with technical and technological objects within 
the clinical context. An object in general is thus meant to signify some stabilised pattern of 
action made possible through the objectification of some specific aspect of physiological 
function. The central notion is that such objectifications of reality make decisive differences 
for action. Only in the case of therapy will it be fully appropriate to speak of technological 
objects (i.e. standing-reserves) in the sense described above, as stored up agency that can be 
released at will. In diagnosis it may be more pertinent to speak of technical objects, i.e. as 
objects that lead to some further intervention and not directly to improvement. As will be seen 
in the following analysis, this difference is important insofar as this leaves more of the 
responsibility for action in the hands of the physician or the patient, i.e. further interventions 
come to hinge upon choice rather than material agency. Lastly, prevention may be material in 
which it may be described as a standing reserve, or it may take the shape of information.  
  
Diagnosis. The practicing clinician finds himself between two worlds: on the one hand, that 
of the pure laws distilled in the laboratory and, on the other hand, the complex life-world of 
the patient and the clinical context as made up of technical apparatus, colleagues, 
administrative work and so on. In the laboratory, technological equipment and scientific 
methodology is used to purify phenomena from unwanted influences, so as to get to their 
generality. In the clinic, equipments and technologies are used to localise causes of pathology 
in the concrete case of the patient. Pathology is objectified by correlating symptoms as 
expressed in and by the patient with findings of objective signs gained through the use of 
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biochemical or genetic tests, or through the application of powerful visual technologies, like 
the PET-scanner, ultrasound or the CT. To a large degree, the authority of the medical doctor 
hinges upon the notion of a privileged access to the underlying causes of disease as expressed 
in the physiological symptoms:”…in diagnostication a symptom is usually considered to be 
an abnormal sensation perceived by the patient, as contrasted with a physical sign that can be 
seen, felt, or heard by the examiner” (DeGowin and DeGowin 1976). In order to relate to a 
previous chapter: clinical judgement aims at the identification of primary qualities in 
Descartes’ sense, and these are by necessity established through isolation and careful analysis 
within the environment of the laboratory.  
 
The diagnostic object, then, is obtained through a complex process of correlating a general 
knowledge of normality and pathology with the concrete case of the single patient. This 
corresponds well with the hermeneutic conception of judgement as conceptualised from 
Aristotle to Gadamer: it is the movement between the general and the particular, and this 
movement cannot itself be subjected to general rules, but relies upon the training of 
judgement. Clinical skill and judgement cannot be transmitted through theoretical learning 
only; it is also a matter of experience and of tacit know-how. Here is how one anthropologist 
describes the process of making a genetic diagnosis in the case of dysmorphology: 
 
“The qualities that enable this [diagnosis], clinicians recognize, cannot be extracted from textbooks or 
found in dysmorphology databases. Clinical expertise involves something more than textbook 
knowledge or following the routine of history-taking, investigation, and differential diagnosis. It 
develops over years of clinical experience, and it is expressed in slightly different and sometimes 
idiosyncratic ways by different consultants. Clinical skill may enable a consultant confidently to rule 
out a particular diagnosis by noticing the absence of distinguishing physical features, without waiting 
for laboratory test results. Or it may permit diagnosis when only some of the usual features of a 
particular condition are present. It is also displayed through the ability to suggest a diagnosis where no 
one else can, or where the usual presenting features are absent”  (Shaw 2003). 
 
 
Hence, the skilled clinical geneticist may not have to consult with a laboratory in order to 
make a diagnosis. Still, this does not change the fact that the laboratory states a necessary 
condition for the practice of clinical judgement. Obviously, the ability to recognise a specific 
genetic disease on sight depends upon an intimate acquaintance with experimentally 
established knowledge. This is a question of knowledge about normal physiological 
functioning as well as knowledge of the pathological deviations from these physiological 
norms. As will soon be described, this entails a specifically modern conception of diagnostics; 
one in which the recognition of the pathological by necessity has to pass by an understanding 
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of normality as established within the laboratory.  Although consulting experimentally 
established knowledge is not necessary in every concrete case, the knowledge of the 
experimenter is implemented as an essential part of the training and socialisation of the 
clinician.  
 
The exercise of clinical judgement then, takes as one of its major premises knowledge 
established through experimental action in the laboratory. This knowledge, as already stated 
by Claude Bernard, is one of principles of general physiological functioning. This is how the 
clinical diagnosis of pathology comes to rely upon the general knowledge of the normal 
functioning of the organism as defined in terms of objective signs.  
 
As clearly as modern clinical judgement cannot do without experimentally established 
knowledge, as clear is it that it cannot be reduced to this knowledge. And so the clinician will 
frequently operate with more complex and heterogeneous notions and models of causality 
than does the experimentalist. In the philosophy and theory of medicine, one important 
outcome of this difference, is the tension between the concepts of illness and disease (Wulff, 
Pedersen S.A. et al. 1990). In the words of one practitioner and philosopher: 
 
“Health care practice uses the concept of causation to provide an explanation for a person’s illness and 
to offer a theoretical rationale for action to restore health. Causation in health care is therefore a subset 
of causation in the broader sense.  What is not always recognised is that the way causation is 
conceptualised in health care practice is dependent on the way illness is conceptualised. In primary 
care causation is usually conceptualised in terms of an holistic relationship where it at least describes, 
and at best explains, how two or more (and usually many more) items (states, events and objects) 
relate together to generate the outcome experienced as illness. This contrasts with the traditional 
biological model where the influence of contagionism in the 19th Century left a legacy of unifactorial 
causation as an ideal, even if today it is recognised that actual situations are more complex” (Tyreman 
2004). 
 
Therapy. Medicine did not prosper as a modern profession until the therapeutic revolution of 
the early 20th century. As will be described in some more historical detail; diagnostic skills, 
however good, were never adequate to redeem the great promise of medicine: to cure disease 
(Porter 1997). 
 
Because pathology is caused by a deviance from normality, therapy must aim at somehow 
interrupting the chain of pathological causation. The aim of such intervention is to re-establish 
normal functioning (Bernard 1957). We may imagine different pathways by which the 
abruption of pathology takes place: it may be directly or indirectly connected to the causative 
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agent. Take the example of immunological intervention: insofar as therapy becomes a 
question of applying the specific antibody to its corresponding antigen, the intervention goes 
directly to the causative agent (by way of technological re-construction of the operations of 
the immunological system). In other cases the relationship is not that simple, as for instance 
with chemotherapy for cancer. In yet more “distant” cases the question becomes one of 
postponing or alimenting the effects of the pathological agents, as is the case with most 
treatments for HIV. In that case, although the causative agent may be identified, the actual 
causal pathways are not, and so therapy remains partial. As a case bordering on that of 
therapy, we may also talk about the palliative object, which aim is not to cure but to decrease 
suffering (pain, nervousness, depression, anxiety…). 
 
Anyway, the primary aim here is not to distinguish between all the ways in which therapy 
may be accomplished, but rather to lay bare some basic premises for the social organisation of 
therapeutic action. Because diagnosis depends upon a previously established understanding of 
normality and a localisation of the causative agents of disease, therapeutic action presupposes 
the existence of both the laboratory (in order to establish physiological norms) and the clinic 
(to develop diagnostic skill). As stated by Roy Porter: ‘The interplay of physiology, pathology 
and pharmacology constituted the key to experimental medicine, and each had to be a 
laboratory science’ (Porter 2002:83). 
 
In concrete, material terms, the therapeutic object will be more of an “object” in the everyday 
sense of the word; it is manufactured and so typically takes the shape of a pill, some 
substance to be injected or the like.  
 
Prevention. Prevention is also derived from a previous understanding of pathological 
deviations from normality. The central difference (from the point of view of action) is 
temporal: prevention aims at interfering before the pathological fact and not after. Prevention 
objectified may be both material and intellectual.  
 
The classical example of material prevention is vaccination, a direct physiological measure. 
Vaccination is a technological object in the Heideggarian sense, it is a standing reserve to be 
released at will. The effect of prevention, however, is not experienced as a positive 
manifestation; it is rather to be described as the absence of some effect (disease) that could 
  93
otherwise be expected to occur. In other words: prevention is a matter of avoiding risks. 
Again, the object may be directly or indirectly applied to avoid disease. Injecting antiserum 
into the organism aims at interference-before-the-fact, to block the future action of an external 
agent, the antibody. Other preventive measures may be applied to the environment of the 
exposed organism rather than to the organism itself, as typically found in hygienic 
interventions to neutralise pathogens in the water supply, build sewerage systems, or to clean 
the air or the soil.  
 
Non-technological interventions may aim at social prevention of pathology; improving living 
conditions and the likes. In that case, it is more a question of applying information as a means 
of prevention, and not some direct, technological intervention with highly specific aspects of 
the environment. Since the time of Rudolv Virchov, this has been one important task of social 
medicine. As will be seen in the analysis of genetic and genomic medicine this mode of action 
is becoming more and more wide-spread (as a part of the wider paradigm of preventive 
medicine). 
 
I now continue to expand the framework even further, to encompass factors that have been 
regarded as “external” to the concerns of research by such different perspectives as classical 
epistemology, the ethics of research (Merton, Tranøy) as well as the micro-sociological 
approaches described (Knorr Cetina, Rheinberger).These are, of course, political and legal 
principles of action.  
Organising legal and ethical principles 
Large parts of the previous chapter went to transform the Heideggerian conceptions of 
Bestand and Gestell into terms that can be used to analyse actual experimental intervention 
aiming at the manufacture of stable and standardised techno-medical objects. However: 
Transferring the Heideggerian philosophy of Being-in-the-World to the production of 
scientific knowledge in second modernity lays bare a fundamental weakness of that 
philosophy: Whereas in a pre-modern, archaic world, we may presuppose the ready-to-hand, 
i.e. the importance of things and tools, as prior to domains such as politics, economy and 
industry, and still get away with it, this will not suffice for the analysis of knowledge-based 
practices in (second) modernity. Today, more clear than ever, we cannot ignore the political 
character and constitution of science. Most large-scale research, like the Manhattan project, 
research in high-energy physics or the Human Genome Project presuppose major political 
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commitments for their realisation. Moving backwards through history: The project of building 
the nation state cannot be subtracted from the scientific enterprise any more than science can 
be subtracted from modernity (Giddens 1990). And, going even further back: the projects of 
science, wealth accumulation and political rights all find themselves at the centre of the social 
contract as articulated by Locke, and they are all intimately linked to the notion of the agent 
as a rational actor (Locke 1966). 
 
Politics and science are mutually supportive and dependent, though strangely separated at the 
same time. Just think about the necessity of engineers and medical doctors for the projects of 
nation-building in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well as the necessity of the national state in 
granting to those professions legitimate monopolies over their respective action domains. In 
other words: science and politics have co-evolved (Latour 1993).  
 
However, a great number of theorists converge on the finding that the times of smooth co-
production of scientific and social order may have come to an end (Beck 1992; Latour 1993; 
Nowotny, Scott et al. 2001; Jasanoff 2004). The changed position of the nation state within 
the global economy is one significant fact about the matter (Beck 1993, 2001). Along with 
this deterioration of previous categories of legitimacy, a long-held dogma is questioned: the 
presupposition of politics and science as sharply distinct domains of action and organisation. 
Not infrequently, this new constellation of things is itself propelled forward by the 
strengthened positions of industry, economy and technology into the previously stable 
categories of politics and science (Etkowitz and Webster 1995). These developments blur 
previously stable categories of legitimacy, such as for instance those between public and 
private funding, or that between basic and applied research, or they question the nature/culture 
opposition more directly, as in the case of the patentability of living things.  
 
Relating to the methodological choices of this project, this entails that we cannot allow 
ourselves the naivety of treating legal and political modes of action as derivative of or 
historically secondary to scientific practices (although the standard modern solution claim 
exactly that procedure as its mark: first, find out what the object is like, then decide, in terms 
of values and political considerations how to deploy it). This is especially true of the principle 
of patentability, which has significantly altered the pace and nature of basic research in the 
biomedical sciences (Krimsky 2003).  
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Relating to Heidegger the socialisation of science and technology revealed the inadequacy of 
describing these in terms of historical epoch or technological determinism (modernity as the 
epoch of the Gestell). In the previous chapter, therefore, I tried to recast his philosophy of 
technology in more sociologically oriented terms, like that of the counterfactual organiser. 
When socialised in this manner, it remains hard not to take notice of the specifically political 
character of modern science and technology: new technologies, like biotech, computers or 
semiconductors, have been called upon to replace old industries like chemicals, cars, or even 
oil (Doremus 1995). And genetics and reproduction technologies have raised the issue of the 
worth of the unborn, or of genetic deviance, in a new context. What is offered us by 
Heidegger is a rather linear representation of technology as determinant of the moral or 
political sphere. But we cannot accept such dogmatic conclusions, and so the communicative 
framework should be further expanded. 
 
I therefore continue to sketch out some basic methodological features of what I have just 
argued: that patentability and autonomy are not to be treated as derivative on science or 
technology, or as totally independent, for that sake, but rather as two sides of the same coin: 
science and morals, nature and culture. Politics are themselves capable of (relatively) 
autonomous intervention to change the course of science and technology. There is, in short, 
no reason to treat the one sphere as principally prior to the other, or to regard them as dealing 
with absolutely separate domains. This is reminiscent of Latour’s general principle of 
symmetry. But in accordance with my previous critical remarks, the field is investigated from 
the point of view of social action and hermeneutics, and not from Latour’s field ontology.  I 
start out with a standard account of action according to legal rules and principles, before I say 
something more of the intersecting of the legal and the political with the scientific taking 
place in second modernity and some of the challenges thereby raised.  
Legal rules and principles according to Hart and Dworkin 
I have already spent some time trying to establish a hermeneutic framework for the analysis of 
the techno-medical object and its organisation as centred round the counter-factual organiser. 
But it has also been claimed that the concept of counterfactual organiser is not restricted to the 
domain of science and technology, but can also be applied to the domains of law and politics. 
Also here they entail presuppositions about agency: in the case of autonomy, it is the general 
stipulation that the single individual is capable of rational self-determination (Kant 1968). 
Applied to medical ethics this notion implies that the patient should determine what is best for 
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him or her in a context of research or clinical treatment (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). In 
the case of patentability it is the expectation that a contractual relation between inventor and 
society will turn out to the common good due to the workings of the market (Etkowitz and 
Webster 1995). In both cases, law instigates itself between the involved actors and ascribes 
rights and duties (more or less) in accordance with the relevant principles. In this section I 
revisit some central elements within the sociology and philosophy of law, addressing the issue 
of legal rules and principles as social action. 
 
Law, said H.L.A. Hart, has the character of power-conferring rules (Hart 1961). It ascribes 
powers to act in certain ways to legal subjects (like for instance the Parliament). The primary 
function of law is not that of giving orders to the citizens or of ascribing punishment in case 
of breach. The primary function of law is to order and co-ordinate actions among the citizens, 
and between the citizens and the state. In most cases legal rules have little to do with 
punishment and orders, but much to do with how we actually make our way in modern 
society: getting a driver’s license will give me the right to drive a car, but also the duty to 
respect the traffic regulations; if I change my nationality from Norwegian to Spanish, I will be 
a legal subject to Spanish rules and regulations. I will have the duty to pay my taxes to the 
Spanish government, but I will also get the rights that come with a Spanish citizenship. The 
legal system, said Hart, functions mainly by conferring to subjects the power of entering upon 
legal arrangements or contracts ascribing rights and duties. Speaking with Giddens, law may 
be seen as the most basic social mechanism for integrating the life politics of the citizens 
(Giddens 1991). Although these accounts may be based upon optimistic accounts of the 
capabilities of personal autonomy, it is clear that laws in many cases have the power of 
providing individuals with opportunities for action. One central function of legal rules is to 
provide legal subjects with more or less stable and predictable frameworks so that ordered 
social action and planning becomes possible: 
 
“to promise is to say something which creates an obligation for the promisor: in order that words 
should have this kind of effect, rules must exist providing that if words are used by appropriate 
persons on appropriate occasions…those who use these words shall be bound to do the things 
designated by them. So, when we promise, we make use of specified procedures to change our own 
moral situation by imposing obligations on ourselves and conferring rights to others; in lawyers’ 
parlance we exercise ‘a power’ conferred by rules to do this”  (Hart 1961:43). 
 
Although Ronald Dworkin may be said to have continued Hart’s sociological approach to 
law, he also sharply criticised it for being too simplistic. I will not go into that debate here 
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(i.e. Dworkin’s critique of legal positivism), but just confine myself to the expansion of Hart’s 
notion of law as a system of rules. Hart’s notion, says Dworkin, is flawed because, by its 
exclusive focus upon rules it fails to observe the presence of the more complex phenomenon 
of principles. Logically speaking, whereas rules have an exclusive either-or character (one has 
a right or one has not), principles are less clear-cut in that different rules may legitimately be 
derived from them. Although part of the legal and political system, they “do not set out legal 
consequences that follow automatically when the conditions provided are met” (Dworkin 
1977:25). Hence, there may be reasonable disagreement as to the application of principles to a 
single case, and in every instance discretion and judgement is required to determine whether 
or how a principle should be brought to bear on a case: “All that is meant, when we say that a 
principle is a principle of our law, is that the principle is one which officials must take into 
account, if it is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one direction or another” (ibid., 26). 
Hence, principles may be closer aligned to deeply embedded cultural, political and legal 
values, and as such they distinguish themselves from rules by carrying normative weight that 
cannot be fit into the all-or-nothing character of rules. In logical terms: legal rules may be 
derived from principles, but principles cannot be derived from legal rules.  
 
Principles, in contradistinction to legal rules, cannot be confined strictly to the legal system, 
but have their relevance and importance from close connections to other cultural and political 
currents: “The origins of…legal principles lies not in a particular decision of some legislature 
or court, but in a sense of appropriateness developed in the profession and the public over 
time. Their continued power depends upon this sense of appropriateness being sustained” 
(ibid., 40). Hence, although they may remain stable over long periods of time, as for instance 
many of the political freedoms, principles enjoy a much more fleeting existence than do rules:  
 
“…we could not devise any formula for testing how much and what kind of institutional support is 
necessary to make a principle a legal principle, still less to fix its weight at a particular order of 
magnitude. We argue for a particular principle by grappling with a whole set of shifting, developing 
and interacting standards (themselves principles rather than rules) about institutional responsibility, 
statutory interpretation, the persuasive force of various sorts of precedent, the relation of all these to 
contemporary moral practices, and hosts of other such standards” (ibid.) 
 
As will be seen, the two principles of autonomy and patentability are principles in Dworkin’s 
sense. In nothing but the most obvious cases definite rules can be inferred from them, and in 
the overwhelming number of cases considerable negotiation between different actors are 
necessary to arrive upon more or less specific rules of action. For instance, it took many years 
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to establish the rule that informed consent was to be required where research upon human 
subjects contained the slightest risk for the subject. And only after the establishment of that 
rule it was inferred that it was derived from the more general principle of autonomy (Jonsen 
1997).  
 
Importantly, on Dworkin’s account there is a close relationship between policies and 
principles, even so much that they at times may become impossible to separate. That is also 
very much the case with autonomy and patentability. When the patentability of living 
organisms was introduced by American courts in the early 1980s, it was closely related to the 
political initiative to transform and renew industry through the commercialisation of science 
(Hughes 2001). After this short account I now turn to one of the particular and most peculiar 
marks of second modernity, namely some of the ways in which the scientific, the legal and the 
political come to intersect in (seemingly) new ways. 
 
Granted these general accounts of law and its role in organising and facilitating social action, 
peculiarities arise when applied to fields opened up by novel and fast-expanding technologies: 
First, as described by Hart, one main purpose of legal rules is to supply predictability and 
stability to social action. This, however, is hard in fields in which there may be few precedent 
cases upon which to rely and an even scarcer understanding in the general population from 
which to draw legitimacy. Second, in strong relation to the first point comes the strong 
inclination towards basing this kind of legal decisions and legislation upon premises taken 
from experts, i.e. natural scientists (Jasanoff 1995; May 2004). This again poses a number of 
further problems of both practical and principal character: will the decisions carry sufficient 
democratic legitimacy? What about the cases in which no consensus is to be found among 
experts: Who are we to rely upon? Can experts within very narrow fields be trusted to be 
experts also in wider social issues, or may it even be that these experts are exactly the ones 
that are not to be trusted where broader issues are involved? (Veach 1995). Last, but not least, 
many of the questions posed by new technologies also carry strong political implications and 
symbolic significance. As described by Dworkin, it may be difficult to distinguish between 
policies and legal principles, and this may be even more so in the cases with which we are 
here dealing. For instance: In the case of new reproductive technologies and stem cells 
research we witness how these issues range high on the political agenda, and this may not 
contribute to greater stability. 
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Contextualising autonomy and patentability 
It has already been described how organising principles of the life-sciences may be put into 
context. In the case of the gene, I will take it that there is indeed such a thing as DNA, 
described by Watson and Crick in 1953 and that this was an important event in the founding 
of a new discipline, molecular biology, which would come to act as the representing agency 
of physiological function as conceptualised through the central dogma, articulated by Crick in 
1958. Although the representing principle will frequently be confounded with its reference, 
DNA, this is a mistake: there is no pure correlation between the concept and its phenomenon 
(Kant 1968). Furthermore, I have argued that for the sake of social analysis we cannot rely 
upon realist assumptions taught in science class or by classical epistemologists; the real 
reference of the organising principle is the actions that it makes possible, and the representing 
agency is not the concept but the scientific community.  
 
Now, we may make similar moves with the legal and political concepts of autonomy and 
patentability. Also these principles organise social action across a broad range of disciplines, 
life-worlds and professions; also these have their representing disciplines referring to specific 
domains of action. What is more, just as the central dogma may be traced right back to the 
anthropology of the 17th century, so autonomy and patentability have deep cultural and 
political roots. Indeed, both are to be found at the centre of the social contract as articulated 
by Locke, the founding father of liberal democracy. Furthermore, also patentability and 
autonomy make counterfactual statements about agency and causal relations in the world, 
although in a different and less precise manner than is the case with the central dogma and 
physiological functions. These are not simply observations or neutral reports of states of 
affairs existing “out there”; they are deep-held convictions residing at the roots of western 
culture. This is, I take it, one main reason why they are called upon in order to regulate in the 
cases of novel technologies: in cases of uncertainty we try and stick to formulas that have 
worked before, not the least because these may induce legitimacy due to their cultural 
importance.  
 
I will return to some of these reflections in the chapters on patentability and autonomy. For 
the moment, however, I will try and say something more about how we may address the 
concrete contexts of the two principles. To what or to whom is it that they refer? By who are 
they represented?  
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In the case of autonomy it may be said that it refers to every citizen finding him or herself 
within some western democratic constitution, and that this has been so, at least ideally, since 
the introduction of political rights. However, what is of interest here is how the principle can 
be said to be thrown into a new context, the medical; how it has served as a mean for 
negotiating new social and material relations and ways of action, and how it has come to 
intersect with domains of action traditionally belonging to medicine and to science. This is of 
course also the main reason why the shaky foundations of the nature/culture divide has been 
so strongly emphasised earlier on: at least on the face of it, it seems that some deep-held 
convictions about the nature of things has been challenged. In short: autonomy was 
introduced in order to challenge the view held for more than two thousand years granting the 
sole authority of the therapeutic encounter to the medical doctor. In the face of challenges 
posed by technological and institutional growth it was surmised that the medical doctor no 
longer was the natural authority in matters dealing with health and sickness, and that a wider 
range of decision-makers had to be introduced into the decision-making process. This change 
was further propelled by the political climate of the 1960s, emphasising minorities’ rights, 
self-determination and anti-authoritarianism. The language of rights to self-determination was 
further articulated and stabilised by bioethicists and lawyers in the 1970s and it came to make 
up a central principle in the re-negotiations of the relationship between the scientific and the 
medical worlds on one hand and the patient or research subject on the other. Therefore: 
although the principle of autonomy, which eventually came to make up a cornerstone of 
bioethics as well as central parts of health legislation, instigates the patient as the central 
decision maker, it is clear that in reality it should be seen as part of a much wider field in 
which a number of actors, disciplines and professions readjust to technological and social 
change. At the same time, the interests of the patient should indeed be held up as a main 
principle for assessing developments, for making strong evaluations. Autonomy, then, as both 
a legal principle and a tool for policy-making is situated within a complex net of actors and 
disciplines taking shape after the Second World War, it is articulated by bioethics and health 
law. As a normative starting-point, we also state that it refers itself to the life-world of the 
patient and to his or her well-being.  
 
Similar conclusions may be drawn regarding patentability: it was part of industrial politics 
and regulation since the time of the industrial revolution, but it did not make up a central 
concern to life scientists until the 1970s when the economy entered the laboratory through the 
patenting of recombinant DNA technologies. It has become a central tool for policy-making 
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in the face of emerging (global) industrial and economic landscapes, and it is effectuated by a 
professional group, economical law, although also subject to considerable influence from 
politics and from the economy itself. Rather than continue this line of thought, however, I 
would like to make a short hermeneutic reflection upon the close ties between economy and 
technology. I return, therefore, to the language of Heidegger: 
 
Similar to technological power, we may also regard the position of economic or other 
valuable property as a standing-reserve. Indeed, the language suggests that Heidegger has 
taken the metaphor directly from economy: Bestand/standing reserve is a surplus of resources 
that has been stored up through the use of standardising media and that can be released at will. 
Hence, the economy, in a primitive form, may even be the origin of the conception of the 
standing reserve. Furthermore, in both the case of technology and of money, numerology and 
quantification play significant parts by serving the medium through which the standing-
reserve is quantified and rendered capable of being handled intellectually. This is also what 
renders both money and technology de-contextual beings: they may be transferred from one 
context to another. Out of this exchange they may gain or lose value, but their function and 
the conceptions through which their functions are conceptualised (standardised) remain more 
or less the same. 
 
Thus, whether we regard economy or technology as the primary version of the standing 
reserve may be a matter of convention, and not of absolute priority. Both are ways of storing 
up that seem to have a certain catalytic effect on the other, both may embody potentially 
powerful modes for enhancing action and agency, and both are in principle exchangeable for 
each other.  
 
Indeed, technology is the vehicle of an intensified exchange between economic and natural 
resources, an exchange that is radically intensified in second modernity. Before large-scale 
technologies, providing standardisation on a wide basis entered the field of the life-sciences, 
there was no strong relation between the economy at large and scientific or medical practice. 
For instance, the general practitioner, although operating in a free market, would only on very 
rare occasions be a wealthy man (Rothman 1991). Before the strong expansion of medicine 
following the therapeutic revolution and the building of large hospitals, there was no strong 
connecting principle between physiological function and the function of the economy.  
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In second modernity, technology has decisively connected the domains of two of our 
counterfactual organisers: the hidden hand of the market (patentability) and the hidden design 
of physiological functioning (the genome). The intrusion of the economy accommodated 
through the principle of intellectual property rights has been significant enough to cause 
serious concern about the integrity of both science and medicine. In a 1982 commentary in 
Science it was stated that: 
 
”Scientists who 10 years ago would have snubbed their academic noses at industrial money 
now eagerly seek it out...The present concentration of industrial interest in academic science 
is generating no small amount of concern about whether the academy is selling its soul” quote 
from (Andreoli 1999). 
 
After these brief remarks the analytical framework may be displayed as follows: 
 
 
Representing discipline Action-organising principle Reference/context 
Molecular biology Central dogma DNA/physiological function 
Economical law Patentability Commodities/markets 
Bioethics Autonomy Patient/life-world 
 
I now turn to some further considerations upon how principles like the above have entered 
society during the course of modernisation. I keep basing the exposition upon sociological 
theories of reflexive modernisation and upon hermeneutics, and I try to further merge the two 
frames of analysis.  
The socio-material contract  
There is a peculiar fact about the modern production and distribution of knowledge: it 
proceeds on the general assumption that whereas science deals with facts, politics and law 
deal with values. We have seen the contours of this division of labour in the anthropology of 
Descartes, where dis-interestedness towards the body and the world is constitutive of the 
calculation of how to pursue our worldly interests in the best manner. And we see it at work in 
the production of knowledge: great resources are called upon for the sake of creating new 
knowledge, but the main source of legitimacy of that knowledge remains its character of a 
disinterested representation of nature’s workings offered us by science. How can something 
be regarded as non-biased, and still be invested with so much value, culturally, politically and 
economically, as science and technology?  
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This way of producing and distributing knowledge is, I will argue, one of the main obstacles 
towards overcoming the problems that come with socialised science: Science and technology, 
propelled forward by strengthened alliances to the economy, transform culture and society 
with unprecedented speed. Still, large parts of the social and humanistic disciplines would 
rather ignore that fact: they leave science and technology to scientists and engineers and work 
on social and cultural issues “proper”. Hence, knowledge of nature and knowledge of culture 
usually concern themselves with widely differing fields:  
 
“As in the famous Cartesian mind-body dualism, there are two realms whose natural unity is 
apparently broken into two modes of being; or at least, into two kinds of knowledge. In the familiar 
environment of the West, ideas or theories of the natural world seem to run along their own course and 
to reflect an internal, unfolding logic isolated from the historical or social contingencies that interest 
the historian” (Figlio 1977) 
 
However, parts of the disciplines we may term social and cultural have turned their attention 
towards these problems: for the law, of course, technological developments cannot be 
ignored. Unlike most social and cultural sciences, law has to intervene, and it is forced to face 
up to social problems created by science and technology. In addition we have a growing sub-
discipline of philosophy, namely bio-ethics, which has come to occupy itself with practical 
moral problems created by advances in medical technologies and in the health care system in 
general. Not the least, because bioethics has concentrated upon issues of direct relevance to 
the interactions of law and clinical practice, it has made itself a socially relevant discipline, 
involved in negotiations over research practices, patient’s rights, clinical dilemmas, and so 
on25.  
 
The legal profession and the discipline of bioethics, while intervening with the practices of the 
life-sciences, to a large degree do so through transformed versions of the language of rights as 
instigated by philosophers in the 17th century. This comes down to the effect that whereas the 
language of rights, originally constructed to deal with the political sphere only, increasingly 
intrude also on the field of science, it still remains articulated within the language of the legal 
and political spheres. However, in so doing, rights by and large accept the accounts of the 
natural world granted them by science (these are, after all, objective), and so the question 
                                                 
25 Science and technology studies (STS), however, have so far had their domain of action mainly restricted to 
academic circles. This is to be lamented, insofar as these offer perspectives carrying a much wider scope of 
social and cultural issues than does law and bioethics, and insofar as they do not generally proceed according to 
the general assumptions laid down in the modern fact/value scheme. But then again, that may be exactly the 
problem: that of falling between categories of both thought and action.   
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becomes one of rights ascribed to a subject on the basis of a specific state of the world as 
described by science. For example, I have the right to receive proper information about the 
nature of the genetic test I am about to take, as well as the possible consequences it may have 
for me, before I take the test. In Norway, genetic testing comes with genetic counselling as a 
right for the patient and as a duty for the health care system.  
 
Following Shapin & Schaffer (1985) and Latour (1996), this state of affairs may be analysed 
by recourse to negotiations among empiricist philosophers of experiment and rationalist 
strands of political philosophy in the 17th century. In the face of continuing social unrest and 
religious wars, philosophers of both schools sought out methods for arriving upon unbiased 
truth about nature and society. Two solutions emerged, sharply at odds but oddly 
complementary at the same time: One was that of physical experimentation (Boyle); the other 
was that of the political sovereign (Hobbes).  
 
According to the experimentalist version of truth, the only safe method of reaching mutual 
agreement would be to let nature speak for herself, and for the scientist to be her witness. As 
nature is silent, however, that intervention called the experiment was required to help nature 
give her secrets away. The virtue of the carefully conducted and constructed experiment 
would be that it left no doubt in the mind of the spectator. Hence, the scientific object is given 
a new function, insofar as it becomes the silent representative of nature and the final witness 
of truth (Latour 1993). On the other hand, this newly established sphere of agreement was to 
be sharply separated from politics or from traditional scholastic philosophy, domains in which 
strife, disagreement and un-order were expressions of the general (political) conditions of the 
times.  
 
Thomas Hobbes, on the other hand, constructed an altogether different way of representing: 
the sovereign, invested with the right to represent everybody through the monopoly of social 
power: the head of the state, invested with the powers to create social order. The contract 
between the sovereign and the people would come about as the result of a rational calculation 
on the side of the citizens: to give away part of their freedom in exchange for protection of 
life and property. Only by submitting to one total power, could the social and political spheres 
be brought under control (The contract could be reversed under extreme conditions where the 
sovereign did not fulfil his duties). This transfer of power could only take place under the 
condition that other authorities, such as God or natural spirits, were dispelled from the 
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political altogether. Under these conditions, the claim from the experimentalists, that the 
experimentally established object be the last authority on any matter, represented a decisive 
threat to the authority of the sovereign: no one could know in advance which truths the object 
would yield.  
 
This opposition was not solved. Rather, the gradual acceptance of both views came to 
constitute a mutually exclusive contract: to give to science what belongs to science, and to 
give to the sovereign and the subjects of the state what belongs to politics (Latour 1993). Both 
positions shared a commitment to proper method as a way of ridding reason of unwanted, 
external influences. Furthermore, the commitment to scientific method issued in mechanistic 
explanations of the political as well as of the natural, as was common for the new natural 
philosophers. The disagreement was how to conceive of mechanism, by mathematics 
(Hobbes) or by experiment (Boyle), and to which spheres, the social or the natural, 
mechanistic explanations were to be deployed (Shapin 1999).  
 
I now proceed by sketching out some of the consequences this differentiated delegation of 
authority was to have for the organisation of action. The sketch bases itself upon arguments 
that should be well-known to those who have followed hermeneutic and practical philosophy 
through the last half of the previous century. 
Expert and lay, universality and contextuality 
Obviously, science, politics and society have changed considerably since the times of Hobbes 
and Boyle: the sciences have become powerful tools of intervention with both the material 
and the social, and we have had representative democracy and the division of powers. But the 
significant point is that the strange separation between fact and value, scientific truth and 
political rights, has prevailed right up until today, although within new configurations.  
 
Within their separate domains they have served as vehicles for the fostering of whole 
professional groups: engineers, medical doctors, lawyers and politicians. The professions have 
come to serve as the main representatives of different aspects of reality: nature on one hand, 
legal and political rights on the other. In respect of being legitimate representatives of the 
different spheres of reality, specific domains of action have been singled out as legitimate 
domains of intervention to promote social order. In other words: the natural and the cultural 
have served as different, though complementary, sources of legitimacy in the ongoing 
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rationalisation of society (Weber). During the modernisation of western societies, sources of 
legitimacy were increasingly conceived of in terms of universal claims to truth and validity. In 
action, universality spells out as the application of the smallest number of principles to the 
largest number of cases. This is also where the issue, so much debated in recent philosophy, 
between formal and substantive justification26, enters the picture. When a rising number of 
cases are to be submitted to a decreasing number of principles, tensions arise between 
universal principles and the need for concrete, case-by-case knowledge and argumentation. 
Hence, what took place through the socio-material contract was very much an elevation of 
abstract reasoning over contextual knowledge: 
 
“The contrast between the reasonableness of narratives and the rigor of formal proofs, between 
autobiography and geometry, is the contrast between the “soundness” of substantive argumentation, 
which has the body and force needed to carry conviction, and the “validity” of formal arguments, 
whose conclusions are determined by the starting points from which they are deduced. There is a 
parallel contrast between our local knowledge of the patterns we find in concrete events, and the 
universal, abstract understanding embodied in purely theoretical points of view. The substance of 
everyday experience refers always to a “where and when”: a “here and now” or a “there and then”. 
General theoretical abstractions, by contrast, claim to apply always and everywhere, -and so –as Tom 
Nagel points out – hold good nowhere-in-particular” (Toulmin 2003:15-16). 
 
Modernity has institutionalised, standardised and materialised universality, in the sense that 
universal laws of nature and the universal rights of the citizens were made bases of decision-
making within the professions. Hence also the organisational necessity of elevating 
counterfactual organisers to legitimate principles of social and material intervention: as no 
two cases are exactly the same, the principles underlying material and social agency, like 
autonomy (Kant), the hidden hand of the market (Smith) or the hidden design of physiological 
function (Bernard), would have to serve as principles for the organisation of action. This also 
allowed for ideas of agency, and for technological objects, to be transported across distances 
of time and space, and to be re-embedded within different contexts from the ones in which 
they arose.  
 
However, as indicated by the quote from Toulmin, the standardisation of action-organising 
principles has come at a price: the (partial) forgetting of the contextual grounding of 
knowledge, so necessary for the redemption of the fundamental (human) interests that 
knowledges are expected to promote and legitimate, for instance those of securing social 
                                                 
26 See for instance (Habermas 1981; Habermas 1992). Although I here refer to the distionction in its modern 
sense, i.e. as argumentation, it may be traced right back to Aristotle’s distinction between technical (Techne) and 
practical skill (Phronesis) (Aristotle 1955).  
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order and human health. For whereas universal knowledge claims can be validated through 
experimental testing, theoretical or ethical justification, this will not suffice to justify the 
social legitimacy of the actions that universal claims are set to organise, nor of the social or 
material interventions carried out in order to reach those goals.  
 
The socio-material contract and its division of reality into two separate spheres, each to be 
represented through universal propositions, was accompanied by a removal of the bases for 
acting, knowing and choosing: from the life-worlds and into abstract, knowledge-based 
systems of action. This entailed an attempt at excluding the body as the seat of values and of 
cultural and practical skills, for the purpose of promoting secure knowledge within the 
professions. It represented, simultaneously, the removal of the bases of public decision 
making out of historically and traditionally mediated structures of action and into the 
rationalised structures of abstract systems. Politics and law become the spheres of dis-
embodied and abstract “values” recast in a language of rights, medicine and the sciences the 
spheres of “facts” of the mechanistic functions of the body.  
 
For better and for worse: a removal of the knowledge bases from the life-worlds of the 
citizens, now to be intermediated by experts through abstract systems of acting and knowing. 
For instance, whereas the “right to property” in pre-modern societies would reside in 
networks and relations within local communities, for instance the “right” of the poor farmer to 
some of the crops cultivated on the land-owners’ property, today property claims can be put 
forward on a global scale through the modernised language of intellectual property rights. 
Today, it is fully possible to infringe on the property of another, purely by using some product 
in an unknowing manner, as for instance non-licensed software or a genetic test. Or, to take 
another example: think about the rights that come with nationality. It makes quite a 
difference, in terms of formal possibilities for action, whether one is a citizen of China or of 
Denmark. These possibilities for action are all caught up in a number of rights and duties 
channelled through the administrative and legal systems of the respective countries (as well as 
the international institutions or agreements entered upon by the different countries).  
Trust in universality? 
Whereas knowledge of ethical, legal and political principles found their ways into the legal 
and political systems of action, and knowledge of nature went into the sciences, medicine and 
engineering, the contextual and fleeting knowledge that can only be gained and trained in the 
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encounter with the life-world was de-valuated qua legitimate source of knowledge. Hence, the 
investment of trust in the natural and the political, constituted through the socio-material 
contract, would come to mean a transfer of knowledge: out of traditionally organised societies 
and into abstract expert systems. But this did not and could not entail the replacement of 
structures of abstract knowledge for communal relations in pre-modern societies. In modern 
societies, the question of trust, far from having been replaced by universal systems of 
knowing and acting, may be more important than ever:  
 
“In conditions of modernity, the future is always open, not just in terms of the ordinary contingency of 
things, but in terms of the reflexivity of knowledge in relation to which social practices are organised. 
This counterfactual [my emphasis], future-oriented character of modernity is largely structured by 
trust vested in abstract systems – which by its very nature is filtered by the trustworthiness of 
established expertise. It is extremely important to be clear about what this involves. The reliance 
placed by lay actors upon expert systems is not just a matter –as was normally the case in the pre-
modern world – of generating a sense of security about an independently given universe of events, as a 
result of the continual reflexive implementation of that very knowledge. One of the things this means, 
in a situation in which many aspects of modernity have become globalised, is that no one can opt out 
of the abstract systems involved in modern institutions. This is most obviously the case in respect of 
such phenomena as the risk of nuclear war or of ecological catastrophe. But it is also true in a more 
thoroughgoing way of large tracts of day-to day life, as it is lived by most of the population. 
Individuals in pre-modern settings, in principle and in practice, could ignore the pronouncements of 
priests, sages, and sorcerers and get on with the routines of daily activity. But this is not the case in the 
modern world, in respect of expert knowledge” (Giddens 1990:83-84). 
 
According to Giddens trust is one central medium through which expert knowledge is re-
embedded within the life-worlds. For instance: changes in the scientific and technological 
bases of medicine instigate renegotiations of the relationship between the clinic and the life-
world of the patient. Throughout these renegotiations, the relation of trust between expert and 
lay are alpha and omega to the continued functioning of legitimate social institutions. Genetic 
counselling that comes along with genetic testing, as well as the new discipline of bioethics 
are expressions of this state of affairs (Toulmin 1982; Rothman 1991; O'Neill 2002).  
 
These institutions, as argued, exist in a tangle between universal principles and the need for 
contextual understanding, a tangle which may be pulled tighter by constant pressures from 
economy, industry and politics of international competitiveness. Due to time pressure as well 
as a general increase in the shear amount of knowledge to be handled, the need for 
universality also increases. Hence, modern institutions are faced with rising demands for 
universality and contextuality at the same time. This means that the good understanding and 
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judgement, both of expert and lay, are being constantly challenged by the dynamics of second 
modernity.  
 
In this context, where new technologies are introduced rapidly and without anything 
approaching overview of the social, cultural or medical consequences (Fischer and Welch 
1999; Deyo and Patrick 2005), it may be far fetched to talk, as does Giddens, about trust as 
actively and rationally invested (by the public) in the social institutions and expert systems 
(Giddens 1991). For Giddens expert knowledge comes through as more of a positive resource 
than as something that is simply imposed on (more or less) un-knowing subjects (Giddens 
1991). As will be seen, especially in the chapter on patient autonomy, this does not pose a 
realistic image of expert and lay knowledge; it remains too dependent upon the rationally 
calculating agent (Beck, Lash et al. 1996; Wynne 1996). In this particular context, Brian 
Wynne may be more on the mark in describing trust in new technologies and expert systems 
as “virtual trust”, as based upon an “as-if” clause that is more grounded in dependency and 
necessity than in rationally calculated possibilities for action (Wynne 1996). I have already 
presented the critique directed at Giddens and Beck from social constructivists like Lash and 
Wynne, and I have argued that in the case of Beck’s theory it is misguided. For the present 
project, the main question does not concern the character of trust, but rather the distribution of 
knowledge and ignorance (Wissen und nicht-Wissen), and their implications for action. This 
strategy is more reminiscent of Ulrich Beck’s approach than those of Wynne, Lash or 
Giddens: “The crucial issue of reflexive modernization…is this: how do “we” (experts, social 
movements, ordinary people, politicians, not to forget sociologists) deal with our unawareness 
(or inability to know)?” (Beck 1998:102).  
 
In trying to come to terms with Beck’s question, I have introduced the hermeneutic 
dimension, in which qualitative distinctions are made between different kinds of knowledge. 
Thus, I also take it that the question concerning trust, rather than being placed at the basis of 
the analysis, is also a question of how to establish more rational social institutions, more 
adapted to uncertainty and unknowing, i.e. the counterfactual character of modernity. Indeed, 
within the hermeneutic tradition there is a long held basis for contrasting rational-calculative 
interaction and communication with more substantially rational notions of action and 
communication (Taylor 1971-1972; Habermas 1981; Toulmin 2003). This dimension, which 
we may now place on the interface between the “system world” and the life-world, is used for 
all it is worth by Wynne:  
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“Through their rationalist discourses, modern expert institutions and their ‘natural’ cultural responses 
to risks in the idiom of scientific risk management, tacitly and furtively impose prescriptive models of 
the human and the social upon lay people, and these are implicitly found wanting in human terms” 
(Wynne 1996). 
 
The main risks of second modernity, says Wynne, are those imposed on social identities by 
rationalistic and technical models of human agency. However, true as this may be, Lash and 
Wynne’s notions of social constructivism and the methodological program of ethnography 
tend to ignore a central issue: the instrumental character of expert knowledge, with all its 
reductionist and rationalist assumptions, in many cases works. That is, in many cases expert 
knowledge supplies people with desired and sought-after goods, for instance vaccinations 
against common diseases. Hence, public expectations to expert systems are already caught up 
in complex networks of dependency and reliance. Acknowledging this fact, and 
acknowledging that important aspects of public institutions are indeed strongly instrumental 
in character does not mean that one endorses the image of the human agent as mainly rational 
and calculative; it means that one accepts that parts of human life is concerned with 
instrumental pursuits of necessary goods, like food, health and money, and that central parts 
of expert systems are constructed to serve those needs. True, a lack of trust may result from 
overtly instrumental attitudes of experts towards the lay public. But a similar distrust and a 
lack of legitimacy may also arise from the failure of expert systems to provide important 
social goods, and this is indeed one main argument in Beck’s theory: in second modernity 
there is a real danger of the side-effects of expert knowledge outpacing the goods that 
supposedly come from such knowledge and from new technologies (Beck 1998). But to 
present this mechanism as the outcome of a simple calculation of risks versus possible 
advance, as done by Lash and Wynne, remains a too simplified image of social action held by 
neither Beck nor Giddens.  
 
Authors like Wynne and Lash, along with many other proponents of ethno-methodological or 
micro-sociological methodologies in science and technology studies, typically forward local 
strategies and contextual knowledge as “real”, as opposed to (socially) constructed regimes of 
expert knowledge. On the other hand, modernist readings would tend to emphasise, as does 
Giddens, the positive character of new possibilities offered to us by science and technology 
and the increased autonomy granted to the individual.  
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In what follows, I want to cast a (hermeneutic) glance upon what may be found between these 
traditionally opposed strategies. According to Beck, simple modernity thrived on excluding its 
own basis of knowing and acting. One central mark of second modernity is that what has been 
excluded, for instance the contextual character of knowledge, now re-appears in the middle of 
modern practices themselves (Beck and Bonss 2001). In this project, that presupposition is 
coupled to and attempted confirmed through recourse to a hermeneutic conception of agency 
and social action: modern forms of knowing and organising typically proceed on “thin” 
notions and presuppositions of social and material agency (Geertz, Oakeshot), thereby 
excluding the wider environment, culture and the body, what Clifford Geertz would call 
“thick descriptions”. Hence, the theory of reflexive modernisation is coupled to a normative 
and hermeneutic call for knowledge-based institutions that provide time and space for critical 
reflection and experience across disciplinary and professional borders, the ultimate purpose of 
which is to develop what Aristotle termed practical wisdom, or Phronesis. A central asset of 
that capability is that of good judgement, essential to the negotiations taking place between 
expert and lay, system and life-world. 
Judgement: modernity’s excluded third? 
Judgement, according to the hermeneutic tradition, is the movement of the intellect between 
the general and the particular27 (Gadamer 1960). Both legal and medical reasoning are prime 
examples of such operations of human knowing and acting (Gadamer 1960; Cassell 1991). 
The strange thing about judgement is that, whereas it works by applying general principles to 
particular cases, this skill of the human mind and body cannot itself be subjected to rules 
(Wittgenstein 1953; Aristotle 1955; Johannessen 1990). Judgement is intrinsically interwoven 
with practical skill and training, and only the experienced practitioner knows how to move 
between the different layers of being and generality in order to secure the best possible 
outcome. The beginner, on the other hand, has to rely upon theory and advice from more 
experienced practitioners for his or her advancement within the field (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
1986). As modernity progresses, the distance between the universal and the contextual may 
become harder to negotiate. Thus, good judgement is continuously challenged.  
 
That is not the least so because the two poles of representation sketched above do not, within 
their idealised conceptions of reality, really recognise the fundamental value of judgement to 
                                                 
27 Another word for judgement may be good common sense, in the English empirical tradition primarily 
connected to sentiment rather than to intellectual representations (Gadamer 1960).  
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social practice. Rather, judgement is regarded as firmly situated within the schemata of 
universal principles, as detrimental to the practical application of such principles, but not to 
their establishment. That is, the fundamental laws of nature and the rights of men are, due to 
their universal character, in principle beyond the uncertainties of daily experience and 
historical contingence. Whereas judgement obviously cannot be excluded from fields like law 
or medicine, practical skills are constantly challenged by universal claims constructed to 
promote certainty and cleanse the sources of legitimate knowledge of uncertainty.  
 
This is perhaps most easily seen in the repeated attempts at overcoming un-warranted 
influences on the understanding of disease, which spells out as the attempt to transform 
medicine from art to science (Bernard 1957; Cassell 1991). As conceived by Bernard, the 
clinical application of scientific principles could not, and should not, be cleansed of 
uncertainty and complexity, but the basis for clinical intervention, delivered through 
experimental action, could (and should). Similar developments are to be found within the art 
of building and constructing, which in modernity is transformed into the science of 
engineering (Heymann and Wengeroth 2001). 
 
In the law, similar attempts have been made. Legal positivism, for many years the dominant 
theory of law, sought to establish secure criteria for demarcating between law and other 
related phenomena, like ethics or politics. Significant outcomes of these attempts were 
Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law and H.L.A. Hart’s Rule of Recognition. According to these 
theories, there should be some fundamental fact about the matter of legal practice that could 
be used to demarcate it from those other, perhaps more fleeting, fields. In Hart’s theory, 
which may be the most mature outcome of legal positivism, most legal practice comes down 
to the application of legal rules, which may relatively easily be distinguished from other (non-
legal) rules of action. Only in particularly hard cases, where no legal precedence exists, the 
judge may use his discretion in order to decide the outcome. However, on the positivist 
account “discretion” is not accepted as intrinsic to the legal system; neither are the particular 
reasons upon which the judge may base his decision in hard cases (Dworkin 1977).  
 
In the other main strand of western jurisprudence, natural law, in many cases seen as opposed 
to legal positivism, ethical principles have been sought out that would be valid across 
distances of time and space. According to a simplistic exposition of this tradition, legitimate 
law would have to accord with these basic ethical principles. Natural law has been particularly 
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important in establishing the first modern institutions. Closer to our times, its basically ethical 
founding, established by thinkers like Pufendorf and Rousseau, has been challenged by legal 
positivism and the attempt at establishing jurisprudence as a system cleansed of ethical and 
political considerations (Doublet 1995). However, following the atrocities of world war two, 
natural law enjoyed a certain renaissance, for instance in authors like Radbruch and Fuller, 
and, at a later stage, in attempts at giving it a foundation free from metaphysics, as found in 
(Habermas 1992) or in (Rawls 1971) 
 
Common to the two projects we find the attempt to establish principles of legitimating the 
constitution. Common to the two, we may also state the commitment to the language of rights, 
fundamentally those of life and property. However, they differ in the reasons given in support 
of rights: for the positivist, rights are legitimate because they belong to some legal system (as 
positivised); within natural law, rights will tend to be seen as prima facie duties to be 
followed, also where there is no legal system to secure them. Hence, the difference between 
positivism and natural law may for the present purpose be put down to the respective attempts 
to ground jurisprudence within the two domains of facts (positivism), or values (natural law). 
Again, we see how the socio-material contract serves the sources of legitimating and 
demarcate social practices. Like in medicine, these attempts should not be seen as naïve 
attempts to dispel judgement from practices that obviously are in great need of interpretation 
and judgement: actual practice will always take place under conditions that do not correspond 
to the idealised conditions under which the practice of law or medicine actually takes place. 
However, the tendency of modernity has been to regard (practical) judgement as a rest-
category, not of itself capable of establishing basic principles of action: 
 
“The idea that all the practical arts owe a debt to the skills Aristotle calls phronesis was not especially 
welcome to rational-minded thinkers in the modern period. Although, in its Latinized form prudence, 
this term keeps a place in words like jurisprudence, its broader implications are largely forgotten” 
(Toulmin 2003:114). 
 
The out-differentiation of cognition and ethics, nature and culture, alluded to above, was also 
paralleled by an out-differentiation of aesthetic knowledge. According to Gadamer (1960), the 
philosophical roots of this separation of aesthetics from the life-worlds are to be found in 
Kants Critique of Judgement. In that work, Kant departs from the understanding of aesthetics, 
prevalent since antiquity, in which art and beauty were considered legitimate sources of 
knowledge, not to be sharply separated from questions of truth (also scientific), or from 
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questions of politics or morals. Against this tradition, in which aesthetics could be seen as a 
theory of perception in general, Kant introduced aesthetics as a theory of art. He furthermore 
appointed the genius the legitimate representative of beauty in art and nature (Kant 1968). By 
this move, Kant completely legitimised the relegation of knowledge from the life-worlds: 
cognition was the domain of science (physics); ethics was grounded in universal principles of 
reason, to be sharply distinguished from the influxes of the senses; and now aesthetics, 
considered as a theory of how we perceive the world, was delegated to the perceptions of that 
strange and isolated creature: the genius.  
 
When Gadamer re-introduces the Greek conception of aesthetics, then, he does not intend that 
as a move in a debate about art. His purpose is to take back, from science and ethics, some 
very general categories of thinking and acting; categories that, before modernity, belonged 
primarily to the humanities: judgement, common sense and a general education. These are all 
broad categories necessary for what Aristotle termed phronesis, practical wisdom, and all 
necessary for the broad and integrative understanding of specialist practices: “while in a 
special field the good critic is a specialist, the good critic in general is the man with a general 
education” (Aristotle 1955:1095a).  
 
We may even, in Gadamer, find support for the more sociological and institutional view 
sketched above, that as modernity advances, the more general phenomena of good 
understanding and judgement increasingly have to give way to abstract principles of nature 
and to the political and legal language of rights. In the face of increasing organisational and 
epistemic complexity and the accelerated speed of modernisation, abstract principles of 
thought and action are called upon to replace the domains that previously belonged to 
judgement: 
 
“Wir leben, wie mir scheint, in einer beständigen Überreizung unseres historisches Bewusstseins. Es 
ist eine Folge dieser Überreizung und, wie ich zeigen möchte, ein arger Kürzschluss, wenn man 
angesichts solcher Überschätzung des historischen Wandels sich auf die ewigen Ordnung der Natur 
berufen wollte und die Natürlichkeit des Menschen zur Legitimation des Gedankens des Naturrechts 
aufriefe” (Gadamer 1960:4). 
 
If, then, Gadamer had not remained committed to the sciences of the text, and if he had, so to 
speak, made a 180 degree turn, to observe within the developments of the natural sciences, the 
parallel relegation of contextual knowledge, he might have been on to a critical understanding 
of second modernity production and organisation of knowledge even before it took place. 
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That is, he would have been able to include the material and institutional reconfigurations of 
the production and distribution of knowledge that has driven modernity beyond its borders.  
 
Second modernity is the stage of modernity in which the drive towards technical and universal 
solutions to practical problems outpaces the ability of judgement to keep track with 
developments: “Die Zweite Moderne erreignet sich, wenn Reflexivität über Reflexion 
triumphert, wenn nämlich das Reflexivwerden des Modernisierungsprozess die klassischen 
Selbstbeschreibungen der Moderne obsolet werden lässt” (Beck and Holzer 2004) 28. 
Technical knowledge stands in constant danger of transgressing its own boundaries, without 
this being acknowledged by the central agents acting to promote that development (Böhle, 
Bolte et al. 2001) . A similar state of affairs can be expressed by recourse to Sheila Jasanoff’s 
formula, that scientific and social order do not by necessity co-evolve, but are rather in 
constant need of re-negotiation (Jasanoff 2004). One reason for this being so, is that whereas 
technical developments themselves can be grasped within the object-languages of science and 
technology, many of their consequences cannot so easily be subsumed under the same 
categories. Neither does the unintended side-effects of the modern production and distribution 
of knowledge fit neatly into the legal or ethical language of rights. This is not the least so 
because of the fundamental agreement of the socio-material contract: insofar as law or politics 
intrude on the domains of the sciences, they usually do so by respecting the monopoly of 
those disciplines. As science and technology are not questioned, the language of rights stands 
in danger of reproducing the ignorance of consequences (social and natural) promoted in the 
scientific and technical disciplines. The consequences of modernity fall outside of most 
disciplinary boundaries, and so the issue of making them constitutive of policy-making is still, 
by and large, an out-standing task (Beck and Holzer 2004).  
 
Let me sum up some of the main arguments of the last sections: the socio-material contract 
established natural laws and political rights as the main sources of knowledge. In this process, 
the hermeneutic movement between the general and the particular is sharpened through the 
material, institutional and intellectual reconfiguration of universality within abstract systems 
of action. This tendency is further strengthened as modernity progresses and as science and 
technology are socialised. The decisive threshold to second modernity is crossed when 
                                                 
28 ”Reflexivität”, in this context, is to be understood as non-intended consequences of the modern order. The 
modern order, on the other hand, is primarily given through “reflexion”, the basic categories of modern self-
description. Hence, there is an increasing tension, but not a downright opposition, between the categories 
through which we act and think, and the world in which we live. 
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science and technology, with good help from politics and the economy, transgress their 
legitimate limits so as to have detrimental (non-intended) consequences to other systems of 
actions or in the life-worlds. Obviously, this movement of modernity is hard to measure. 
However, it must be kept in mind that these are (primarily) heuristic considerations: socially 
and historically situated reflections to be validated through their application to the field of 
biotechnology in general, and to genomic medicine especially.  
 
The above arguments should now be used to gain an improved methodological overview: By 
introducing the concept of judgement as detrimental to policy and knowledge-based practice 
in second modernity, I intend to overcome certain short-comings found in many (not all!) 
studies of science and technology. Latour is a central example: he was used to portray the 
socio-material contract, but for the drawing of normative conclusions, his conceptual 
apparatus, i.e. that of “field ontology” remains insufficient. By relying upon aesthetical 
categories and neglecting the language of the actors involved, he ends up with unstable 
categories of thought and action. Taking Gadamer as our guide, Latour is speaking about 
cognitive modernity (science and technology) from the point of view of aesthetic modernity. 
The one is superimposed on the other. But as we have seen, both of these have been 
delegated, out of the life-worlds and into abstract systems: science and art. 
What remains excluded, then, is the category of judgement as grounded in everyday 
experience and bodily perception, as well as in social action. Hence, whereas Latour points in 
the right direction, the language he develops may be at odds with essential issues involved in 
the analysis of science and technology: what are we going to do? How should knowledge be 
produced and distributed throughout society? 
 
Obviously, these are big questions, not to be expected solved within any great synthesis. 
Furthermore, they should be regarded as heuristic and methodological projections for the sake 
of the following socio-historical analysis. The “conclusion” will have to wait until we have 
observed some of the central developments on the interface between the laboratory, the clinic, 
the life-worlds and the law. However, I will try and sum up some of the main points of this 
last chapter: 
 
1. The scientific object is represented through the scientific community and not through the 
signifier as commonly presupposed within classical epistemology. 
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2. Through the socio-material contract specific aspects of reality were delegated to scientific 
disciplines and professions. The conception of the counterfactual organisers is meant to point 
towards this delegation of epistemic authority and organisational powers in modernity. 
Delegation basically takes two forms: either to the material, then through the intermediating 
representation of science and the scientific community, or to political subjects, and then the 
delegation takes place through the intermediation of democratic institutions.  
 
3. The above structures must be regarded as dynamic and subject to social and historical 
change, what Beck terms the Metawandel of second modernity. Whereas in first modernity 
this delegation would function more or less smoothly, in second modernity rationalities tend 
towards getting muddled up. The principle of functional differentiation is questioned and 
organisational problems arise that cannot simply be solved through further differentiation 
(Beck and Bonss 2001).  
 
4. The organisational challenges of second modernity arise not because of some qualitatively 
new situation, but rather because of an intensification of modernity’s founding forces: 
science, technology, economy and liberal politics come together within new and powerful 
constellations.  
 
5. One main challenge for regulation is the mediation of increasingly abstract and universal 
principles of action organisation and the need for judgement in concrete cases. This sharpened 
conflict between universality and contextuality may issue in increasing, even overwhelming, 
complexity. One main feature of this is that expert knowledge increasingly comes to be 
expressed in terms of risk rather than in terms of certainty. 
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4. The modernisation of medicine 
In this chapter I address the modernisation of medicine as 1) a program of research (Claude 
Bernard), 2) as successful (experimental) action carried out on a broad institutional basis 
through the manufacture of techno-medical objects. This second perspective is addressed by a 
description of some central aspects of the therapeutic revolution as exemplified by the work 
of Paul Ehrlich. What is common to both perspectives, to both Bernard and Ehrlich is the 
centrality of experimental intervention carried out in the laboratory. They also share in a 
common commitment to what we may term the positivist ethos of research, in which the 
facticity and the legitimate source of knowledge is positively established and contained within 
the laboratory before being transferred to other contexts of application. In that respect, the 
main frame of reference is the clinical application of the knowledge established through 
experimental intervention. In short: there is to be a 1:1 relationship between experimentally 
established knowledge and its clinical application. As described by Georges Canguilhem: For 
Bernard legitimate and successful clinical action is action in accordance with the laws of 
nature determined through experimental action (Canguilhem 1991).  
 
Although Bernard may have been one of the first to give a coherent articulation of this 
relationship between experiment and action, it was only first carried out on a broad scale in 
the following generation of experimental physiologists, during the therapeutic revolution. The 
findings of experimenters like Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch and Paul Ehrlich did contradict 
Bernard’s image of normality and pathology on one central point: according to Bernard, 
pathology would arise as a consequence of imbalances in the internal milieu only. Surely the 
discovery of the actions of micro-organisms did not go well along with this image. But in 
most other respects there is a remarkable convergence between these figures of early modern 
medicine, centrally the importance of the close relationship between experiment and 
application. For the sake of social action this is the important aspect.  
 
There is, however, one more aspect to be noted: as the success of the early modern research 
ethos makes itself manifest, that is not a movement initiated from the laboratory only. The 
success of Ehrlich did not come from experimental genius alone, he also profited greatly from 
close connections to the state apparatus and from close ties to industry. Ehrlich’s work entered 
into a social situation in which the chemical industry was becoming a significant factor, what 
has been described as a “second industrial revolution” (Harwood 2005). Although Bernard, on 
his side, came to be well aware of the institutional and social implications of his research 
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program (Coleman 1985), this is one aspect of research that is not articulated in his writings. 
That stated, Bernard was not alone in ignoring the industrial and economic aspects of 
research: for many years these were regarded as second or tertiary nature to research, as 
influences to be avoided (Merton 1973) and never really acknowledged as part of the (first 
modern) scientific enterprise. This has also made its decisive influence on how we have 
thought about the past, i.e. about the research practices of central figures like Pasteur, Koch 
and Ehrlich:  
 
“Historians and biographers have studied Paul Ehrlich as a biochemist, a medical messiah, and an 
eccentric. The links with industry of this Nobel Prize-winning pioneer of experimental therapeutics 
and immunology have, however, been largely neglected. Perhaps this was because commercial 
involvement was regarded as unseemly by historians, or because those ties were thought to be 
insignificant in relation to the major contributions Ehrlich made to therapeutic practice and theory. 
More recently, attitudes have changed…” (Liebenau 1990). 
 
As will be seen later on: in second modernity the situation changes: from exerting a certain 
influence on research, acknowledged and un-acknowledged at the same time, commercial and 
industrial ties come to make up a constitutive force. The ethos of first modernity is decisively 
challenged and transformed (Wright 1986; Krimsky 2003). Hence, we are dealing with an 
expansion of modernity, one in which its constituting forces seems to come to interact even 
more closely and intensely. But that will be a topic of later chapters. For now, I start out by 
describing the research ethos of Claude Bernard. The main purpose of this, however, is not to 
describe an ethos as such, but rather to get to the institutional structure in which this ethos was 
embedded: the organisation of knowing and acting in first modernity.  
 
Claude Bernard and the ethos of research. 
The first institutional step towards modern medicine, we may state, came with the Paris 
clinics in the years following the French revolution. Through a new methodology, the 
anatomico-pathological, diagnostic abilities were put into action on a wide, institutional scale, 
finding their ways into clinics all over Europe. Hence, the perception of disease was 
transformed once and for all, not the least through the introduction of the objectified 
distinction between signs and symptoms (Foucault 1973; Ackerknecht 1982; Porter 1997). 
Although the Paris clinic may have posed an important step on the road towards modern 
medicine, its diagnostic abilities were not countered by a corresponding capacity in 
therapeutics. Not least due to the statistical method, elaborated by Pierre Louis, this became 
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clear. The outcome was a certain therapeutic nihilism on the part of the physicians working in 
the clinic.  
 
Claude Bernard put this problem down to 1) the methods being used in the clinic, and 2) to 
the prevailing ontological conception of disease (disease as discrete entities) as defined by 
Bichat and his colleagues in the Paris clinics. 
 
Concerning the method, which he termed “empiricist”, the main problem was its fundamental 
passivity towards its object. This was a shortcoming which it shared with its predecessor, 
nosology: both schools were limited to the passive observation of natural phenomena, be it 
through mere observation at the bedside or through numerous autopsies in the mortuary. The 
term ‘empiricism’, which should not be confused with the English school of philosophy of 
that name, was applied to the physicians of the clinic because of their lack of theoretical 
guidance. Scientific medicine, Bernard taught, was to be guided by strict physiological rules 
and not to stumble blindly around in the infinite manifold of experience. All that the 
‘empiricists’ could accomplish, was the collection of facts about the specific diseases and to 
place them according to type of lesion caused in the specific tissues, organs or body parts. 
This, however, did not amount to establishing the causes of disease; it only meant observation 
of their effects. Insofar as these were confused for the cause of  disease, it was small wonder 
that therapy didn’t work, and that frequently the proper therapeutic measure to be taken was, 
literally, to abstain from any intervention whatsoever: “Clearly you have never tried doing 
nothing!”, Magendie quoted from (Canguilhem 1994).  
 
In order for medicine to become a science proper, it would have to adopt the methods of the 
experimental sciences, physics and chemistry. Only through direct intervention with natural 
phenomena, the scientist could hope to wrest from nature her secrets: “to find truth, men of 
science need only stand face to face with nature, and in following experimental medicine, 
question her with the help of more and more perfect means of investigation”, (Bernard 
1957:221). It follows that the laboratory, and not the clinic, should be the heart and brain of 
scientific medicine, the fundamental difference being that “The observer accepts phenomena 
just as nature sets them before him; the experimenter makes them appear under conditions of 
which he is the master”, Bernard quoted from (Coleman 1985). 
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The ideal for Bernard was to describe physiological phenomena in the physico-chemical 
language (ibid.). In spite of this, he was no blatant reductionist. Although arguing vehemently 
against vitalist theories as obstacles to scientific progress, he clearly saw that physiology, as 
the science of living organisms, posed methodological problems on its own terms, which were 
not met with in the physico-chemical sciences.  
 
In order to deal with this problem, Bernard came up with the conception of the internal 
milieu, by which he was able to combine two seemingly opposing demands. On the one hand, 
the internal milieu exists on a par with other natural phenomena, and is as such susceptible to 
physico-chemical analysis. On the other hand, however, the internal milieu is separated from 
other natural phenomena; it exists for itself, and is therefore responsive to its own internally 
established norms. The organism responds to challenges put to it by the environment through 
the regulation of its internal milieu. Therefore, Bernard said, although the processes of the 
internal milieu are of a physico-chemical nature, these are in turn regulated by way of the 
physiological processes of the internal milieu, hence pertaining more to the teleological 
relations between specific organ functions than to chemical laws (which are under any 
circumstance everywhere the same). Therefore, experimental physiology is the fundamental 
discipline of medical science, and not physics or chemistry: “General physiology is the basic 
biological science towards which all others converge” (Bernard 1957:65).  
 
The normal condition of the internal milieu is one of equilibrium. In this state, the different 
processes of the body (i.e. nerve system, digestion, metabolism, circulation of the blood…) 
are co-functioning so as to produce the best possible functioning of the organism as a whole 
in its exchanges with its environment. The internal milieu is therefore a (teleologically) 
functioning whole capable of self-regulation, in modern nomenclature termed homeostasis 
(coined by Walter Bradford Cannon in 1929).  
 
Because Bernard thought of nature as homogenous rather than as consisting of qualitatively 
differing domains he conceived of disease as existing on a continuum with the phenomenon 
of the healthy organism, the normal, functioning whole. Pathology, he said, is nothing but 
normality gone awry: it is the quantitative deviation from the normal value of physiological 
processes: “Every disease has a corresponding normal function of which it is only the 
disturbed, exaggerated, diminished or obliterated expression”, Bernard quoted from 
(Canguilhem 1991:68). From this he concluded that since medicine was the science of disease 
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(pathology), and physiology the science of normal function, physiology must be the medical 
discipline par excellence.  
 
Bernard demonstrated his theories through numerous experiments. Among the most 
significant, we find his treatise on diabetes, published in his Lectures on Diabetes and Animal 
Glycogenesis, in which he argued that diabetes is caused by deviation from the normal 
amount of sugar contained in the blood (glycemia): 
 
“There is only one glycemia, it is constant, permanent, both during diabetes and outside that morbid 
state. Only it has degrees: glycemia below 3 to 4 % does not lead to glycosuria; but above that level 
glycosuria results…It is impossible to perceive the transition from the normal to the pathological state, 
and no problem shows better than diabetes the intimate fusion of physiology and pathology”, quoted 
from (Canguilhem 1991:70).  
 
Through experiments on dogs, Bernard established that the liver has the ability to synthesise 
glucose molecules in relative independence from the uptake of glucose from nutrition. 
Consequently, the ability of the liver (and the pancreas) to regulate the level of sugar in the 
blood was deduced from this experimentally established fact.  
 
As the above quotation makes clear, the transition from a normal to a pathological level of 
glycemia can only be established by way of strict quantitative measurement. As has been the 
case also in other positivist attempts at clearing the fields of science and philosophy of 
metaphysical content, subjectivity also went by the board29. In fighting off the ancient, but still 
prevailing theory of vitalism as unscientific and metaphysical, Bernard found it necessary to 
dispose of concepts possessive of any experiental value whatsoever.  
 
Thus, “disease” was transformed into “pathology”, “health” into “normality” and so on; 
qualitative connotations belonging as it were to a necessary, but pre-scientific stage on the 
way towards true physiology. 
 
Also this move was conceived by Bernard in a homogeneous manner: the scientific and 
quantitative concepts of physiology do not belong to a reality distinct from those of ordinary 
language. They were so to speak purified reality: the complexity of the clinical situation 
                                                 
29 A modern attempt was that of Rudolf Carnap and the logical positivists program for the social sciences. How 
was one to treat the so-called “belief-sentences” within a scientific-logical language? The answer, according to 
Carnap, consisted in ascribing belief-sentences an emotive value only. As such, they were relegated to the non-
scientific domain, possessing as it were no cognitive (semantic) value.  
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reduced to its most basic properties by way of experiments in the laboratory. Thus, we may 
place the autonomy of the physiological discipline in a specific domain on a continuous scale: 
as more complex than physics and chemistry (due to the character of the interior milieu), but 
less complex than clinical science (due to the extractions taking place in the physiological 
experiment). Curiously (but tactically), the conclusion was drawn that whereas the complexity 
of the organism could not be reduced to chemistry without loosing sight of the whole, the 
complexity of the clinical context could in a sense be reduced to that of the physiological 
laboratory. Bernard therefore conceived of the laboratory as the basis, not only for theory-
formation, but also for the regulation and ordering of action within the clinical domain. Here 
was thus not only a theoretical program, but a program of action as determined by medical 
science as well:  
 
“In writing the Introduction a l’etude de la medecine experimentale, Claude Bernard set out to assert 
not only that efficacious action is the same as science [the italics are mine, KR], but also, and 
analogously, that science is identical with the discovery of the laws of phenomenon. On this point his 
agreement with Comte is total” (Canguilhem 1991:107). 
 
We are reminded of Comtes famous dictum: “savoir pour prevoir, prevoir pour pouvoir”. It 
follows that technology is the application of positively established knowledge. Hence, right 
action is action in accordance with the laws of natural phenomena30. Whereas medicine 
traditionally had been considered an art, it would have to become a science in order to 
accomplish this goal:  
 
“Another false opinion, which is pretty well accredited and even professed by great practicing 
physicians, is expressed in saying that medicine is not destined to become a science, but only an art, 
and that physicians accordingly should be artists, not men of science” (Bernard 1957), 203. 
 
Natural phenomena, says Bernard, are to be determined through physiological determinism:  
 
“Physiological determinism is quite different [from philosophical determinism]. It is the expression of 
a physical fact. It consists in the principle that each vital phenomenon, like every physical 
phenomenon, is invariably determined by physicochemical conditions…”, Bernard quoted from 
(Karlsen 2003:30). 
 
Hence, the clinical context takes nothing away from the laws established in the laboratory; it 
only adds complexity. Formally expressed: natural laws of the laboratory + cultural, 
                                                 
30 “Phenomenalism” is the view that we can have no perception of ultimate causes and that reality is given us as 
perceived phenomena only. The classic articulation is given in the philosophy of Kant. 
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emotional, economical, political + x factors equals the total situation of the clinician. The 
scientifically trained clinician would be the one who knew which of these factors (the natural 
laws) were therapeutically relevant, and which were not (every additional layer of 
complexity), and acted accordingly in the concrete case.  
 
As indicated in the above quote, the type of determinism Bernard had in mind was nothing 
like fatalism, the belief that the course of life is absolutely determined and that there is no 
such thing as free will. What he meant was roughly this: The laws of nature are directly given 
to us through intervention with natural phenomena in the laboratory. The primary technique 
of discovery was, quite consistent with his theory of the normal and the pathological, the 
destruction, or the temporary halt, of normal functions. By thus manipulating natural 
phenomena, the goal was the determination of their immediate causes: if you remove the 
cause for one phenomenon to take place, you also remove the phenomenon. Speaking of the 
material causes of phenomena, Bernard states that: “These conditions once known, he [the 
experimenter] can then master the phenomenon; by supplying or not supplying them, he can 
make the phenomenon appear or disappear at will…thus physiologists gain empire over vital 
phenomena” (Bernard 1957:75). For instance, Bernard inferred that the liver was of itself 
capable of producing glucose. He came upon this conclusion by cuttings in the nutrition given 
to his research animals.  
 
In retrospect, it is clear that Bernard’s experimental phenomenalism was an optimistic one, 
and also, in Canguilhem’s sense, an ideological one. He held mathematics in low esteem, and 
he held that the laws of nature must be given to us directly through the experiment: “…in 
matters physiological one could repeat one’s experimental operations and confidently expect 
that a given phenomenon would return” (Coleman 1985). So even though Bernard’s ideas, 
significantly that of the internal milieu, are of high relevance even in today’s biomedicine, 
here is at least one point of dischord: it is only in very rare cases of pathology (monocausal 
disease) or in cases of theoretical optimism (Watson: “there is only one science: physics”) that 
we may be justified in speaking about determinism in Bernard’s sense. Overall, today’s 
models of causation in medicine are probabilistic rather than deterministic (Vineis 2000). The 
disciplines of epidemiology and social medicine would be impossible on a Bernardian 
account. 
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In Bernard we find a double set of identifications: pathology is identified with physiology, 
and physiology is moulded after the ideal of the experimental sciences, physics and chemistry. 
This last identification was necessary in order for Bernard to carry out the first. Only by 
quantifying the relationship between physiology and pathology, it became possible for him to 
see the two as identical, and quantification was only possible by excluding every conception 
of quality from the life sciences (especially as found within the vitalist tradition). Bernard’s 
determinism was thus dependent upon two simultaneous reductions: that of pathology to 
physiology, and that of quality to quantity, thus “…obeying the spirit of the physical 
sciences” (Canguilhem 1991:110), as laid down by Laplace, Lavoisier and their likes.  
 
In passing, we should also remark upon the following philosophical point: By insisting upon 
the experimental character of knowledge, Bernard seemed to be following the Kantian 
philosophy of restricting the conceptual basis of the discipline to that which could be given 
phenomenally given only. However, Bernard must have ignored some of the finer points in 
Kant’s philosophy, namely those concerning the continuity of natural laws. For Kant, the Lex 
continui in natura was a necessary logical (transcendental) presupposition of the mind. This 
rule was not, however, to be ascribed to nature itself. For Kant, nature is also strife and 
discontinuity. It consists of Reale Oppositionen, not to be reduced by the mind’s inherent 
dialectical inclinations. Who then, was the greater sceptic: the system-builder par excellence, 
Immanuel Kant, or the experimentalist Bernard, insisting upon any system, physiological or 
philosophical, as an obstacle to be done away with in the name of scientific progress? This 
insistence upon unity and continuity we also find at a later stage in the positivist philosophy 
of Ernst Mach (Mazumdar 1995). 
 
We therefore state that the goal of Bernard’s investigations was the experimental 
determination of vital phenomena (Coleman 1985). As previously stated, the scientific object 
is to be regarded as constituted by the social organisation of the scientific community around 
a specific site, the laboratory. Bernard must have realised this: not only was he one of the first 
to come up with a unified cognitive structure for scientific medicine, he also sought this 
structure carried out as a social programme. We have already stated the implications that 
Bernard intended the new physiology to carry with it for clinical action. Between that plan 
and its realisation there was, however, a gap: how to put the idea into action, into society?  
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Bernard solved the problem by ascribing to the laboratory a double role: it was to serve 
simultaneously as the provider of a cognitive structure and as the place for training new 
researchers and clinicians. As Coleman points out, Bernard in his later years went beyond 
mere theoretical and experimental ambitions: his was clearly also a social project, in which 
physiology became the prime justification of his overall vision for medicine’s role in society: 
 
“The cognitive elements of experimental physiology were to Bernard a decisive instrument in 
translating bold explanatory ideals and proposed methods of a science in the making into the worldly 
needs of laboratory space, financial support, and provision for the training of students, each a function 
of social organization and together constituting the disciplinary domain par excellence” (ibid.). 
 
As described above, Bernard already possessed the cognitive justification necessary for the 
establishment of physiology as the basic medical science. What he lacked, however, was 
economical and political support for carrying out his program. Not least due to the strong 
position of the clinic and the hospital in France; compared to Germany there was no strong 
laboratory culture to be found. Bernard’s experiments were carried out under poor conditions, 
and for many years he received no support for his work. His results stemmed more from 
experimental genius than from anything else, being as they were carried out with scarce 
resources, (ibid.).  
 
The physiological laboratory may have taken as its model the chemical laboratory, but as 
strongly emphasised by Bernard, it posed requirements of its own. Most significantly, the 
organism was to be studied as a whole in order to determine the immediate causes of vital 
phenomena, and the laboratory had to be shaped accordingly. Animal experiments were thus 
of crucial significance. This again required facilities quite specific for the 
biological/physiological laboratory: keeping a stock of research animals demands space. In 
addition to chemistry and vivisection, histology formed the third methodological pillar of 
physiology. The new theory of the cell also promised insights into vital mechanisms beyond 
those of the organs. Hence, microscopy was also to be elaborated in order to fulfil the specific 
requirements of the physiological laboratory.  
 
He was lucky enough to receive the support, financial, intellectual and political, from the 
minister of public instruction, Victor Duruy. Bernard’s efforts coincided with a movement 
towards national restoration and educational reform starting in the 1860s. One looked 
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(enviously) towards Germany, where similar reforms had already taken place, and where 
laboratory research had found a more welcoming environment, not least due to strong support 
of the universities and their attached scientific institutes (Porter 1997). Of model statuary was 
the Humboldtian educational reform, by many regarded as the main promoter of German and 
Preussian economic, political and military progress. Hence, the establishment of the 
laboratory took place under conditions of strong nationalist impulses, closely mirroring and 
reproducing the national conflicts taking place between France and Germany/Prussia. As will 
be seen from the following chapter, a close relationship to the rising nation states was a 
prominent feature of the expanding experimental medicine. 
 
The therapeutic revolution 
During the seventeenth-century scientific revolution, 
controversies flared about the proper relations between 
theory and practice, science and craft, and pure and 
applied knowledge. The Baconian tradition stressed 
the marriage of thought and action through 
experimentation; the scientific society, the private 
laboratory and other institutions formal and informal 
put the programme into practice. All these were to 
have lasting significance for medicine, alongside a 
further bone of contention: the ethics of the links 
between the advancement of knowledge and the relief 
of suffering,  
 
Roy Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind. 
 
In this section I describe the first successful large scale application of the experimental ethos 
of research. I do so in accordance with the previously described modes of reasoning: under a 
general presupposition of the specificity of micro-organisms, a rational and standardised basis 
for action was experimentally negotiated and put to use in a clinical context. The success of 
the undertaking for the following organisation of biomedicine can hardly be underestimated: 
through the organiser of specificity organisational powers were effectively delegated to 
powerful therapeutic techno-medical objects. These were also the early days of industrial 
pharmacology and the beginnings of the tightened relation between the state and science as 
carried out through experimental action, state intervention and a growing health care sector. 
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Before we get started, I should also comment upon some methodological choices of the 
following section. In a relative contradistinction to the later account of the genetics, I have 
relied upon works within the history of ideas rather than upon the approaches taken within the 
science studies literature. Centrally, I have used (Silverstein 1989; Mazumdar 1995; Tauber 
1997; Silverstein 2002). These are all central works within the emerging discipline of the 
history of immunology, and they complement each other nicely by focusing upon the same 
period of time but from the perspectives of different experimentalists and disciplines (i.e. 
Silverstein focus particularly on Ehrlich the biochemist, Mazumdar on the physical chemistry 
of Pauling, and Tauber on Metchnikoff’s biological approach). However, they do not 
particularly concern themselves with the institutional dimensions. I have tried to remedy this 
by introducing some other authors emphasising the institutional aspects. I do indeed take the 
therapeutic revolution to be something of a historical and social fact, and as such I may be 
involving myself in the writing of “wig history”. However, it should be kept in mind that this 
is not a work in history, but rather a socio-philosophical reconstruction of some institutional 
and epistemic dimensions taken to make up central parts of the Wirkungsgeschichte of 
experimental and clinical interactions. I precede more from the presupposition that this 
constellation is central to understanding the present, than from a historical description trying 
to establish or explain that state of affairs.   
 
The work of Bernard and his fellow German pathologists (like Virchov and Muller), operating 
between 1830 and 1880, had been devoted to the search for the underlying functions of vital 
and pathological phenomena. As such, they belonged to what Pauline Mazumdar has termed 
“the Unitarians” (Mazumdar 1995). Nature was projected as continuous and homologous, 
revealed by the experimenter through the determination of vital phenomena. According to this 
view, the seeming manifoldness of natural phenomena was simply an expression of the 
underlying unity of nature.  
 
In contradistinction to the Unitarian view, the next generation of experimentalists would be 
dominated by the search for specificity: Pasteur in France, Koch in Germany, a dominance 
which was to last throughout the first half of the 20th century. The stereochemical reaction (to 
be explained), as conceived by Paul Ehrlich, permitted of no cross-reactions between 
chemically different substances or between different sera or anti-sera. This conception was 
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described as teleological: the Raison d’Etre of the antibody was to react with the specific 
antigen with which it corresponded.  
The serological approach to immunity 
Hence, even though the next generation of experimental physiologists were to continue and 
strengthen the development of the laboratory as knowledge base, they also, on significant 
points, deviated from Bernard’s program. First, chemistry more or less replaced the 
conception of vital phenomena as the dominant physiological theory. This was not least due to 
the successes of great experimentalists such as Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch, working in the 
field of bacteriology. In providing effective vaccinations and therapies against a great number 
of infective diseases such as gonorrhea (1879), malaria (1880), tuberculosis (1882), cholera 
(1883), diphtheria, tetanus (1884), and rabies (1885), they launched what would become a 
revolution in therapeutics (Tauber 1997). Chemistry gained a momentum that would make it 
the basic discipline within immunological research right up until the 1950s, (Silverstein 
1989)31. This also meant that bacteriology and immunology in the first half of the 20th century 
by and large rejected significant developments within biology: 1) the Darwinian idea of the 
transformation of one species into another due to adaptation to the environment; 2) the 
cellular pathology of Rudolv Virchov, according to which disease was not the result of an 
imbalance of the humours (as claimed through 20 centuries by the Galenic tradition), but 
rather of malfunctioning cell formation; 3) Elie Metchnikoff’s phagocyte theory of immunity, 
which owed much to both Darwin and Virchov (Tauber 1997). Thus, Arthur Silverstein writes 
of the reception given to the immunological branch of the new biology that 
 
“…the cellular theory of immunity advanced by Elie Metchnikoff in 1884 did not constitute just one 
further acceptable step in a well-established tradition; rather it represented a significant component of 
a conceptual revolution with which contemporary science had not yet fully learned to cope”  
(Silverstein 1989:41). 
 
As with the Paris clinicians, the ontological pluralism (the notion of discrete entities) taken up 
by the serologists was not mirrored by a corresponding epistemological pluralism. On the 
contrary: the stronger the connection to physico-chemical methodology, the stronger the 
exclusion of other languages. In this way, strong presuppositions about the nature of things 
were also made, namely through the “thesis of the applicability of the laws of the inanimate 
world to vital phenomena” (Moulin 1988). Through this adhesion to the language and 
                                                 
31 In accordance with Silverstein’s exposition this immunological tradition, most powerfully represented by 
Robert Koch and Paul Ehrlich, is hereafter termed the serological approach to immune phenomena. 
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methodology of chemistry, Robert Koch and Paul Ehrlich went a long way in establishing a 
scientific basis for the understanding of a wide range of diseases as well as for effective 
clinical interventions. The close connections to the chemical industry of the times would also 
secure a fast industrial response as soon as a proper methodology for standardising anti-toxins 
was established.  
Robert Koch 
Parallel to Louis Pasteur in France, Robert Koch made important discoveries concerning the 
connections between specific bacteria and specific diseases. His scientific break-through came 
with his demonstration of the life-cycle of the Anthrax-bacillus, performed at the University 
of Breslau in 1876 in front of a number of highly influential scientists, among them the 
botanist Ferdinand Cohn and the pathologist Julius Conheim. In short, what Koch proved was 
the conditions under which the reproductive organs of the bacteria, the spores, took place and 
how the spores would next develop into bacteria. He also demonstrated the highly specific 
relationship of the spores and the bacteria to the Anthrax disease itself. The demonstration 
was revolutionising and highly effective, not least because it defined and proved the 
specificity of bacteria in front of a highly receptive and important audience, (Mazumdar 
1995). A central dogma of Koch’s, which was adopted and developed by Paul Ehrlich in the 
area of immunology, went as follows: “A distinct bacteric form corresponds…to each disease, 
and this form always remains the same” Koch quoted from (ibid., 66).  
 
Louis Pasteur had already developed vaccines against both Anthrax and Rabies. But a 
thorough and methodological explanation and identification of the causal agents, the micro-
organisms, had not been given until the time of Koch’s demonstration, and so one lacked the 
insight needed to develop effective therapeutic regimes (Pasteur grouped and named the 
micro-organisms according to the disease caused, and disregarded the morphological specifics 
of the micro-organisms). Koch opened up for categorising bacteria in the same way as was 
done with species within botany. Further discoveries followed, significantly of the tubercle 
and the cholera bacilli. Until Koch’s demonstrations, conceptual and experimental uncertainty 
had reigned in botany as well as in bacteriology as to the status of both mono-cellular 
organisms and bacteria. Following the tradition from Aristotle and Linneaus one wished to 
classify micro-organisms as to species, genus etc. But this was problematic because of the 
size of the task: technological innovations were needed in order to be able to determine the 
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morphology of micro-organisms. Robert Koch clearly grasped this problem, and he pioneered 
the use of contemporary technological innovations:  
 
First, microscopy was improved. The development of the art and science of microscopy was 
strongly represented in Germany, not least due to the works of Ernst Abbe, who developed 
new illumination techniques for the company of Carl Zeiss. Second, staining techniques were 
brought from the chemical industry (anilin) and used for staining bacteria in order to 
differentiate between them. Third, Koch changed the media used to cultivate bacterial 
cultures. Pasteur had deployed liquid media for this purpose. Improvements of microscopy 
techniques discovered impurities and distortions of the cultures by the liquid media, and Koch 
therefore developed techniques using dry media. For this purpose he deployed sliced potatoes 
and agar-agar, an extract from Japanese sea-weed. Finally, whereas botanists and cell-
biologists traditionally had drawn micro-organisms, Koch combined microscopy with 
photography, the result being great improvements of precision. The visual fixation of 
chemico-organic processes at specific stages furthered the view of micro-organisms as 
discrete entities:  
 
“Koch’s procedure was to smear the bacteria out on a microscopic slide, to separate them, to dry the 
smear to keep the organisms still for observation, to stain them with the aniline dyes to make their 
appearance clearer, and finally to photograph them instead of making drawings” (Mazumdar 1995:63). 
 
As already remarked upon, Koch’s approach to the study of micro-organisms received a 
welcoming reception within a well-established school of research at the University of Breslau: 
 
“Koch’s visual technology and his emphasis on morphology linked up perfectly with Cohn’s 
traditional botany to form a style that was taken up by the whole Koch school and its later descendants 
and the goal of which was to arrive at an accurate subdivision of species” (ibid., 102). 
 
The Germans also possessed important competitive edges through other industrial and 
technical innovations. Chronologically, but also methodologically and conceptually prior, was 
the establishment by the organic chemist Justus von Liebig of his institute in Giessen, where 
he established one of the most important educational and research facilities of the day. Liebig 
gained worldwide recognition for his work with the organic and inorganic chemistry. 
Together with his colleague Friedrich Wöhler, he performed chemical investigations of 
nutrition and metabolism, thus establishing the foundations of what was to become 
biochemistry. Liebig and Wöhler educated hordes of students in the application of physico-
chemical analysis to the living body, thereby promoting scientific materialism as the leading 
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ideology of research, and furthering pharmacology and physiology as basic medical 
disciplines (Porter 1997; Fruton 1999). 
 
Closely connected: after 1850 the chemical industry in Germany boomed. Starting out mainly 
as manufacturers of dyes (particularly aniline), by the end of the nineteenth century many of 
the same skills and techniques were also applied to the manufacturing of drugs (Weatherall 
1996). Close connections developed between the chemical industry and research institutes, in 
which it may fairly be stated that the industrial was just as much a precondition of the 
scientific developments taking place as the other way round (Pickering 2005). These powerful 
constellations secured growth bypassing that of Britain and France and lasting up until the 
present day. Large-scale companies like BASF, Höechst and Farbwerke Cassella were all 
parts of this development. The building of industry and research laboratories formed an 
important part of the growing nationalist movement in Germany. Following the rise of the 
German states in the 1840s and, after the Franco-Prussian war, their unification, there existed 
in Germany a particularly close relationship between industrial leaders, government officials 
and university professors (Fruton 1999). As stated by William Coleman:  
 
“By the late 1860s, science and medicine across Europe had become a convenient tool for popular 
statecraft, not to mention petty nationalism; national power and prestige, especially in France and 
Germany, were finding a new measure. Some traced the dramatic ascent of Prussian military power 
and German economic activity to the widespread encouragement of science in these lands” (Coleman 
1985). 
 
Hence, there definitely existed a favourable climate, political and industrial, for the 
application of experimental chemistry to physiological and pathological phenomena. But the 
scientific approach was also being forwarded in another, more medically related context, 
namely that of hygiene, in which Koch was to play a particularly central role.  
 
In 1880, Koch was appointed advisor of The Imperial Bureau of Health in Berlin. Up until 
that time, hygienic practice in Germany had been headed by Max von Pettenkofer, professor 
at and founder of the Institute of Hygiene in Munich. Pettenkofer took his methods from the 
British sanitary movement, emphasising water supply, sewerage, ventilation as well as the 
purification of the city milieu and the soil from fermenting and putrefying substances, 
(Mazumdar 1995). The methods deployed were based on the collection of data and statistics, 
and the data collected were used as basis for legislation and intervention on a local level. 
From an etiological point of view, the justificatory theory of Pettenkofer was that of the old 
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miasma theory, the idea being that different diseases stem from fermentation and putrefaction 
of impure substances residing in the soil. As in France, etiologies based on the theory of 
miasmas was thus limited to local circumstances (Foucault 1973). Pettenkofer’s hygienic 
methods were based on local statistics and aiming for interventions on a corresponding level.  
Hence, Pettenkofer also opposed legislation from the recently established central government, 
an attitude that was welcomed by mercantile and liberal centres such as Hamburg (Mazumdar 
1995).  
 
From his position in Berlin, Koch soon came to dominate the hygienic movement. Following 
important scientific discoveries of the Tubercle bacillus and the Cholera bacillus, his 
popularity rose throughout Germany, and he was duly recognised also by the state. He soon 
replaced Pettenkofer as the leading figure of the Cholera Comission, and he was given his 
own institute in 1891 (The Institute for Infectious Disease), and he was steadily promoted 
through the military system as well as through the civil system. As already remarked upon, 
there existed a particularly close connection between the military system and the state, and 
Koch profited from his good connections in both ranks. Many of his students were closely 
connected to the Sanitary Corps, and many were trained at the military medical school, (ibid.).  
 
As seen from the description of some of Koch’s central discoveries, his success by no means 
came unwarranted. He may rightly be termed the father of scientific bacteriology32, and his 
methods were central to the discovery of a great number of diseases: diphtheria, typhoid, 
gonorrhoea, pneumonia, undulant fever, meningitis, plague, leprosy, tetanus, syphilis and 
whooping cough as well as other streptococcal and staphylococcal infections (Porter 1997). 
Still, there is a rather long way from the laboratory to the realms of legislation, state 
intervention, and to concrete hygienic measures undertaken on a broad, social scale. For 
instance, the modern heir to hygiene, social medicine, may in its methods be just as 
resembling of Pettenkofer’s statistical methods as of Koch’s bacteriology. Thus, it seems that 
additional factors were required for Koch’s success. Pauline Mazumdar remarks that  
 
“Koch’s cholera programme was the opposite of Pettenkofer’s in every respect. He pushed for border 
controls, quarantines, boiled water, strong state intervention, and health legislation on a national scale. 
The civil authorities supported Koch to the hilt in these movements…Koch’s sudden and complete 
eclipse of Pettenkofer at the Bureau of Health may have been due less to his ‘correct’ theory of disease 
                                                 
32 For instance, Koch’s postulates, formulated to prove the causation of a given disease by a specific agent, are 
still in use, (Dorlands Illustrated Medical Dictionary). 
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transmission, than to its consonance with the desire of the central government to impose itself upon its 
constituent states” (Mazumdar 1995:85).  
 
 
 
Although Koch came a long way in establishing a convincing and efficient theory of bacterial 
specificity as well as a powerful social network through which his ideas could be spread, it 
would take the interventions of Paul Ehrlich to establish a scientific basis capable of 
standardisation on an industrial scale. I now turn to a description of some of the events that 
went to make up, for the first time, a global basis for therapeutic intervention. 
Paul Ehrlich and the early days of immunology 
 
Therapy, the most important branch of medicine, has 
from the outset developed on empirical grounds, in 
which more accidental or incidental observations on 
cures, be it in man or animal, led to the approach to 
practical use. Thus it was that the greatest majority of 
therapeutic substances have been attained, such as 
quinine, opium, and mercury. Only in recent times, 
especially with the progress in pure chemistry, have 
changes been made in this. One strives for the time 
when insight into the essence of drugs is attained, and 
to decide the question in the first instance of the 
relationship between the constitution of these 
substances and their therapeutic action. Justifying this 
approach was especially the more accurate research of 
the alkaloids, which showed that the great number of 
these variously active substances [have] a common 
nucleus similar to pyridine, to which side-groups 
connects as the carriers of physiological activity. This 
knowledge must necessarily lead to the desired goal of 
the synthesis of new drugs…it will in fact be possible 
by means of certain combinations to eliminate nearby 
damaging activity without prejudicing the curative 
potential,  
Paul Ehrlich, 1891, quoted from (Silverstein 2002). 
 
 
Through the history of modern science, only a few persons may have been able of matching 
such a strong formulation of the positivist research ethos with corresponding successful 
actions as was Paul Ehrlich. Drawing a line from Claude Bernard up until present articulations 
of the same ‘ethos-paradigm’ of research, Paul Ehrlich may be seen as a privileged 
transitional figure, one in which normative justification and practice came together to a 
remarkable degree33. While not aiming to subtract anything from the unquestionable genius of 
                                                 
33 Taking as our clue Tranøy’s distinctions, I here refer to internal as well as external normative justification. 
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Ehrlich, it should nevertheless be clear that the successes of early immunology were not due 
to one person alone, but also to an extremely creative environment and favourable historical 
and institutional settings. Ehrlich was by no means the only person responsible for the 
remarkable developments that took place within immunology specifically, or medicine 
generally, in this period. Still, as remarked by (Silverstein 1989; Tauber 1997; Silverstein 
2002), he became the leading figure in the therapeutic revolution that took place in 
bacteriology and immunology around the turn of the century. Ehrlich the person, then, should 
not be regarded as the efficient cause in the developments that took place, but rather as one 
talented person ending up in the privileged position of articulating and putting into 
experimental practice something very close to the general episteme of his time. 
 
In 1890 Emil von Behring and Shibasaburo Kitasato, working in Koch’s Hygienic Institute, 
discovered that resistance towards diphtheria and tetanus is due to the creation of antitoxins 
against toxins created by the bacteria. Here was a possible explanation for immunisation 
against anthrax and rabies, as demonstrated by Koch and Pasteur, which also promised fast 
gains in therapeutic outcome. As it turned out, immune serum would not only protect the host 
(active immunity), it could also serve to immunize other animals through the transfer of 
immune serum (passive immunity), or even to cure infected animals were disease was not too 
far advanced.  
 
As described by Silverstein, Mazumdar and Tauber, the discovery of serum-mediated 
immunity would not only establish immunology as a scientific discipline, it would also direct 
research for the following half century in a chemically oriented direction. As mentioned 
above, this ensured that the biological approach ‘proper’, notably as promoted by Elie 
Metchnikoff, would not regain its legitimacy until the biological revolution of the 1950s. In 
what follows, I will try to reconstruct some of the theoretical and experimental results of this 
orientation, the clinical contexts into which they entered, and some wider institutional 
preconditions for the successes of the serological paradigm. Theoretically, it appears that the 
presuppositions that would grant the serological paradigm dominance for half a century would 
eventually also lead to its demise. I will return to that issue towards the end of this chapter. 
 
At the time of von Behring’s and Kitasato’s discovery, it was widely held that all infectious 
diseases develop due to toxins liberated from pathogenic organisms. Highly significant was 
the discovery of Roux and Yersin in 1888 of the diphtheria toxin, proving that the disease was 
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caused by the toxin and not by the bacteria itself. The discovery was soon followed by similar 
demonstrations with respect to tetanus (Kitasato) and tuberculin (Koch) (Silverstein 2002). 
Hence, it was inferred that the road to therapeutics lay in the cultivation and administration of 
the corresponding anti-toxin. Some time into the 1890s, rumours of the isolation of an 
effective agent against diphtheria was spreading, raising expectations in medical circles 
extending far beyond the borders of Germany. Furthermore, several chemical companies had 
taken an active interest in the commercial potential of von Behring’s discovery (Liebenau 
1990). There remained, however, serious obstacles to the wide-spread transfer of the anti-sera: 
 
First, the nature of the protective body was poorly understood. von Behring and Kitasato 
described it in vague terms, like ‘sera’ or even ‘forces’. As late as 1906, Louis Hallion 
classified the question of the existence of antibodies as ‘a metaphysical one’ (Cambrioso, 
Jacobi et al. 1993). Paul Ehrlich, though, applied the concept of the antibody already in 1891, 
although he used it in a mainly non-technical sense. The bacteriologist Hans Buchner was the 
first to try to give a definite meaning to the concept, his suggestion being that the 
antitoxin/antibody was a product of the bacteria itself, and that ‘…they may even be different 
modifications of one and the same substance’, Buchner quoted from (Silverstein 1989:61-62). 
According to Silverstein, this (in retrospect) simplistic solution is highly understandable since, 
at the time, “…nothing was known about the chemical nature of toxins or antitoxins and little 
was known about the chemistry of biological macromolecules in general”, (ibid., 62).  
 
Second, there were serious problems with the quantification of anti-sera. The first attempts at 
clinical application were with the treatment of diphtheria in children. These attempts failed, 
largely due to problems with the dosage of antiserum: no method existed for assaying the 
strength (the “titer”) of the serum, and the outcome varied accordingly. In most cases, the 
serum used was too weak to have any effect whatsoever. The Höechst Company, with whom 
von Behring had made a contract about the manufacture and sale of anti-diphtheria serum 
threatened to withdraw from the contract (ibid.). 
 
In sum, at least four basic questions had to be dealt with: 1) what is an antibody? 2) How does 
it originate? 3) What is the nature of the interaction between antigen and antibody? 4) How 
can anti-sera be titered so as to standardise it for effective clinical use?  
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In 1891, Paul Ehrlich was appointed at Robert Koch’s Institute for Infectious Diseases. By 
then, he had already been working for Koch at the unit for the clinical study of tuberculosis at 
the Moabit Hospital in Berlin (containing some 150 beds) (Silverstein 2002). Having already 
performed successful demonstrations with the titration of the plant toxins abrin and ricin, he 
was now urged on by von Behring, the Höechst Company and by Koch himself, to apply his 
abilities to the solution of the problem of standardisation of anti-diphtheria serum. Building 
upon earlier experiments of his, it was during this work that Ehrlich would give his own, 
highly imaginative, solutions to the other three questions posed above. Significantly, he came 
up with his famous ‘receptor theory’, or ‘side-chain theory’, of the antigen-antibody 
interaction. Continuing the tradition from Koch, viewing bacteria as highly specific 
organisms, Ehrlich came up with the conclusion that also the antigen/antibody-interaction was 
characterised by absolute specificity. Antigens and antibodies were discrete entities.  
 
I start out by giving a short description of Ehrlich’s works with abrin and ricin, before I turn 
to the application of the techniques thereby developed to the more complex case of anti-
diphtheria serum. Following that, some attention will be paid to early theorisation about 
immune reactions in general.  
 
In his experiments with plant toxins34, Ehrlich had found that research animals would 
withstand very high doses of toxin, as long as they were administrated in gradually increasing 
doses instead of one single dose. Correspondingly, the amount of anti-toxin contained in the 
blood serum of the research animal, would be much higher. This was in itself an important 
discovery, insofar as it would facilitate the production of high-titrate dosages of antitoxin that 
could next be separated out from the blood of the animal, packaged and administered to a 
different animal or a person. But it also made way for the important insight that immunity was 
a highly dynamic phenomenon, and that the development of tolerance would have to be 
studied as such. 
 
The first challenge lay in the quantification of the toxin’s titration curve, so as to facilitate its 
reproducibility. Ehrlich started out by finding the amount of toxin necessary to kill one 
research animal. He found that 0,035 mg of ricin would suffice to kill one white mouse, the 
                                                 
34 Plant toxins were used because they, in contradistinction to toxins produced by bacteria, already existed in 
pure state and as commercially available (Silverstein 2002) 
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endpoint of the assay being death within 5 to 6 days. He termed this amount the median lethal 
dose (MLD), thereby establishing this as the basic unit of toxicity.  
 
Once the titration curve of ricin was established Ehrlich moved on to the quantification of the 
corresponding degrees of immunity (Immunitätsgraden) found in the test animals. This was 
measured as the greatest number of lethal doses (MLDs) that the animal could withstand 
following the gradual inducement of immunity through injection of increasingly higher doses 
of toxin. By the combined oral and subcutaneous introduction of toxins into the research 
animals, he was able to reach a degree of immunological tolerance of 400 MLDs by the end 
of the third week, whereas he would never be able to exceed a degree of 1000 MLDs.  
 
As the goal of the experiments on anti-diphtheria serum was of a highly practical nature -that 
of standardising antiserum for the treatment of diphtheria in humans, Ehrlich and his co-
workers set about to establish even more accurate measures for the antitoxin. The main 
problem with von Behring’s approach, they inferred, was that it was based upon the in vivo 
reactions of the research animals. von Behring had proceeded by the injection of a certain 
amount of antiserum into the animal, thereafter testing it for the amount of toxin it would 
protect against. But this approach yielded highly varying results, as no two research animals 
(in this case guinea pigs) would withstand the exact same amount of toxin. Hence, Ehrlich and 
his assistants turned to in vitro experiments, as these would not be that influenced by 
individual variations35. They started out by mixing differing amounts of antiserum with a pre-
established standard amount of toxin (taken from von Behring). Following this, the mixture 
was injected into the research animals36 to test for residing toxicity. In the end, the results 
were stable enough to define one ‘Immunization Unit’ (IE) as the mount of antiserum 
required to neutralize 1.0 cc of Behrings standard toxin, (ibid.).  
 
Having thus established a standard unit for anti-diphtheria titration, the antiserum was tested 
clinically, this time with highly successful results: in trials carried out in different Berlin 
hospitals, 168 out of 220 children recovered after the treatment. A major reason for the 
remaining death rate was the late onset of treatment in these cases. Where treatment was 
                                                 
35 In a later study, they would further demonstrate the superiority of the in vitro approach to that of the in vivo. 
The endpoint of the toxin/antitoxin reaction, defined as the difference between a severe reaction and no reaction 
at all, would vary within a 20 % limit in vitro, whereas the same limit would be 150 % in vivo (Silverstein 2002). 
36 Ehrlich used goats instead of guinea pigs, as he found that they produced higher amounts of diphtheria 
antitoxin. 
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given on the first day of symptoms, the survival rate was 100 %. The main conclusions of the 
clinical trials was that treatment was to be commenced as early as possible, that high titer 
antisera be employed, and that it should be administered gradually and in progressively 
stronger doses. In Silverstein’s words, Ehrlich and his assistants succeeded “for the first time 
[to] provide serotherapy with a rational basis”, thereby providing “a vade mecum for the 
clinician facing an outbreak of diphtheria”, (ibid., 44). 
 
These outstanding results soon were brought to the attention of both clinicians as well as the 
Prussian Ministry of Education. The minister, Friedrich Althoff, instantly made Ehrlich head 
of the Royal Institute for Serum Testing and Serum Research in Berlin-Steglitz, where he 
continued the work on the nature of immunity (ibid.). However, work at the institute was not 
restricted to the purely theoretical and experimental. A range of products had already been 
marketed in Germany and abroad. Out of concern that these be distributed uncritically, the 
German Ministry of Health had imposed regulations as early as in 1894, restricting the sale to 
authorised apothecaries and on the condition of the sera having been prescribed by a medical 
doctor (Liebenau 1990). These procedures, however, presupposed some authorising agency, 
and so in 1895 the Control Station for Diphteria Antitoxin was established in direct 
connection to Robert Koch’s Institute for Infectious Diseases. However, the pressure on the 
facility, not least due to large-scale production initiated by companies such as Hoechst, 
Schering and Merck, demanded that the testing functions of the Control Station be expanded. 
Thus it was that the Steglitz Institute was created and Ehrlich appointed its leader (ibid.).  
 
During the Steglitz period certain companies emerged as better cooperative partners than 
others. Among German companies, Hoechst and Schering had taken a more profound interest 
in Ehrlich’s work, and methods of measurement and standardisation were developed in close 
connection with these companies. Ehrlich himself was not content with practices in many 
other companies, and it seemed that lack of attention to procedure and measurement issued in 
lowered safety and a lack of purity and consistency in their products. This was confirmed in 
1896 when The Lancet tested the stability and potency of products from a number of 
companies from Germany, England, France, Belgium and Switzerland. Huge varieties were 
discovered, but the products developed by Hoechst and Schering in cooperation with the 
Stiglitz Institute came out as superior. Constellations emerged in which science, regulatory 
apparatus and parts of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry would mutually strengthen 
each others positions:  
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“The procedures which he [Ehrlich] outlined were officially confirmed by an order from Althoff in 
1897 and the methods, developed in close co-operation with Hoechst and Schering, were applicable to 
the rest of the industry. In order to meet the standards, moreover, manufacturers were to obtain fresh 
supplies of standard toxins from Ehrlich’s laboratory about every three weeks. Such dependence 
worked distinctly in favour of those who had produced antitoxins early, and particularly for Hoechst” 
(ibid.).  
From practice to theory 
In the years between 1896 and 1899 Ehrlich continued work on the problem of 
standardisation of antisera. Compared to the stability of ricin and abrin the experiments with 
diphtheria antitoxin still left something to be desired. As we have seen they had been based 
upon a unit of toxicity that was taken from von Behring. This posed several problems: 
 
First, von Behring’s unity of toxicity was itself unstable: it would contain varying degrees of 
other substances that interfered with the assay. In addition to this, it was contained in a 
solution of glycerine, which was supposed to stabilise it. Ehrlich, however, felt uncertain as to 
the function of glycerine, and he searched for a way of containing the serum without the 
addition of solutions. By avoiding all contact with light, water, oxygen and heat, he sought to 
establish a standard serum that would remain stable. The standard serum would then be put 
into tubes and distributed globally. 
 
Second, the old ‘standard’ had been based upon the degree of inflammation caused in living 
animals, which proved a too uncertain measure. As already described, Ehrlich would replace 
this approach by in vitro measurements: he set the endpoint of the assay to be death within 4 
to 5 days of a standard 250 g guinea pig. He then defined one immunity unit as the amount of 
antitoxin required to neutralise 100 lethal doses of toxin. In this manner, he paved the way for 
what was to become ‘the first biological standardization’ (Mazumdar 1974). 
 
Having thus established a standard for the titration of diphtheria antitoxin, he used it to make 
measurements of different standard solutions of antisera, samples being taken from different 
laboratories in Germany and abroad. The measurements were based upon two set values: L0, 
which was the amount of (new) toxin neutralised by one unit of standard antisera, and L+, 
which was the amount of (new) toxin required to leave one lethal dose of toxin after 
neutralisation by one unit of (standard) antisera. A priori, this should mean that L+ - L0 would 
always leave one lethal dose of toxin. But this never turned out to be the case with any of the 
solutions that Ehrlich tested. The difference between L+ and L0 always turned out as higher 
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than one, and the difference increased with time: among 11 samples tested, the resulting 
differences varied between 1.7 and 22 lethal doses (Silverstein 2002) (Mazumdar 1974).  
 
The practical solution to this problem would be to continuously supply manufacturers with 
fresh antisera from Ehrlich’s Steglitz Institute, and to make sure that it was not unnecessarily 
exposed to light, air or heat so that the standard serum would not deteriorate (Liebenau 1990). 
But Ehrlich also took an active interest in the theoretical foundations of immune reactions, 
and one department at the institute was particularly devoted to this task. In order to explain 
the perplexing results, Ehrlich had to resort to a degree of speculation and theorising that had 
not been central to his experimental works so far.  
 
It was concrete, experimental problems, namely those of giving an adequate explanation of 
the action of immune serum, which instigated Ehrlich’s more theoretical speculations about 
the antigen/antibody reaction. When he came up with a solution, and, eventually, a theoretical 
explanation of it, his side-chain theory, it was based upon views about biochemical reactions 
that had been part of his experimental works for years, but never articulated into a coherent 
theory. As remarked by several commentators, there was a red thread running through most of 
his works, namely the chemical approach to biological phenomena. Ehrlich himself wrote that 
 
“Anybody who considers the diverse activities which are carried out by each individual cell, cannot 
but agree with Pflüger’s view that living protoplasm must represent a giant molecule. Everything – 
specific vital activity, reproduction, assimilation, growth, multiplication, perception, thought, will – is 
the work of the cell substance…the expression of a certain chemical organisation…” Ehrlich quoted 
from (Mazumdar 1974). 
 
From structure to function 
Ehrlich’s approach to biological phenomena had always been from the point of view of ‘pure 
chemistry’. He would consequently think of the relationship between chemical and biological 
substances in terms of discrete molecular entities, as connecting through absolutely specific 
properties and as forming non-reversible complementary structures (Silverstein 2002). In 
other words, he held that specific chemicals were capable of connecting to specific types of 
tissue or cell, and only to these (Mazumdar 1995). A telling example of this approach would 
be his early works with the staining of tissues and white blood cells (erythrocytes). His 
inaugural dissertation had been on the staining of tissues using aniline dyes from the coal tar 
industry. In this work, he claimed that the specificity of the reaction of tissue with the dyes 
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was due to a particular dichotomous structure of the (dyeing) molecule: it would have to 
contain one group for binding to the tissue, and one for supplying the colour. This last group 
he termed the chromophore group. The binding group he conceived of as a salt, hence as 
being either basic or acidic.  
 
In a way reminiscent of Koch’s classification of disease according to the specific micro-
organism that had caused it, Ehrlich now applied his techniques of staining in order to define 
and classify leucocytes. Even though these blood cells could not be classified as species in the 
ordinary, natural historical or biological sense of the word, Ehrlich would nevertheless treat 
them as if they were. The classification of blood cells was performed according to a previous 
classification of the chemical properties of the dyes; these could be basic, acidic or neutral. 
The white blood cells were classified into five different groups. This was performed 
according to different granules found in the protoplasm of the cell, which could be 
differentiated according to their reactivity with the specific dyes. Hence, three out of five 
groups of leucocytes were named after the chemical properties of dye-stuffs: Neutrophiles 
react with a neutral solution, Basophils with a basic solution and Eosinophils with the acidic 
solution Eosin. Therefore, ordinary classificatory criteria from natural history and biology 
were neglected; organs of reproduction were of course not an alternative. The morphology of 
the cells was, however. But also this perspective was subordinated to chemical structure, as it 
turned out that morphologically identical blood cells showed a habitus that would differ 
according to chemical properties (Mazumdar 1995). 
 
Turning to the problem of standardising diphtheria antisera described above, Ehrlich deployed 
many of the same insights. The initial problem was as follows: he had defined two limit 
values: L0 and L+, where L0 was taken to signify the number of lethal doses of (new) toxin that 
would be neutralised by one unit of standard antitoxin, and L+ was the amount of (new) toxin 
required to leave one lethal dose of toxin after neutralisation by one unit of (standard) 
antiserum. Logically, this should always leave him with one unit of toxin after subtracting L0 
from L+. As already described, this never turned out to be the case, as the toxicity decreased 
with time.  
 
Also in this case, Ehrlich turned to a dichotomous explanation based upon absolute (chemical) 
specificity. In a way similar to that of the analysis of the blood cells and of the dye/tissue 
interaction, he surmised that the antigen molecule would have to consist of two different 
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atomic groups, each with its distinct function. One, called the haptophore group, would be 
responsible for connecting to the antibody (i.e. its affinity for the antibody), whereas the 
other, the toxophore group, would be responsible for the antigen’s toxicity.  
 
Now, the L0 value would be an expression of the affinity of the antigen to its antibody, and 
this value would remain stable over time. This meant that the antigen would still be 
neutralised by the antibody, but it would not be toxic. The L+ value, on the other hand, would 
be the expression of the toxicity of the antigen, and this appeared to change with time and 
temperature. In keeping with the school of absolute specificity (cf. Mazumdar, 1995), Ehrlich 
would not accept that a quantitative down-graduation (Abstufung) took place within the same 
atomic group. Instead, the conclusion was drawn that toxicity declined as a result of the 
unstable toxin group changing into a toxoid; a discrete, non-toxic group. Hence, whereas the 
affinity of the toxin remained stable, its toxicity did not. This theory was to some degree 
supported by experimental findings with guinea pigs: by the injection of old toxin into guinea-
pigs, the lethal effect would not occur. It would, however, cause paralysis in the test-animal. 
This was taken as evidence that a qualitative leap had taken place along with the break-down 
of the toxin, turning it into an altogether different substance (ibid., 117).  
 
Ehrlich also made further subdivisions among the toxins, consisting of proto-, deutero-, and 
trito-toxins, according to the respective affinities for the antitoxin. These were further divided 
into two types, alpha and beta. The toxoids he divided into pro-, and syn- toxoids. The idea 
was next that the toxins with the highest degree of affinity for the antitoxin would be the first 
to enter the chemical interaction, next to be followed by the second strongest, and so on. In 
this manner, Ehrlich’s audience was presented with a picture of the toxin as a preparation 
consisting of several, discrete substances with varying degrees of affinity and toxicity, 
(Silverstein 2002). 
 
Alas: When the molecule’s chemical structure changed, so did its function. This extensive 
differentiation according to structural premises was more a logical consequence of Ehrlich’s 
theory of absolute specificity than it was of experimental findings. According to the law of 
definite proportions two substances will fix each other only if they possess absolute structural 
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compatibility37. Only in this case would we have a chemical reaction proper. The approach 
was termed ’stereochemical’ and Ehrlich would also frequently use the metaphor (borrowed 
from Emil Fischer) that antigen and antibody would have to fit like ‘lock and key’ in order to 
interact (Mazumdar 1995).  
 
This theoretical approach had at least one great advantage: it would serve as a possible 
explanation of the existence of immunological specificity. Specificity, it seemed to Ehrlich, 
could be explained by the fact that certain antigens would react with certain antibodies and 
not with others, as for instance seen in how they would seek that specific antibody, existing in 
that specific site in the organism. For instance, tetanus toxin would connect to the central 
nervous system and not some other visceral organ (Silverstein 2002), 80. 
 
But the ‘solution’, based on the assumption of absolute specificity of antigen/antibody met 
with stark opposition, and the debate over the nature of the reaction would dominate 
immunological practice up to the replacement of serology by cellular immunological theory 
(Silverstein 1989). The debate was sparked in 1897, when Ehrlich presented a paper on the 
standardisation of antidiphteria serum, in which he also touched upon the theoretical question 
of the origin of antibodies. His main question, -what is an antibody, -and some of the answers 
he offered, defined the immunological debate for half a century, and some of his concepts are 
still being used by contemporary immunologists (Silverstein specifically mentions the terms 
of monovalent and multivalent antiserum, Silverstein, 2002, 81). It was also in this lecture that 
he introduced his famous receptor theory, which he was to give its most powerful formulation 
three years later, in his Croonian Lectures (Cambrioso, Jacobi et al. 1993).  
 
As a result of the successes of bacteriology and immunology, immunological research 
boomed, and by the turn of the century new phenomena were discovered almost daily. A 
consequence of this development was that the distance between theory and practice grew: 
immunological phenomena were discovered that could not be easily accounted for within 
existing theoretical frameworks. Whereas the early days of immunology had been concerned 
with infectious disease, asserting exo-toxins liberated from bacteria to be the only cause of 
pathology, numerous discoveries were now made of immunological phenomena that did not 
                                                 
37 Exspressed by Ehrlich as follows: ”The reaction of toxin and antitoxin takes place in accordance with the 
proportions of simple equivalence...A molecule of toxin combines with a definite and unalterable quantity of 
antibody” Ehrlich quoted in (Mazumdar 1995:116). 
  145
fit neatly into this picture38. The functions of antibodies turned out to be far more many-sided 
than first asserted, significantly through the discovery of the diverse functions (in the blood) 
of precipitation, agglutination and hemolysis. These phenomena would concern themselves 
also with other agents than bacteria, such as the haemolysis of erythrocytes, spermatozoa and 
proteins (Silverstein 1989). Furthermore, the growing number of antibodies posed problems 
by itself, as it became increasingly hard to fit them all into one and the same theoretical 
framework. Hence it came about that when Ehrlich eventually set about to articulate a 
coherent theory to account for his results, the receptor theory, the field had already outgrown 
the theoretical framework within which it had arisen. According to Silverstein, Ehrlich, by 
entering upon the more theoretical aspects of the toxin/antitoxin reaction, went from an 
experimental approach in which his theories were controlled ‘almost entirely by data’ to a 
period were ‘theory outpaces data’ (Silverstein 2002:55). Eventually, immunology would 
leave its golden age: highly abstract chemical and physical conceptions would come to 
dominate the field until biology re-entered it in the middle of the nineteenth century 
(Silverstein 1989).  
 
At more or less the same time as Ehrlich entered upon these theoretical problems, the 
dynamics set in motion through the success of anti-sera were working their way into the 
deeper structures of production and social regulation. In 1894 he had signed a fifteen year 
contract with Hoechst, who by far came up as the main producer of diphtheria anti-toxin. In 
1903 the company announced a record sale of 20 000 litres over the last ten years, earning the 
company close to 4 million marks. In the publication of these results the company underlined 
its close connection to the academic scientists Koch, von Behring and Ehrlich. Von Behring, 
who had helped the company set up its anti-sera production in the first place, left out of a 
concern that he was being cheated of profits of the sale. Ehrlich, however, continued to have 
close connections with the company. Significantly, the company came to hold many patents in 
his name (Liebenau 1990). 
 
In 1899 the Steglitz Institute moved to Frankfurt am Main. Among the reasons for that move 
was the presence of many prominent pathologists in that city (among the Ehrlich’s cousin 
Carl Weigert) and strong support from local politicians, among them the Mayor of the city. 
But there was also the presence of the Hoechst Company and Casella & Co. The new institute 
                                                 
38 Today, it is held that the body may produce antigens against almost any substance, be it bacteria, exotoxins, 
proteins, cells from other animals, plant products etc. (Tauber 1997). 
  146
in Frankfurt eventually came to exercise three main functions: testing, service and research. 
First and foremost, the institute was to serve as the central testing facility for all government-
controlled sera sold in Germany. In accordance with earlier practice it would also continue to 
issue standards for the manufacture of serum. Second, it was to have a servicing function 
towards the physicians and hospitals, the hygiene movement as well as the military service of 
Frankfurt. A small laboratory performing tests of incoming samples made up an important 
part of this work. In addition there was also an educational element in which the Institute 
would inform about bacteriological, serological and hygienic measures. Lastly, it was to 
continue research into the deeper functioning of immune reactions and serology. Nowhere 
along the lines of these functions, it seems, was the close connection to industry questioned: 
"The relations between the laboratory's functions as a testing facility and as a promoter of 
antitoxins was close indeed. In a sense, the government laboratory was simply endorsing 
Hoechst biologicals" (ibid.).  
 
Ehrlich himself would eventually come to have serious doubts concerning the developments 
instigated by himself and his colleagues. Observing the fast-moving expansion of 
bacteriology and immunology into the pharmaceutical industry, he came to lament a deviation 
from the programme of the positivist ethos and its devotion to the main goal of medicine, 
namely that of producing therapies: 
 
"To the initiate, the lack of sufficient positive knowledge is revealed by the inactivity which now 
characterizes a field once entered upon with so much promise. The innumerable drugs which have 
overwhelmed medicine in the past few years, of which only a few are of any value and thus denote any 
real progress, have sufficed speedily to allay the original enthusiasm. A feeling of indifference has 
thus been engendered, which is constantly being increased by the advertisements which are daily 
becoming more and more evident. Apart from these evils, however, this line of study is at present 
suffering especially from two other evils: 1) the habit, when a drug has been partly accepted, of 
immediately following it with a dozen rivals of similar composition, and 2) the exclusive preference 
given to drugs acting purely symptomatically, which are not true curative agents" Ehrlich quoted from 
(Liebenau 1990). 
 
On Liebenau’s account these shortcomings were seen by Ehrlich, not as problems rising from 
social structure or from the role of industry, but rather as an illegitimate intrusion of chemistry 
into the disciplines of physiology and pathology. The field had to be taken back from the 
chemists, who did not have the goals of medicine in clear view. This was articulated in a call 
for a “purely biological” program which was to be put into action on an experimental basis. 
However, as seen in the previous descriptions, Ehrlich’s conception of the “biological” was 
already heavily indebted to the (stereo-) chemical point of view. We have already seen how 
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Bernard had argued in a similar vein: although accepting the experimental methods of 
chemists and physicists, the life sciences were to establish their own way of experimental and 
theoretical analysis in accordance with the conception of the internal milieu. Compared to 
Bernard’s internal milieu, however, Ehrlich’s program stood out as strongly chemically 
inclined.  
 
Subsequently, he would not stray from the path of chemical specificity, but rather continue to 
develop it: theoretically in terms of the receptor theory, therapeutically in a program of 
chemotherapy in which the actions of antitoxins were to be reconstructed chemically 
(Liebenau 1990). Before concluding this chapter I will briefly touch upon these two subjects.  
 
I have already referred to several problems encountered by the attempt to establish a scientific 
account of immune reactions. The lock-and-key metaphor provided the clue to physiological 
speculations concerning the origin and nature of antibodies. In Silverstein’s words: when a 
toxin binds to a specific site in the organism it “…can only be due to the presence in the 
receptive tissues of specific receptors that pre-exist there to mediate not only the localization 
but also the physiological activity of the toxin”, (Silverstein 2002:80).  Concerning the origins 
of this complementarity further speculation would be futile, the answer presumably deeply 
hidden within natural history.  
 
Similar to Bernard’s account of pathology as a quantitative deviation from normal 
physiological functioning, Ehrlich came up with the idea that antibodies are products of the 
cells normal functions. In their original state, they are receptors produced by living cells in 
order to bind substances to its surface, hence part of its normal metabolism. Primarily, this 
meant that the receptors, or side-chains as he would also call them, were responsible for 
binding nutrients to the cell surface. This would also provide a possible explanation of drug 
action, -drugs act on specific cells because of their complementarities with the specific 
receptors of that specific cell. Antibodies then, Ehrlich argued, are nothing but receptors 
responsible for binding antigen to the cells surface. When the cell is attacked by toxin/antigen, 
its receptors are blocked, and the cell cannot any longer receive the nutrition necessary for its 
continued existence. The response of the cell will be to compensate, or even over-compensate, 
for this loss of physiological function by the production of new receptors. These are next shed 
into the blood (serum) were they connect to the haptophore group of the toxin/antigen so as to 
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render it incapable of further attachment. Hence the existence of circulating immune serum 
(ibid.). 
 
A similar model was also used in the construction and effectuation of Ehrlich’s dearest idea, -
that of chemotherapy. In short, the idea was to synthesise chemical substances that would 
interact with infectious agents in a way similar to that of the biologically produced anti-toxins. 
However, the task would be much harder, as the active substances had to be constructed rather 
than simply discovered. Not only did this concern the therapeutic agent itself, -vehicles for 
transporting it to its specific site of action within the organism would also have to be found 
(Silverstein 1989). Ehrlich’s plans for a renewed therapeutic program were supported by local 
forces, and in 1906 a new medical research facility appeared in Frankfurt, -The Georg Speyer 
Haus. Research in the new facility was split into two different departments: one working on 
biological, the other on synthetic agents. The work culminated with the making of Salvarsan, 
a chemical curative for syphilis, which was marketed in 1909 (Liebenau 1990). The drug 
became a huge commercial success and it remained on the market until after World War I. 
Although that particular drug became a huge success, Ehrlich’s vision of a “magic bullet”, -a 
chemical drug with no side-effects, never materialised (Silverstein 1989). One specific 
outcome of the event was that the relations between state, science and industry were pulled 
tighter: "Salvarsan was developed at the Speyer Haus, controlled by and with the backing of 
the government institute, and patented, produced, and marketed worldwide by Hoechst" 
(Liebenau 1990). 
Summing up… 
Ehrlich’s experimental and methodological approach to immunology supplied the discipline 
with a unified method. This came about both as a result of his chemical approach, which 
established a quantifiable object for use in the laboratory as well as in the clinic. The impact 
of such a unified platform was enormous for both immunology and the medical action system 
as such. According to Thorvald Madsen, one of the leading immunologists of the day, 
“Ehrlich’s method of measurement [of toxin and antitoxin] is the common property of all 
civilized nations”, and “Ehrlich’s immunity unit plays the same role for antitoxin 
measurement as does the Standard Meter for the measurement of length” Madsen quoted from 
(Silverstein 2002:51). Indeed, Ehrlich’s methods were spread worldwide: in the aftermath of 
World-War I, they were distributed globally through the Biological Standardisation 
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Committee of the League of Nations. And the clinical results, as could be stated with unusual 
certainty, were highly effective:  
 
“Ultimately, the use of formolized diphtheria toxin as toxoid, adsorbed onto aluminium hydroxide or 
hydrated aluminium phosphate and given in two doses, has resulted in the virtual disappearance of 
diphtheria in the industrialized nations. The enforcement of childhood immunization, in the form of 
DPT (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus) inoculations, has substantially banished each of these diseases 
as significant public health concerns” (ibid., 52).  
 
 
However, as we have seen, the astonishing results did not come about as the exclusive result 
of theoretical mediation, on the contrary, -Ehrlich’s attempts at theoretical reconstruction of 
immune reactions went beyond experimentation and into the domains of what Canghuilhem 
would term “scientific ideology” (Canguilhem 1991). Says Arthur Silverstein: “Fortunately, 
the practical value of Ehrlich’s protocol for the standardization of diphtheria toxins and 
antitoxins did not depend on the validity of his theoretical concepts”(Silverstein 2002:60). 
Concerning the conception of the counterfactual organiser, then, it is clear that it did not 
reside in Ehrlich’s account of immune reactions in terms of stereochemistry, but rather in the 
more general episteme of specificity, introduced to the experimental setting by Robert Koch 
and carried out within a wide range of disciplines up until the 1950s (Mazumdar 1995; Kay 
2000). Within immunology competing notions of immune reactions turned up, as the 
physicochemical approaches of Bordet and Madsen, or the biological approach “proper”, 
developed after Metchnikoff’s idea of phagocytosis (Silverstein 1989; Tauber 1997). The 
central point is that whereas the general of specificity certainly had much going for it, and so 
came to function as an organiser across fields of action and knowing, it was never pinned 
down to a distinct theory about immunity. The success of immunology took place before it 
was articulated within something resembling a coherent theory. Many of the improvements 
made by Ehrlich concerned themselves with techniques of standardisation and purification, 
many of which were outcomes of experimental genius, but they were not derived from 
Ehrlich’s theoretical work.  
 
Concerning the institutional aspects of the matter, Ehrlich found himself in an extremely 
privileged positioned at the centre of state regulation, product development and research. 
Although lamenting the course taken by developments, which he saw as moving away from 
the vision of positive knowledge standing in the service of therapeutic ideal, he still was in the 
position of exercising considerable control in all the important domains concerned with the 
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new therapeutics. Concerning the patenting of new products as well as their development and 
quality control, Liebenau states that:  
 
"The patents...had to be owned and defended by a powerful organization. Ehrlich also needed that 
power, to be able to control the vast productivity of his research team. Furthermore, the products of the 
research itself could not be made available until after the work was finished to the standards of the 
laboratory" (Liebenau 1990). 
 
 
It may therefore be inferred that both the positivist ethos of research and the organiser of 
specificity already had had their hay-days, and that they increasingly entered into 
organisational and theoretical complexities in which they would no longer run smoothly along 
with developments. Still, the discoveries within immunology and bacteriology would continue 
to work their ways into society with remarkable degrees of success well into the interwar 
period. What took place may therefore be regarded as a double movement: a gradual 
expansion of anti-sera production and control conducted by Ehrlich in close connection with 
industry and regulatory apparatus, and rising problems of supplying a theoretical and 
experimental account of immune reactions (ibid.). Within this double movement we may 
identify dilemmas that will, in the later case of genetics, come to spell out as problems of 
regulatory legitimacy: the decoupling of experimental and theoretical command from social 
forces recast and given momentum through experimental intervention itself. It will also be 
argued that a particularly strong promoter of these developments is the close connection to 
industry, which will later (i.e. in second modernity) also come to introduce strong movements 
of (relatively) free-floating capital, rendering the academic-industrial relations ever more 
unstable and unpredictable. Hence, borrowing from both Beck and Heidegger, we may state 
that projections of the academic-industrial complex were made by Ehrlich and his colleagues 
that would later re-enter the experimental systems in the transformed version of venture 
capital.  
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5. Trajectories of the gene and its organisation 
Several powerful metaphors have been invoked in order to describe the gene and its 
organisation. Both in the fields of basic genetic research and in the literature describing this 
research, the functioning of the metaphors of information (Kay 2000) and mapping (Bostanci 
2004) have been central. As have already been argued I take it that these metaphors are 
important primarily because of their significance for the organisation of action.  
 
The notion of action has also been a powerful metaphor during the construction of the gene. 
The concept of action and its intermingling with the gene has been articulated by Evelyn Fox 
Keller (Fox Keller 1995; Fox Keller 2000; Fox Keller 2002). Specifically: the significance of 
the concept of action hinges on the ways in which we ascribe causal agency to the gene and, 
correspondingly, the social and material configurations and re-configurations thereby 
entailed: What does the gene do? What can we expect from it, and, considering the needs in 
medicine and health care: how can it be put to use in the best possible manner?  
notions of action and language. I adopt a perspective on the history of the gene that is closely 
related to that of Fox Keller. However: as institutional, political and economic perspectives 
are downplayed in her expositions, it is necessary to borrow from other theoreticians, 
significantly Lily Kay, Pnina Abir-Am, Susan Wright and Gaudilliere, Rheinberger et. al. 
Furthermore, Fox Keller often undertakes rather broad sweeps of the field. These other writers 
are therefore important also in filling out details concerning technologies, experimental 
activity and material agency. 
 
Historically speaking then, I base my exposition upon three different stages of development as 
given by Fox Keller and the different notions of gene action entailed in each: 
 
1) Classical genetics, lasting (roughly) from 1930 to 1960. In this period, causal agency 
is ascribed to the gene “itself”. Hence, this is the period in which the notion of “gene 
action” arises and is given its most literal interpretation.  
2) Early molecular biology, 1960 to 1980. In this period, the notion of agency is 
transposed from the gene “itself” to that of the genetic program.  
3) Post-recombinant DNA (developmental) molecular biology, lasting from 1980 to 
2000, in which the genome is conceived as the fundamental unit of genetic action and 
information (Fox Keller 2002:113). 
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Needless to say, categorisations like these should not be taken too literally, but should be read 
as historically situated analytical categories. We are talking about gradual developments in 
which one period is not simply “replaced” by another, but rather transformed (Aufgehoben) 
into the next. Hence, the notion of gene action does not disappear even if replaced by the 
genetic program: 
 
“…the explanatory force of the terms gene action, feedback, genetic programs, and positional 
information relies upon and makes use not only of their function in disparate contexts from which they 
were borrowed but also of the functions of earlier terms and earlier forms of explanation in genetics 
that may not longer be explicitly invoked” (ibid., 114). 
 
 
The usefulness of metaphor for experimental activity has been extensively studied in the 
literature about science and technology39. The notions of gene action, the genetic program and 
information are described by Fox Keller as fundamentally ambiguous terms: they are 
metaphors of something else, something that we do not quite know what is, and so they may 
be ascribed even contradictory properties. Perhaps a bit surprising for those used to think of 
science in terms of accurateness and exactness: Fox Keller draws the conclusion that without 
the plasticity of central biological concepts, research would never get started in the first place. 
This is possible because we are talking about two different levels: concepts like gene action 
and the genetic program are reflective constructs used to give unity to experimental 
phenomena, but they are not themselves identical with these phenomena.  
Gene action 
The concept of the gene in the 1930s was exactly such a strange creature. It was given the 
responsibility for widely divergent functions: on the one hand it was to account for patterns of 
inheritance as described in the formalistic Mendelian crosses. On the other hand, it was also to 
account for the concrete development of the organism as such. Hence, the gene was functional 
both as a determinant of inter-generational transmission and of the development in the single 
organism (the two were united through the conception of causal agency: the ability to act as a 
prime mover in two directions simultaneously).  
 
As described by Fox Keller, this double function of the gene corresponded outwardly to an 
attempt at a disciplinary take-over: the notion of development had originally belonged to 
                                                 
39 The classical example being the studies undertaken by Mary Hesse (Hesse 1980). Fox Keller has also devoted 
one book explicitly to the subject (Fox Keller 1995). 
  153
embryology, whereas the transmission of inheritance belonged to genetics (a distinct 
discipline since 1909, when the concept of the gene was coined by Wilhelm Johannsen). Now 
the gene was also called upon to account for embryonic development. If the causal primacy of 
the gene could be established also in this field, embryologists would have to acknowledge the 
authority of the geneticists.  
 
However, as the material basis of the gene was still unknown, genetics was treading the same 
waters as other biological disciplines of the day. Biochemical and biological action and 
reaction was, as already described in the previous chapter, to a large degree explained in terms 
of specificity, a concept already central to a wide spectrum of disciplines. The notion of 
specificity had acquired its technical and scientific meaning mainly through its successful use 
within immunology in the beginning of the century (Mazumdar 1995). But it had also proven 
a useful organiser within other disciplines such as bacteriology, enzymology and taxonomy. 
In short: even before the material basis of specificity had been established, it was proving its 
usefulness in a number of experimental contexts. It was known that enzymes, bacteria, organs, 
antibodies, species and genes were possessive of high degrees of specificity, and it was 
furthermore assumed that these were determined by protein structure. Roughly speaking, 
basic physiological research from the twenties to the mid 1950s took place within a protein 
paradigm (Kay 2000).  
 
Up until the early 1930s, however, genetics was not part of experimental physiology, but was 
carried out more or less in the classical Mendelian sense, notably by T.H. Morgan. Insofar as 
it was concerned with experiments upon the fruit fly Drosophilia, it was of course an 
experimental science. But compared to the interventions of biochemistry, it remained abstract 
with its reliance upon models and linkage maps, and for Morgan the gene remained a 
theoretical entity (positioned somewhere on the chromosome).  
 
If we expand the notion of intervention to the social level, however, it becomes misleading to 
state that genetics was non-interventionist. From the time of the rediscovery of Mendel’s laws 
in 1900, genetics came to be closely associated with the eugenics movement. I am not going 
to give a detailed description of that movement here, but restrict myself to noticing the 
following: In these early days a large number of geneticists were supportive of the movement, 
and their work willingly found its way into popular works and eugenic programs. As the 
movement expanded into social policy, many withdrew their support, not the least because of 
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the simplistic, quasi-scientific inferences involved in the program. But active public resistance 
towards the possible misuses of genetics was not notable until the atrocities of the Nazis were 
revealed (Beckwith 1996). In 1939 central geneticists like Muller and Haldane, who earlier 
had been supportive of the movement, would sign a manifesto that actively condemned the 
use of genetics for eugenic purposes. But, as noted by John Beckwith, “for the most part, the 
influence of geneticists on the misapplication of their field was too little and too late and thus 
had a minimal effect” (ibid.)40.  
 
Although T.H. Morgan did not himself take an active part in the eugenics movement, early in 
the century his works came to be associated with the American Breeders Association, an 
organisation that championed eugenics (Kimmelman 1983). And later, as an advisor to the 
Rockefeller Foundation, he argued in favour of the active application of physical and 
chemical interventions as means for getting to biological structure (Fuerst 1982). Although 
itself not a eugenic program, it remains an undisputed fact that the program of the Rockefeller 
Foundation would promote the use of physiological intervention to improve upon the human 
stock (Abir-Am 1982). There is a lesson, pointed to by John Beckwith, to be learned from the 
historical cases of eugenics and the program of the Rockefeller Foundation. It has to do with 
scientific reductionism and it has to do with the interventions, scientific and social, thereby 
rendered possible. The levelling of physiological function onto one explanatory level, such as 
that of the gene, is not only pursued for the sake of knowledge itself, but has some potential 
use in terms of standardised and rationalised action on the social level. On a diagnostic level, 
this poses a danger insofar as it also facilitates the classification of human beings across a 
wide range of social, physiological and cultural differences. Taken a few steps further, 
genetics may also serve to diagnose “conditions” normally ascribed to the social dimension, 
such as unemployment, musicality, race and so on. Today we see this honourable tradition 
continued by sociobiology (Rose 1997). 
  
Without wishing to go too deep into the “reductionism/anti-reductionism debate”: there is a 
social fact of the matter about efforts to reduce a great number of organismic, psychological 
and social factors to one level of explanation only: it also facilitates the standardisation of 
actions towards social or cultural groups on a broad scale. This may turn out as useful to 
society, but it may also turn out very ugly indeed. In Norway, following World War II, Nazi 
                                                 
40 In 1969, Jonathan Beckwith, then at the Harvard Medical School, led the first team of scientists to isolate a 
single gene.  
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sympathisers were diagnosed as mental deviators. 1100 women known to have had 
relationships with German soldiers were internalised on the “Hovedøya”, an island outside of 
Oslo (Hviid Nielsen, Monsen et al. 2000). Obviously there were strong social and historical 
reasons behind the resentments against these women that were, regarding the post-war 
situation, quite understandable. But this does not excuse the (mis-)use of scientific arguments. 
 
When applied to genetics, specificity would read as follows: one gene – one trait. Morgan and 
his research group had long rejected the ascription of such specific action to the gene. The 
reasons behind Morgan’s initial rejection of this connection were disciplinary rather than 
scientific. Strange as it may seem today, geneticists and embryologists had for many years 
shared work between them: genetics study transmission of heredity, embryology the 
development of the concrete organism. But in the long run, this division of labour made little 
sense: “…what would be the point of tracking the transmission of hereditary factors unless 
these factors can be assumed to be implicated in the formation of the traits or characters that 
distinguish an organism, that is, in its development?” (Fox Keller 2002:125). The search for 
an answer seemed to be driving in the direction of the molecular level, hence also towards 
radically different research methods.  
 
However, the embryologists had a strong research program of their own, and if their 
preferences were different from those of classical genetics, they were even more opposed to 
the methodologies and the views upon basic physiological functions found within the new 
discipline of molecular biology. As pointed out by Scott Gilbert: If molecular biology was the 
science of the genotype, embryology was the science of the phenotype. Whereas the new 
biology took its inspiration as well as its methods and technologies from the physical 
sciences, emphasising genetically regulated cell differentiation as the motor of development, 
embryologists would study development on an altogether different level, namely that of 
morphogenesis (Gilbert 1996). Here then, we have two radically opposed views of what 
physiology is supposed to be. It is also clear that, at the time, it was in no way determined in 
which direction developments would move. Within the framework of the main paradigm of 
the period, that of protein structure, embryology indeed possessed authority in matters of 
inheritance and development: “…experimental embryology…was equivalent to the 
‘molecular biology’ of the 1930s in terms of its revolutionary potential for solving the then 
major problem of biology – the problem of biological order” (Abir-Am 1982).  
 
  156
In 1878 Claude Bernard had stated that the goal of studying living phenomena was to uncover 
the “hidden design”, the organisational principle underlying development and physiological 
function (Fox Keller 2002). (Classical) embryology, proceeding from ordered form as a 
functioning whole, took this principle to reside in the cytoplasm and to be studied on the level 
of tissues, not by recourse to the cell nucleus. In the study of differentiation and development, 
this choice of level makes quite a difference, methodologically, technically and institutionally. 
Geneticists, of course, would take the hidden design of the organism to reside first in the gene, 
then in the genetic program, and then in the genome. In 1970, referring to Bernard’s “hidden 
design”, Francois Jacob wrote that “Not a word of these lines needs to be changed today”, 
quoted from (ibid., 141). 
 
Influenced by the physico-chemical approaches within immunology, genetics came to be seen 
as an important tool in the research program of the Rockefeller Foundation. Also Morgan, by 
then acting as advisor to the foundation, came to endorse this broadening of the scope of 
genetics. Notably: if genetics could be linked to experimental intervention (Kay 1996), it 
could also become a powerful tool for social engineering.  
 
“It is within the new agenda of physiological (or physico-chemical) genetics that specificity gained 
direct relevance to gene action. And as in the other life sciences, the notion of specificity was 
transported into genetics from immunology through the nascent field of immunogenetics. Serological 
studies from animal systematics had demonstrated a direct relation between the formation of 
antibodies and heritable genetic markers, relations with immense promise for eugenic intervention. 
With the intensified programmatic development of physiological and biochemical genetics in the 
1930s, the relations between genes and their products came to be conceptualised in terms of biological 
and chemical specificities” (Kay 2000:45). 
 
The main problem consisted in establishing how this worked. Taking inspiration from the 
physical and chemical sciences, it seemed that there would have to be some basic unit, like 
the atom, possessive of the necessary agency. It also seemed that this seat of agency, the gene, 
would have to work in two directions simultaneously: as reproducing itself into the next 
generation and to determine the properties of the organism through the mechanism of cell 
differentiation within the single generation. How could the structure of the gene translate into 
function? (Fox Keller 2002). One direction of research that later proved immensely influential 
went by situating genetics within biochemical reactions in the study of unicellular organisms. 
Embedding gene action: Model organisms 
In the early forties some progress was made towards experimental demonstrations of the 
specificity of gene action. One such event was the demonstration of the so-called one gene – 
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one enzyme reaction established in the fungus Neurospora by George Beadle and Edward 
Tatum. The studies of Neurospora did not so much grow out of genetic research as out of 
biochemical and bacteriological studies of metabolism in micro-organisms. Up until then 
genetic studies had been carried out mainly on the fruit fly Drosophilia, a diploid organism. 
How could traditional genetics, presupposing sexual reproduction, be applied to haploid 
organisms41 like fungus, in which the existence of chromosomes remained highly uncertain?  
 
One central part of the answer went as follows: it was assumed that the study of mutations in 
micro-organisms would prove analogous to sexual reproduction in diploid organisms 
(Creager 2004). How was this analogy established?  
 
In the 1930s extensive studies were made of reproduction and nutrition in bacteria. It had 
earlier been observed that bacterial cultures underwent morphological changes. Could these 
be attributed to mechanisms of sexual reproduction? Furthermore, biochemical studies of 
metabolic pathways in micro-organisms were central to nutritional research in the interwar 
period (ibid.). One important way of carrying out these studies went by the induction or 
inhibition of growth factors for bacterial cultures that had been grown on chemically definable 
media. By such manipulations, biochemists were able to study specific changes in metabolic 
pathways.  
 
Beadle and Tatum built upon these techniques and developed them further by mutagenising 
Neurospora with X-rays. In that way they were able to produce a far greater amount of 
variables in the original culture in the shape of mutants with changed nutritional requirements. 
For instance, one mutant would be unable of synthesising the vitamin pyroxene. It was then 
assumed that these mutations were attributable to changes in specific parts of metabolic 
pathways that were controlled by specific enzymes. By cross-breading the mutated spores 
with wild-type spores it became possible to observe mechanisms of recombination which next 
could be subjected to traditional genetic linkage maps. The first established mutation, that of 
pyroxene, recombined in a manner that could also be predicted on Mendelian principles, and 
                                                 
41 The notions of haploid and diploid refer to sets of chromosomes. Whereas diploid organisms have two sets of 
chromosomes, haploid organisms have only one. For sexual reproduction to take place, two sets are necessary. 
Through the process of meiosis the sex cells, with one chromosome set only, are produced. Traditional 
Morganian/Mendelian studies of gene recombination presupposed these mechanisms for establishing genetic 
linkages. 
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so it was assumed that the mutations, hence also biochemical reactions, were genetically 
controlled.  
 
Following up on the Neurospora experiments, Tatum, now in collaboration with Joshua 
Lederberg, went on to apply the same techniques to the bacteria E. coli. At the Cold Spring 
Harbour Meeting in 1946 they were able to present ample evidence that different (growth 
inhibited) mutant strains of E. coli would also undergo genetic recombination when mixed on 
a minimal media (that is, nutritionally un-supplemented) (Fruton 1999). 
 
At the same meeting, Alfred Hershey reported experiments demonstrating that also 
bacteriophages (bacterial viruses) would undergo something very similar to genetic 
recombination. He carefully pointed out that viral genes were defined by way of mutation and 
not by segregation/recombination, but that mutation may prove analogous to allele 
segregation in diploid organisms.  
 
Hershey also went on to define the locus of mutation, the “genetic site”, as possessing 
specificity in the sense that it would mutate independently from other loci. A gene, then, 
would be “the hypothetical structural site of a mutation or set of alternative (allelic) mutations 
that occur independently of other known mutations” (Creager 2004).  
 
Finally, also this at the same Cold Spring Harbour Meeting, Max Delbrück and William 
Bailey demonstrated that infection by mixed bacteriophages could result in new viral 
genotypes. Hence, says Creager, “…many results of 1946 pointed to genetic exchange 
between viral variants and between E. coli strains, opening up the prospect of genetic 
mapping” (ibid.). The mechanisms of bacterial and bacteriophage reproduction remained 
mysterious until, among others, the mechanisms of transduction, plasmid action and lysogeny 
were discovered. It then became clear that the recombination of these organisms depended 
upon both nuclear and cytoplasmic factors. From then on “Bacteria and bacterial viruses 
quickly supplanted fruit flies as the test-bed for many of the subsequent developments of 
molecular genetics and the biotechnology that followed” (ibid.). 
 
The Neurospora studies and the works on E. coli and bacteriophage went some way in 
establishing micro-organisms as model organisms for experiments on the level of the 
molecule. It was established that Mendelian genetics could also be part of direct interventions 
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that went far beyond the classical studies on fruit flies. But whereas this went some way in 
explaining hereditary transmission, genetics was still a far cry away from the sought-after 
explanation of the development of concrete organisms. And so we are back to the initial 
aporia of this chapter: that of uniting the transmission of heredity with the development of the 
organism within one explanatory framework. The question had, however, been somewhat 
refined: How was it possible that the genome, presumably always the same in every cell, 
could produce so different (specific) effects in the single cells, tissues and organs? 
 
In a paper from 1948, “Differentiation as the Controlled Production of Unique Enzymatic 
Patterns”, Sol Spiegelmann posed the problem explicitly in terms of cellular differentiation. 
Cellular differentiation was, as the title stated, given a biochemical explanation in terms of 
“unique enzyme patterns” (cf. specificity). Genes control enzymes, enzymes control 
development. Spiegelmann’s study built on premises established in two earlier studies. The 
first was that of Beadle and Tatum already described, in which the one gene – one enzyme 
hypothesis was, if not actually proven, then indicated. The second was a study by Greenstein 
and colleagues, in which it had been established that the cells of different tissues display 
differing enzymatic pathways. Together, these premises strongly indicated that differentiation 
was controlled by different enzymes (Gilbert 1996). 
 
Enzymatic adaptation to different growth substances had been studied by enzymologists and 
bacteriologists since the early 1930s (Kay 2000). Now Spiegelmann and others brought these 
studies to bear on the problem complex of genes, enzymes and cellular differentiation.  By 
observing the effects of changing the growth conditions of yeast, Spiegelmann hoped to cast 
light upon the much more complex process of embryological development: “One could 
certainly study the biochemistry of cells much better than in the constantly changing 
embryo!” (Gilbert 1996). One main reason for using yeast was that the cultures could be 
halted at different stages of the growth process in a nitrogen deficient medium, thereby 
rendering it more accessible to study.  
 
By changing the growth conditions the yeast would produce different enzymes, namely those 
needed to metabolize the substrate on which it was growing. It was then said that the enzyme 
had been induced by that particular substrate. In order to continue the production of that 
specific enzyme, the continuous presence of the inducer substrate was necessary. One central 
example was the production of galactosidase by yeast grown on galactose. The yeast studies 
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were taken by Spiegelmann as indicators of how identical genomes would synthesise different 
proteins: the difference was caused by the inducer. Furthermore, they said something 
important about the kinetics of enzyme production. It seemed that synthesis proceeded 
according to curves descriptive of autocatalytic reactions: the more enzymes already present, 
the faster enzyme synthesis would proceed. He also drew the conclusion that different 
enzymatic processes were competing for a limited amount of resources: amino acids and 
energy. With the notion of autocatalysm in mind, this would mean that the stronger one 
specific strain of enzyme synthesis got, the less (proteins) there would be for competing 
systems (ibid.).  
 
A comprehensive theory of gene action would have to explain how this competition among 
cytoplasmic agents (ribosomes were not yet discovered) was controlled from the cell nucleus, 
i.e. from the genes. By the use of phosphate as a tracer, Spiegelmann demonstrated that 
protein production took place simultaneously with phosphate movement out of the nucleus. 
He thus drew the conclusion that there had to be an intermediate transmitter between the 
nucleus and the cytoplasm, and he termed this the plasmagene (messenger RNA had not been 
discovered either) (ibid.).  
 
Embryology, then, could be founded upon the theory of the plasmagene. Similar conclusions 
had also been made by others in the field, significantly by C.H. Waddington. Still, the theory 
remained incomplete. The nature of the main actor, the gene, was still unknown, and there 
was a general lack of experimental data to back it up. However, there were other and related 
experiments going on that would further promote the molecularisation of embryology. These 
were the studies carried out at the Pasteur Institute; also these starting out with the physiology 
of enzymatic adaptation in bacteria, finally resulting in the discovery of messenger RNA and 
the notion of the genetic program.  
 
To sum up: until the discovery of DNA as the material basis of heredity, basic physiological 
research was carried out under a protein paradigm. During this period, biologists came to 
adopt many of the experimental methods developed within the physical and chemical 
sciences. For these purposes, model organism like E.coli, bacterial phages and viruses played 
essential roles. Hence, in terms of experimental action, the study of heredity and development 
took decisive steps from abstract representations of genes towards interventionist practices 
(Hacking 1983) through which the chemical basis of heredity would also be illuminated. This 
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was also the period in which the promise of medical utility started to seem a possibility on the 
horizon. Although classical genetics had possessed a potential opening towards social 
intervention (i.e. eugenics), it was by embedding gene action that physiological intervention 
first appeared as a realistic possibility. Important model organisms, like E.coli, bacteriophages 
and viruses, were introduced to the practice of genetics, and important mechanisms, like 
transduction, plasmid action and lysogeny were described. All of these would later come to 
play important roles in genetic technologies.  
 
On social and institutional levels, we may point towards several factors that went hand in 
hand with the reconfiguration of genetics in a more materialist and interventionist direction: 
 
First, developments within immunochemistry and bacteriology had already proved immensely 
successful, not only on the experimental, but also on the clinical level (previous chapter). 
Within the protein paradigm it was not far-fetched to ascribe agency to genes much in the 
same way as agency had been ascribed to the anti-body: as operating stereochemically and as 
possessive of high degrees of specificity. 
 
Second: Theoretical physics was undergoing important changes (Fjelland 1991) from classical 
to quantum theories of the organisation of matter. These were also carrying non-reductionist 
implications that, as pointed out by Abir-Am, opened up “conceptual and epistemological 
spaces for a ‘new biology’: ideas of wholes, atomic organization and systems” (Abir-Am 
1982). One important link went directly from Niels Bohr and the Copenhagen School to the 
so-called “phage group” at Caltech, headed by Bohr’s former student Max Delbrück. In the 
1960s, when the founding myths of molecular biology were first created by central actors in 
the field, this connection did not go un-heeded. James Watson would then derive his own 
project more or less directly from that of Delbrück, which again led back to Bohr (Abir-Am 
1999). This move served both to underpin the historical importance of Watson himself, and to 
give to molecular biology a sense of robustness by aligning it with physics. But: in the 1930s 
and 40s these connections were not clear at all. So even though the influence from physics 
contributed strongly towards the search for the “basic building blocks of life”, the further 
course of events was open, and the drive towards reductionist research agendas was not yet 
“written in the genes”. 
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Third: actors with interests in the modernisation and rationalisation of society took an active 
interest in “biological progress”. As exemplified by the politics of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, there was indeed a strong institutional and ideological drive towards deploying 
the new biology for purposes of modernisation: The term “molecular biology” was coined by 
Warren Weaver, the foundations Director of the Natural Science Division, in 1938. Prior to 
research policies following World War 2, philanthropic organisations and private patronage 
did play a major role in directing and funding research agendas:  
 
"...the research policy instituted by large philanthropic foundations, and especially that of the 
Rockefeller Foundation in the 1930s, shared a common vision with their later counterparts. In the 
1930s, the Rockefeller Foundation's research policy was not only an attempt to provide a firm grip on 
the course of scientific progress simply for the sake of science, but was also a crucial element in a 
strategy aimed at maximizing total 'social returns' from science" (Abir-Am 1982). 
 
 
The program of the Rockefeller Foundation spanned over a wide range of disciplines, and the 
social (behaviourist) and biological sciences came to be seen as key tools for modernisation 
and rationalisation. Before it became the molecular biology program, it was called 
“psychobiology”, and it formed part of the larger program of the “Science of Man”, having as 
its main goal “to coordinate the biological sciences, social sciences, and medical sciences 
toward a comprehensive rationalization of human behaviour in quest of social control” (Kay 
1996). One main goal, as well as an operational strategy, was that of transferring technologies 
from the physical and chemical sciences to the biological sciences. By promoting the 
application of technologies from physics and chemistry, such as X-rays, electron microscopes, 
biochemical assays, ultracentrifugation and so on, the study of the organic was supposed to 
move biology out of its unproductive backwaters. This approach, however, did, more often 
than not, fail to promote the actual goal of “biological progress”. According to Abir-Am, the 
early attempts from the Rockefeller Foundation were strong in physical and economical 
power, but most of the projects thereby carried out were short on biological knowledge. 
Weaver and his associates “lacked the basic understanding that people work on problems; 
they do not merely use techniques” (Abir-Am 1982). However, although lacking in short-term 
successes, the program did indeed influence further developments: 
 
“If the Rockefeller Foundation was impressed by its own rhetoric and managed to advance clever 
entrepreneurs, its historical relevance for future molecular biology was nevertheless real. While none 
of its long-term grantees pioneered a redefinition of biology along molecular lines, Foundation Grants 
stabilised not only their personal careers but also established their institutions as training centres for 
users of physical technologies on biological materials. The presence of these “users”, in growing 
numbers colonised biology in the name of a mastery of ‘progress defining’ technologies. Their sheer 
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numbers eventually established a new social reality, which claimed the name 'biology', - albeit 
preceeded by the metaphorical adjective 'molecular' - for individuals who had little knowledge of 
biology, but who had mastered powerful physical technologies in search of results to sustain careers” 
(ibid.). 
 
 
Regardless of who caught up with whom: power (institutional/economic) and the different 
kinds of knowledge involved in the negotiations of the 1930s, did indeed reunite in the post-
war period so as to give meaning to the efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation. It was this 
stabilisation of the complex relations between physical technology and biological knowledge 
that would turn up as the full-fledged discipline “molecular biology” in the early 1960s.  
 
The conception of gene action most certainly found fertile ground within the social, historical 
and scientific environments of the 1930s, 40s and 50s. Not only did it serve as a necessary 
stepping stone for geneticists trying to come to grips with heredity and development, it also 
went along well with modernist agendas and the wider developments within the natural 
sciences; changes in theoretical physics as well as the recent successes of biochemistry. No 
wonder, then, that the conception of gene action did not possess a precise, scientific 
definition, and no wonder that this fact did not seem to bother many at the time: there were 
lots of functions for the gene to play. This did not necessarily mean that the geneticists and 
biologists of the day were naive; it just means that there were many reasons, scientific as well 
as extra-scientific, for the concept to be a useful one (Fox Keller 2002). As we have seen, 
early, “semi- material” definitions of the gene were given through studies of phage and virus. 
Although no chemical definition was achieved, the gene, and thereby also the conception of 
gene action, was defined loosely as the loci of mutations (Hershey) or in terms of 
recombination (Delbrück et al.). As long as the chemical basis of these experiments remained 
unknown, the conception of gene action also retained its plasticity. In the long run, however, 
this was not a tenable situation:  
 
 
 “Insofar as the science of genetics was committed to a causal narrative of development, there needed 
to be a place, a thing, a word to which causal force could be attached, and in the absence of any 
foreseeable route to a clarification of what that thing might be, it was functionally important to have a 
word that could contain or black-box its uncertainty and to keep its internal incoherence, as it were, 
under wraps. Not only did it permit researchers to get on with their work – resolving the problems they 
were able to address, without having to worry about those they could not – but also it provided them 
with an explanatory framework, albeit a provisional one, with which they could make sense of 
progress they were making in their day-to-day research, both to themselves and others. That it also 
served other uses – for example, in the struggle to establish genetics as a discipline and even in 
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international and gender politics – only means that it was productive in more than one sense” (Fox 
Keller 2002:132). 
 
 
In fact, says Fox Keller, the conception of gene action was not only a metaphor, -it was a 
“metaphor of a metaphor”. The speculation about what the gene might actually be was not 
clarified until the elucidation of its chemical structure in 1953. So, while awaiting an 
affirmative answer, the question as to the gene’s material basis had to be suspended. But if the 
gene was to organise any experimental action at all, the least one could expect was some 
notion of what it is that the gene does. In an almost perfect tautology, the answer went that the 
gene acts. Because there was no firm point of reference for answering the question as to what 
the gene actually does, it was likened to that which we do know, namely agency. In that 
manner, the circle was completed: the question as to what the gene is was answered in terms 
of what it does, and the question as to what it does was answered in terms of what it is, 
namely an agent. In that way, the gene was invested with agency. It was, we may state, 
created in the image of man, and at the same time it was inscribed with almost divine powers: 
Those of reproducing itself infinitely and, at the same time, of being the cause of concrete 
developments in the single, finite, organism (Fox Keller 2002).  
 
Being as it is science that we are talking about here, the inherent tautologies of gene action 
could not go unheeded for long. Indeed, during the 1940s some sobering-up was achieved: in 
1944 Avery, MaLeod and McCarty demonstrated experimentally that nucleic acids were the 
carriers of specificity in pneumococcus bacteria, and in 1946, as already described, Tatum and 
Beadle went some way in embedding genetics in studies of metabolic pathways in 
Neurospora. As also described by Abir-Am (above), this increasing ability to intervene so as 
to establish genetics as experimental physiology also corresponded to the re-coupling of 
instrumental, institutional and economic power with basic biological knowledge and 
experimental competence. However, assuming that this process of learning peaked with 
Watson and Crick’s elucidation of DNA’s structure in 1953, the notion of gene action was 
also thereby dis-empowered. When there was no longer any reason for doubting the chemical 
basis of the gene, it also lost many of the properties earlier ascribed to it:  
 
“…the discovery of the structure of the double helix, together with that of a correspondence between 
sequences of nucleotides and sequences of amino acids, did (or so it seemed at the time) cleanse the 
concept of the gene of all residual ambiguity. But for the purposes of explaining development, these 
findings also cleansed it of its force…Thus, for a satisfying global narrative of development – 
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especially, for an account of how genes may direct ‘some cells in the embryo in one way, some in 
another’ – a new linguistic construct would be needed” (Fox Keller 2002:134).  
 
This new linguistic construct would come in the shape of the genetic program. As will be 
seen, the gene, or, rather, the genome, thereby regained many of the properties ascribed to it 
in the terms of gene action, this time on a higher level of complexity. This did not make the 
concept less strange than its precursor. As described by Fox Keller, the inconsistencies of 
gene action were brought along -and some new ones were added.  
Closing the space of development 
 
The importance of deoxyribeonucleic acid (DNA) within living cells is undisputed. It is found in all 
dividing cells, largely if not entirely in the nucleus, where it is an essential constituent of the 
chromosomes. Many lines of evidence indicate that it is the carrier of a part of (if not all) the genetic 
specificity of the chromosome and thus of the gene itself (Watson and Crick 1953). 
 
 
After the elucidation of DNA structure in 1953 by Watson and Crick, one major experimental 
problem was how to relate this structure to the protein synthesising machinery of the cell (the 
problem of hereditary transmission being regarded as solved trough the mechanism of DNA 
replication). How did the four nucleic acids translate into the twenty or so amino acids that 
went to synthesise proteins? If the notion of specificity was to apply to these chemical (re-
)actions, there seemed to be a missing link: how did the message get from the nucleus to the 
cytoplasm?  
 
In 1965, Andre Lwoff, Jaques Monod and Francois Jacob would share the Nobel Prize for 
their work elucidating these connections: For demonstrating some of the central specifities 
and regularities in the interactions of genes and proteins; for elucidating the regulation of 
these by the genetic program, and for discovering and demonstrating the role of messenger 
RNA in this process (Kay 2000:195).  
 
An important precursor of the studies that underpinned these discoveries was the 
(biochemical) works on microbial physiology carried out by Andrè Lwoff in the 1930s. These 
were specifically focused on the role of enzymes in regulating metabolic pathways. Two main 
features of this research went as follows. First: enzymes are not created from something else; 
they arise from other enzymes. These results were primarily derived from experiments in 
which specific pathways of carbon digestion in micro-organisms were singled out and their 
function related to the presence or absence of specific enzymes. Second, they developed 
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precise techniques for elucidating these mechanisms. Through the cultivation of stocks of 
cultures whose characteristics were known and through the deployment of minimal media that 
were biochemically well defined, they were able to trace lesions in metabolic pathways with 
great precision. These techniques also came to play a central role in the experiments of Beadle 
and Tatum (Burian 1996). 
 
At the time of Lwoff’s studies, the growth of bacteria was depicted as depending on the media 
on which they had been grown. Changing the media would also change the metabolism of the 
bacteria. These changes, it was assumed, furthermore depended on two types of enzymes, 
termed respectively adaptive and constitutive enzymes. Adaptive enzymes would be 
synthesised only in the presence of specific substrates in the medium, the substance being for 
instance a sugar, the enzyme then being formed in order to metabolise carbohydrates. 
Constitutive enzymes, on the other hand, would continue to be formed regardless of the 
presence of any specific substrate in the medium. This division corresponded to a central 
problem in microbial physiology that has already been mentioned more than once. This 
concerned the mechanisms controlling enzyme biosynthesis: were they primarily genetic 
(constitutive) or were they chemical (adaptive)? The question carried both theoretical and 
ideological implications: the adaptive point of view stressed the impact of the environment 
and the organism’s capability for learning from its surroundings and was typically associated 
with Lamarckism, dominant in France at the time. The other point of view (Darwinian) would 
represent development in terms of randomness and spontaneous mutations rather than smooth 
co-existence with the environment42. In this way the problem also came to bear on the old 
issue of the basis of inheritance: was it nuclear or did it reside in the cytoplasm? (Kay 2000) 
 
The answers given by the Pasteur group would further dispel the mechanisms of reproduction 
and metabolism from the cytoplasm and place it within the closed-off space of the nucleus. 
This was done through a conceptual change in which the old vocabulary of biochemistry 
(proteins) was recast within a discourse of information, systems theory and cybernetic 
metaphors. Centrally: The above mentioned distinction between adaptive and constitutive was 
no longer to be regarded as fundamental properties of enzymes, but rather as properties of 
biological systems. Adaptivity was furthermore dispelled from the conceptual apparatus and 
retranslated as induction. Also induction would be taken to mean a heightened degree of 
                                                 
42 Through the Lysenko affair, these issues gained a direct political relevance: The credibility of biology had 
been questioned on the international political arena. 
  167
synthetic activity in the presence of some substance external to the bacteria, but now with an 
extra clause added: it was controlled, not by the external substance, but by an endogenous 
inducer (ibid.).  
 
One important reason for this change of vocabulary was experimental: many cases of so-
called “nonadaptive behaviour” had been observed in micro-organisms. Max Delbrück and 
Salvador Luria had demonstrated (1943) that many changes in bacterial physiology do not 
take place in the form of smooth adaptations to their environments, but rather in terms of 
seemingly random and spontaneous mutations (Fruton 1999).  
 
Jaques Monod was definitely on the side of the neo-Darwinians: his projects in the late forties 
were designed to dispel the notions of teleology and last causes from French biology. These 
attempts would also come to go hand in hand with his program for modernising the same 
science and to establish molecular biology at its centre. Together with his assistant Melvin 
Cohn he had studied enzyme synthesis in E. coli and made observations that seemed to go 
against the prevailing Lamarckianism. First, they discovered that lactose could inhibit the 
synthesis of beta-galactosidase (so-called end-product inhibition). They reasoned that the 
inhibitory force operated independently from the lactose-galactose interaction itself and that it 
had to rely on an inductive mechanism of the bacteria. Inhibition of galactosidase was not an 
outcome of this chemical interaction but of something else. They furthermore observed that E. 
coli bacteria constitutive for the production of galactosidase would continue to synthesise the 
enzyme even in the absence of galactose in the growth medium. It seemed pointless that the 
bacteria should go on producing an enzyme that could not be used to metabolise the substrate. 
Also this pointed in the direction of genetic control and away from contextual and 
environmental explanations (Kay 2000).  
 
In the 1950s Francois Jacob and Elie Wollman had been studying the genetic organisation of 
bacterial sexuality. Central to these studies had been recombinations between the genetic 
material of E. coli and bacteriophages (bacterial viruses) that would eventually cause lysis 
when inserted into the bacterial host (i.e. the bacteria would dissolve). “Male” bacteria 
carrying phages in a non-active state (so-called pro-phages) were shown to induce lysis in 
recipient, “female” bacteria that from the outset of were non-lytic43. By the use of a blender 
                                                 
43 For a feminist reading of these metaphors, see Fox Keller (1995). 
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they were able to interrupt the mating of the two bacteria, and so it became possible to study 
the exchange of genetic material in its different stages. Surprisingly, it was revealed that the 
recipient bacteria, the “female”, for a short period of time after the mating process would exist 
in a diploid state, i. e. it was possessive of two pairs of chromosomes. This “zygotic 
technology” was then taken as confirmation that the mating process of bacteria was (more or 
less) the same as in higher organisms (Kay 2000).  
 
In earlier studies, Jacob had also made observations on prophage activity that would become 
central. By exposing lysogenic bacteria to ultraviolet radiation he discovered that the radiation 
would act as an inducer so as to make the prophage burst (causing lysis in the bacteria). This 
phenomenon would later become known as the removal of some inhibitory mechanism 
working on the phage so as to stop it from bursting (derepression). A similar phenomenon 
was discovered to reside naturally in bacteria immune to phage lysis. It was then assumed that 
immunity was another such repressive mechanism operating on the level of the phage 
genome.  
 
In a classical series of experiments that would be known as the “PaJaMa” experiments, 
Monod, Jacobs and Arthur B. Pardee used the zygotic technologies developed by Jacob to 
study the genetic control of the lactose synthesising system of E. coli. Following and further 
developing the methods of Beadle and Tatum, Monod had isolated three so-called lac-
negative mutants, bacterial cultures that were unable to grow on lactose even though they 
were constitutive for the enzyme beta-galactosidase44. The phenomenon was explained by 
reference to the absence of another enzyme, permease, assumed to concentrate the basic units 
of lactose in the cell. The lac negative mutants were assumed to lack this enzyme, thereby 
also rendering them unable of metabolising beta-galactosidase. It was furthermore assumed 
that synthesis of the two enzymes was genetically linked. These relations were now studied by 
inserting the mutations in male and female bacteria, thereby adding a new dimension to the 
experimental techniques of enzyme analysis: 
 
“The experimental system was altered. The conjunctions of the E. coli and phage systems now 
produced a composite experimental system and hybrid technologies, thus reconfiguring the 
experimental space, once again, to include new graphemes: representations of enzymatic functions in 
terms of genomic maps” (Kay 2000:212). 
                                                 
44 Monod had received the specific strains of E. coli from Joshua Lederberg at the University of Wisconsin. As 
described by Kay, “these different mutant strains were central to the material culture of microbial genetics, 
circulating widely within its international network” (Kay 2000:206). 
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The completion of this move would eventually lead, not to the adding of a dimension in the 
representation of biological systems, but to the reduction of biological space to one dimension 
only, namely the genetic map or sequence. Three-dimensional biological space was on its way 
to be recast within the uni-linearity of informational space.  
 
The lac mutations were mapped along the genome of E. coli: The ability to synthesise 
permease was located to the “Y” gene and that of synthesising galactosidase was located to 
the “Z” gene. It was discovered that the constitutive vs. the inducible character of the two 
genes seemed to be linked, and so this “meta-control” was ascribed to a site of its own, the “I” 
gene. The I - gene seemed to be distinct from the two others and it seemed to be able to turn 
these on and off, hence exercising a sort of meta-control. It thus seemed that there were 
actually two levels of genes. Whereas one level was responsible for the direct induction of 
enzyme synthesis, the other level would in turn regulate the actions of the first level genes.  
As it turned out, the I-gene was working in a different way from what had been previously 
assumed.  This mechanism had been represented in terms of a replacement of the inducer, 
hence a sort of positive control. Now, however, in a move that would further expand the scope 
of genetic explanations by the borrowing from cybernetics and communication theory, it was 
represented as the removing of an inhibition (as will be seen, the articulation of this 
mechanism would soon be improved through the operon model). 
 
This result came about by cross-mating two strains of the I–gene: one was constitutive for 
synthesis of galactosidase and permease (I-); the other was inducible (I+). “Inducible” in this 
context meant that the I+ strain would synthesise the two enzymes only in the presence of 
lactose, whereas the “constitutive” strain (I-) would synthesise both enzymes also in the 
absence of lactose. When crossed, the I+ strain surprisingly turned out to be dominant over 
the I- strain. The product of the I+ gene was then represented in terms of an inhibitory 
mechanism: the strain did not produce the enzymes galactosidase or permease; it produced an 
inhibitor that would repress the production of the two enzymes. The I- mutant, then, was 
constitutive because it was lacking this inhibitory mechanism. The regulatory mechanism of 
enzyme production was now relegated to one further gene operating on the I + gene in the 
form of a de-repressor. When galactosidase and permease were synthesised in the cell plasma, 
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it was actually because this de-repressor inhibited the inhibitory products of the I+ gene: a 
chemical movement of double negation.  
 
These complex and technical deductions are worth mentioning for the following reason: by 
these movements, Jacob and Monod abstracted the genetic regulatory apparatus away from 
the ordinary biochemical workings of the cell and moved them into the (supposedly) closed-
off space of the nucleus. A few years later, they constructed the division between structural 
and regulatory genes on the basis of findings like these. Here was a genetic explanation that 
seemed capable of answering the aforementioned problem of why genes do not act all the 
time. The answer was that they were switched on and of by the regulatory genes. The 
regulatory genes, it was figured out, worked by the two mutually constituting mechanisms of 
induction and repression. The structural genes, i.e. Y and Z, were structuring the information 
necessary for the synthesis of permease and galactosidase. This (autocatalytic) process was 
halted by a repressor enzyme that was determined by the regulatory gene (I). Induction was 
then pictured as the repression of the repressor. When compared to the notion of adaptation as 
described above, it becomes clear that the notion of nuclear interaction with the environment 
(the cytoplasm) had been removed from its original significance. Adaptation (induction), 
originally the property of an enzyme, had been reconfigured as a property of the genetic 
regulatory apparatus, which in turn was soon to be integrated within the genetic program. 
What this entailed was a radical reconfiguration of hereditary mechanisms, from existing in 
biological, three-dimensional space, to the uni-dimensional and immaterial notion of 
information. The material was separated from the immaterial, the cytoplasm from the nucleus 
and the biochemical from the genome (Kay 2000; Fox Keller 2002).  
 
In this way, Crick’s central dogma was both confirmed and expanded. Confirmed, because the 
only way that the necessary relation between nucleus and cytoplasm could be maintained 
went by imagining gene expression as a one-way street: information is transferred from the 
nucleus, but it cannot, under any circumstance, find its way back into the nucleus. Expanded, 
because its integration into the notion of the genetic program allowed for far more 
differentiated and complex analyses, notably of the whole genome as such (once again, the 
attempt at integrating genetics with embryology was given a spark). The notion of feedback, 
to take one central example, would previous to these developments be conceptualised in terms 
of inhibition by end-product, a biochemical equalisation in order for a system to conserve 
itself at a steady state under the influence of varying environmental circumstances. On this 
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view, the end-product, re-entering the system so as to inhibit further synthesis, still exists on a 
par with the other parts of the system.  
 
According to the informational view, changes in the state of a system would also come about 
as a result of external influence (an inducer). But there would be no exchange of information 
taking place whatsoever: information is moving in one direction only. The nucleus issues its 
orders through mRNA to repression enzymes in the cytoplasm, thus switching on and off the 
synthesis of enzymes in the presence of the inducing substance. In this way, notions of 
learning and experience were relegated from the conceptual apparatus of cell mechanisms. 
With information going only one way: how could the cell adopt anything external to the 
genetic program? Monod promptly put it in the following manner: 
 
“The entire system is totally, intensely, conservative, locked into itself, utterly impervious to any 
‘hints’ from the outside world. By its properties, by the microscopic clockwork function that 
establishes between DNA and protein, as between organism and medium, an entirely one-way 
relationship, this system obviously defies ‘dialectical’ description. It is not Hegelian at all, but 
thoroughly Cartesian: the cell is indeed a machine” (Monod 1971). 
 
Last, but not less important: it was during the PaJaMa experiments that messenger RNA first 
turned up as a possibility on the experimental and theoretical horizon. Within a few minutes 
after coitus, the recipient cell would start to synthesise galactosidase. Because Jacob and 
Wollman had already established that recombination would take more than an hour, the 
synthesis could not be the result of genetic recombination, but was rather explained in terms 
of a direct signal, or messenger, from the nucleus to the cytoplasm. This then, would 
eventually turn out to be the missing link between gene and cytoplasm (mitochondria). In the 
1961 May Issue of Nature, two papers appeared that, each from its perspective, identified the 
messenger RNA. During a stay at Caltech, Francois Jacob, together with Sydney Brenner and 
Matthew Meselson, set out to prove that the synthesis of proteins in phage was controlled 
through the mediation of messenger RNA attaching itself to the bacterial ribosomes. 
Deploying techniques developed by Meselsohn entailing centrifugation of radioactively 
labelled bacteria, the aim of the experiment was to show how the mRNA from labelled, 
phage-infected bacteria would attach to the ribosomes of the infected host bacteria. After 
repeated centrifugations, their hypothesis was confirmed. Elaborating on these results by 
similar methods, James Watson and Francois Gros also demonstrated a close (base ratio) 
correspondence between the templates of mRNA and DNA, and it was these results that made 
up the second Nature paper referred to above.   
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In 1953 Monod became director of the Pasteur Institute. Already situated at the forefront of 
physiological research in France as well as internationally, the institute became an excellent 
vehicle for his project of modernising French biology. As described by Lily Kay, social 
activism and experimental activity were not sharply separated in Monod’s projects. He 
immediately took it upon himself to reorganise the Institute “completely” in terms of 
laboratory equipment, teaching facilities and increase of personnel. In 1936 he had held a 
postdoctoral Rockefeller Fellowship at the Caltech biology division of biology. He now 
applied to the Foundation for funding for the modernisation of the institute. The application 
was, as he himself described, a very ambitious one, encompassing the biosynthesis of proteins 
(enzymes), nucleic acids, amino acids, as well as puric and pyrimidine bases and nucleotides. 
Still, he contended, as the program “concentrated on the same microbiological material (E. 
coli) and common methodologies it would be cooperative and quite focused” (Kay 2000:204).  
 
I have described some central aspects of what was to become the beginning of the closure of 
the mechanisms of heritage and development. Under the aegis of the genetic program what 
would serve as the object domain of the new discipline of micro-biology in the 1960s was 
carved out, mainly from the workings of one unicellular organism, the bacteria E. coli. E. coli 
itself does not undergo cellular differentiation, but this did not seem to bother Jacob and 
Monod in their attempts at extrapolating their findings in bacteria to other organisms: what 
was true of E. coli was also true of the elephant (ibid.). 
 
The Genetic Program 
In the (late) 1950s, enzymatic regulation and cellular differentiation were more and more 
frequently described in terms of feedback mechanisms, a conception taken from cybernetics 
and communications theory. It had been demonstrated that enzymes were produced by auto-
catalysis: a self-generating mechanism also contributing to specificity insofar as it depended 
on the competition between different enzymes for the same resources (cf. above section). But 
self-generation could not proceed infinitely; something would have to stop the process before 
it reached catastrophic levels. This mechanism was first explained in terms of end-product 
inhibition, and, with the coming of cybernetics, as negative feedback. The discussion went, as 
before, about the site and nature of these regulations: was it pure biochemistry relying on the 
cell as a whole, or was it genetic, hence also exclusively nuclear? David Nanney compared 
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these two different views of cellular mechanisms to a democratic versus a totalitarian state. In 
the democratic version, “The Steady State”, feedback models would serve as general 
explanations of a wide range of cellular mechanisms tending towards steady states. On this 
conception, stability is not owed to one kind of molecule only, “but to the functional 
relationships of these molecular species”. In the totalitarian version, feedback became the 
servant of the nucleus (Nanney 1957)45. One year later, the totalitarian version would be 
strengthened within the frames of an informational paradigm and given its most powerful 
articulation in Francis Crick’s Central Dogma of molecular biology:  
 
“…once information has passed into protein it cannot get out again. In more detail, the transfer of 
information from nucleic acid to nucleic acid, or from nucleic acid to protein may be possible, but 
transfer from protein to protein, or from protein to nucleic acid is impossible. Information means here 
the precise determination of sequence, either of bases in the nucleic acid or of amino acid residues in 
the protein” (Crick 1958). 
 
The conception of the genetic program was introduced by Jacob and Monod at the 1961 Cold 
Spring Harbour Symposium. The main purpose of the new conception (borrowed from 
computer science) was to extend the results from the studies of enzyme synthesis in E. coli to 
the study of embryological development46. This was carried out through a bold leap that 
would unite many of the findings described during the last pages and explain them within the 
new conception of the genetic program: the repressor, negative feedback, the messenger 
RNA, and, one last (f)actor that has yet to be mentioned, the operon. As already pointed out 
many times: Early articulations of the gene seemed ill-fit to describe both heredity and 
development at the same time. Even though the hereditary mechanism had been elucidated 
through the structure of the double helix, the question still remained as to how differentiation 
came about, and how it could be that genes were not acting all at the same time. Even though 
this had been answered in part by the division into regulatory and structural genes, that was 
hardly satisfactory. It had been established that the regulatory genes switched the structural 
genes on and off. In that way, both the rate and the structure of protein synthesis had been 
explained. But what about the regulatory genes? Who or what was in charge? And how was 
the action of the regulatory genes integrated within the organism as a whole?  
 
                                                 
45 Interestingly, Nanney also conceived of two versions of the “totalitarian molecule”. The simple version 
corresponds more or less directly to the central dogma. The other, refined version, would also recognise that 
“organic specificity be a function not only of the intrinsic capacities of the system, but also of the environmental 
circumstances” (Nanney 1957).  
46 Jacob and Monod had in the meantime, triggered by a reflective leap of Jacob’s, established that immunity in 
bacteria was depending on the same repressive mechanisms as in enzyme synthesis (Kay 2000). 
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The genetic program was designed to provide molecular biology with an analytical basis for 
relating the activation of various genes to the development of the organism as a whole. 
Although the identification of the chemical basis of these processes may have done damage to 
the notion of gene action as posed within the old, biochemical paradigm, in which specificity 
was pictured as having a material basis47, this potential was soon regained within the new 
paradigm of information.  
 
It was now recognised that specificity was due to nucleotide sequence, and that this in turn 
could be represented in non-material terms, as code or as information48.  
 
This was not an outcome of biological experimentation per se. Where the basic metaphors had 
earlier been provided in terms of human agency, at the threshold to the age of information the 
genome would be described by metaphors taken from computer science. Hence, the genome 
sequence was compared to the computer programs of the day, in which information would be 
loaded onto a magnetic tape, issuing its order in binary codes lined up in a uni-directional 
sequence as the tape was read off. The regulatory and structural genes were seen to operate in 
a manner similar to this. Also they were issuing binary orders, switching protein synthesis or 
other genes on and off (Fox Keller 2002).  
 
By 1961 it had been established that the regulatory genes worked by issuing orders through 
messenger RNA. It had also been established that the mRNA would translate into proteins 
that in turn would act as de-repressors upon the inhibitory mechanisms of the structural genes. 
In that way, the regulator gene induced protein synthesis. The specific site for this exchange 
of information between the regulatory and structural genes was now conceptualised in terms 
of the operon model. The operon was portrayed as the site in which the instructions from the 
regulatory genes are carried out; a complex of regulatory elements and structural genes (Fox 
Keller 2000). On this view, the synthesis of proteins and enzymes was no longer to be seen as 
regulated in terms of end-product inhibition, in which regulation takes place solely between 
enzymes within the same autocatalytic pathway; synthesis was now to be regarded as 
determined by the regulatory genes, so-called “allosteric inhibition”. Theories of enzyme 
synthesis were not wrong, but they did not get to the specific sites through which 
differentiation was controlled. Enzyme synthesis was thus dismantled from ordinary 
                                                 
47 Notably through the template hypothesis. 
48 For the notion of the genome as a code to be deciphered, see (Kay 2000). 
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enzymatic activity taking place at the level of the cell, the former now being regarded as 
genetically determined. The proteins issued by the regulatory genes work by directing 
synthesis, but do not themselves take part in the synthesising process. This order was now 
invoked to explain the genetic determination of cellular differentiation; explanations on the 
level of ordinary enzyme synthesis being as it were insufficient for the job (Fox Keller 2002), 
155. One important reason for so doing was the urge to move from models of enzyme 
synthesis in bacteria to the organisation of higher organisms.  
 
Initially, this move entailed an Aufhebung of explanations of cellular mechanisms onto the 
level of genetic regulatory mechanisms in which the cellular is subordinated to the genetic. 
But in one further move this division itself was now moved onto a different, genetic level.49  
Cellular differentiation displays both stability and change at the same time: some 
phenotypical traits are conserved for centuries whereas others undergo change. The problem 
faced by Jacob and Monod was how to explain this phenomenon from the point of view of the 
genome. If the operon model was to go along with Crick’s central dogma, according to which 
conservation is maintained genetically, it was necessary to show that the genetic material did 
not itself undergo any changes during the course of evolution. The notions of cellular versus 
genetic, activity versus synthesis, were now recast within the language of information in terms 
of conservation and change. As such, the question no longer came to hinge upon the 
biochemical language of the old days: “The very terms of the new configuration reflect a shift 
from the discourse of biochemistry (and also, though less conspicuously, from the taxonomy 
of classical genetics) to the language of molecular biology, and specifically, to the language 
of Francis Crick’s central dogma” (ibid., 164).  
 
The operon model, it was argued, provided the means for the proper analysis of informational 
change and conservation. By switching on and off the structural genes, the regulatory genes 
would provide for both conservation and change of gene expression. The regularities and 
changes thereby entailed would reside in the genome itself, or, more specifically, in the 
genetic program. One pressing task, therefore, resided in deciphering the “code” according to 
which gene expression was regulated: “The unity of cellular mechanisms across species 
divides would hold if the code were shown to be universal” (Kay 2000:233).  
                                                 
49 Indeed; insofar as the term Aufhebung is pertinent description of this move, it is Luhmannian rather than 
Hegelian: One difference being replaced by another difference, this time on a higher analytic level. This hardly 
comes as a surprise, as Luhmann takes his conceptual apparatus from some of the same sources as Monod. But 
from the level of cellular differentiation to that of social differentiation, there is quite a leap.  
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What was thereby presupposed was the status of the genetic program as the final unit 
responsible for development. Indeed, if it was true that the genome did not undergo change 
and that it determined differentiation from the very beginning of life, the genome had to be 
pre-programmed so as to carry all the essential information required during ontogenesis, the 
development of the organism. The notion of teleology, for many years relegated to the 
periphery of biological discourse, now reappeared in its middle. To be sure, teleology did not 
reappear in Aristotelian or Lamarckian terms, in which the purposeful interaction of the 
organism with its environment takes place as an open-ended process. The concept of 
teleology was recast as teleonomy, in which the purpose of the organism as a whole was 
inscribed in the nucleus qua genetic program from the very beginning. 
 
Furthermore: With the coming of the operon model, it needed no longer be presupposed that 
genes act. Now they were depicted as activated by other genes possessive of a regulatory 
function only. But this, says Fox Keller, merely served to transpose the problem onto a 
different level:  
 
 
“It was of course understood that, in order to do their job and turn the structural genes on and off, 
regulatory genes themselves needed to be activated, but this fact seemed to present no impedance 
whatsoever to the new construction. Part of the reason for this is already suggested by the legacy of so 
long a tradition of agentic discourse in genetics, and by the persistence of ingrained habits of thinking 
and talking that maintained the capacity to act, control, or to govern as an inherent property of the 
gene, even after the gene had been recognised as no more than a chemical molecule, and a relatively 
inert one at that” (Fox Keller 2002:138-139). 
 
 
In this way the discourse of agency was replaced: from the level of the single gene to that of 
the genome, which was in the end controlled by the genetic program. Finally then, Bernard’s 
“invisible guide” had been given an articulation within the language of molecular biology. 
But the computer metaphors had its obvious limitations. Who had “programmed” the 
genome? And how was it supposed to be understood that the program “acted”?  
Stabilising the genetic code 
 
“it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that the minute amounts of protein that probably remain 
attached to DNA, though undetectable by the tests applied are necessary for activity…There is 
accordingly some doubt whether DNA is itself the transforming agent, although it can be regarded as 
established that DNA is at least part of the active principle”, Alfred Mirsky (1951), quoted from 
(Fruton 1999:441). 
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Lily Kay describes the year 1961 as decisive to the coding problem. In this year, the search 
for the genetic code left its “formalistic” phase and entered upon a more “materialistic” path. 
By this, she means that the search for the principle correlating nuclide acid synthesis with 
amino acid synthesis came to rely less upon the efforts of cryptographs, communication 
theorists, physicists and mathematicians, and more upon biochemical “bench-work” proper. 
Catherine Waldby has criticised Kay for relying upon too simplistic categories in evaluating 
this shift; from “bad”, militarised research to “good” biochemistry (Waldby 2001). But we do 
not have to follow Kay’s arguments all the way: for the present purpose, it will suffice to note 
that the direction of research was changed quite suddenly and unexpectedly by the success of 
a biochemical approach. In a somewhat looser sense than that intended by Kay: research took 
a dynamic turn, away from abstract and structural approaches towards functional, biochemical 
ones. 
 
In 1958, Francis Crick articulated the problem in terms of two general principles: the 
sequence hypothesis and the central dogma. The sequence hypothesis stated that “the 
specificity of a piece of nucleic acid is expressed solely by the sequence of its bases, and that 
this sequence is a (simple) code for the amino acid sequence of a particular protein” (Crick 
1958). He further envisioned two possible paths to the discovery of the correlating principle 
between the two. One went by way of biochemical analysis, the other would deploy more 
“abstract arguments”. Although highly up-dated on both fronts, it seems fair to state that 
Crick’s preferences lay more on the abstract and structural side than on the experimental and 
dynamic. The works on the structure of DNA with Watson from 1953 clearly displayed this, 
and his close connection to the so-called “RNA Tie Club”, significantly as articulated in the 
works of physicist George Gamow, was one further fact about the matter. Hence, after 
explaining the biochemical issues involved, Crick stated that: 
 
“So much for biochemical ideas. Can anything about protein synthesis be discovered by more abstract 
arguments? If, as we have assumed, the sequence of bases along the nucleic acid determines the 
sequence of amino acids of the protein being synthesized, it is not unreasonable to suppose that this 
inter-relationship is a simple one, and to invent abstract descriptions of it. This problem of how, in 
outline, the sequence of four bases ‘codes’ the sequence of the twenty amino acids is known as the 
coding problem. It is regarded as being independent of the biochemical steps involved, and deals only 
with the transfer of information. This aspect of protein synthesis appears mainly in the more 
sophisticated sciences. Most biochemists, in spite of being rather fascinated by the problem, dislike 
arguments of this kind. It seems to them unfair to construct theories without adequate experimental 
facts. Cosmologists, on the other hand, appear to lack such inhibitions” (ibid.). 
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Breaking the code 
Marshall Nirenberg must have been such an experimenter as referred to by Crick: a 
biochemist with a “fascination for the coding problem”. Nirenberg became a research fellow 
at the Bethesda NIH (National Institute of Health) laboratory in 1957. The NIH research 
facilities were known to be at the apex of biological research, albeit not in the fields of 
molecular biology or genetics. Having as it was a long established tradition in biomedicine the 
NHI remained conservatively based upon biochemistry rather than jump the new disciplines. 
This also carried with it a certain hostility towards these disciplines, as famously articulated in 
Erwin Chargaff’s notion of molecular biology as “biochemistry without a license”. The 
general direction of the argument was that the theories of the molecular biologists were 
speculative and underdetermined by experimental evidence (Kay 2000). However, if the 
difference between the two disciplines was sharp, it should be added that it would also turn 
out a very productive dialectic. Just as Crick was updated on the latest in biochemical 
research, so Nirenberg, originally working in enzymology, was familiar with the works of 
Jacob and Monod. He knew about the latest in phage research and biochemical genetics, and 
he knew of the different approaches to the coding problem put forth by Crick, Gamow and the 
RNA Tie Club (ibid.). 
 
As is getting clear along with the growing evidence from the Human Genome Project: the cell 
is indeed a complex thing: “We know about molecules; we know about cells and organelles; 
but the stuff in between is messy and mysterious” (Ball 2003). If this is the case today, then it 
must certainly have appeared no less so to the biochemists trying to trace the movement of 
tRNA through the cell in the late 1950s/early 1960s. As retrospectively stated by Francis 
Crick:  
 
“The central dogma was put forward at a period when much of what we now know in molecular 
genetics was not established. All we had to work on were certain fragmentary experimental results, 
themselves often uncertain and confused, and a boundless optimism that the basic concepts involved 
were rather simple and probably much the same in all living things” (Crick 1970). 
 
 
There is no direct pathway to cellular mechanisms, one have to proceed by the use of “genetic 
tricks” (Watson, Tooze et al. 1983). One way of breaking open the black box of the cell and 
getting to the underlying biochemical pathways went by destroying the cell membrane so as 
to be able to intervene directly with the (known) factors of the system: nucleic acids and 
enzymes, ribosomes, ATP and GTP (”molecular fuel”) and amino acids. The cell was broken 
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down into its constituent chemical parts by running it through a blender, and a number of 
amino acids were added, one of which was radioactively labelled. Paul Zamecnik, with whom 
Crick kept in close contact, demonstrated through such a “cell-free system” that proteins were 
formed through the synthesis of RNA with amino acids in the ribosomes. Moving from the 
study of rat liver cells to E. coli, he further optimised the system in terms of a higher 
incorporation of amino acids into protein (Rheinberger 1997). For the purposes of decoding, 
however, there remained a crucial problem: if the system was to yield the exact relation 
between the nucleotide sequence and the proteins, something had to be known about the 
nucleotide sequence. Without knowing the input of the system, the output also remained 
mysterious in terms of genetic explanation; the essential information was lacking, and it was 
hard to envisage a way of getting to it.  
 
One step forward was made by Tissière, who demonstrated the inhibitory effect of the enzyme 
DNAase on the synthetic activity of the cell-free system. Except from providing a useful 
experimental tool, this also went a long way in proving the role of RNA as an intermediate 
messenger between the nucleotide sequence and the protein. DNAase works on DNA by 
chewing the sequence into pieces (as does RNAase on RNA). And so it was deduced that 
since the “action” of the DNA had been halted it had also halted RNA synthesis. This 
enzymatic mechanism, then, offered a way of freezing the system so as to facilitate 
observation on different stages of protein synthesis. 
 
It was the improvement of the techniques working with cell-free systems that would 
eventually lead Nirenberg and his co-worker, Heinrich Matthaei, to break the genetic code. 
After working for a long time just to stabilise the system for their purposes, they were able to 
report the discovery of a new type of RNA, namely messenger RNA50. One reason why 
mRNA was discovered later than tRNA and rRNA was its unstable and short-lived condition. 
Shortly after transcription, mRNA is destroyed by the enzyme RNAase. But it was also this 
fact that allowed for its discovery. When RNAase was added, protein synthesis would stop, 
and so it was inferred that there had to be a “ribosomal RNA”, which was shortly after given 
the name of mRNA (Kay 2000). The experiment that would eventually “break the code” 
                                                 
50 The existence of the messenger had already been indicated by the PaJaMa experiments at the Pasteur Institute 
and by experiments conducted by Watson and Gros at Harvard. Gradually it became known to wider circles: 
“The concept of the messenger was obviously “in the air” in these days. It was bandied about in conferences 
during the fall of 1960” (Rheinberger 1997:213). 
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followed as a systematic testing out of different amino acids, synthetic as well as endogenous, 
as inputs into the system to discover if any acid of known composition would perform the role 
of the messenger. By feeding into the system radioactively labelled poly-uridylic acid (Poly-
U) and phenylanaline, Matthaei observed high degrees of the protein polyphenyalanine on the 
Geiger counter. The result seemed incontestable: the amino acid Poly-U coded for the protein 
polyphenyalanine (ibid.), and hence a definite relation was established between nucleic 
sequence and protein. 
 
In 1958, Francis Crick wrote that: 
 
 “Once the central and unique role of proteins is admitted there seems little point in genes doing 
anything else. Although proteins can act in so many different ways, the way in which they are 
synthesized is probably uniform and rather simple, and this fits in with the modern view that gene 
action, being based upon the nucleic acids, is also likely to be uniform and rather simple” (Crick 
1958). 
 
 
Out of all the amino acids existing in nature, a limited number had been singled out as the 
“magic twenty”: “…only about twenty different kinds of amino acids occur in proteins, 
and…these same twenty occur, broadly speaking, in all proteins, of whatever origin – animal, 
plant or micro-organism” (ibid.). In 1953, following Erwin Chargaff’s demonstration of 
nucleotide base composition gathered from a number of different species to be (almost) 
uniform, Watson and Crick had also established the relation between the two corresponding 
nucleotide base-pairs:  
 
If it is assumed that the bases only occur in the structure in the most plausible tautomeric forms...it is 
found that only specific pairs of bases can bond together. These base pairs are: adenine (purine) with 
thymine (pyrimidine), and guanine (purine) with cytosine (pyrimidine)...if only specific pairs of bases 
can be formed, it follows that if the sequence of bases on one chain is given, then the sequence on the 
other chain is automatically determined (Watson and Crick 1953). 
 
Here, then, was how Crick and his colleagues in the RNA Tie Club came to perceive of the 
problem complex: primarily as a relation between numbers, frequently also supplied by the 
relations between linguistic entities like letters, words, sentences and so on: “This problem of 
how, in outline, the sequence of four bases ‘codes’ the sequence of twenty amino acids is 
known as the coding problem. It is regarded as being independent of the biochemical steps 
involved, and deals only with the transfer of information” (Crick 1958). What this suggested 
to Crick and his colleagues, was that there had to be some limitation, or some definite rule 
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governing the arrangement of the nucleotide bases. The already mentioned sequence 
hypothesis was the concrete outcome of this state of affairs: “…the specificity of a piece of 
nucleic acid is expressed solely by the sequence of its bases, and …this sequence is a simple 
code for the amino acid sequence of a particular protein” (ibid.). In other words: what the 
decoders were looking for was the basic unit of information transfer. This would have to be 
restricted in two directions simultaneously: first, it was the question of the order of the base 
pairs. Second, the size of the coding unit: how many bases did it take to make up one unit? 
Was it double, triple or quadruple, or was the number even higher? And, supposing the 
correct number had been established: how was the code actually read? (Kay 2000). 
 
In this manner, the problem of biological meaning was further conceptualised in terms of 
information. As already seen: for Crick the coding unit came to be seen, somehow 
inconsistently, as separated from its biochemical basis. Biological meaning was given 
indiscriminately through the sequence of information, and not through the chemical agents. 
Following Gamow, the coding problem typically revolved around different possibilities given 
by the two numbers of four and twenty. Given the four bases, a two-base unit (codon) would 
add up to 16 combinations (4 x 4). But this number would be insufficient to account for the 
specificity of the twenty amino acids, and so 4 x 4 x 4 seemed a more likely alternative, 
according to which the possible combinations amounted to 64. These kinds of formalistic 
approaches led many biochemists to look with some suspicion upon the abstract musings of 
molecular biologists, as for instance given in Joseph Fruton’s dismay with the “hypnotic 
power of numerology” (Fruton 1999:461). 
 
Still, “numerological” and informational features also found their way into the thinking of 
Nirenberg and Matthaei, and along with them also into the conceptual apparatus of a new 
generation of biochemists: “informational macromolecules” came to be seen as the bearers of 
genetic specificity (Kay 2000). Previous to the experiment that would finally yield a glimpse 
into the genetic code, they had been guided by the idea of a triplet code, an idea already 
nurtured for some time by Crick and Gamow (ibid.). 
 
The idea of the triplet code was clearly articulated in an important paper by Crick and 
colleagues, published only weeks after Nirenberg and Matthaei’s publication of their 
discovery: “A group of three bases (or, less likely, a multiple of three bases) codes one amino 
acid” (Crick, Barnett et al. 1961). The paper also stated that “The sequence of the bases is 
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read from a fixed starting point. This determines how the long sequences of bases are read off 
as triplets” (ibid.).  
 
Following the publications of Nirenberg and Matthaei in 1961, the decoding work changed its 
direction, and a greater number of biochemists entered the race to complete the work on the 
code by the use of cell-free systems. In 1960, the mounting evidence for the existence of 
mRNA had suggested to Severo Ochoa (New York Academy of Medicine) that he deploy 
synthetic polynucleotides as messengers into the system, and that this procedure may 
eventually lead to the desired goal of breaking the code. In that way, says Kay, mRNA 
became simultaneously an epistemic and a technical thing, serving both as a probe into the 
workings of the system and an entity to be highlighted for its own sake; mRNA was involved 
in a dialectic of representing and intervening, the final aim of which was the cracking of the 
code (Kay 2000).  
 
Disappointed by the priority of Nirenberg and Matthaei’s discovery, Ochoa now made the 
completion of the code the main objective of his laboratory, and he did this by the continued 
use of mRNA. First, its role was affirmed through the observation that its insertion into the E. 
coli system would increase the rate of the synthesis of Poly-U into phenylalanine. Hence, 
Nirenberg and Matthaei’s result was also affirmed. He then turned to the use of mixed 
polynucleotides (heteropolymers), observing that more amino acids than one were generally 
involved in protein synthesis. In a 1962 article published in the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, they were able to increase the list of amino acids involved in protein 
synthesis to eleven, a publication that was soon after followed up and (partly) affirmed by a 
list of fifteen from Nirenberg and his colleagues at the NIH (ibid.). The article, 
“Ribonucleotide Composition of the Genetic Code”, also served to put the possibility of a 
triplet code on firmer experimental ground. 
  
Although the nucleotide composition of the “magic twenty” amino acids involved in protein 
synthesis were being rapidly determined, Crick’s coding problem remained unsolved. How to 
decide the size and sequence of the basic unit, increasingly known as the “codon”?  
 
One main problem was posed by the so-called degeneracy of the code: more than one coding 
unit seemed to be involved in the synthesis of most amino acids. For instance: today we know 
that the amino acid Proline is coded for by CCU, CCC, CCA and CCG. But if the sequence 
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of, let’s say, CCU is not known, it can only be represented in terms of its composition, as 
C2U. This unit may also turn up as CUC, which codes for Leucine and not Proline. Gobind 
Khorana of the University of Wisconsin set out to clear the field by obtaining completely 
defined sequences of ribopolynucleotide messengers (mRNA) as a starting point for mapping. 
This turned out a difficult task, however. DNA synthesis had been some years in the coming 
and so was fairly well developed, but the same could not be said about chemically induced 
RNA synthesis. He therefore turned to DNA synthesis, and in 1963 he succeeded in 
synthesising a DNA polymer comprised of the two bases A and T, which would in turn 
transcribe as A and U bases in the RNA chain. Following this success, he continued to 
synthesise di- and tri-nucleotides for decoding purposes (Kay 2000).  
 
In the NIH laboratory, Nirenberg and his assistant Philip Leder were occupied elaborating 
techniques that would complete the decoding process. In 1964, they devised the so-called 
“triplet binding assay”, which thrived on the discovery of the role of tRNA and amino acids in 
protein synthesis: ribosomes, the “protein-synthesising machinery” of the cell, attach to RNA 
triplets only in the presence of an aminoacyl-tRNA complex. A tRNA complex is a tRNA 
linked to a specific amino acid. tRNA serves to bind the mRNA codons to their specific 
amino acids so as to unite them into protein chains. In this way, the original nucleotide 
sequence is retained. The tRNA unit was baptised the “anti-codon”, as it corresponded exactly 
to the codon sequence found in mRNA. In 1965, Robert Holley and his research group at 
Cornell had managed to map the sequence of Alanine tRNA in yeast. They also managed to 
determine the Alanine codons: GCU, GCC, GCA and GCG.  
 
The step that would finally lead to the completion of the genetic code took advantage of the 
discoveries of Holley and Khorana: if the composition of the amino acid that was 
incorporated was known, and if the sequence of the anti-codon (in tRNA) was known, then 
the sequence of the mRNA could also be determined. By inserting one of Khoranas artificially 
synthesised trinucleotides into the system, they would not have to deal with the problem of 
how to isolate one codon from the very complex sequence of ordinary RNA. Furthermore, 
because the sequence of the tRNA was determined, the problem of the direction was also 
solved. In this manner, while the mRNA would give the composition and the tRNA would 
give the direction of the sequence, the reading mechanism (translation) of protein synthesis 
was established. Because Khorana had obtained a complete set of trinucleotides (64), the code 
could finally be completed (ibid.).  
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In this manner, they were able to read off the translation process taking place in the cell:  
In a paper from March 1965, Nirenberg and his colleagues reported that: 
 
“Nucleotide sequences of RNA codons have been investigated recently by directing the binding of 
C14-AA-sRNA [the amino-acid complex] to ribosomes with trinucleotides of defined base sequence. 
The template activities of 19 trinucleotides have been described and nucleotide sequences have been 
suggested for RNA codons corresponding to 10 amino acids. In this report, the template activities of 
26 additional trinucleotides are described and are related to the general nature of the RNA code” 
(Nirenberg, Leder et al. 1965). 
 
Through Holley’s elucidation of tRNA, it also became possible to explain the degeneracy of 
the code. Because of the spatial folding of the molecule, the anti-codon site is bent, and so 
strict specificity is only obtained by the first two bases, whereas the third base may vary. 
Crick termed this the “wobble” of the code (Kay 2000). In 1968, Khorana, Holley and 
Nirenberg shared the Nobel Prize "for their interpretation of the genetic code and its function 
in protein synthesis" (The Nobel Prize Organisation 2005). 
 
Before I continue the story with some considerations of a more institutional character, I will 
make a brief pause to relate this last section to what has earlier been stated about gene action 
and the genetic program. As described, the biochemical turn was also inspired by more 
abstract reasoning, as provided by Crick, the RNA Tie Club, and by Jacob and Monod. Of 
specific significance was the re-articulation of gene action within the linguistic framework of 
the information discourse, in which, as we have seen, genetic properties came to be separated 
from the material biochemistry involved. What the biochemical turn provided, was a way of 
getting to the concrete structure of gene action, without thereby sacrificing the potential 
inherent in the information discourse. Finally, the structure of the gene had also yielded its 
function (Fox Keller 2000). Obviously, this provided molecular geneticists with a strong tool 
also for the sake of concrete intervention with genetic processes. And, as will shortly be seen, 
genetic engineering and recombinant DNA technology was right around the corner. However, 
what the biochemical turn did not yield was the (ontological) order of the genes. What kind of 
genes are there? How do they interact among themselves, and how do the complexes of 
different genes affect cellular growth and differentiation?  
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The RNA codons 
Second nucleotide   
  U C A G    
UUU 
Phenylalanine 
(Phe) UCU Serine (Ser) UAU Tyrosine (Tyr) 
UGU Cysteine 
(Cys) U  
UUC Phe UCC Ser UAC Tyr UGC Cys C  
UUA Leucine 
(Leu) UCA Ser UAA STOP UGA STOP A  
U  UUG Leu UCG Ser UAG STOP 
UGG 
Tryptophan 
(Trp) G  
CUU Leucine 
(Leu) 
CCU Proline 
(Pro) CAU Histidine (His) 
CGU Arginine 
(Arg) U  
CUC Leu CCC Pro CAC His CGC Arg C  
CUA Leu CCA Pro 
CAA Glutamine 
(Gln) CGA Arg A  
C  CUG Leu CCG Pro CAG Gln CGG Arg G  
AUU Isoleucine 
(Ile) 
ACU Threonine 
(Thr) 
AAU Asparagine 
(Asn) 
AGU Serine 
(Ser) U  
AUC Ile ACC Thr AAC Asn AGC Ser C  
AUA Ile ACA Thr AAA Lysine (Lys) 
AGA Arginine 
(Arg) A  
A  
AUG Methionine 
(Met) or START ACG Thr AAG Lys AGG Arg G  
GUU Valine Val 
GCU Alanine 
(Ala) 
GAU Aspartic acid 
(Asp) 
GGU Glycine 
(Gly) U  
GUC (Val) GCC Ala GAC Asp GGC Gly C  
GUA Val GCA Ala 
GAA Glutamic acid 
(Glu) GGA Gly A  
G  GUG Val GCG Ala GAG Glu GGG Gly G  
 
 
The RNA Codons and their corresponding amino acids, reprinted from Kimball’s Biology Pages 
(http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/) 
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As described, Jacob and Monod had already served the conceptual apparatus through which 
gene action would be recast: the genetic program, acting on the scale of the whole genome, 
interaction taking place at the site of the operon. But, in moving from the single gene to the 
whole genome, it becomes clear that the function of the gene had not been entirely elucidated 
through its function. Even though the correlations between the different nucleotides and the 
amino acids were known, the question of genomic structure remained wide open. It would 
also soon become clear that the operon model did not apply to biosynthesis in higher 
organisms, where the process is altogether more complex. Gene expression is regulated 
mainly (but not only) by the rate of translation of DNA into different RNAs, processes that 
are in turn triggered by different mRNA polymerases and the promoter (Winter, Hickey et al. 
2002). 
 
The operon model and the conception of the genetic program did indeed expand the scope of 
genetic explanation greatly. But at the same time it must be clear that it challenged the 
simplicity of the Crick model. Hence, Fox Keller describes the distinction between structural 
and regulator genes as “the first wrinkle on the face of the central dogma” (Fox Keller 2000), 
55. And, indeed, this was only the beginning of the exploration of the many genes there is and 
of the many functions they may have. I will have some more to say about this at a later stage. 
Now, something more must be said about the institutional setting of the 1960s and the 
transition to the phase of genetic technology.  
 
Nirenberg and his colleagues at the NIH were regarded as outsiders in the de-coding 
competition, and when they somehow unexpectedly struck gold, many established and well-
known de-coders would describe their results as a strike of luck. Matthaei and Nirenberg, 
however, denied any such allegation, and they claimed their code-breaking experiments to be 
the result of hard, systematic work designed to achieve the breaking of the code and nothing 
else. The fact that other researchers, significantly Severo Ochoa, were steering in the same 
direction indicates that this was indeed the case. Furthermore: if one takes a look at the major 
investments made in basic research in the post-war period, the results seem even less random. 
The NIH was at the centre of a fast-growing governmental program designed to stimulate 
research on a broad scale. We have seen that in the pre-war era, research funding was 
primarily a matter of private patronage, like that exercised by the Rockefeller Foundation or 
by the universities themselves. But with the coming of the cold war, huge amounts of state 
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money were poured into weapons and space research, and science in general profited from its 
potential for the “industrial-military complex”.  
 
Along with these developments, investments in biomedical research grew proportionally. In 
part, the increase came as a result of the general attempt of the Truman Program to strengthen 
health and social conditions. But it was also stimulated by powerful lobbying groups, such as 
the Lasker Foundation and the American Medical Association, to direct research towards the 
fight of disease, significantly towards cancer research (Wright 1994). The NIH came to be 
seen as the main promoter in these efforts, both in terms of performing actual research and as 
an instrument for allocating research funds on a national basis. Between 1945 and 1968, 
investments grew steadily, from 2.8 million dollars in 1945 to more than 3 billions in 1968 
(numbers in 1982 dollars) (ibid.). Come the 1960s, the state financed network of biomedical 
research was spread among universities and research facilities all over the USA, and the NIH 
formed its organisational and scientific basis. With reference to the classical physiological 
research paradigm, it may seem as if this research came close to fulfilling the Bernardian 
ideal: providing a basis for curing disease through a broad program of basic research. 
However, the ideal of “pure basic research” is hard to achieve, not least because it requires 
economical resources that necessarily stem from sources that do not and can not share in the 
scientific ideal of disinterestedness:  
 
“The prevailing view within the biomedical research community was that its primary mission was the 
development of a scientific basis for modern medicine through progress in understanding basic 
biological processes. On the other hand, politicians mindful of the political mileage to be made from 
“breakthroughs” in the control of disease, and the pharmaceutical industry, hoping to be given new 
technologies and new products, emphasized the rapid achievement of cures for major diseases” (ibid., 
27). 
 
No doubt, the research carried out at through the NIH network in the 1960s was of a very high 
quality. In a 2005 interview, Marshall Nirenberg regrets the contemporary climate of strong 
external pressures upon young researchers to conform to existing, safe lines of research, 
hindering them from embarking on bold theorising or experimentation, and he recalls the 
conditions given to him in his youth as exemplary (The Nobel Prize Organisation 2005). But 
for a number of reasons, the strong growth in the research budgets could not continue. Susan 
Wright mentions the Vietnam War as one obvious drain on the state budget. But there were 
others as well: first and foremost, the growth rate of research funding had been exceptional, 
and sooner or later it would have to adjust to the larger balance of ins and outs on the budget, 
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and it would have to be defended against other priorities. This could only be done by pointing 
to pay-backs from science to society in terms of health improvement or industrial utility. In 
itself, this pointed towards a greater selectivity of funding: Research had to be justified with 
regard to utility factors in order to legitimise itself politically and economically. This 
tendency was also strengthened by the increasing need for competing on the international 
arena, scientifically and economically (a tendency that itself was instigated largely by US 
economy and politics in the post war era). Hence, even though the radically increased funding 
of research produced scientific results of high quality, the NIH tree could not continue to 
grow into the heavens. Furthermore, as illustrated by Nirenberg’s regrets mentioned above, 
the astonishing results achieved by him and others came at a price: Whereas pre-war funding 
had been a matter primarily to be settled between the single researcher and his/her university, 
now the single researcher had been enrolled in a network of increasingly bigger research 
groups competing for resources with strong connections to the political, industrial and 
economical arenas. Through this tendency, a different type of scientist was also in the coming, 
namely the one in possession of “the qualities of managers and entrepreneurs” (Wright 
1994:30).  
 
The situation was not helped by the fact that molecular biology, so far, had fostered no 
practical applications of significance. It continued to be an experimental, though “highly 
promising” discipline. This, however, was soon about to change. 
 
Recombinant DNA technology 
Perhaps within the lifetime of some of us here, the 
code of life processes tied up in the molecular 
structure of proteins and nucleic acids will be 
broken. This may permit the improvement of all 
living organisms by processes which we might call 
biological engineering  
Edward Tatum, Nobel Lecture, 1958 
 
In the early seventies technical and scientific developments took place that promised to bring 
molecular biology closer to the worlds of practical application, and, at the same time, closer to 
the study of gene expression in higher organisms. The new technologies took advantage of a 
number of organisms well studied during the early days of molecular biology and deployed 
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newly discovered enzyme actions for new modes of intervention. In the years to come model 
organisms originally used to represent gene action would themselves be transformed from 
epistemic to technical things and turned into “molecular factories”.  
 
Early experiments on the (cloning) mechanisms that would render such technologies possible 
did not themselves aim directly at industrial applications, but were primarily directed towards 
the regulation of gene expression and the understanding of cancer at the molecular level. Paul 
Berg of the Stanford University Medical School investigated the actions of tumour viruses 
(one was the SV40), the final aim of which was the understanding of cancer development. But 
it was also a way of getting at mechanisms of gene regulation in higher organisms, and so the 
project was interesting from more than one perspective. The dialectics of basic and applied 
research alluded to above was exerting its effects: Funded by the NIH and the National 
Cancer Institute, Berg’s project was well situated within the general trends in research policy 
of the time. And so the members of his research group were well aware of the industrial 
potentialities involved as well as the implications for basic research (regulation of gene 
expression). Many things hinged on the success in making bacteria express the genes of 
higher organisms. Hence, says Susan Wright, Berg’s project constituted and was constituted 
by a definite “duality of purpose” (Wright 1986). 
 
For almost thirty years, prokaryotes like E. coli had been used to represent genetic 
mechanisms in higher organisms. Following the breaking of the code by Nireneberg and his 
colleagues, it had been demonstrated that the code applied (almost) universally, that is, gene 
expression would take place following the table of nucleotide triplets and their corresponding 
amino acids (see above). This being the case, there should be little reason why the simpler, 
prokaryote organisms should not also be able to express the DNA of higher organisms, 
thereby producing hormones, enzymes, proteins or other physiologically or industrially 
important substances. Or, on a more basic level, the resulting hybrid organisms could serve as 
probes into the regulation of gene expression in higher organisms.  
 
It should be noted how “primitive” these early studies of the genes and genomes of higher 
organisms really were, and what kinds of difficulties the researchers were up against. In 1971, 
when the first experiments on DNA recombination started, it was only two years since the 
first single gene had been isolated. The gene in question did, of course, belong to E.coli, in 
which it coded for the expression of the lac operon (Shapiro, Machattie et al. 1969). It would 
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last until 1974 before Brown and Sugimoto succeeded in isolating a “gene” (5S DNA) from a 
higher organism, the frog Xenopus mulleri. Hence, back in 1971, getting to pure DNA had 
proven notoriously difficult, and the possibilities for studying gene regulation in higher 
organisms were poor. The problem was not least due to all the proteins of the chromatins in 
which the DNA of higher organisms is coiled. What was all that protein doing there? Today, 
it is recognised that also chromatin regulates gene expression (Felsenfeld and Groudine 2003). 
 
The way out of this dilemma went by introducing new model organisms, namely animal 
viruses, to represent gene expression in higher animals (Watson, Tooze et al. 1983). These 
viruses, like SV40 or polyoma, came in handy for a number of reasons. They posited small 
genomes similar to those found in bacteria (hence a strong element of familiarity), they would 
recombine willingly in animal cell cultures, and they could easily be labelled by radioactive 
isotopes (ibid.). Somehow ironically, since human genes could not be singled out, they also 
could not be studied genetically. There was no direct way of ascribing genes to our genes!  
 
Early studies of gene expression in higher organisms had to take advantage of what was 
known and could be handled experimentally. Messenger RNA was one such indirect way of 
getting to DNA, and so research was directed towards cells in which mRNA existed in 
abundance. One organ that was particularly well-suited, both because of the easy access it 
provided and because it had been well studied almost since the beginning of biochemistry, 
was blood. Haemoglobin and immunoglobulin mRNA were welcoming targets (ibid.). The 
reason why I mention this here is that the blood is one typical “model organ of the human 
physiology”, and the diseases of the blood system would prove valuable “model diseases” in 
the years to come. Biological thinking is based on the use of models of many different kinds, 
and the point is of some relevance for the discussion of the universality of biological 
representations and interventions. 
 
As for the possibility of genetic intervention into human physiology: Taking for granted the 
present state of knowledge, stating that there is somewhere between 20 and 25 000 genes in 
the human genome (Coghlan 2004), it goes almost without saying that a lot was in the dark. 
The main significance of recombinant DNA technology would be that it allowed for the 
isolation and cloning of definite segments of DNA. Hence, in 1971 the question as to how the 
different genes of the genome relate to each other, not to say how the genome relates to 
protein structure, could not yet be posed in any meaningful manner.  
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In 1968, Meselson and Yuan had conducted experiments to investigate the action of 
bacteriophage on two different strains of E. coli (Meselson and Yuan 1968). During these 
experiments, they discovered a peculiar thing about the two strains, namely their ability to 
protect themselves from foreign substances by discriminating between their own DNA and 
that from other organisms. This was achieved by the marking of the own DNA with a specific 
methyl group (methylation), the absence of which singled out DNA as foreign. But the really 
interesting aspect lay in the discovery of the thereto connected protective mechanism: specific 
enzymes that would serve to cut the foreign DNA into pieces, thereby rendering it harmless. 
These were named restriction enzymes, or restriction endonucleases, and they would play a 
major role in the recombinant DNA technologies that were to come. Up until then, different 
DNAses had been attempted used for the cutting of exact fragments of DNA sequences, but 
results were meagre. These DNAses did not display the required sequence-specific action and 
so the results had been too inaccurate to go on with (Watson, Tooze et al. 1983). 
 
The strategy developed by Jackson, Symons and Berg was to use the phage Lambda as a 
vector for introducing DNA from the SV40 virus into a host culture, E.coli, where it would 
replicate. Both lambda and SV40 DNA are circularly closed, and so they had to be cleaved 
prior to synthesis. Such an operation had not been possible until the discovery of the 
restriction enzyme endonuclease. Treatment with the enzymes terminal transferase and 
lambda exonuclease modified the two terminis of DNA by the removal of parts of the 5’ 
regions and the adding of complementary nucleotides to the 3’ end. Next, the two DNAs were 
annealed (joined) to form a new circular structure and finally they were treated with E. Coli 
polymerase, ligase and exonuclease. The result was a hybrid molecule, containing “the 
information to code for most of the functions of SV40, all of the functions of the E. coli 
galactose operon, and those functions of the lambda bacteriophage required for autonomous 
replication of circular DNA molecules in E. coli” (Jackson, Symons et al. 1972). 
 
The experiment was not completed, however, as the introduction of the tumour virus SV40 
into E.coli, which exists naturally in human and animal intestines, raised concerns about the 
possible consequences should the newly created organism escape from the laboratory. This 
incident led to a moratorium on further research and, eventually, also to the Asilomar 
conference, where scientists for the first time gathered in a forum to discuss the potential 
hazards of research (Rogers 1975). The conference ended in a provisional statement 
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graduating different degrees of risk inherent in different types of research. The basic 
categories became those of low, moderate or high containment, which eventually also found 
their way into official policy guidelines issued by the NIH in the USA and by the Ashby 
Committee in Great Britain (Wright 1994). 
 
However, research continued on other, less hazardous organisms, and in 1974 the research 
group of Cohen, Boyer, Goodman, Morrow, Chang and Helling published the article 
“Replication and Transcription of Eukaryotic DNA in Escherichia coli”. There, they 
described the successful cloning of Xenopus laevis DNA (a toad). For this purpose, they 
improved on the enzyme techniques developed by the Berg group, and they introduced the 
new technique of electrophoresis, by which the analysis and separation of the fragmented 
DNA was greatly improved. 
 
As already described, the value of restriction enzymes consists in their ability to recognise and 
cut DNA at specific sequences. These sequences, called palindromes, share the specific that 
they read the same in the 5’→3’ direction on both strands of DNA (Winter, Hickey et al. 
2002), 265. In 1972, Vittorio Sgaramella had improved the understanding of restriction 
enzyme action. He had used the enzyme EcoRI (taken from E.coli) to obtain linear sequences 
of DNA from the bacterial virus P2. Following separation, he observed that the fragments 
would reform spontaneously, a fact that was later explained by the discovery of the so-called 
“sticky ends” of endonuclease-generated DNA fragments. Boyer, Goodman and Hedgpeth 
further elucidated this mechanism by the determination of specific sequences created by the 
restriction enzymes (Wright 1994). Using the same restriction enzyme for different DNAs 
meant that the splits in each molecule would be identical. For instance, EcoRI acts 
specifically on the sequence GAATTC, creating a cleavage between the G and the A bases: 
 
 
Palindrome                          Restriction enzyme                                     Staggered end   
  
                ↓  
         
5’-GAATTC-3’     5’G                      AATTC-3’ 
                                                  EcoRI       →        +      
5’-CTTAAG-3’     3’CTTAA                      G-3’ 
 
            ↑        
      Staggered end 
Copied from (Winter, Hickey et al. 2002). 
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The results were so-called staggered (or sticky) ends, identical in both the Xenopus and the 
plasmid, which would render the two amenable for transformation, the process by which the 
two DNAs recombine.  
 
The DNA of the Xenopus was cut with EcoRI and linked to the plasmid pSC101, following 
which it was introduced into E.coli. The new plasmid hybrid reproduced stably. The 
experiment was remarkable not only because of the successful cloning, but also because it 
deployed the new technique of (agarose gel) electrophoresis for the purification and 
separation of specific DNA molecules. This technique offered a simple way of analysing the 
fragments of DNA cut by restriction enzymes (Helling, Goodman et al. 1974). Later on, 
electrophoresis would prove highly valuable to the sequencing of genomes.  
 
By this experimental result, a long standing dogma of biology was broken: the belief in the 
specificity of species. Although recombination occurs naturally, the crossing of species made 
possible by recombinant DNA technology broke with pre-existing orders, in science as well 
as in nature. This was in itself remarkable. But there were also other dimensions to the new 
technology, significantly its potential for industrial use in medicine and agriculture, and these 
were soon to threaten another “dogma” of science, namely its objectivity maintained through 
its (relative) independence from particular and private interests (Merton 1973; Krimsky 
2003). A press release from Stanford University announced the Xenopus experiment to the 
larger society and the news were soon picked up by major media. The new technology, it was 
stated, would bring enormous benefits to society. The production of insulin, interferon and 
growth hormone by molecular factories was forestalled as especially promising (Wright 
1994). Thus, the production of technological objects proper was starting to appear as real 
possibilities and not mere projections of a possible future, as was the case in the above quote 
from Edward Tatum’s Nobel lecture. 
 
The commercial potential of the new techniques soon became manifest on an institutional 
level: at the time of the press release, Stanford University applied for patents on the processes 
developed by Cohen, Boyer and their colleagues. This was the beginning of a new era in 
biology, in which high profile media coverage, venture capital investments and applied 
research went hand in hand. In 1981, Herbert Boyer would figure on the cover of Time 
Magazine as head of the first major biotech company, Genentech, and as biotechnology’s first 
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multimillionaire51. The company, founded in 1976 by Boyer and venture capitalist Robert 
Swanson, was to become one of the first in a series soon counting hundreds of firms uniting 
pharmaceutical research and high-risk capital (Krimsky 2003). 
 
There were also significant tendencies within the larger economy that strengthened the 
movement towards more commercially relevant research. As already described: Whereas state 
funding in the 1960s had been generous, the early 70s saw a more restrictive and selective 
funding policy. This tendency was further strengthened by significant macro-economical 
developments: In the United States, old industries like automobile, iron and textile production 
were challenged by competition within a globalising economy. In addition came the 
phenomena of “stagflation” (high inflation and high unemployment), as well as rising prices 
in the energy market. Hence, new and cost-effective and research-based industries were 
sought out, industries that would also channel money into research. Genetic engineering, 
along with areas such as telecommunications, semiconductors and aircraft, was singled out as 
one main field of investment (Wright 1994). In the years from 1975 to 1978 the number of 
recombinant DNA projects funded by the NIH went from 2 to 546, and investments rose from 
20 thousand to 61 million dollars (ibid.).  
 
That the interest of research was drawn from basic to applied science was also expressed in 
the choice of genes researched upon: from ‘classical organisms’ like mouse and Drosophilia 
to genes possessing a higher commercial and industrial potential, like hormones, interferon, 
insulin and vaccines (ibid.). 
 
But before investments into genetic engineering could pay off, serious technical challenges 
remained to be solved. Research concentrated on goals central to the control with those pieces 
of DNA that was to enter into the foreign cell, the amplification of replication, hence 
efficiency, and on the generalisation of the techniques of genetic engineering to an increasing 
spectre of DNA. Most important, says Wright, was the work on gene expression from higher 
organisms in bacteria: how to get lower organisms to turn the genetic material of higher 
organisms into proteins useful in research and industrial production alike. The years between 
1974 and 76 saw intensified research into the improvement of the newly discovered 
technologies:  
                                                 
51 http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19810309,00.html 
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-new vectors were introduced (plasmids making thousands of copies in each cell; pBR322, as 
well as development of the lambda bacterial virus) 
  
-new cloning techniques were taken into use. Of special significance was Temin’s discovery 
in 1970 of the enzyme reverse transcriptase. The discovery of this enzyme, of which I will 
have some more to say soon, seemed to fly in the face of Crick’s central dogma, as the 
specific action of the enzyme is to transcribe mRNA into DNA52. Hence it became possible to 
select expressed genes along a given genome for cloning. The technique was soon to be 
replaced by the more effective shotgun method, in which the whole genome is fragmented by 
the use of restriction enzymes. 
  
-more effective methods for the selection of bacterial colonies containing specific DNA 
(screening of radioactively labelled DNA) were developed. 
 
-new sequencing techniques were introduced by Sanger, Maxam and Gilbert at the Harvard 
University. Sequencing means the procedure by which the exact order of nucleotides along 
the DNA molecule is read of (Watson 1992). 
Inconsistencies of biological meaning and information… 
In the fall of 1977 a team lead by Boyer succeeded in synthesising the peptide hormone 
somatostatin and to have it expressed in E. Coli. From an industrial point of view, these were 
good news. And indeed the investments by venture capital companies as well as larger, 
multinational concerns sky-rocketed in the years to come, only to stagnate in 1983, as 
expectancies somehow cooled off (Wright 1994). At the time, major research interests were 
directed at the regulatory genes of higher organisms, made possible by the new recombinant 
and cloning techniques. But when the first results of the probes into chromosomal structure 
were announced, the community of researchers was in for a surprise. In accordance with the 
central dogma,  
 
“It was taken for granted that the nucleotide sequences within the genes would be identical to the ones 
in the cDNA probes. Yet the first preliminary results indicated that the restriction fragments obtained 
from the segments of DNA were frequently different from the ones generated from their related cDNA 
probes…it seemed impossible for the cDNA (or mRNA) to be other than identical to the sequences 
from which they were transcribed” (Watson, Tooze et al. 1983:91). 
                                                 
52 DNA transcribed in this way is known as cDNA, complementary or copy DNA. 
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It had been known for some time that early versions of mRNA (so-called pre-mRNAs) were 
cut down to shorter sequences during transcription in the nucleus. But it had been taken for 
granted that this processing consisted in the removal of regulatory DNA only, assumed to 
reside at the 5’ and 3’ ends of the pre-mRNA (ibid.). Following this logic, gene expression 
would still faithfully reproduce the sequence of structural genes on the DNA molecule. But 
now it was discovered that the DNA of higher organisms (i.e. animal viruses) was fragmented 
into coding (exons) and non-coding regions (introns). The introns, for which no function 
could be discerned, were promptly referred to as “junk DNA”, and their presence raised tricky 
questions. In evolutionary terms: What were the introns doing there? And what remained of 
the strict correspondence between DNA and protein earlier found in prokaryotes? (Fox Keller 
2000). The role of junk DNA still remains little understood, but the mechanism by which the 
introns are excised, DNA splicing, has been shown to consist in the joint actions of pre-
mRNA and small nuclear ribonucleoproteins (“snurps”), that together make up so-called 
splicosomes (Winter, Hickey et al. 2002). 
 
The picture was complicated further when it was discovered that splicing (or editing) would 
also proceed in a number of different ways, so-called alternative splicing. By this is meant the 
ways in which different mRNA transcripts are formed from the same primary transcript. The 
potential for variation does not end there, however: it was soon discovered that different 
proteins may also be synthesised from the same mRNA. Which primary transcript finally 
translates into which protein, then, remains a highly variable matter, depending on a range of 
contextual factors, among them the type of cell and its stage of development. What’s further, 
it seems that many of these changes of the translation process also rely upon the binding of 
proteins to the primary transcript (the promoter site), and so in fact gene expression cannot be 
pictured as initiated by the genetic program (qua prime mover), at least not in higher 
organisms (Fox Keller 2000). There are lots of other editing mechanisms as well: DNA repair, 
exons from different primary transcripts are spliced (“transposable genes”), foreign bases may 
be introduced and so on.  
 
In addition to the above factors, the fact should also be mentioned that a very low percentage 
of the genes along the chromosome actually codes for proteins (“structural genes”), maybe as 
little as three percent. Other kinds of genes, however, seem to exist in abundance: promoters, 
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terminators, activators or leaders…-genes whose roles are not connected directly to the 
production of proteins (ibid.). Also this state of affairs turned up as a result of the ability to 
isolate, control and sequence the expression of specific genes in vitro. 
 
Hence, the “one gene – one enzyme” hypothesis was forever relegated to the junk-pile of 
history. And, speaking of higher organisms, the operon model did not fare much better. As 
seen, the “simple” division of operator and regulatory genes expected to be found along the 
DNA transcript did not appear. In stead, a variety of regulatory mechanisms turned up that 
pointed in the direction of contextual, not genetic, regulation of gene expression. And indeed, 
here we find important pointers towards dominant trends within present-day research: 
 
“It is from these regulatory dynamics [of the cell as a whole], and not from the gene itself, that the 
signal (or signals) determining the specific pattern in which the final transcript is to be formed actually 
comes. Unravelling the structure of such signalling pathways has become a major focus of 
contemporary molecular biology, and while the temptation remains strong to order these pathways as 
linear sequences of events deriving from the action of yet other genes, the evidence that is 
accumulating makes such a simple ordering ever more difficult” (ibid., 63). 
 
Parts of the evidence here alluded to started accumulating already in the 1950s and 60s, but 
became manifest only in the late seventies with the early results of recombinant DNA 
technology.  
 
However, obstacles like these did not seem to cause great concern among the gene’s loudest 
proponents: “The focus of research was not the expression of genes in general, but the 
expression of genes coding for commercially important proteins” (Wright 1994:84). The first 
success of the new “industrial-academic complex” also came in the year of 1977, when 
Herbert Boyer and his team at the University of California, alongside Keiichi Itakure at the 
City Hope National Medical Centre in California, succeeded with the complete expression of 
an animal protein in bacterial culture. The final product, somatostatin, is a peptide hormone 
found in the brain of humans (ibid.).  
 
By this time, the number of small biotech/engineering firms started to rise (Cetus, Biogen, 
Genex, Genentech) and an increasing number of multinational corporations were taking an 
interest in the field. In the beginning, this interest took the form of investments in the smaller 
companies. In that way the multinationals (Eli Lilly, Monsanto, Standard Oil Louisiana, 
Abbott Labs, Philips Petroleum, Kellogg, Dow, Hoechst, Kleiner and Perkins and so on) 
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could monitor the development within the field. New constellations developed between 
universities, governmental agencies, small engineering firms and large-scale companies. 
Eventually, also venture capitalist companies found their way into the business, placing high-
risk investments behind the prospective developed in the engineering firms and university 
institutes. Later on, the large-scale companies would enter the competition in a heavier 
manner, establishing their own research institutes and buying expertise from the universities 
and engineering firms. In 1979, the Carter administration instigated a policy designed to 
increase cooperation between science, industry and the military which was to be continued 
and expanded by Reagan in the early 80s: liberalisation of patent rights, tax incentives 
encouraging the flow of high-risk venture capital into the new start-up companies, increased 
state support for research into commercially promising technologies. In England, with the 
election of Margaret Thatcher, similar developments took place (Wright 1986). 
 
“From the beginning, the new firms used aggressive research and development, proprietary, 
and communications strategies to advance themselves” (ibid.). No wonder many of the 
prospects offered were of a rather optimistic nature, no longer guided by the research ethos of 
science but now also by the dynamics of venture investment and large-scale capitalism. One 
case in point was the joint announcement of Genentech and the City Hope National Medical 
Centre of the (alleged) stabilisation and expression of the gene for human insulin in E.coli. 
The announcement was made at a press conference, together with the announcement of a 
multi-million dollar contract with the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly. However, the 
scientific “breakthrough” was not as original as claimed, and the results were highly 
premature with respect to the feasibility of the project. Says Wright: 
 
“In summary, as genetic engineering became seen as a promising investment prospect, a turn from 
traditional scientific norms and practices towards a corporate standard took place. The dawn of 
synthetic biology coincided with the emergence of a new ethos, one radically shaped by commerce” 
(Wright 1994:107) 53. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 For an analysis of the new biotechnologies and the traditional research ethos articulated by Robert Merton, see 
(Krimsky 2003). 
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6. Re-opening the space of development: mapping and 
sequencing the human genome 
 
However you consider it, the label The Human 
Genome Project is of course multiply misleading. 
Take it apart. “The human genome”. As we all know, 
there is no one human genome…at the level of the 
mapping of genes the differences among individuals 
may be unimportant…Yet when we come to 
sequencing, on a scale at least a thousand times finer 
than gene mapping, we will be interested in precisely 
those stretches that we know to contain our genes and 
control elements and where variation is high. Here we 
uncover clues to disease; here may be buried our 
talents. Here, the preconception that there is one 
human genome, implicit but unexamined in the name 
of the project and built into the way the project is 
being carried out, is both false and pernicious 
 
Horace Freeland Judson, The Eight Day of Creation  
 
We have already seen how the human genome, in the 1960s and 1970s, counterfactually, 
came to be perceived of in terms of the genetic program, and so it is today more often than not 
displayed as a unified object. Referring to such different characters as Walter Gilbert, Bob 
Waterston and John Sulston, Adam Bostanci writes that:  
 
“Visionary molecular biologists have always conceived of the human genome as a single natural 
object. Dubbing their fantastic plan of determining the sequence of its building blocks the “holy grail 
of genetics”, they predicted that the human genome sequence would eventually become “the central 
organizing principle for human genetics in the next century”” (Bostanci 2004).   
 
 
In what follows, I will try to reconstruct some of the developments that went into the broad 
establishment of the human genome as a global (in a double sense) organisational principle. 
The Human Genome Project emerged as the result of a complex set of scientific, 
technological, administrative and political factors. I will try and single out some of the most 
important of those, but it goes without saying that the complexity of the project, its 
contemporariness and the scope of this text do not offer the opportunity to go into details. The 
central point, however, is not to give a detailed historical description, but to get at the status of 
the genome as an action-organising principle and object. Can any conclusions be drawn as to 
the implications of the present state of knowledge for experimental, clinical and legal action? 
What kinds of clinical action does the genome permit/facilitate, and which are the significant 
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social implications of its implementation given the wider institutional and epistemic context 
to which it is shackled? When coupled to Beck’s theory of first and second modernity, the 
case of immunology will eventually be used as a reference-point for evaluating the present 
situation insofar as the two objects of the antibody and the genome make up statutory cases, 
almost social-epistemic “ideal types”, of first and second modernity.  
Mapping technologies54 
On the technical and scientific side, already mentioned developments within recombinant 
DNA technology were of great importance to the efforts of mapping genomes. First and 
foremost: restriction enzymes, allowing for sequences of DNA to be cut at specific sites, were 
of great importance. Together with the use of ligases these formed a basic toolbox that could 
be used to “cut and paste” nucleus acids. Combined with new cloning techniques (i.e. 
recombination in bacterial cultures through the use of vectors), these enzymes allowed for the 
copying of large amounts of specific gene fragments into so-called “clone libraries”. Through 
further treatment with enzymes, new fragments of DNA (“contigs”) could be made that next 
could be measured according to length by electrophoresis. Eventually, the resulting fragments 
could be pieced together so as to form a map of chromosome structure (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
Cloning techniques were further advanced by the ability to duplicate large chromosome 
sequences in yeast, so-called “Yeast Artificial Chromosomes” (YACs). These procedures, 
“physical mapping”, allow for specific gene loci to be mapped accurately onto the 
chromosomes on which they reside. Later on, physical mapping has been improved, notably 
through different hybridisation techniques (Winter, Hickey et al. 2002), following which the 
ability to map genes onto their respective chromosomes have been performed with greater 
resolution and detail.  
 
From a clinical point of view, the technique of genetic linkage mapping, emerging more or 
less simultaneously with physical mapping in the late 1970s/early 1980s, proved of more 
immediate value. The practical and scientific value of genetic linkage mapping lay in its 
ability to combine classical methods from human genetics with the new molecular genetics. 
Traditionally, human genetics had been cut off from the interventionist techniques of 
Mendelian/Morganian crossings due to physiological factors (procreation rate) and from the 
new molecular biology due to ethical restrictions on experiments on humans. Hence, its 
domain of action had been restricted to statistical correlations between family pedigrees and 
                                                 
54 For a discussion of the mapping metaphor, see (Gaudilliere and Rheinberger 2004). 
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ordinary clinical diagnoses. However, due to increasing capabilities in mapping genes onto 
more or less specific chromosomal sites, it was just a question of time before genetic markers 
found their way into traditional mapping practices, hence establishing the first major interface 
between molecular genetics and clinical science. The central problem consisted in locating the 
genes of specific diseases along the genome when these genes themselves were unknown: At 
the time, the task must have seen even worse than searching for the needle in the hay-stack.  
 
Mark Skolnick and his team of researchers at the University of Utah found a way around this 
problem by concentrating, not on the disease genes themselves, but on certain markers 
situated in locations nearby the genes on the same chromosome. These markers were 
established on the background of natural genetic variations occurring among members of the 
same family. If enough such variations could be found, both within single families and 
between different families, Skolnick and his colleagues figured out that these could be used as 
substitutes for the genes themselves (Cook-Deegan 1994). The rationale for this way of 
proceeding lay in the two following states of affairs: 1) Genetic loci occupying neighbouring 
or adjacent positions on the same chromosome tend to be passed on together from generation 
to generation. The closer the loci of two or more genes, the greater the chance of them 
occurring together also in the next generation, hence the greater the probability that they will 
not recombine. The distance between two or more genes can therefore be measured by 
recombination frequency, expressing the statistical probability of the two loci occurring 
together also in the progeny (Winter, Hickey et al. 2002). 2) The same genetic loci may be 
subject to a limited number of internal variances among family members. It is this state of 
affairs that allows for the loci to serve as markers for genetic variance: differences among the 
genetic markers of the individual family members are correlated to phenotype variance, i.e., 
the occurrence or non-occurrence of disease in the person. Hence, it becomes a question, not 
of finding the gene itself, but of finding markers that are sufficiently nearby the disease gene. 
If enough observations can be made correlating the same genetic markers with the same 
disease in different individuals, this will make up sufficient evidence for the genetic link to be 
inferred. The markers established by Skolnick and his colleagues were termed restriction 
fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs). They were constructed by the use of specific 
restriction enzymes to find repeated sequences of DNA, a phenomenon occurring throughout 
the genome and with a frequency sufficiently high to “anchor” a map (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s then, the Utah group set out to establish enough RFLPs to 
map disease genes onto specific regions of different chromosomal regions. The work was 
supported by both the NIH and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (a private foundation). 
Utah was strategically chosen because of the high numbers of Mormones in that area. 
Mormones keep especially close tracking of their family pedigrees due to religious reasons, 
and so their cooperation was another important factor for the success of the undertaking. The 
Utah group soon received competition from a privately funded team, that of Helen Donis-
Keller from Collaborative Research, Inc. in Boston. 
 
In spite of problems financing the undertaking (Donis-Keller was turned down first by NIH 
then by Wall Street) Collaborative Research continued their mapping work and the hunt for 
disease genes. The entry of different research teams and private capital contributed a strong 
sense of competitiveness to the gene hunt. With the heightened practical potential of the new 
molecular techniques also came a transformation of the research community: 
 
“Despite the professional tensions, or perhaps abetted by them, the genetic linkage map beginning to 
coalescence around the efforts of the groups at Utah, Collaborative Research, and elsewhere became 
an enormously powerful tool. The number, pace and scale of hunts for human disease genes increased 
dramatically in the late 1980s. RFLP mapping reached a fever pitch, often flashing a sharp, 
competitive edge. In musing on the history of their field, geneticists James Crow and William Dove 
compared the 1987 ‘map flap’ with publication of the first genetic linkage map, Alfred Sturtevant’s 
1913 paper on Drosophila: “these quiet beginnings stand in abrupt contrast to the current hubbub over 
the human linkage map and the proper definition of a map. With its rival factions and the glare of 
publicity, the mapping race is almost a genetic Olympics.”Crow and Dove betray a tinge of nostalgia, 
even a tacit disapproval, of the style among new upstarters. But the world had changed” (Cook-
Deegan 1994:71). 
 
In the period 1983-87, several important discoveries of markers for genetic disease followed: 
Huntington’s and Duchenne’s in 1983, polycystic kidney disease, retinoblastoma and cystic 
fibrosis in 1985. The first genes with unknown functions were found in 1987. The greatest 
story of success, as described by Cook-Degan, was that of the CF marker in 1985, followed 
by the location of the gene itself in 1989. The consequences, although drawn on somehow 
optimistic premises were correctly deemed to be drastic. The New York Times pronounced 
that: “A new phase in the application of molecular genetics to the dissection of human 
inherited disease has begun”. And, quoting Donis-Keller, it was announced that the new 
techniques “…will give choices that were never before possible” (Schmeck Jr. 1987).  
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DNA Sequencing 
In spite of the successes of groups involved in linkage mapping, the decisive technological 
impetus of the Human Genome Project came from elsewhere. The techniques of linkage 
mapping would be helpful for locating specific genes to specific chromosomes, but they did 
not reveal the actual location of the disease genes (Cook-Deegan 1994). Physical mapping, on 
the other hand, would go some way in serving this purpose, but the problem with that 
technique was that it presupposed that the gene and its function was already known. The first 
physical maps to be made were successful largely because they were carried out on well 
established model organisms, like yeast and worms. These projects, then, were able to draw 
on bodies of knowledge that were not available to human geneticists (and would for that 
reason come to serve as valuable “model projects” for the Human Genome Project).  
 
Sequencing is the systematic registration of the order of base-pairs along the DNA strand 
(Watson 1992). Whereas the previous mapping techniques generally presupposed that 
something was known about the gene and its products, i.e. that it had been expressed, 
sequencing meant reading off the DNA “itself”, and so offered a more direct approach to 
mapping. In the mid 1970s, Fredrick Sanger (Cambridge) took procedures for protein and 
RNA sequencing (to a huge extent developed by himself) one step further and applied them to 
DNA. The new sequencing techniques took advantage of the naturally occurring replication 
process of DNA, and upon the triplet variations over the four bases A, C, G and T in each 
single “informational unit”. Sanger found a way to mark one single base, say, G, and insert it 
into the replication of a single sequence. The replication process would come to a halt when 
reaching the position of the new, modified base, G*. For example, the sequence 
AGCTCCGAGGT would come out as the sequences AG* (end), AGCTCCG* (end), 
AGCTCCGG* (end). From this it was deduced that G was located in positions 2, 7, 9 and 10. 
By repeating the process with the other bases, the final sequence would in the end be 
established (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
 
Sanger’s accomplishment was paralleled by that of Gilbert and Maxam, who, working out of 
Cambridge in the USA, came up with a different sequencing method. The procedures, 
respectively termed the chain termination method (Sanger) and the chemical degradation 
method (Gilbert and Maxam) were laborious and monotonous, and were often carried out by 
PhD or post-doc students. In the years to come, work centred on the automation and up-
speeding of the sequencing process. Most of these efforts came from companies that produced 
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lab equipment: “A few companies were formed to develop instruments, usually growing out 
of academic centres to fill market niches left vacant by larger companies” (ibid. 64).  
 
Between 1983 and 1987, two teams worked hard to apply the proper technological apparatus 
to the automation of sequencing. Caltech55, a public university, but supported by big 
companies like Monsanto and Upjohn, focused on the application of fluorescent dyeing 
techniques, whereas Applied Biosystems (a company) focused on detection and slab gel 
techniques. During a short span of time, a wide range of complementary technologies became 
available at the market: 
 
“A group from Applied Biosystems visited Caltech in the spring of 1981, just after the first gas-phase 
protein sequencer had been developed. Applied Biosystems later picked up the license for the protein 
sequencer and evinced interest in the protein synthesizer, DNA synthesis machine, DNA sequencer 
and other instruments under development at Caltech. With this suite of four instruments, a laboratory 
could break down proteins and DNA into their component sequences or build up a specified protein or 
DNA sequence from scratch. These were essential steps in a wide range of molecular biology 
experiments. Instruments to sequence and synthesise proteins and DNA formed the technological 
quartet for a new approach to biological research” (ibid., 67). 
 
Up until that time, Beckman Instruments had been the leading company within protein 
synthesisers. When its founder, Beckman, who had been financing research at Caltech, 
learned that the protein synthesiser had been sold to a competitor, the newly founded Applied 
Biosystems, he became furious. But Leroy Hood, who had played a central role in both the 
engineering and the fund-raising process behind the new machine, felt that he was in the clear. 
As it was, Beckman Instruments middle manager had been offered the machine, but had 
turned the offer down. “Hood learned that selling a new idea required approaches to top 
management and also convincing middle management and corporate technical experts. 
Individuals at many levels could block a new idea; progress required all the gates to be open” 
(ibid.). 
 
When the first automated DNA-sequencer eventually hit the market in 1986, it was based 
upon the application of fluorescent dyes to cut strands of DNA. Each of the dyes (four in 
number) would connect to the ends of specific pieces of DNA, depending upon which of the 
bases was at the end; A, C, G or T. When run through agarose gel and beamed with a laser, 
the different colours would identify the base by its colour. Following this, the cut pieces were 
re-assembled to the original sequences using computer algorithms (Indeed, the Cartesian 
                                                 
55 California Institute of Technology 
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notion of analysis and synthesis had found its technological expression). A main difference, 
though, was that the sequencers and synthesizers of Applied Biosystems also allowed for the 
synthesis of new compounds, not previously existing in nature. 
 
The sequencer, when completed, soon became a commercial success and spread throughout 
the world56. Being as it was itself a product of a highly competitive and commercialised 
cooperation between science and industry the sequencer fitted well into the global 
environment it now entered. Both in Europe and in Japan different sequencing efforts were 
well under way, usually more or less co-existent with efforts to develop own sequencing 
technologies. Hence, competition ranged simultaneously over the areas of science, industry 
and commerce, the goal being to come up with the best results, products and technologies 
first, thereby to gain position in the global market (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
 
The new techniques for physical and genetic linkage mapping and DNA sequencing co-
developed, and eventually came to make up complementary parts in the general process of 
genome mapping. Because linkage mapping served to correlate the disease gene to a specific 
clinical diagnosis, it was a valuable tool for anchoring (embedding) the physical map, which 
on its side would offer a more accurate description of the specific area on the chromosome. 
Sequencing, on the other hand, would be able to offer bigger maps of even higher resolution, 
and it would also yield structural information about so far unknown genes. Hence, in the 
general debate leading up to the Human Genome Project, the “trialectic” of the three 
technologies was often heavily underlined (Cook-Deegan 1994).  
 
Developments within sequencing technologies and improved maps were incremental to the 
increasing success in finding disease genes. Whereas single gene hunts in the early 1980s had 
to be undertaken with no knowledge of the overall position of the relevant gene, conditions 
improved towards the end of that decade. Early attempts were particularly laborious: with no 
clue as to the position of the gene along the genome, other traces had to be followed, like 
knowledge of the gene product (the protein or some specific antibody connected thereto), or 
knowledge of the function of that gene (Strachan 1999). As mapping projects of the human 
genome got under way, possibilities for finding disease genes also increased. A number of 
different strategies and techniques had to be combined to get to the single gene: clinical, 
                                                 
56 Cf. http://www.genomenewsnetwork.org/ 
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experimental and computational. Once a candidate gene had been found, it had to be checked 
against mutations in affected persons. In the mid 1980s, the technique of positional cloning, 
introduced by Francis Collins, improved conditions further. The technique became possible 
because of improved maps, and could be used to correlate knowledge of gene positions with 
knowledge of mutations in affected families. The genes for Duchenne muscular dystrophy, 
cystic fibrosis, adult polycystic kidney disease, Huntington disease, colorectal cancer and 
breast cancer all were discovered using this technique (Strachan 1999). 
 
Much of the following work went into the rationalisation of procedures, technologies and 
instrumentation, all in the name of faster, bigger and more accurate sequences, work that 
cannot be described here. One important innovation that deserves to be mentioned, however, 
is that of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). 
 
PCR is a highly efficient technique for copying DNA by way of enzyme reaction, developed 
by Kay Mullis at the Cetus Corporation in the mid 1980s57. Whereas copying sequences of 
DNA had been possible since the 1970s through cloning, the process was often slow and 
laborious. By the use of PCR, each new copy of DNA acts as a template for the synthesis of a 
new copy; hence the number of copies rose exponentially. Whereas cloning had been 
restricted to the copying of long stretches of DNA, with this new technology one was able to 
copy specific and also very small stretches or regions. Indeed, the bottom limit would be the 
single gene “itself”, as long as it did not consist of less than a hundred base pairs (Doggett 
1992). The process is carried out in a test tube, where template DNA is mixed with nucleotide 
precursors for making the new DNA and a DNA polymerase enzyme (The enzyme was called 
TAQ polymerase. ‘Polymerization’ denotes the process by which a number of simple 
molecules are formed into a compound called a polymer. A polymerase acts as an enzyme in 
this process). The reaction is initiated by heating the mixture, whereby the two strands of 
DNA separate. In the original technique, this process had to be repeated for each new cycle. 
By 1986, the Cetus group had replaced the original enzyme with one found in hot springs, and 
this new enzyme made sure that DNA constantly was copied anew. Among other advantages, 
this allowed for the process to proceed without the need for replacing the enzyme between the 
cycles. Indeed, it was later asserted that “the genome project itself had become practical only 
in the wake of Mullis’s discovery. PCR was a godsend” (ibid.). It should also be mentioned 
                                                 
57 A close description of the process is offered in (Rabinow 1996). 
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that PCR has proved valuable not only to sequencing efforts, but in many other, related fields 
as well. Because it makes the analysis of DNA in ordinary biological samples possible, PCR 
is used in forensic analysis, in genetic anthropology, developmental genetics and for taking 
blood or tissue samples in clinical practice (Rabinow 1996).  
Some policy issues 
As indicated above, in the last part of the 1980s the number of obstacles to the sequencing of 
the human genome was great: inadequate technologies, a general lack of over-all organisation 
among research groups and laboratories, and correspondingly few communicative strategies 
to coordinate the efforts of biologists involved in different mapping projects58. The scientific 
community was generally sceptical towards any such large-scale research projects; it was 
clear that it would have to take a coordinated effort among groups that were not used to 
working in large teams (Alberts 1985). The feasibility of a sequencing project was also 
questioned on scientific grounds. At a meeting in Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, put 
together by James Watson, the idea of a synchronised genome mapping effort was set forth. 
The idea stemmed from Charles Delisi of the Department of Energy (DOE), who also 
envisaged his department as coordinator of the project. The proposal met with massive 
critique from a huge number of central geneticists and molecular biologists. Strong support 
gathered for David Botstein, who argued that the mere size of the project would change the 
structure of science, and that the change might eventually turn out negative for the scientific 
community (Cook-Deegan 1994).  
 
However, other forces were also in motion. The idea had been circulating, among scientists as 
well as administrators and policymakers. Not unimportantly, major databases resulting from 
DNA sequencing had already been established, one in Los Alamos, the other at the European 
Molecular Biology Laboratory in Heidelberg, Germany. Soon other agencies also came to 
concern themselves with the idea, and these were agencies that were at the very heart of 
policy-making and research within the life sciences. The proposal of DOE, it was argued, 
suffered from a general lack of biological know-how, depending too heavily on perspectives 
                                                 
58 Here I refer mainly to the understanding among scientists involved in clearing up the problems involved 
before large-scale mapping and sequencing could take place: “The human genome project should differ from 
present ongoing research inasmuch as the component subprojects should have the potential to improve by 5- to 
10-fold increments the scale or efficiency of mapping, sequencing, analyzing, or interpreting the information in 
the human genome. Progress toward all the above goals will require the establishment of well-funded central 
facilities, including a stock center for the cloned DNA fragments generated in the mapping and sequencing effort 
and a data center for the computer-based collection and distribution of large amounts of DNA sequence 
information” (National Research Council 1988). 
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from engineering, and with a too strong emphasis upon (sequencing) technology to solve the 
biological problems involved (not unlike the situation with the Rockefeller Foundation in the 
1940s). One strong actor became the Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI), in the 
eighties the largest private foundation supporting physiological research in the USA. In July 
1986 it hosted an international meeting held at the premises of the NIH, also this fronted by 
central scientists like Watson and Gilbert, where the possibilities of a coordinated sequencing 
program was discussed anew. This time, however, the emphasis was more upon sequencing 
strategies as continuations of already existing mapping practices. The one without the other, it 
was stated, made little sense (ibid.). It was also a massive display of power in which the 
pendulum set in motion at the Cold Spring Harbor meeting (held only one month previously) 
seemed to have oscillated in the opposite direction:  
 
“The HHMI forum turned into a love fest for a redefined genome project. There were several brief 
presentations about the technologies and what was going on in the U.S. agencies and in other parts of 
the world. But mainly, it was a show of power – a battleship summit for molecular biology” (Cook-
Deegan 1994:122). 
 
One obvious reason for this change of heart was that the strongest critics from Cold Spring 
were not present at the HHMI meeting. However, consensus that the project should be carried 
out was growing, and towards the end of the 1980s the central question was not if there was 
going to be a project, but rather how it was to be carried out (ibid.). 
 
The consensus to carry out sequencing of the human genome was strengthened by the gradual 
involvement of central agencies like the National Academy of Sciences and the NIH. By 
including well-known scientists and sceptics towards large-scale sequencing in the 
preparatory work, and by placing more emphasis upon linkage and physical mapping 
strategies, the project became more acceptable to a wider part of the scientific community, as 
exemplified by a conditioned approval issued by the American Society for Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology in June 1987. The close connection between organisational structure and 
the quality of scientific work was put into clear focus. The scientific community feared a 
strong top-down structure in which the main premises were set by administrators and 
politicians, and not by scientists themselves. It should be kept in mind that, at this stage, there 
was no lack of mapping and sequencing data: a number of projects were already well under 
way, pouring data into the databases. GenBank, the database of the National Institute of 
General Medical Science (NIGMS), was in desperate need of upgrading in order to keep up 
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with developments. And so the quality of science came to be debated in terms of quality 
versus quantity:  
 
“Delbecco challenged Baltimore by saying that the aggregate of cost of doing many small projects 
would drastically exceed the cost of an organized program. Botstein countered that the costs would be 
higher, but the amount of information beyond mere sequence data would also be significantly greater” 
(ibid. 140). 
 
A closer attention to the state of the art of mapping practices seemed to clarify the matter. 
During work for a committee set down by the NAS to clear technical and scientific issues 
involved in the project, Maynard Olson’s reference to the tradition instigated by Fredrick 
Sanger in Cambridge, England, won strong support. Sanger’s strategy was to aim for the 
limits of the technically feasible so as to integrate technological developments into the 
mapping project as it was progressing, a gradual up-scaling (ibid.).  
 
It should also be noted how the involvement of the NIH meant closer connections to both 
scientists and politicians due to the special position of that organisation. It already occupied a 
central mediating position between the two groups, being as it was (is) the largest research 
funding agency for the biomedical sciences in the U.S and enjoying great popularity in 
Congress. At the same time it was (is) not tied down by the restrictions normally applying to 
administrative agencies or departments (i.e. it posited wide discretionary powers). Director 
James Wyngarden did an important job by introducing the project in political circles and by 
rendering it compatible with the complex appropriations process necessary to secure support 
from Congress (ibid.). As described by Cook-Deegan, this operation of translating scientific 
goals and needs into an administrative and politically comprehensive language was 
instrumental in the establishment of political support for the project. 
Some developments on the ground… 
During the 1980s a large number of private as well as public mapping centres and research 
groups came into being. By 1987 it was estimated that a number of 4 257 human genes were 
identified. About 1 200 of these had been mapped onto specific chromosomes or 
chromosomal regions (Office of Technology Assessment 1988). At the time, the total number 
of genes was estimated to somewhere between 80 and 100 000; in more recent times these 
numbers have been corrected to somewhere between 20 and 25 000 (Coghlan 2004). In 
addition, the mapping of the genomes of several other organisms was also well under way. 
These other genome projects were deemed highly valuable also for the sake of mapping the 
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human genome, -as well-studied model organisms they served important clues to the 
correlation of gene and gene product also in humans. 
 
Percentage of genome sequenced in some well-studied organisms in 1988 
Organism          Genome size (base pairs)        % sequenced 
Escherichia coli bacterium) 4.7 million 16 
Saccaromyces cerevisiae (yeast) 15 million 4 
Caenorhebditis elegans (nematode) 80 million .06 
Drosophila melanogaster (fruit fly) 155 million .26 
Mus musculs (mouse) 3 billion .04 
Homo sapiens (human) 2.8 billion .08 
 
Source: (Office of Technology Assessment 1988). 
 
 
Concomitant with technological developments and the liberalised economic policies of the 
Reagan-era, a highly competitive environment emerged in which human disease genes 
occupied a privileged position. The main target was the classic Mendelian disorders, of which 
there are not many, and so the stakes were high. For those who succeeded, the award would 
be funding, prestige and patentability rights (Hilgartner 2004). 
 
Two different approaches came to define mapping and sequencing practices (ibid.). One, 
typically connected to smaller, private enterprises, was that of “gene hunting”, in which the 
focus was upon the identification and isolation of Mendelian disease genes. The other, more 
identified with larger, often publicly funded laboratories, was seeking to map the overall 
structure of whole genomes or chromosomes. For this latter purpose, low-resolution mapping 
techniques were of primary importance, whereas gene hunting, concentrating on much smaller 
regions, would aim for high-resolution maps. Now, it can easily be imagined that these two 
practices did not exist in total separation, but were involved in a complex dialectic in which 
the exchange of information played an essential role. Clones or maps from one mapping 
laboratory could be used by gene hunters and vice versa. What was more, the laboratory 
equipment deployed were the same in both lab types, and scientists would frequently work in 
projects of both kinds (ibid.).  
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Mapping and sequencing ideologies 
The issue of patentability proved a particularly hard case when it came to the sequencing of 
the human genome. So far, patentability had been restricted to the procedures of mapping 
techniques and markers, like the RFLPs, and their products, isolated genes. With respect to 
patentability, single genes that had been isolated and purified did not constitute any 
significant legal differences from the patents that emerged with the coming of recombinant 
DNA technology.  
 
Also in the mapping field ideological differences reigned within the mapping communities: 
the Hughes Institute at the Utah University and Collaborative Research each possessed about 
600 markers. Whereas the Utah Group would go public instantly after a new discovery, 
Collaborative would not. Because markers are in-exact, giving away information to a 
competing company could result in that company coming up with an even more exact marker, 
which would then out-do the scientific relevance of the first, more imprecise marker. Hence, 
keeping quiet gave a competitive edge (Roberts 1987).  
 
But when it came to sequence data the issue proved even harder to settle. In 1987, Walter 
Gilbert provoked the whole scientific community when he resigned from a public committee 
on the genome project established by the NRC, and announced his intention to carry out the 
sequencing of the genome in a private company, the Genome Corporation (Cook-Deegan 
1994). As sequencing would not yield indirect access to genes, but rather direct access to the 
“genes themselves”, i.e. to the exact base sequences, the question arose as to whom the 
genome actually belonged (Roberts 1987). Two poles emerged, one “public” and one 
“private”, the first claiming the genome to be the collective property of the human race, the 
other denying the validity of the basic premises of the argument. Typically, as argued by 
Gilbert: “the sequence data is not identical with the genome itself; hence the data can be 
patented” (ibid.). Obviously the question was of huge significance for those with industrial 
and commercial interests in the new technologies: “A key question for industry…is how to 
protect our investment and collaborate with scientists. We need new mechanisms to protect 
our rights or it will not work…For 90 % of the work we do, we don’t see how we can share 
it”, Bernadette Alford, Collaborative Lawyer, quoted in (ibid.). Two problems emerged: First, 
whereas mapping and sequencing data were highly scarce resources to be protected, there was 
also a need to share work. Hence, data exchange was often entangled in complex strategies of 
give-and-take among the actors involved (especially among the disease hunters), in many 
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cases leading to relations of mutual distrust (Hilgartner 2004). Second, in the question of 
patentability, case law was restricted to tangible property, whereas sequence data is 
immaterial. No precedent existed for the legal battles that would follow (Eisenberg 2002). The 
patenting debate would follow and structure the Human Genome Project in important ways in 
the years to come. I return to this problem in the chapter on patentability. 
 
For most practical purposes then, the ideal types of “public” or “private” were already 
muddled up (Gieryn 1998), hurdled into the dynamics of second modernity where long 
accustomed categories lose their sense and re-emerge within new conceptual contexts and 
institutional configurations (Beck and Bonss 2001). As stated in one Science article, “…the 
majority of the nation's leading molecular biologists have corporate ties of some kind” 
(Roberts 1987). Hence, in the United States at least, most molecular biologists working for 
public or other non-commercial organisations were also, in some way or other, working for 
private companies, so that, beyond the purely conceptual level, it became notoriously difficult 
to differentiate the one from the other. 
Integrating policies  
But strong incentives were also pulling in the direction of a more sharing, coordinated effort: 
given the state of available technology, the shear size of the task was enormous, not to say 
insurmountable. Hence, the necessity of sharing tasks and exchanging information about the 
different parts of the genome was strong. Given the coexistence of needs for cooperation and 
the obstacles to such cooperation posed by the strong competitiveness of the field, it may not 
surprise that a more coordinated effort emerged as the best option. In 1988, two central policy 
documents emerged in the United States, one made by the Office of Technology Assessment59 
(OTA), the other by the National Research Council (NRC). By the first, it was noted that: 
 
“…some general ethical questions are moot because of contemporary realities, for example, the 
question of whether there should be any human genome mapping and sequencing activities at all. The 
question is moot because mapping and sequencing projects have been underway for over a decade and 
there has been no concerted effort to prohibit them. The more immediate questions, therefore, are how 
these projects should best proceed from now on and what use should be made of new genetic 
information” (Office of Technology Assessment 1988).  
 
The conclusion seemed inevitable. The National Research Council saw things the same way: 
 
“…it should be noted that RFLPs will continue to be developed, maps will be made, and genetic 
counselling will occur even without a concerted effort to map and sequence the human genome. The 
                                                 
59 The group behind this report had Robert Cook-Deegan as its project director. 
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greater coordination and quality control that will result from a concerted effort will in fact benefit the 
public by reducing the chance of misuse of poorly organized information” (National Research Council 
1988). 
 
 
It is likely that reasons like these counted strongly for many initial critics that eventually came 
out as proponents of a concerted genome effort. Still, at this stage there was no direct 
suggestion of a single project. Referring to a human genome project, DOE wrote that  
 
”the term is a useful way to link research initiatives and to distinguish them from ongoing programs 
for budget planning. It highlights the ultimate objective- understanding human biology by developing 
a new set of research resources – and captures political support and broad public interest. It has had the 
effect, however, of generating rancorous debate which has inhibited the development of consensus on 
how to improve the research infrastructure. The importance of maps, databases, and repositories has 
been obscured by the controversy over massive DNA sequencing” (Office of Technology Assessment 
1988). 
 
  
Concerted mapping and sequencing efforts, then, were displayed as natural continuations of 
existing mapping practices, and as “bottom-up” rather than “top-down”. This integrative 
attitude also seemed to characterise the general epistemic status of genomic data: the 
exclusive status often ascribed to genetics was to be integrated within the larger field of 
biology: 
 
“The Human Genome Project invites confusion by implying that the human genome will be 
understood when the project is over. The immediate goal of genome projects is not complete 
understanding, but creating tools to bring about such understanding in the 21st century. Understanding 
encompasses all biomedical research; it does not distinguish genome projects from others” (ibid.). 
 
In retrospect, this humble approach is understandable due to the high levels of conflict 
generated by rumours of a monolithic sequencing project, and by the need to get on with more 
practical issues. Still, it would only last two years before The Genome Project was actually up 
and running. And, in spite of the integrative approach taken in the report, the gene-centrism of 
the central dogma was never really questioned: “The information in a genome is the 
fundamental description of a living system—it is what the cell uses to construct a copy of 
itself—and so is of fundamental concern to biologists” (ibid.). Indeed, the study was 
introduced by the bold conjecture that “the mysteries of inheritance are surrendering to 
modern biology” (ibid.).  
 
The listing of diagnostics for single gene disorders was impressive, among the most central 
examples were Duchenne muscular dystrophy, Cystic fibrosis, Huntington's, Sickle cell 
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anemia, Hemophilia, Beta-Thalassemia, Chronic granulomatous disease, Phenylkotonuria, 
Polycystic kidney disease and Retinoblastina (ibid.). Diagnostic tests for these diseases were 
already developed or being developed by companies such as Cetus and Collaborative 
Research. The list of polygenic disorders, like cancer, coronary heart disease and diabetes, 
which according to the premises laid out in the OTA-report (OTA 1988) make up the 
overwhelming majority of diseases, did not parallel this progress. The report confined itself to 
noticing the positive prospects for diagnosing also these diseases (the ultimate goal, although 
not explicitly stated, being that of prediction). The section on therapies was not much longer. 
To an even stronger degree, here the rewards were presented as future rather than present. 
Then, as today, a key problem was that of protein folding, calling for a wide approach: 
“Advances in the development of human therapeutic products will be made more rapidly if 
research in the areas of protein engineering, the relationship of protein structure to function, 
rational drug design, and others parallels genome mapping efforts” (ibid.).  
 
Although the report noted the tendency of a growing divide between diagnostic and 
therapeutic ability, the “therapeutic gap” was not made a problem as such. The report from the 
National Research Council, however, remarked that 
 
“Where there is no effective therapy, new abilities to detect diseases in advance of their onset create 
harder choices for clinicians and patients. As we explore the human genome, more people will be 
faced with the dilemma that now faces those at risk for Huntington’s disease: Is it better or not to 
know one’s fate when it is out of one’s control?” (NRC 1988) 
 
But also in this version there was no way around the dilemma, as the problem was so 
intimately entwined with the cure: 
 
“At the same time, the very discoveries that exacerbate those dilemmas will also be crucial steps in 
developing of new therapies that can help resolve them. It will be important as the project proceeds to 
pursue those steps and attempt to narrow, rather than widen, the gap between our abilities to diagnose 
and treat disease” (National Research Council 1988).  
 
Two goals stood out in the work to come: the development of new technologies and 
methodologies, and the development of a new infrastructure specifically suited for genetics. 
The work was (somehow) to be shared between the four main agencies already involved, the 
National Institutes of Health, Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation and the 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute (Office of Technology Assessment 1988). But as to who 
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was finally going to head the project dissent continued in the agencies, in Congress and 
among scientists, the two relevant options being NIH and DOE.  
The Human Genome Project 
The prospects of a coordinated, large-scale genome project also met with fierce opposition 
inside the NIH itself. Ruth Kirchstein, director of the institute presiding over the genome 
program (NIGMS), wanted to protect basic science from undue political influence. Her way 
of achieving this was to keep things running as usual, genome research being carried out in 
smaller, relatively independent units (hence, she remained in accordance with many of the 
critics of the genome project). James Watson and NIH director James Wyngarden were 
directly opposed to this policy: if the NIH was to occupy a central position in the genome 
efforts, it would have to seize the moment so as not to lose the initiative to DOE. The NIH 
was by many seen as the legitimate agency for the task, but compared to DOE it had moved 
slowly, and so ran the risk of losing out. As described by Cook-Deegan, Wyngarden secured 
the leading position of the NIH by a few masterstrokes: he got the budget accepted by 
Congress, he established a bureaucratic centre for genome research and he appointed Watson 
its director. In October 1988, Watson became associate director of the NIH and head of the 
newly established Office of Human Genome Research, which was later to become the 
National Center for Human Genome Research (Cook-Deegan 1994). Watson did not proceed 
with great discretion:  
 
“Watson’s scientific and administrative careers were built on an independent sense of priorities. “Just 
do good, and don’t care if it doesn’t seem good to others”. His highly intuitive manner focused on 
character judgments and results, and scientific results were the ones that counted most. Good science 
was elevated to a guiding moral principle” (ibid. 168). 
 
But even this characteristic did not stick absolutely: One of Watson’s first moves, to the 
astonishment of many, was to reserve a certain amount of the NIH genome budget for 
research upon ethical, social and legal dimensions of genetics.  
 
The official beginning of the genome project in October 1990 was preceded by a long and 
heated debate over the allocation of research funds. Critics claimed that the project would 
occupy an untoward part of the general NIH budget for biomedical sciences, and that it would 
be at the expense of smaller, researcher-initiated projects. Proponents downplayed the size of 
the project and focused on the (alleged) positive effects of a concerted effort.  A survey 
conducted at the UCLA found that, whereas support for the genome project was strong in 
  216
government and (the pharmaceutical) industry, among academic scientists the number of 
proponents and opponents more or less cancelled each other out (ibid.). 
Integrating strategies 
Two strategies came to be decisive to the practical goals of improving technology and 
communications among researchers. Both were central parts of the emerging 5-year plan 
established by NIH and DOE at the outset of the genome project. These were: 1) the 
development of so-called STSs, “sequence-tagged sites”, and 2) the up-scaling of certain 
research facilities to so-called “genome centres” (Hilgartner 1995; Hilgartner 2004).  
 
Sequence tagged sites were introduced by Olson, Hood, Cantor and Botstein during work for 
an advisory group set down by Congress. The mandate of the group was to give scientific 
advice for the already mentioned 5-year plan. An STS is a unique sequence along the genome 
(Doggett 1992). Due to its uniqueness it serves well as a marker, or a “landmark” of a gene 
(Doggett 1992; Hilgartner 1995). As argued by its creators, the STS had many advantages 
over ordinary markers used in existing physical or genetic maps. First of all, it dispersed 
genomic information among users. It was not based upon physical access to cloned gene 
segments, as kept in the libraries of the biggest laboratories, but upon the more recent PCR 
technology. Using PCR, a spectre of polymerases of differing substrate specificity was 
obtained. These, in turn, would serve to define given markers along the genome. Hence, the 
specificity of the gene sequence (the marker) was defined by its reaction to an enzyme (PCR), 
and not by some previously identified and cloned segment existing in a DNA library. This 
meant that researchers all over the world would be able to localise markers by using the right 
PCR (which was commercially available). Hence, the vital information could be stored in a 
databank accessible to everybody within the research community. Second, it could be used as 
a “common language” for uniting previously incommensurable markers established through 
different mapping techniques, such as for instance restriction maps or contig maps (Hilgartner 
1995). It would also be capable of synthesising information from genetic linkage maps with 
that from different physical maps, and these maps could also be synthesised with sequence 
data. The objective was to translate all existing maps into STS marker maps and to store the 
resulting information in common databases, thus uniting the efforts of previously unrelated 
mapping communities. As described by Hilgartner (2004) this would also serve as a powerful 
management tool, as a technology for holding genome centres accountable to a centralised 
administrative agency (NIH) and to Congress. The productivity of a certain group could be 
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measured in numbers of STSs established by that group, and the quality of a map could be 
measured according to number of STS along a certain region. In the end, it could also serve as 
a means for holding the genome project as such accountable to politicians (Hilgartner 1995).  
 
Concerning the establishment of genome centres, this was a direct response to the need for 
more large-scale research units, as opposed to the smaller, traditional laboratories of biology. 
This also entailed a change of working style: from experimentalist, “bench-style” approach 
carried out by individuals or small teams, to one of interdisciplinary, cost-intensive work 
centred round a common goal of high throughput data accumulation. The amount of 
automation and repetition involved in mapping and sequencing was grist to the mill for those 
who argued that the quality of science would decay in inverse proportion to the amount of 
data produced. Many other concerns were repeated as well, for instance that the centres would 
take funding from smaller facilities and that they would gain too exclusive access to 
information (Hilgartner 2004). 
 
Due to the critically exposed position of the project, NIH and DOE decided upon a stricter 
policy of planning than usual in NIH-funded projects. As opposed to a traditional attitude of 
“laissez-faire” as soon as money was granted a project, a more integrative approach of science 
and administration was sought out. There was a need to keep the project on track with respect 
to achieving its central goals and not invoke further criticism. For this sake, the use of STSs 
became a central administrative as well as a technical tool (relating to Rheinberger’s 
terminology we thus see that administration made its way well into the laboratory through 
gaining control with technical things). It became possible to set quantifiable goals for 
mapping and sequencing, and it became possible to monitor the advancement towards that 
goal by requiring progress reports (ibid.).  
 
By the end of the five-year period, much of the criticism directed at the project from the 
scientific community had diminished. Important reasons were that it had grown to encompass 
more and broader concerns than first assumed by many, among them the mapping and 
sequencing of a number of other organisms as well. Indeed, this was also a scientifically good 
strategy because of the need for model projects after which to shape the sequencing of the 
human genome in the years to follow (Cook-Deegan 1994). But it was also a result of the fact 
that the project did indeed achieve its goals within the scheduled time, and, importantly, that it 
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produced and distributed new data generously among other users. Hilgartner, in summing up 
the first five years of the HGP, writes that 
 
“strategies for governing genome centers were built into the policies of funding agencies, the material 
forms of laboratories, the social relations among laboratories, and even the maps themselves. Through 
such strategies, the HGP succeeded in constituting American genome centers as accountable entities, 
allowing the proponents of the project to assure the scientific community that these centers would give 
back more than they would take. But creating centers that simultaneously solved the prevailing 
problems of technical and social order in the American context by no means produced stability in the 
rapidly moving world of genomics. To be sure, finding solutions to these problems helped justify a 
continuing infusion of government funds and scientific talent. But the production of better genome 
maps and the expansion of genome databases in the first years of the 1990s generated unprecedented 
commercial interest in the field, contributing to the rise of “private” genomics and, in turn, raising new 
problems of technological and social order” (Hilgartner 2004). 
 
 
Although it may be said that the HGP simply channelled and organised developments that 
were already taking place, there can be little doubt that the restructurings of its first years 
strengthened the notion of the genome as the fundamental unit of physiological and 
pathological explanation:  
 
“The penultimate level of the maps is the developmental: what we want is the map to show us what 
gets turned on and off in temporal order during the human creature’s lifetime, to answer the intractable 
questions of embryology, of differentiation. Special versions of the map will be clinical, dealing, say, 
with inborn errors of metabolism and their cure by gene therapy, or with the cancers and their 
prevention (Freeland Judson 1992).  
 
As described, this required a number of organisational, technological, scientific and 
administrative rearrangements. During these processes, the genome emerged as much more 
than a research-guiding principle restricted to the laboratories. But this was only the 
beginning of a number of “revolutions” that were already taking place and would continue to 
take place. A massive integration of disciplines were required for a complete understanding of 
the genome: “…protein chemistry, mass spectrometry, nucleic acids chemistry, large-scale 
DNA sequencing, genetic mapping, DNA diagnostics, and computational techniques” (Hood 
1992). In some of its most ardent proponents, of whom Leroy Hood was a good example, 
there were no limits to the potential of the genome as an organising principle:  
 
“Once the 100,000 human genes have been identified, they will be used as therapeutic reagents for 
dealing with all aspects of human disease…New industrial opportunities will arise from DNA 
diagnostics…There will be striking future industrial opportunities in biocomputing…In the future, 
there may be more than one hundred distinct biological databases…It will be an enormous challenge 
to maintain these data bases as well as to make all of them readily accessible to the biologist or 
physician user. The development of new object-oriented data bases, which can organize information in 
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keeping with its functional attributes, provide interesting new possibilities for instantaneous 
accessibility” (ibid).  
 
Finally, technology would provide the solutions to age-old problems of biology: “Neither 
developmental biology nor protein folding is a problem inherent to the genome project; rather, 
the genome project will provide new tools for attacking these problems in other areas of 
biology” (ibid).  
 
Although sometimes extreme in its technological optimism, there is no mistaking the general 
tendency: a reconfiguration of experimental and pathological space through the loophole of 
powerful information technology designed to relate the most distant sites on the genome with 
the widespread community of researchers, and make of them a functional whole. A 
corresponding education of medical doctors, especially in new drug-related therapies, would 
have to follow in order for technology transfer to be successful. This would also have to be 
accompanied by a corresponding “education” of the population in matters genetic:  
 
“Scientific expertise among specialists must be accompanied by public understanding or problems will 
surely arise. If DNA analysis is to be more widely used in the future, then the general population must 
be provided with a basic genetic understanding – not that everybody should become a molecular 
biologist, but people should comprehend the implications of the information that becomes available. In 
particular, the issue of genetic carrier status must be fully explained. Some of these educational issues 
include the significance of carrier status to personal health, job selection, insurability, and informed 
options for childbearing. Moreover, the importance of improving science education, from kindergarten 
through twelfth grade, cannot be overemphasized” (Caskey 1992).  
 
Statements like these abound in policy-documents and popularisations surrounding the HGP, 
and they betray a lot about the views about human agency, social forces and the preconditions 
of social action entailed by many of the project’s protagonists. Technology transfer, from the 
scientific context to the clinical and public domains, is depicted in a linear manner, as direct 
application of the techno-medical object facilitated and accompanied by the proper 
information, the main parameters for assessment being those of cost-benefit, risk-ratio (risk 
vs. potential benefit) and utility. The “users”, first and foremost patients, but also medical 
doctors, are presupposed as rational agents planning their actions in correspondence with the 
alternatives handed to them by the basic sciences, not unlike Claude Bernard’s vision of 
experimental medicine from 1865 (Bernard 1957). As will be seen later on, linear 
representations of technology and technology transfer were strengthened by a strong turn in 
research policy during the 1980s, one which radically came to underline the commercial 
aspects of genetics and genomics, and which tended towards aligning social value of medical 
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technologies with commercial viability. This vision was being strongly promoted through a 
liberal and expanding patent policy (Office of Technology Assessment 1988; Kevles 1998; 
Krimsky 2003).  
 
 
Two genome centres emerged as “model organisations” for future sequencing of the human 
genome: the Sanger Centre in Cambridge, England, and The Institute of Genomic Research 
(TIGR) in Maryland. Granted that the genome is embedded qua organisational principle in 
complex networks of institutional, computational, instrumental and experimental practices, it 
should not come as a surprise that difference of organisational structure will also yield 
different epistemic commitments, perhaps also different genomes (Bostanci 2004). This is 
indeed what happened as these two centres came to develop two different maps and two 
different versions of what the genome was supposed to be. The two versions would be 
projected through the structures of the Human Genome Project on one hand, and through 
Celera Genomics on the other, both presenting their maps at the same time in 2001, four years 
ahead of the scheduled termini of the Human Genome Project.  
TIGR 
Craig Venter set up the TIGR institute following his resignation from an NIH laboratory in 
1992. He had left following a bitter-felt controversy over patenting rights with James Watson, 
and due to lack of funding for a proposed project to sequence protein-coding DNA (“ESTs”) 
from human brain tissue. The case will be described in some more detail in the chapter on 
patentability. 
 
The scientific strategy proposed by Venter diverted from the established practice of 
sequencing single genes one at a time. Normal practice would be to isolate and then sequence 
a specific gene of known function, based on knowledge derived from genetic or physical 
maps. To Venter, this strategy was too slow and laborious: as only a small percentage of the 
genome actually codes for protein, normal mapping procedure would have to work itself 
through a whole lot of “junk DNA” before getting to the interesting parts, the coding regions. 
A normal gene-hunt would start out by an approximate knowledge of the region of a gene of 
known function, and then work itself through that region until the sought-after gene had been 
localised. As described earlier, the way to isolate single genes during the early years of 
recombinant DNA technology, had been to isolate messenger RNA coding for a specific 
protein, then to convert the RNA back into DNA using reverse transcriptase. In that way, a 
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whole repository of cloned DNA, possibly comprising thousands of genes of unknown 
function, would be established before the actual gene was hit upon (Davies 2001:57-59).  
 
Venter’s idea was to take advantage of the DNA libraries thus established during ordinary 
gene hunts and to run them through large-scale sequencing machines. Although he would not 
know the function of the sequenced genes, he would at least know that they coded for some 
protein, and hence would be more likely to be of interest, both scientifically and 
commercially. For his first project, he focused upon cDNA libraries established from cDNAs 
from the human brain, as this is an organ particularly rich in protein-coding genes: 
 
“Together with Mark Adams, a research associate in his lab, Venter chose a brain cDNA library 
containing potentially tens of thousands of genes that are active in the brain. It was a routine process to 
pick a few dozen bacterial colonies, each containing the cDNA of a mystery gene expressed in the 
brain, purify the DNA, perform the sequencing reactions, and determine the sequence on the ABI 
machine. Finally, Venter would compare the DNA sequence of the two hundred to three hundred 
bases that he typically obtained from each cDNA with previously identified genes from a variety of 
species whose sequences were already in the public gene database” (ibid.,57-58). 
 
Venter was a pioneer in the heavy application of sequencers to genomics research. When his 
application was turned down, it was both because a general scepticism towards mapping by 
sequencing still prevailed, and because of his announced intent to patent the sequences. The 
event sparked a general debate which also ended with the resignation of Watson, who did not 
approve of the generally positive stance eventually taken towards sequencing and 
patentability in the NIH (Cook-Deegan 1994; Shreeve 2004). Instead of using public money, 
TIGR was funded by the New York company HealthCare Investment Corporation. In return 
for the funding, the company was to get the property rights for any commercially viable 
products the institute would come up with (Shreeve 2004).  
 
One of Watson’s reasons for opposing Venter’s proposal was related to already described 
differences in mapping and sequencing strategies. Although recognising the rationale in going 
for the protein-producing genes only, Watson had committed himself to the gradual up-
scaling of the sequencing project, meaning that it would start with already mapped regions so 
as to establish a complete map and never to get too far off the ground with the sequencing 
work. The sequences produced at TIGR were of unknown genetic origin and would have to be 
mapped after sequencing in stead of before. Hence, one criticism directed at Venter was that 
he would do the easy work of sequencing the interesting parts of the genome, while relying 
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upon others to perform the less attractive job of establishing the function of that gene within 
the larger context of the genome as a whole. What was the role of regulatory genes in the 
expression of the gene in question? By focusing exclusively upon protein-coding DNA this 
question was overlooked. Hence, the determination of the role of the huge amounts of “junk 
DNA” would also be left to others (Sulston and Ferry 2002). Furthermore, as the above quote 
indicates, Venter’s procedure was also dependent upon the public databases in order to 
establish the function of the sequenced genes. Insofar, then, as Venter’s approach came to be 
established as a competitive alternative to ordinary mapping and sequencing, not as 
complementary, it represented a threat to the established working methods of the scientific 
community. Says John Sulston, leader of the sequencing centre in Cambridge: “I was in no 
doubt that in the long run sequencing the complete genome would be the only way to find all 
the genes. I saw Craig’s challenge as a threat to what we were doing” (ibid., 125). 
 
The general approach introduced at TIGR, and later by Celera, is that of whole-genome 
shotgun sequencing. Due to limitations in computational powers, the genome cannot be 
sequenced in one operation but must be sequenced piece by piece. Genomic DNA is therefore 
cut into pieces, inserted into plasmids and then sequenced separately. Because the resulting 
sequences will be overlapping, a computer program can work out their internal relations and 
piece them back together. According to critics of the whole-genome shotgun method, it is 
unreliable because of the large segments of sequences put into one single operation. This 
increases the chances for mutated versions of some sequence to drift to other parts of the 
genome, causing the sequence to be mapped onto the wrong region (misassembly). This 
source of error is drastically reduced by the use of the hierarchical shotgun-method, which 
was the one championed at the Sanger Centre (Bostanci 2004). 
The Sanger Centre 
Although work at the Sanger centre was also funded by private capital, it was not by venture 
investors but rather by a charitable organisation, the Wellcome Trust. The work was a 
continuation of the previous mapping of the genome of the worm C. elegans, carried out by 
John Sulston in Cambridge and Alan Coulson and Bob Waterston at the Washington 
University. Because they already had the (worm) map, there was no need to sequence the 
whole genome in one operation: one could sequence parts whose position along the genome 
was already known by marker sequences taken from the physical map. In short, the genome 
was split into several thousand regions which were then inserted into so-called BACs, 
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bacterial artificial chromosomes. Following this, the BACs were matched with the markers 
and finally assembled (ibid.)  
 
Thus, by dividing work into parts corresponding to their position on the physical map, 
chances of error were greatly reduced. In this way, the map not only served to organise the 
finished sequence, it also served to share tasks within laboratories and between different 
laboratories, significantly between Cambridge and St. Louis, where Waterston had settled 
(ibid.). C. elegans had been chosen as a model organism for the understanding of cellular 
development and differentiation by Sydney Brenner in the late 1960s (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
Because the worm had already been studied for many years, the sequencing efforts came to be 
seen much more as a communal effort enjoying wide support both in the worm mapping 
community and in the genetics community more generally: “I feel it has been not so much a 
map as a means of communication”, J. Sulston quoted from (Bostanci 2004). The results were 
published in a common data-base accessible to all.  
 
The downside of the hierarchical model is that it is time- and cost demanding, and so friction 
was likely to rise with the ever-increasing demands on higher throughput at the genome 
centres (Hilgartner 2004). Hence, the project drew some criticism for its cost-efficiency as 
well as for producing allegedly unnecessary information, i.e. the sequencing of non-coding 
parts on the genome. But by thus remaining embedded within the research community and in 
the mapping tradition the centre retained a high level of trust as well as legitimacy by keeping 
the focus steady on the production of low-risk information. At the Human Genome Summit in 
1994, the Sanger Centre emerged as a model for the future organisation and collaboration 
among genome centres around the world (Bostanci 2004).  
 
Whereas the mapping of C. elegans could proceed according to an already established 
physical map, the same was not the case with the human genome. Based upon earlier genetic 
and physical markers, a unified digital map was elaborated, and each genome centre then had 
to establish a repository of DNA sequences corresponding to the part of the genome that it 
was working on. Parts of the genome were allocated according to its own “sequencing 
etiquette”, the entitlement of a region being assigned according to previous sequencing work 
(ibid.). The parts were distributed to the different centres during an international conference 
held at Bermuda in 1996. During that meeting, some general rules concerning patenting and 
data release were also agreed upon: 
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- sequence assemblies larger than 1 kb were to be released as soon as possible, 
preferably within 24 hours 
- annotated sequences are to be immediately published 
- the entire sequence of the human genome is to made freely available to research and 
development in order to maximise the benefits to society (Sulston 2002 ). 
 
 
After the initial five years, a draft phase followed, in which most of the information for the 
project was gathered by genome centres around the world (Collins 2004). In spite of 
differences TIGR had continued to work within the fold of the Human Genome Project. Eight 
centres emerged as leading: that of the Sanger Centre in Cambridge, England (John Sulston) 
was responsible for 30 % of the sequencing; six NIH funded centres should carry out 60 % , 
among them those of Bob Waterston in St. Louis and Eric Lander at the MIT-Whitehead 
Institute, and a DOE-funded centre, Joint Genome Institute would do the 10% rest 
(http://doegenomes.org/). 
 
In 1997 arguments were raised that the concerted effort ought to proceed by whole-genome 
shotgun sequencing in stead of the Sanger model (Weber and Myers 1997). This sparked a 
debate in which also the general status of the genome itself was questioned (Bostanci 2004). 
The main thrust of the argument, put forward by Jim Weber and Gene Myers, was that the 
whole-genome approach would attain the goals of the HGP faster and cheaper and even at a 
better quality. It was argued that the whole-genome would produce more polymorphisms, the 
central marker of genetic variation. The proposal also rose out of a feeling that the HGP was 
moving too slowly: “We should generate as much of the critical sequence information as 
rapidly as possible and leave cleanup of gaps and problematic regions for future years” 
(Weber and Myers 1997). The use of existing maps for organising the concerted effort, was 
held against the HGP, as the division of the map into parts would lead to an “artificial 
coverage of the genome” (Weber and Myers 1997).  
 
The successful sequencing of three bacterial genomes at TIGR was used to back up the 
argument. However, as the method was only being used actively at TIGR, taking the proposal 
seriously would mean a rather large re-organisation of the whole project. According to the 
whole-genome shotgun model, sequencing would be distributed among genome centres 
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throughout the world, but the finishing stage, assembling the sequence data, would have to 
take place in one central facility in stead of being carried out in the different centres.  
 
The proposal met with stark critique from Phil Green, who argued that the method of 
computer simulation deployed by Weber and Meyer was a rather poor substitute for the 
already existing map that served as the basis for the HGP. Although at this stage only a few 
percents of the genome had been sequenced, it would also be a bad choice to change strategy 
now that the project was well under way. Green further argued that the whole-genome 
approach was unreliable and would result in a map of lower quality, significantly because of 
the indiscriminate treatment of the whole genome method in which problematic regions were 
treated on a par with non-coding regions. The danger of misassembly would also be far 
greater, and errors were not likely to be discovered until years later due to the massive amount 
of data generated at once.  
 
Arguments like these indicated deeper differences in opinions about what the map was 
supposed to be. For Green, the main purpose was the gradual establishing of a complete map 
of the genome, which eventually could serve as a “gold standard” reference for assessing 
human (genetic) differences. Myer and Weber’s suggestion to have a go at the whole genome 
in one step entailed a “monolithic approach incompatible with clone-by-clone sequencing” 
(Green 1997). The spatial divisions of the genome in the two different maps corresponded to 
the division of work in the two models: in one, work was shared and planned according to a 
prior topology, in the other the topology would emerge during assembly in one large centre 
(Bostanci 2004).  
 
But the main significance of the debate was yet to be seen: in 1998, Craig Venter left the 
Human Genome Project to form the private company Celera. Together with Tom Hunkapillar 
of Applied Biosystems, main producer of automated sequencers, he set out to sequence the 
genome on private hands by using the whole-genome shotgun method. Hand in hand with the 
announcement of the alternative genome project, Venter declared that he would patent a 
number of 100 to 300 of the sequenced genes. However, the number was not important: 
Venter also claimed that he could carry out the sequencing much faster than the HGP. If this 
projection came through, he would still be in the position of patenting thousands of genes 
before the HGP had finished (Davies 2001). As could be expected, the initiative caused 
massive criticism, both from scientific peers and from the wider public. With respect to the 
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scientific community, this was quite understandable: “We are changing the rules and that 
upsets people”, Venter quoted from (Bostanci 2004). By breaking with the sequencing 
etiquette and with the Bermuda principles, Venter also broke with the public commitments 
made by the leaders of the HGP, thus also with the accepted projection of what the genome 
was going to be. Celera’s project was described by its critics as a “land grab”, in which the 
ground of the public effort was torn away even before it had been established (ibid.).  
 
People like Watson and Sulston were determined to establish the genome as a public and 
freely available repository of information. As argued by Sulston, it belonged to humanity’s 
common heritage, not to some private investment firm. This meant that whereas the genome 
could serve as a starting point for developing patentable products, the sequence itself could 
not be the object of patenting:  
 
“The principles of accessibility and on-the-spot release mean that anyone in the international 
biological community can use the data and ultimately turn them into new inventions that are eligible 
for patents. But when the raw sequence is released publicly, it will be unpatentable. It promised well 
that so many people came to share a vision of the genome sequence as the heritage of humanity, as 
stated in Article 1 of the universal declaration on the human genome and human rights, which 
emerged from Unesco’s general conference in 1997” (Sulston 2002 ). 
 
But in important ways, it was already too late: As described, the NIH itself had been drawn 
into the patenting game in 1991, when Venter first proposed the patenting of specific 
sequences. The proposal was supported, to Watson’s great dismay, by director Bernadine 
Healey, who mainly proceeded on a precautionary rationale: if the NIH did not move to 
secure property rights fast, someone else would surely do. Hence, it was also a matter of 
securing the position of American prominence in research and industry: 
 
“My God, if this thing doesn’t get done in a substantive way in the United States, that is the end of 
biotechnology in the U.S…There is a tremendous effort in France, England, and Japan…If this 
becomes a race and if gene fragments become proprietary, then it is in the best interest of the U.S. and 
entities of the U.S. to file for patents”, Wallace Steinberg of the HealthCare Investment Corp, quoted 
in (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
 
 
Due to great uncertainty as to the role of patentability and genomics in the future, it was best 
to play safe. Seemingly ironically, it could also be argued that the best way to secure the 
public accessability was for public institutions to seek for intellectual property rights. Indeed, 
this had been the practice in many universities and research facilities since the dawn of the 
1980s. The irony was not complete, however, as the patenting institute had always been meant 
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as an incitement to promote innovation and development. It is a contractual relation between 
the inventor and society: by granting to the inventor a temporarily limited monopoly, society 
would receive the greater good of the publication of the knowledge entailed. The separation of 
knowledge and commercial utility, therefore, is supposed to work out for the common good 
(under the aegis of the hidden hand of the market) (Etkowitz and Webster 1995).  
 
And indeed, this came to be the general strategy of Celera Genomics as the sequencing race 
got under way. It would make its data public, but with a delay of three months for potentially 
lucrative annotations and sequences, so as to give its investors the chance to strike first. 
Coincidence or not, only two days after Venter’s announcement to start Celera, the Wellcome 
Trust announced its decision to scale up the funding for the part (1/3) of the sequencing 
carried out at the Sanger Centre (Davies 2001). And shortly thereafter leaders of the genome 
project announced a change of course, namely the intention to complete a rough draft of the 
genome by 2001. This seemed to go against the strategy of a gradual up-scaling, but Francis 
Collins stayed the course. In 1999 the schedule for the rough draft was moved again, this time 
to spring 2000. One important strategy for speeding up was to channel more funding into the 
three most productive genome centres in the U.S., the laboratories of Eric Lander, Bob 
Waterston and Richard Gibbs (Davies 2001).  
 
The draft version was published in Nature, 12. February 2001, at the same time as Celera 
published its draft version in Science. Celera thus made its map public, but it reserved the 
rights for the up-dates for paying customers. By the time, the company had filed more than 
the announced 300 patent applications, but it was retained that many of these were 
provisional, and that the final number would be under 300. The two publications sparked a 
new debate on the relationship between the two projects: Celera’s version of the genome had 
used data from the publicly available HGP data bases in order to anchor its own sequencing 
data. Phil Green therefore concluded that “We are left with no idea how a true whole-genome 
assembly would have performed” (Green 2002). Hence, the discussion about the general 
status of the two maps continued, also after the official completion in 2003. Not 
unimportantly, the two versions contained differences, and due to the different approaches 
taken as well as the general climate between the two groups, it remains an open question to 
which degree a final synthesis could be negotiated. Adam Bostanci sums up:  
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“Finally, if all attempts to reconcile the two data bases fail and the sequences remain separate, it 
remains to be seen whether they will ultimately be used in different ways, one as a reference for basic 
research and public health, the other to satisfy the needs of pharmaceutical companies” (Bostanci 
2004). 
 
These differences will not be further elucidated here. On the 14. of april 2003, the completion 
of the genome project was announced. Its leader, Francis Collins, deemed it an unconditional 
success: "All of the project’s goals have been completed successfully – well in advance of the 
original deadline and for a cost substantially less than the original estimates.” (The 
International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium 2003). No doubt, according to the 
goals it had set for itself, the genome project had come through on many of its promises. It 
was assessed that the map corresponded to the sequence with an accuracy of 99.9 percent 
(Schmutz 2004). Hence, according to the interpretive premises laid down in this project, it is 
clear that the negotiation of the counterfactual organiser of the genome with its object, the 
sequence, was carried out with 99.9 percent accuracy.  
 
However: Obtaining a static map of the genome is one thing; understanding how it works is 
another. Molecular biologists and geneticists have had their expectations cooled off by the 
shear complexity of the genome, which has turned out to be a different entity from the one 
projected in the 1960s and 70s (Fox Keller 2000). First of all there is the enormous amount of 
information that now waits to be interpreted. It was always understood that the genome 
project would have to be followed by such a phase, and that the data themselves would yield 
nothing as to biological function. That being the case, the increasingly unidirectional focus of 
the research community that it took to carry out the project may have been a two-edged 
sword. As made clear by Sydney Brenner in his Nobel Lecture from 2002, the strong focus 
upon sequence and data accumulation may even have come at the expense of the ultimate goal 
of understanding: 
 
“We are all conscious today that we are drowning in a sea of data and starving for knowledge. The 
biological sciences have exploded, largely through our unprecedented power to accumulate descriptive 
facts. How to understand genomes and how to use them is going to be a central task of our research for 
the future. We need to turn data into knowledge and we need a framework to do it. So genocentric has 
modern biology become that we have forgotten that the real units of function and structure in an 
organism are cells and not genes” (Brenner 2002). 
 
Hence, for the sake of practical applications of genomic sequence data, it is clear that the 
object “itself”, which is not the sequence, but rather normal physiological function and 
pathological deviation from that norm, has still got a long way to go in order to be aligned 
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with its organising principle, the central dogma. In the article Portrait of a molecule, 
published as part of the 50 year anniversary of the central dogma, Philip Ball, like Brenner, 
directs our attention at the complexity surrounding the nucleus acids: 
 
“If all of this destroys the pretty illusion created by the iconic model of Watson and Crick, it surely 
also opens up a much richer panorama. The fundamental mechanism of information transfer in nucleic 
acids – complementary base pairing – is so elegant that it blinds us to the awesome sophistication of 
the total process” (Ball 2003). 
 
And indeed, it is these processes that have come to constitute the further paths to be taken 
after the sequencing of the genome. Understanding the intricate workings of the 
interrelatedness of the many types of genes in the genome; understanding human genomic 
variation; the interrelatedness of genes and proteins, which has turned out a much more 
complex issue than first assumed by the “one gene – one protein” hypothesis, and the 
interrelatedness of proteins, to mention a few. New consortia have been established for those 
purposes, usually made up by joint public and private efforts. Some are the SNP Consortium, 
devoted to mapping DNA variations (Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms) among individuals 
(snp.cshl.org/); The HapMap Project, devoted to the understanding and mapping of complex 
diseases (www.hapmap.org/), and the Protein Structure Initiative, whose goal it is to “make 
the three-dimensional atomic-level structures of most proteins easily obtainable from 
knowledge of their corresponding DNA sequences” (www.nigms.nih.gov/psi).  
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7. The genome and the clinical context 
In this chapter I start to discuss some of the challenges that may come from the developments 
described in the previous chapter. Considering that there are still uncertainties and areas of 
ignorance connected to the genome as a general physiological principle: what implications are 
drawn for the sake of exporting genomics to the clinical context, and which are the 
implications for legal and social regulation? 
 
In keeping with Claude Bernard’s definition of pathology as a deviation from normal 
physiological function, and taking into account the genomic turn, genetic disease may be 
defined as “disease caused by an abnormality in the functioning of an individual's genome”60. 
The clause about the genomic turn is important, because it is by no means granted that the 
average clinician will count him or herself as part of the “genomic era” (Guttmacher and 
Collins 2003). In Dorland’s Medical Dictionary from 2003, genetic disease is defined in more 
conservative terms as “any disorder caused by a genetic mechanism”, and the genome as such 
is not mentioned. This diversity of definitions may be interpreted as expressions of underlying 
political and scientific tensions resulting from the attempt to transfer genomics to the clinical 
context.  
 
According to the traditional understanding, genetic diseases make up a rather small sub-
species on the nosological chart. The main category is that of classical Mendelian traits, 
caused by one single gene (single gene disorders), like Huntington’s disease, 
Hemachromatosis and Hemophilia (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/). As already described, it 
was this class of diseases that came to be drawn into the molecular fold with the advent of 
genetic markers, and which came to make up the main goal of the gene hunts starting in the 
1980s. Although the number of single gene disorders has increased along with these 
developments and the mapping of the genome, they only make up a small percentage of the 
more common diseases (Burke 2002). In addition come the chromosomal abnormalities, like 
Down’s Syndrome and the other trisomies, known and studied since the late 1950s (Mueller 
and Young 1998). Last, but not least, we have the main category of diseases, multifactorial 
disorders, making up the overwhelming majority of known diseases, such as the cancers, 
diabetes, cardiovascular disease, hypertension and mental illnesses. These have traditionally 
belonged to a number of different disciplines in which the genetic component has not been 
                                                 
60 http://www.medicinenet.com/genetic_disease/glossary.htm 
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particularly strong. This picture, say promoters of genomic medicine, is now about to change. 
As genomics research proceeds, results are transferred and integrated into general health care:  
 
“Genomics has a broader and more ambitious reach than does genetics. The science of genomics rests 
on direct experimental access to the entire genome and applies to common conditions, such as breast 
cancer and colorectal cancer, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, tuberculosis, 
Parkinson’s disease, and Alzheimer’s disease” (Guttmacher and Collins 2003). 
 
I bring a rather lengthy quote from one clinician in order to illustrate how the question of the 
definition of disease is also a reflection of institutional, disciplinary and economic issues: 
 
Clinicians probably feel we have gone overboard in support of cell and molecular biology. I agree. 
With the exception of population studies, it is difficult for medical scientists to obtain support for 
research that clinicians find informative. Biomedical publications in journals with the highest impact 
factors, such as Cell, Nature and Science, deal almost exclusively with cells, molecules, and genes. In 
this rarified group, only the New England Journal of Medicine publishes articles of interest to 
clinicians. What is worse, impact factors now control academic advancement so that cell and 
molecular biologists are preferentially promoted within faculties of medicine. Once in positions of 
power, they are unlikely to renounce it to other groups. The control of medical faculties by scientists 
spawned and supported by granting agencies and multinational pharmaceutical companies is a feed-
forward mechanism that threatens to maintain their power and to downgrade the importance of clinical 
practice in medical faculties in the future (Macklem 2003). 
 
What is at stake here is the status of the genome as a global organisational principle, both as 
physiological discipline and as basic principle for health care reforms. From the point of view 
of many clinicians, it is not at all self-evident that the genome be made a, if not the, central 
object of clinical judgement: “Clinicians deal with diseased organ systems, not individual 
cells and molecules” (ibid.). According to this view, genomics should rather proceed as a 
continuation of genetics as a sub-discipline. However, there is no mistaking the ambition to 
overcome such opposition and to transform the knowledge base of health care systems 
according to genomic principles of normality and pathology: 
 
“All public health professionals…will need an increasing appreciation for integrating genetic research, 
policy, and program development into their daily work. This is not different from the expected 
integration of genetics into health care in general and across the various medical subspecialities. 
Although recognising the need for a cadre of public health researchers and practitioners fully trained in 
genetics, we also believe that all public health professionals will be using advances in human genetics 
in research and practice. We do not particularly endorse the creation of a new public health 
subspecialty in genetics; rather we encourage and emphasise the smooth integration of genetics into 
public health practice” (Khoury 2000). 
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The molecular object in clinical use 
A genetic test may be defined as “the analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, 
and certain metabolites in order to detect heritable disease-related genotypes, mutations, 
phenotypes, or karyotypes61 for clinical purposes” (Burke 2002). As can be understood from 
this definition, a number of genetic testing technologies are already in use in clinical practice. 
The tests take advantage of deviations from normal functioning somewhere on the continuum 
from DNA to protein, and the tests are deployed for a number of different purposes. Many 
tests are available that do not require more than a simple blood test of the patient in order to 
check for the presence or non-presence of disease markers, as for instance mass spectrometry 
(a technique that can be used to identify specific molecular substances). Other techniques may 
be invasive, like amniocentesis, in which tissue is collected from the fluid surrounding the 
foetus, or they may involve such techniques as sonography (hearing tests for newborns), or 
fetoscopy (a special stethoscope for listening to the heart of foetuses) (National Research 
Council 1983; Khoury 2003). Genetic screening is the application of genetic testing to an 
asymptomatic part of the population in order to single out specific genotypes associated with 
heightened risk for disease (ibid.). Hence, in contradistinction to individual tests, screening is 
carried out following general criteria such as ethnicity or age, whereas genetic testing applies 
to the individual and is typically related to clinical history or family history. However, many 
of the tests are the same or they are used in combination, so this is not a sharp distinction 
(Andrews, Fullarton et al. 1994).  
 
Most of these tests are related to the so-called single-gene disorders and chromosomal 
disorders. The wide-spread use of tests for multifactor disorders is still an open issue that will 
be subject to disciplinary and institutional negotiations: the scope of the new tests will 
depend, among other things, upon their explanatory and predictive powers (Vineis, Schulte et 
al. 2001). I will return to this problem. For whereas that may be where the central point of 
discussion is today, the relevant regulatory mechanisms and institutions have emerged along 
with the screening tests for single gene disorders, and so that is where the exposition should 
start. I start out by giving a brief overview of the relevant tests and screening programs before 
I turn to a somewhat more substantial description of the policy issues that follow from the 
expansion of genetic tests. The main point is not to give a description of clinical practice, but 
to give an overview of the groups concerned by the projected transformation: from a limited 
set of genetic tests to a genomic medicine that potentially encompasses most aspects of 
                                                 
61 The full chromosomal set of a cell. 
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medical care and health care. I concentrate upon developments within the American context, 
as that was where genetic testing was first introduced. Hence it was also there that the changes 
were first felt.  
  
Newborn screening. The first screening techniques were introduced into prenatal care in the 
1960s to test for Phenylketonuria (PKU), an error of metabolism causing too high levels of 
phenylalanine, an amino acid, in the blood of the foetus. Unless treated with a proper diet, the 
condition results in severe mental retardation (Walters 1998). Because the tests had not been 
properly evaluated prior to clinical application, serious problems turned up in practice. 
Among these were a high number of false positives, false negatives and unhealthy dietary 
measures. Along with PKU, hypothyroidism has been commonly screened for in newborns 
(Khoury 2003). 
 
Prenatal diagnosis. Screening prior to birth was introduced in 1966, when chromosomal 
abnormalities/disorders were spotted in the amniotic fluid extracted from the uterus of 
pregnant women by the use of amniocentesis. Since that time, amniocentesis has been used to 
screen for markers in late pregnancies (ibid.). In the 1970s, certain neural-tube defects (spina 
bifada) were correlated with changes in proteins levels found in the blood sera of pregnant 
women (Walters 1998). Other diseases frequently screened for in newborns include cystic 
fibrosis and fragile X (Andrews, Fullarton et al. 1994). Chromosomal tests as well as 
developments within ultrasound technology have further expanded the horizons of prenatal 
screening, significantly to the spotting of Down’s and the other trisomies.  
 
Carrier screening is primarily directed towards people in the reproductive phase of life. In 
contradistinction to the above cases, these screening tests are not designed to make diagnoses, 
but to identify people at risk for passing on disease genes to their offspring. Penetrance is the 
concept used to express the likelihood (the risk) that a particular gene will be expressed, i.e. 
that the genotype will result in a changed phenotype (Collins 1999). In genetic disorders of 
particularly high penetrance, such as Huntington’s disease, there is an absolute degree of 
certainty that the genotype will result in an altered phenotype later in life, and that the risk 
that the disease will be passed on to the offspring is 50 %. Huntington’s disease is very rare, 
insofar as it is both dominant and monogenic. It is more usual to screen for recessive diseases: 
if both parents are carriers, the risk is that 1 out of 4 of their offspring will have the disease 
(Mueller and Young 1998).  
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It has already been described how single gene disorders where mapped using a combination 
of genetic linkage maps taken from family studies and genetic markers. These early mapping 
projects were often directed towards specific populations, and so they resulted in the mapping 
of disease susceptibility in specific groups of the populations, typically specific ethnic groups. 
For instance, populations of Ashkenazi Jews have been demonstrated to be at risk for tay-
sachs disease, people of Mediterranean origin are at risk for thalassemia, northern Europeans 
carry a heightened risk of cystic fibrosis, and people from northern Africa may have a 
heightened risk of sickle cell anemia (Burke 2002; Khoury 2003).  
Genomic medicine: expanding the scope onto common diseases? 
In the genomic era, these limited screening practices may find themselves expanded to the 
population at large, the goal being the determination of individual susceptibility to common, 
multifactorial diseases. In that way, it is surmised, disease may be prevented before it erupts 
(ibid.). Indeed, this expansion of preventive potential is perceived by many to be the main 
contribution of genomics to medicine (Burke 2002; Bell 2003; Guttmacher and Collins 2003). 
The application of the human genome map to individual cases of disease resides mainly in its 
potential for relating genotype variations of that individual to the common reference point 
established by the map. Between different individuals there is a genetic similarity of 99.9 
percent. Individual variations occur within the 0,1 percent difference in individual’s DNA that 
comes about as the result of different genotypes inherited from the parents, so-called 
heterozygosis (Guttmacher and Collins 2003). When two genomes are compared, the most 
simple of the resulting differences in base pairs are polymorphisms (SNPs) (Stoneking 2001). 
More complex differences will include differences in interactions between genes in different 
parts of the genome, so-called “haplomorphisms” (Guttmacher and Collins 2003). The 
HapMap project, a newly initiated cooperation between scientists from Japan, the U.K., 
Canada, China, Nigeria, and the U.S., is one heir of the genome project 
(www.hapmap.org/abouthapmap.html). In addition there is the program of proteomics.  
 
If we are to believe the proponents of genomic medicine, changes to medicine and the health 
care system will come fast: “The rapid advances in human molecular genetics seen over the 
past five years indicate that within the next decade genetic testing will be used widely for 
predictive testing in healthy people and for diagnosis and management of patients” (Bell 
1998), and, as argued by Guttmacher and Collins: following the sequencing of the genome, 
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genomic medicine is now ready to take “center stage in clinical medicine”(Guttmacher and 
Collins 2003). This brings us back to the scenario sketched in the beginning of this chapter, in 
which genomics replaces or penetrates the spaces of disease: the clinical domain, taxinomies 
and public perception. Five years after the article written in 1998, without any loss of faith, 
but with a somewhat more generous time-schedule, Bell writes that: “The discovery of the 
double helix half a century ago has so far been slow to affect medical practice, but significant 
transitions are likely to occur over the next 50 years” (Bell 2003). 
 
 
In 10 or 20 years every patient may be presented with a risk profile for common diseases. The above schema is 
fiction, but it may become reality if the possibilities promised by genomic medicine come through. Reprinted 
with kind permission from Stefan Hjørleifson. 
 
 
 
There thus seems to be some doubt, at least when it comes to the timing, regarding the 
implementation of genomic medicine. But there are other uncertainties as well. As argued in 
the previous chapter, there is at least reason for doubts concerning the relevance of some of 
the claims made by genomics. The question hinges on the general status of the genome: if it is 
indeed a unitary aggregate determining phenotype expression, chances are that that these can 
also be controlled through interventions with disease-causing genes. If, however, the number 
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of epigenetic and environmental factors influencing gene expression is great, then there is 
reason to doubt the general relevance of genomics to complex diseases. This was argued in an 
Institute of Medicine report from 1994:  
 
“Certain environmental factors may interact with only one set of genes and not with another. There 
may also be interaction between the various genes involved, so that the effects of multiple gene action 
cannot be predicted by separate analyses of each of the single genes. In such cases, definitive 
prediction will rarely, if ever, be possible. When dealing with genetic testing for some non-Mendelian 
diseases, it will be impossible to group individuals into two distinct categories – those at no (or very 
low) risk and those at high risk” (Institute of Medicine 1994) 
 
In 2000, one of the authors of the 1994 report, Neil Holtzman, repeated and elaborated many 
of the same uncertainties. Now, the argument was published in an article written with Theresa 
Matheau for the New England Journal of Medicine, and the target was the alleged 
revolutionary potential stemming from the Human Genome Project. Revolutionary claims 
made by people like John Bell and Francis Collins “clothe medicine in a genetic mantle”, the 
authors argued. Assuming that the penetrance of most common diseases, in contradistinction 
to single gene disorders, is generally very low, the authors questioned the relevance of 
genomics to clinical medicine. Due to incomplete penetrance there is no way of making 
strong correlations between genotype and phenotype when it comes to the most common 
diseases. Furthermore: where a genetic component is found to make up a decisive part of the 
aetiological picture, these incidences make up a small part of the cases only. This, it was 
argued, was the underlying reality of the genetics of Alzheimer’s, type 2 diabetes, colon and 
breast cancer, in which the genotype had been found to account for less than 3 percent of the 
total number of cases. A similar critique was put forward in The Lancet in 2001 by Paolo 
Vineis, Paul Schulte and Anthony McMichael. There, it was argued that 1) for low-penetrance 
genes, the relationship between genes and environment is constitutive, and not a stable 
relation between two entities, 2) only highly penetrant mutations in cancer genes may act 
without interacting with the environment, and 3) there is an inverse relation between 
penetrance and the frequency with which a gene occurs in a population. The higher 
penetrance, the lower frequency; the higher frequency, the lower the penetrance (Vineis, 
Schulte et al. 2001).  
 
There are already examples of genomic diagnoses yielding information about more complex 
diseases. One example put forward in replies to Holtzman and Matheau is hereditary 
hemochromatosis, in which more precise diagnosis has resulted in improved possibilities for 
  237
therapeutic responses (Block and Aulisio 2000; Khoury 2000). Advances has also been made 
with certain types of cancer, significantly breast, ovarian and colorectal cancer (Emery and 
Hayflick 2001). But the question remains whether these results can be generalised to other 
cancers or diseases. Questions also remain concerning the predictive value of some of these 
tests. Although the gene for breast cancer has been singled out as a potential target in 
screening programs as early as 1999, this does not automatically mean that the test will yield a 
positive “net outcome” in terms of predictive value: “we can assume that, for complex 
phenotypes with a genetic architecture that involves dozens if not hundreds of loci, many 
variants will be involved and they will be sorted into individual packages with as much 
variety as personality and physiognomy” (Cooper and Psaty 2003). 
 
 The presuppositions of genomic medicine can be related to more philosophically oriented 
analyses of probability. John Maynard Keynes, in his one philosophical work, A Treatise on 
Probability, articulated the principle of limited independent variety, stating the general 
presupposition that the field about which we are making predictions is not infinitely complex, 
but can be restricted to a limited number of cofactors. The principle “assures us that the 
objects in the field, over which our generalisations extend, do not have an infinite number of 
independent qualities; that, in other words, their characteristics, however numerous, cohere 
together in groups of invariable connection, which are finite in number”, quoted from The 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. 
 
Many developments may be imagined to overcome the present doubts concerning genomic 
medicine. Some of these have already been mentioned in the previous chapter: 
 
One strategy would be to wait for the accompanying results of proteomics. The true value of 
genomics, writes Claude Lefant, lays in its being coupled to proteomics: “that is the tool that 
will lead to the understanding of pathological processes at cellular level” (Lefant 2001).  
 
New maps will arise of the gene complexes (allegedly) responsible for complex diseases. 
These will come about by assigning SNPs to so-called “haplotypes”, larger DNA segments 
containing more alleles that are all inherited together (Guttmacher, Collins 2002). New 
technologies, not the least in bioinformatics, will have a huge role to play along with the 
further developments of complex systems theories. But also within these “revolutions” the 
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question of the unity and controllability of the genome will loom. The question is not if new 
discoveries will be made or if developments will take place, but rather how significant their 
impact will be on clinical medicine. 
 
But how do we know that these developments will not add, rather than overcome complexity? 
 
Arguments like the above share a weakness with many optimistic views about the value of 
genomics: not only do the therapeutic and diagnostic rewards lie in the future, -the same goes 
for the basis of evaluation. In the vocabulary of the social sciences: they see the creation of 
social order as a mainly scientific, not a social problem. The (radical) expansion of genomic 
medicine is predicted on technical developments and not on what is known to work clinically 
today: “While it is true that the future may not be a linear projection of the past, the claims of 
genomics still have to be evaluated on the basis of principles that we currently accept as 
valid” (Cooper and Psaty 2003).  
 
Taking these distinctions seriously, Cooper and Psaty argue, grants for genomics (or 
proteomics for that sake), a very limited role at the moment. In choosing such a line of 
argument, thy not alone: both proponents and sceptics of genomic medicine advice that 
developments be made at a slow pace so as to integrate all involved parts, from the general 
physician to the patient, the ethicist and the wider public. Information without communication 
makes for a bad strategy of implementation. Developments must move slowly in order for 
integration to take place and in order to be followed by a proper clinical evaluation. (Emery 
and Hayflick 2001; Knottnerus 2003). At the outset, very few would declare themselves 
opponents of such an approach.  
 
And so we are left confused on a slightly higher level. The problem is, of course, that even 
with this consensus established, it will be subject to widely differing interpretations: sceptics 
may argue that a lid be put on the “gene talk” until more is known (Holtzman and Marteau 
2000; Vineis, Schulte et al. 2001; Cooper and Psaty 2003; Porta 2003; Kerruish 2005); 
optimists will argue that we have to start transforming the health care system today 
(preferably yesterday) in order to be prepared for technological developments that will 
inevitably come (Emery and Hayflick 2001; Bell 2003; Guttmacher and Collins 2003; 
Knottnerus 2003; Khoury 2005).  
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Therapy?  
The main rationale, we may state, behind the application of genetics to the clinical context, is 
its potential for discerning the exact mechanisms involved in pathogenesis (Bell 1998). This 
will also entail the ability to make more exact diagnosis and to intervene with the specific 
disease causing mechanisms:  
 
“The issue of specificity of treatment is an important one. New genetic tests to assess the risk of 
common diseases are likely to have properties similar to those of tests for factor V Leiden. They will 
identify relatively common genetic traits that interact with other genetic and environmental factors to 
increase risk. Their clinical usefulness will depend on the ability of specific, effective interventions to 
reduce risk” (Burke 2002).  
 
So far, the case for direct intervention, so-called gene therapy, has been relatively weak. Gene 
therapy is a direct intervention with the disease-causing gene in which the gene is replaced 
with a healthy one. Although successful gene therapy trials have taken place (Petit-Zernan 
2002), the revelation that experimental trials on a boy in Paris had caused cancer caused a stir 
in the world of clinical genetics. The approach remains experimental, its long term effects 
unknown, and regulatory responses in different countries vary (Check 2002). The main 
difficulty is the precise targeting of the therapeutic agent, which has so far been relying upon 
vectors that are hard to control when inserted into the host. 
 
For the foreseeable future then, options for therapeutic action remain mainly within the 
diagnostic and preventive domain: gene expression profiling to obtain more precise 
diagnoses, genotyping in order to adapt drug treatments to the individual patient and new drug 
therapies and so on. Guttmacher and Collins does not see that this will change within the near 
future:  
 
“Since it remains difficult to alter genes in humans (for both technical and ethical reasons), for the 
next couple of decades we will generally use personalized modifications of the environment, and not 
of genes, to translate genomics-based knowledge into improvements in health for most of our patients. 
Clinicians will much more frequently suggest to patients with hereditary hemochromatosis that they 
avoid iron supplementation than that they consider gene therapy” (Guttmacher and Collins 2003). 
 
The occurrence of individualised and preventive genomic health care for everybody is 
predicted on the development of better and more cost-efficient technologies, ultimately 
issuing in the “$1000-genome”, the sequencing of the individual patients genome within a 
decade or two (Guttmacher and Collins 2003). However, the authors see one serious obstacle 
to this progression of events: “Unless complex issues regarding the patenting and licensing of 
  240
gene-based knowledge and techniques are dealt with more successfully than they are today, 
the “$1000-genome” will remain a wish, not a reality” (Guttmacher and Collins 2003).  
 
 
 
 
Co-developing policy issues 
At this stage I would like to prepare for a subject that will be treated in more length in the 
later chapter on patient autonomy. That is the regulatory issues that co-evolved along with the 
developments sketched in this chapter. At the more analytical level, it is also the beginning of 
the story of how the organising principle of autonomy made its way into the clinical 
application of genetics. 
 
Disease with genetic 
component 
Map 
Clone gene 
Diagnostics Understanding 
basic biological 
defect 
Preventive 
medicine 
Pharmaco- 
genomics 
Gene therapy Drug therapy 
Time Accelerated by 
the Human 
Genome Project 
The genomic revolution in medicine as projected by Francis Collins. So far the main 
outcomes of genomics have taken place mainly according to the arrows at the left in 
the diagram. Copied from (Collins 1999).
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U.S. health authorities recognised early on that there was a need to regulate the new and fast 
expanding field of genetic testing and screening. In what follows, I describe some central 
policy issues that developed along with the screening programs. I do this mainly by 
recounting some central issues from three policy documents: “Genetic screening: Programs, 
Principles and Research” (National Academy of Sciences 1975), “Screening and Counselling 
for Genetic Conditions” (National Research Council 1983) and “Assessing Genetic Risks, 
Implications for Health and Social Policy” (Institute of Medicine 1994). Many of the same 
people, scientists, physicians and ethicists, served on the committees, and so the continuity 
between the three reports is strong (Walters 1998). 
 
During the early 1970s, as recombinant DNA technology and genetic screening programs 
were emerging as significant social factors, the field of bioethics was establishing itself as a 
discipline relevant to policy-making. Apart from the biohazard debate surrounding 
recombinant DNA, genetic screening programs were particularly amenable to ethical analysis. 
In 1972, a group from the Hastings Center led by a theologian, James Gustafson, and a 
scientist, Richard Roblin, published a report in the New England Journal of Medicine on 
“Ethical and Social Issues in Screening for Genetic Disease” (Jonsen 1998; Walters 1998), 
256. At the same time, on the request of the American Society of Human Genetics, a 
committee was established by the National Research Council to evaluate screening practices. 
As mentioned, sloppy routines and premature methodologies in PKU screening was one 
reason for assessing the situation. Similar deficiencies seemed to haunt other screening 
programs as well: Following the successful implementation of carrier screening programs for 
tay-sachs disease in the Ashkenazi Jew community a similar program for sickle cell disease 
had been introduced to communities of Afro-Americans. The programs, made mandatory in 
thirteen states, were badly targeted: Aimed at preschool children (!), marriage licensing and 
school admission, and rarely followed up by proper counselling, the message more often than 
not came through as badly distorted. Allegations of discrimination and stigmatisation 
followed, and soon the mandatory character of the programs was abolished (Jonsen 1998). 
Episodes like these singled out the field for ethical analysis, and so many of the members 
from the Hastings group were taken aboard the NRC committee. 
 
Initially established to investigate the practice of PKU screening, the Committee for the Study 
of Inborn Errors of Metabolism soon found its mandate expanded (by the NRC) to deal with 
screening in general: 
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“Screening programs for genetic diseases and characteristics…have multiplied rapidly in the past few 
decades, and many have been begun without prior testing and evaluation and not always for reasons of 
health alone. Changes in disease patterns and a new emphasis on preventive medicine, as well as 
recent and rapid advances in genetics, indicate that screening for genetic characteristics will become 
more common in the future. These conditions, together with the mistakes already made, suggested the 
need for a review of current screening practices that would identify the problems and difficulties and 
give some procedural guidance, in order to minimize the shortcomings and maximize the effectiveness 
of future genetic screening programs” (National Academy of Sciences 1975).  
 
Although recognising decisive shortcomings in screening practices so far, as well as the many 
uncertainties connected to expansion, the potential for development according to improved 
standardised and scientific rules was underlined. However, it was important that the many 
possible side-effects on the social order were taken into account, and that one proceeded in 
“an experimental mood” (ibid.). A main conclusion of the ensuing report was that screening 
be made voluntary, not mandatory. Public participation was pointed out as incremental to the 
successful implementation of screening programs. Screening practices are unique in the sense 
that clinical treatment and research are necessarily connected: because there is no permissible 
way of studying human inheritance in laboratories, the only way to get at human genetic 
variation and its phenotype expressions is to study it in vivo. Future programs, therefore, 
would have to proceed in ways strongly integrated with the particular societies or groups that 
were studied, as well as with local authorities and social organisations involved. For achieving 
these goals it was essential that the purposes of the programs were clearly articulated and that 
the relevant knowledge of genetic disease was spread in the population. Hence, it was also 
very much a matter of educating health professionals as well as the general public in matters 
genetic. This would have to take place in medical faculties, in the education of health 
professionals, but also, importantly, in the public school system. All in all, an integrative 
approach was sought out, what Sheila Jasanoff call a strong co-production of social and 
scientific order (Jasanoff 2004). Furthermore, integration was to take place within the wider 
framework of health care development: “In the future, genetic screening should be regarded 
as one among several preventive health measures and its development should take place in the 
context of the evolution of health care in general” (National Academy of Sciences 1975). 
 
A number of legal issues were also introduced, significantly the question as to whether 
screening be made mandatory or not. The committee recommended against such measures, 
arguing strongly in favour of the necessity to keep with a voluntary approach. In keeping with 
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the above sketched approach, also the legal matters should be integrated into a wider set of 
social, ethical and psychological concerns: 
 
“Screening authorities should consult regularly with lawyers and other persons knowledgeable in 
ethics to avoid social consequences of screening that may be damaging. These take the form of 
invasion of privacy, breach of confidentiality, and other transgressions of civil rights, as well as 
psychological damage resulting from being “labelled” or from misunderstandings about the 
significance of diseases and carrier states” (ibid.). 
 
These problems were further elaborated in a study published in 1983 that specifically 
addressed these issues from the “ethical, social and legal” points of view. The report, issued 
on the request of Congress, carried the somewhat intricate title Screening and Counselling for 
Genetic Conditions: A Report on Ethical, Social and Legal Implications of Genetic Screening, 
Counselling and Education Program (The President's Comission 1983). The first thing to 
notice here is the introduction of a novel institute on the interface between human genetics 
and society, namely that of genetic counselling62. The genetic counsellor was there to help 
people making difficult decisions about genetic choices by supplying the relevant 
information: 
 
“Genetic counselling helps people with a potential or manifest genetic problem understand and, if 
possible, adjust to genetic information; when necessary it aids them in making decisions about what 
course to follow. It is an individualized process in which a specialist in medical genetics confers with 
an individual, a couple, or sometimes a group seeking additional information or assistance” (ibid.). 
 
The second thing to notice is that ethical, social and legal dimensions are singled out as 
distinct issues worthy of their own report, and in demand of distinct expertise. Although in 
many ways continuing the integrative approach of the previous report, it is clear that the 
second report simultaneously implied an out-differentiation of disciplinary relations. This also 
meant a re-conceptualisation of some of the central issues of the 1975 report. Centrally, the 
issue of voluntary participation now came cloaked in a new language: 
 
“The Commission believes that the principle of autonomy, which holds a high place in Western ethical 
and legal tradition, is important not only in the relationships of individual patients and health care 
professionals (through the requirement of informed consent) but also in the choices that people make 
about the uses of genetic services” (ibid.). 
 
                                                 
62 Genetic counselling existed already in the 1960s (Jonsen 1998). My point is that it is introduced as a means for 
policy-making. 
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The notion of informed consent, stemming from a court decision in 1957, had also been 
included in the report from 1975. It entailed the notion that the patient be made familiar with 
the possible consequences of obtaining genetic information prior to the giving of such 
information. But its derivation from the primary principle of autonomy was a new construct 
that resulted from the use of ethicists and philosophers in the committee (Jonsen 1998).  
 
What was more: the principle of informed consent (hence also autonomy) was expanded, 
from regulating the participation in screening programs to include the relationship between 
the patient and the physician or genetic counsellor and policy-making. This novel 
construction (in a medical context) was seen to form part of a whole, expressed in a principle-
oriented approach. Four principles emerged as decisive: autonomy, beneficence, justice and 
privacy. The concepts of autonomy and informed consent came to establish a new contract 
between the concerned groups: geneticists, counsellors, ethicists, patients and policy-makers. 
The early screening programs suffered from a lack of clearly stated goals and operational 
guidelines, both ethical and scientific. For instance, the issue of mandatory screening resulted 
in significant problems on the interface between the health care system and the communities 
that were enrolled in the programs. There was a clear need to protect the citizens/patients 
from undue intrusions of the medical system, and patient’s rights seemed to secure a good 
approach. On the side of the policy-makers, specific principles and guidelines were amenable 
to be made operational and as such served to order a seemingly chaotic field.  
 
And the ethicists? In a post-metaphysical age, they found a field of practical relevance for 
their theories. As claimed by Stephen Toulmin: “medicine saved the life of ethics” (Toulmin 
1982). As will be seen in the later chapter on law and bioethics, this approach to decision- and 
policy-making would be decisive, not least through the work of bio-ethicists Tom Beauchamp 
and James Childress. The significant outcome of these developments was that the issues of 
screening, counselling and autonomy were seen to form a coherent whole:  
 
“In sum, the fundamental value of genetic screening and counselling is their ability to enhance the 
opportunities for individuals to obtain information about their personal health and childbearing risks 
and to make autonomous and noncoerced choices based on that information” (The President's 
Comission 1983). 
 
Before continuing, the issue of noncoercion alluded to by the committee should also be 
remarked upon. It was noticed that the basis for making genuinely autonomous choices in 
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matters genetic could be threatened by “subtle social pressures”: the indirect influences from 
health personnel and social expectancies arising along with the new screening possibilities. 
For instance, a parental couple that does not use the opportunity of genetic screening and 
counselling and thereafter has a severely retarded child may feel themselves responsible for 
not having avoided that outcome. However, the committee did not come up with much in the 
way of recommendations for avoiding such undesired side-effects, except from underlining 
the necessity of educating the public.  
 
The principle of “non-directedness” in genetic counselling was put forward as one important 
requirement in order to secure that the counsellor remained objective and did not intrude on 
the domain of the decision-maker, the patient. Indeed, screening and counselling were the 
means by which to prevent such effects, and as such more of a solution than part of a 
problem. Alluding to the pluralist culture of the United States, it was therefore concluded that  
 
“Nowhere is the need for freedom to pursue divergent conceptions of the good more deeply felt than in 
decisions concerning reproduction. It would be a cruel irony, therefore, if technological advances 
undertaken in the name of providing information to expand the range of individual choice result in 
unanticipated social pressures to pursue a particular course of action” (ibid.). 
 
 
In 1994, a new committee was established, in part consisting of old members from the 1974 
and 1983-committees. This time, however, there was not an exclusive focus upon ethical and 
legal issues. The main goal was to investigate the role of risk assessment in screening and 
counselling, and to draw implications for health and social policy. The report started out by 
quoting and reiterating the point made in 1975: screening programs were spreading and 
regulatory and ethical measures were lagging behind. The ethical principles from 1983, 
however, were incorporated into the general framework for assessment and policy-making: 
“The committee’s fundamental ethical principles include voluntariness, informed consent, and 
confidentiality, which in turn derive from respect for autonomy, equity, and privacy” (Institute 
of Medicine 1994) 
 
One of the main reasons for re-assessing the situation was the rapid expansion of genetic tests 
for a rising number of diseases. These were, of course, direct results of the explosion of 
discoveries in disease-causing genes. But with these developments in mind, the purpose was 
also to address the further expansion of such tests, possibly also to more common diseases of 
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higher aetiological complexity, possibilities that would come from the Human Genome 
Project (ibid.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  247
8. Recasting the subject 
I will now resume some of the stories told in the previous two chapters and relate them more 
explicitly to the methodological framework laid out in chapters one to three. The purpose of 
that exercise is first and foremost to gain some reflective distance to the analysis of the gene, 
and to try and place it within a wider socio-historical context. After that I will return more 
explicitly to regulatory questions and science policy. 
 
Towards the end of the chapter on Heidegger I specifically concentrated on two elements in 
his philosophy, that of Gestell (for which an inaccurate but useful translation may be 
“framework”) and that of Bestand, or the “standing-reserve”. I then used these as clues for the 
elaboration of the more sociological oriented terms of the counterfactual organiser and the 
techno-medical object. The counterfactual organiser is similar to the conception of Gestell 
insofar as it serves as a general conceptual, instrumental and perhaps also institutional 
framework (i.e., by introducing the counterfactual organiser, I specifically imply institutional 
dimensions).  
 
In order to escape Heideggerian ivory-tower philosophising, the two following features must 
be underlined concerning the counterfactual organiser: 1) it is a communicative strategy, 
insofar as it makes possible the inter-subjective sharing of data as well as common, 
standardised ways of acting and talking in the community of researchers; 2) it makes 
presuppositions about causal relations in the world, and it may therefore be directly relevant 
to experimental, clinical and social action. It is through mechanisms like these that the 
counterfactual organiser is capable of establishing itself not only as a scientific principle, but 
also as social metaphysics. It does not come floating through the mist of history like some 
mystic entity, like “Epochal Being” or anything similar.  
 
Furthermore, Heidegger did, quite understandably, proceed according to the world-view of 
physics. Hence, Gestell is primarily conceived of in terms of Newtonian physics, or at least 
something very similar. Gestell comes about as the result of a mathematical projection, 
through which nature is reinterpreted on an a priori basis of geometrical space. Although the 
attempts at reducing molecular biology to physics have made up a substantial part of its 
tradition63, such a model is barely valid as a representation of the ways in which molecular 
                                                 
63 James Watson, for instance, has always emphasised the direct line between the work in Max Delbrück’s phage 
group, of which he was a part, and his later work. The fact that Delbrück had been a student of Niels Bohr was 
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biologists think and work. There are, in principle, no limits to how far we can precede in our 
search for a basic level: the nucleotide bases of DNA are themselves made up of atoms, 
protons, neutrons, and so on. But the reduction of the organism to its single parts comes at a 
price: “an organism can be made the object of physics, but the more detailed knowledge we 
obtain, the more we suppress the organism itself” (Fjelland 2001).  
 
As stated by Richard Burian: “In brief, molecular biology is less like Newtonian mechanics 
than it is like auto mechanics: What it studies are mechanisms and it uses those mechanisms 
to intervene in nature” (Burian 1996). In Burian’s view, molecular biology contains no 
general laws, not even the central dogma would qualify as a law in the sense ordinarily 
attributed to the concept in physics. Its heavy reliance upon the use of model organisms, its 
traditionally strong reliance upon experiment, and its reluctance towards formalistic 
approaches are all expressions of this.  
 
We have seen how molecular biology gradually, in the1960s, came to encompass other 
disciplines, significantly biochemistry and embryology. With the coming of recombinant 
DNA technology and mapping and sequencing technologies in the 1970s and 1980s the 
discipline grew even stronger, and came to encompass at least one medical and clinical 
discipline, human genetics. But today, it may seem that the space of development that was 
closed in the 1960s is again opening up to the wider field of biology. The one-dimensional 
space of the central dogma and the genetic code may not suffice to explain biological function 
on all of its many levels: protein folding, cell and organ function, not to speak of the organism 
as such. Genomic function is not enough: “it is only in the context of higher level structures, 
functioning properly, that molecular mechanisms operate “correctly”” (Burian 1996). In 
Burian’s view, molecular biology has come to rely, not upon a central theory, but rather upon 
“an immensely powerful battery of techniques for getting at the interrelated families of 
complex mechanisms found in all sorts of organisms” (ibid.).  
 
What this indicates is that molecular genetics may emerge not so much as the basic discipline 
of the life sciences, as a way of communicating about biological function on different levels. 
In a philosophical language, it may emerge as more pragmatic and case-based than the unitary 
                                                                                                                                                        
later used to establish the scientific authenticity of the phage group by aligning it with the Copenhagen school 
(Abir Am 1999). Watson has later (1994) been quoted as saying “There is only one science, physics: everything 
else is social work” (Rose 1997: 8). 
  249
and deductive ideal taken from physics. On this model, a strict genetic determinism is an 
impossibility: between each level of biological functioning, DNA, protein, cell, organ, and so 
on, there is a gap that cannot be bridged without losing sight of function and organisation on 
at least one of the levels. Each level of organisation is emergent: “emergent explanations are 
holist insofar as they are irreducible to the behaviour of component parts” (Fox Keller 
2002:284).  
 
So much for the philosophy of biology. It may give us a clue for interpreting the theoretical 
framework of molecular genetics, but it does not put many restrictions upon the ways in 
which genetics is actually conceived and applied. We may, however, keep the notion in mind 
that whereas molecular biology in the 1960s emerged as master discipline along with the 
master molecule, today the somehow paradoxical situation exists that the success of the 
genome project has led to the necessary implementation of a wider spectre of disciplines. And 
so it is that an evolutionary biologist, without causing any stir, today may write that:  
 
“It is important to note that genomes are only one of many important levels of biological organization, 
and that genomic data are only truly useful when viewed in the context of morphological, cytological 
developmental, physiological, and ecological information. By itself, the possession of even a complete 
genome sequence does not provide any great insight into the workings of living systems, let alone the 
place or essence of humanity” (Gregory 2005). 
 
The place and space of the genome is still being negotiated. Indeed, on a social and 
institutional scale, that is what post-genomics are all about: working out the (functional) 
implications and meanings of enormous sets of dis-embedded, perhaps even de-biologised, 
information.   
 
Turning to the clinical context, proponents of genomics do tend to conceive of the genome as 
a unit, and not as a bundle of unrelated DNA. We may accept this, but still be more or less in 
the dark as to the practical implications of this. What does it mean to conceive of 
physiological function and pathology on the level of DNA?  
 
Again, a number of possibilities are available:  
 
As a minimal consensus, it can be assumed that the central dogma poses a valid approach to 
the interpretation and understanding of that unit called the genome for general physiological 
understanding, while not denying the validity and necessity of other approaches (Sarkar 
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1996). This would be a version of genomics that sought to encompass some of the doubts 
regarding the allegedly unique status of the genome. As already seen, we do not even have to 
leave DNA before we get to epigenetic factors, namely the chromatin in which DNA is 
wrapped. In addition, large parts of the genome has functions that are still unknown, like 
“junk DNA”; and phenomena like alternative splicing have forever falsified the notion that 
one gene makes one protein. Thus, the move from genetics to genomics can be said to 
encompass a move in a non-reductionist direction, insofar as function is conceived in terms of 
the interrelatedness of the genes that make up the genome. This much is of course recognised 
also by the proponents of genomic medicine (Guttmacher and Collins 2003).  
 
In many cases, however, a stronger supposition is also made, namely that the tools of 
molecular genetics are sufficiently powerful to explain development on a more basic level 
than other disciplines, and, even stronger, to use its models to predict development (Burke 
2002; Bell 2003; Guttmacher and Collins 2003). Obviously, the main rationale for introducing 
genomics into medicine will be its potential for revealing disease mechanisms so as to 
increase the power to diagnose, prevent and cure. On this stronger account of physiological 
function, the central dogma is, if not exactly taken as a general law of nature, then at least to 
be sufficiently universal to count as such. In other words: genomic information leaves us with 
a surplus of alternatives for action that we did not have before. In a sufficient number of 
practical cases, there is a sense in which phenomena on a higher level of organisation may be 
attributable to genotype. The genotype turns out a better basis for diagnostic, preventive or 
therapeutic action than the phenotype, the clinical appearance. This alternative has, to some 
extent, already been pointed to and discussed in the previous chapter. In addition to findings 
already made in human genetics (mainly single-order diseases but also some heterogeneous), 
it also places great faith in the heightened possibilities that will come from developments 
within fields like bioinformatics, mathematics and complex systems theory (Fox Keller 2002; 
Guttmacher and Collins 2002).  
 
As these issues cannot yet be settled, I will contend myself with the following “conclusion”: 
the space of physiological development and the institutional settings in which it unfolds are 
still open and under constant renegotiation. The outcome of the “genomics revolution” is 
uncertain, and there is a wide space for interpretations and visions of the future. The social 
and ontological status of the central dogma (in its genomic clothing) and the gene as a 
material object is still a matter to be settled. Presumably, this will not take place tout court, 
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but rather be a matter of differing developments within differing fields. For instance, the 
epidemiological information yielded by genomics may turn out useful whereas therapies 
continue to lag behind. The universality of the genomic object will be measured in practical 
terms by it’s capability of organising standardised practices of diagnosis, therapy and 
prevention. 
 
I now turn to consider some of the historical and sociological conditions under which these 
negotiations take place. However, it is important to note that in so doing, I remain with the 
hermeneutic conception of the scientific and technological object. It is not a macro-
sociological interpretation, but an exposition of the ways in which we act and organise our 
actions by manipulating and interacting with the social and the material. I do, however, rely 
upon Ulrich Beck’s interpretation of reflexive modernity (qua Zeit Diagnosis) as a way of 
getting at the wider, socio-historical setting. 
 
The genome between first and second modernity 
In at least three important senses, the genome emerges as the social and material realisation of 
age-old visions of modernity. In order to demonstrate this, I relate the genome as envisioned 
by its contemporary proponents to central elements in Descartes and Bernard. Some of the 
generalisations that follow may not be to the taste of some historians and philosophers of 
medicine. I repeat that the whole analysis is carried out from a specific methodological point 
of view. I remain with the hermeneutic interpretation of social action rather than, say, the 
French epistemological school. As I see it, the particular advance with a hermeneutic 
approach is its ability to remain close to the perspective of action and the everyday perception 
of the world. I freely admit to extrapolating the present onto the past, in the sense that I focus 
on the relevance of past intellectual and institutional developments as they may cast a light 
upon present-day genomics, and not (primarily) as they may have appeared to the actors at the 
time. It is an interpretation of modern medical action in terms of the gradual replacement of 
traditional knowledge by a rational and scientific basis. It is therefore also a short history of 
the counterfactual organiser. 
 
First of all, the genome may be interpreted as the physiological realisation of the Cartesian 
and Galileiean outlook on the body and the physical world. It is the attempt to isolate and 
cleanse the basic causal mechanisms of the body from unwarranted and subjective influences:  
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“Common diseases are currently defined by their clinical appearance, with little reference to 
mechanism. Molecular genetics may provide the tools necessary to define diseases by their 
mechanisms” (Bell 1998). The mechanism referred to here, is described as the genotype, the 
clinical appearance is the phenotype. The clinical appearance, it is argued, disturbs the clear 
and distinct perception of the genotype, the underlying disease mechanism: “An 
understanding of the genetic basis of maladies is providing a new taxonomy of disease, free 
from the risk that the diagnostic criteria related to events are secondary to the disease process, 
rather than its cause” (Chakravarti and Little 2003). The similarity to the aforementioned 
primary and secondary qualities of Descartes and Galilei is striking: today, primary qualities 
may be reinterpreted as genotype whereas the secondary qualities are the phenotype (see 
chapter one).  
 
Furthermore, we recognise the attempt at establishing the taxonomy of disease on a firm, 
scientific ground. This was not undertaken by Descartes, but rather by the Paris clinicians. 
During that process, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities emerged in a 
clinical context, in the conceptual guise of the sign and the symptom. The sign was correlative 
of the objectifying “gaze” (Foucault) which again found its place within the newly established 
clinic. The clinic was the first attempt to establish a scientific knowledge base for medicine 
and for the taxonomy of disease; hence it may also be termed the first modern medical 
institution.  
 
Still, clinical practice did not emerge as properly “modern” until the establishment of 
physiology through the intermediary of experimental medicine: pathology is the deviation 
from normal, physiological function. Normal physiological function can only be established 
through experimental intervention (Bernard 1957). Furthermore, there is an internal dialectic 
between the clinic and the laboratory, in which the laboratory is to serve the knowledge base 
for clinical action. The laboratory stands in the service of the clinic, but epistemologically 
speaking the laboratory is the master. Again, we see the intention of replacing the old 
knowledge of disease with a new, more precisely defined, scientific conception of disease.  
 
Claude Bernard articulated this program, but he did not live to see it carried out in practice. In 
spite of differences to the Bernardian program64, the bacteriologists and immunologists did 
                                                 
64 I.e., they did not place the cause of disease in the internal milieu, as did Bernard, but in the external 
environment. Øyvind Michelsen pointed this out to me. 
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carry out the program of experimental medicine on a broad social and institutional basis, 
insofar as the experimental activities of people like Robert Koch, Louis Pasteur and Paul 
Ehrlich managed to establish a knowledge-base that also entailed the effective manipulation 
and distribution of the techno-medical object on a broad basis. For the first time, experimental 
physiology translated directly into clinical application. Specificity emerged as a main 
organisational principle of both scientific and medical activity, first articulated in terms of 
toxins/antitoxins, then as antigen/antibody, and these were finally encapsulated within a 
general paradigm of protein specificity, which was successfully applied to a number of 
biological and physiological disciplines (Mazumdar 1995; Kay 2000). As described in the 
section on the gene, in the late 1950s/early 1960s the organiser of specificity translated into 
that of biological information. Hence, there is a definite rationale for arguing the influence of 
immunology on later research in genetics and genomics: the success of specificity as a 
counterfactual organiser was translated into that of biological information.  
 
In a strong interrelation to this conceptual transition was the powerful institutional position 
from which the relationship between experimental and clinical action emerged in the wake of 
the therapeutic revolution. As argued by Erwin Ackerknecht: 
 
“The consequences of the development of bacteriology were tremendous. It is impossible to 
overemphasize the importance of the fact that for the first time in history causes of numerous diseases 
became known. The way was opened for a replacement of symptomatic or empirical treatment by 
causal treatment or prevention. A definite answer could finally be given to the question as to whether 
the disease-producing agent was a “miasma”, a chemical agent or a living organism. The problem of 
the specificity of diseases was solved. The gap between the discoveries of pure science and their 
successful application in practice was bridged faster than ever before. This fact impressed the lay 
public with the potentialities of medicine more than any previous discovery. Rational treatment and 
prevention of infectious diseases became possible on an unprecedented scale. The whole of medicine 
was transformed, with the fields of public health and surgery undergoing a complete rejuvenation” 
(Ackerknecht 1982:183-184). 
 
And, as argued by Roy Porter, there were only two disciplines in the 20th century that could 
show for them selves the same interaction between experimental and clinical science: “The 
nexus of basic science, clinical research and practical medicine has been notable in two fields 
in particular in the latter half of the twentieth century. One is genetics…The further field of 
spectacular development during recent decades has been immunology” (Porter 1997:586 -
589). Porter also serves some hints as to the historical interrelations of the one to the other: 
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“Basic research, clinical science and technology working with one another have characterized the 
cutting edge of modern medicine. Progress has been made. For almost all diseases something can be 
done; some can be prevented or fully cured. Nevertheless, a century which has brought the most 
intense concentration of attention and resources on medical research ends with many of the major 
killers of western society – particularly heart and vascular disease, cancer, and chronic degenerative 
illness – largely incurable and in many cases increasing in incidence. It can be argued that one reason 
why there has been relatively little success in eradicating them is because the strategies which earlier 
worked so well for tackling acute infectious diseases have proved inappropriate for dealing with 
chronic and degenerative conditions, and it has been hard to discard the successful ‘microbe hunters’ 
formula” (Porter 1997, 595). 
 
Hence, I take it that genomic medicine is indeed chasing the “microbe hunters formula”, and 
that the therapeutic revolution of bacteriology and immunology in important ways, 
scientifically and institutionally, have shaped our present expectations of medical progress.    
 
Obviously, there are differences. Although I have referred to the therapeutic revolution as 
taking place according to Bernardian prescriptions, this is not entirely true. The therapies 
developed by bacteriologists and immunologists resulted from the discovery and isolation of 
specific micro-organisms; it did not come from a prior establishment of basic physiological 
mechanisms. That stated, according to Paul Ehrlich’s receptor immunology, disease could 
indeed be seen as a deviation from the normal function of cell receptors, which was the uptake 
of nutrients at the cell surface (Silverstein 1989). But this may have been more of a post hoc 
speculation than it was of experimental physiology in Bernard’s sense. Indeed, Ehrlich’s 
attempt to establish a general theoretical framework for his findings (the side-chain theory) 
marked the beginning of a retreat from clinical relevance, a descent into “the dark ages of 
immunology” (Silverstein 1989). Where theory formation in immunology came almost as a 
result of practical and clinical application, this has not been the case with genetics, in which 
theory formation and experimentation has been under way for more than fifty years.  
 
However, if the attempt to establish the human genome at the centre of physiology, medical 
practice and health care should succeed, one could argue that it would be the first successful 
application of Bernard’s vision of modernised medicine. The genome would make up, as 
argued by Francois Jacob in 1970, the “hidden design” of physiological function. 
 
I have outlined several characteristics that mark the genome as a typically modern object: the 
attempt to cleanse knowledge of all uncertainty and irrelevant influences through finding a 
secure first principle, the related wish to establish a new taxonomy of disease based on 
scientific principles, and the direct relevance of experiment to clinical application.  
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However: if we are to believe a wide number of observers of the technological condition, we 
do not any more find ourselves in the modernity of the 19th century; neither that of the first 
2/3s of the 20th century. We are “post industrial” (Bell), “late capitalist” (Habermas), 
“postmodern” (Lyotard), “post normal” (Funtowiz and Ravetz), “Mode 2” (Novotny, 
Gibbons, Evans??) or “reflexive modern” (Beck). Hence, the therapeutic revolution took 
place at the height of first modernity whereas the genome has been a product, or, stronger, a 
contributing force in the promotion of reflexive modernity. How do we recognise this?  
 
First, consider the general contexts of the two “revolutions”. The antibody entered into 
clinical practice as the first standardised product available on a world-wide scale. It radically 
changed the role of the clinician and the general practician through equipping him with a 
techno-medical object that actually cured people (indeed, it was only after the therapeutic 
revolutions that hospitals, as the huge institutions we know today, were established). Other 
highly important discoveries followed shortly after, significantly that of penicillin but also 
surgery. As implied by Ackerknecht, the effect was enormous, and it went smoothly along 
with a number of other developments taking place at the time: the medical profession became 
a corner-stone of the growing nation states, as exemplified through Robert Koch’s close 
connections to the centralised Prussian government, military service and the sanitary 
movement. Health insurance schemes, social medicine and national health programs: all these 
things and more entered most western countries in the years between 1900 and 1930, taking 
the shape of a renewed social contract: 
 
“The twentieth-century ship of state thus took health on board, paying lip service to medical 
thinkers and social scientists who taught that a healthy population required a new compact 
between the state, society and medicine: unless medicine were in some measure 
‘nationalized’, society was doomed to be sick and dysfunctional” (Porter 1997:632).  
 
 
Coming to the 1970s and 1980s, however, the picture has changed immensely. By now, the 
medical system has grown so big that the citizen patient is in need of legal protection against 
the powers of experimentalists and pharmaceutical companies, and even against the authority 
of the doctor himself (Rothman 1991). It also enters in a time in which feelings towards 
technological progress has grown ambivalent, the expert-lay divide has become problematic, 
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and in which the rationalisation of society has come to constitute a problem for itself (Beck, 
Holzer et al. 2001).  
 
Genomics, then, considered as an attempt to recast clinical practice and the taxonomy of 
disease according to strict scientific principles, enters into a tougher social climate. Whereas 
immunology to a huge extent entailed a rationalisation of a society that was still guided by a  
strong sense of tradition, at least when it came to medical practice, genomics aims for the 
“rationalisation of rationalisation” (Beck 1998)65.  
 
In many ways, genomics is the direct heir to immunology: The attempt to recast clinical and 
experimental practice, thereby also the whole perception of disease, and thereby also society 
as such, through experimental activity. In first modernity and with the coming of the 
therapeutic revolution, a number of factors and actors had to come together: there was the 
building of the national state in which immunology and bacteriology entered into alliances 
with a number of other social actors and there was the close connection to a growing chemical 
industry, without which many of the discoveries made by people like Koch and Ehrlich could 
not have been made in the first place. Still, the different spheres of action could also co-exist 
in a relative separation and differentiation of work: Although the state supported its citizens 
with health insurance and instigated programmes of public health, the medical doctor 
remained the main “health politician” insofar as most decisions concerning the health of the 
individual patient were left at his discretion. This changed drastically in the late 1960s, and, as 
with so many other things in the late 20th century, the changes were first felt in the U.S:  
 
 “Beginning in the mid-1960s, the practice of medicine in the United States underwent a most 
remarkable – and thoroughly controversial – transformation. Although the changes have altered almost 
every aspect of the relationship between doctor and patient – indeed between medicine and society – 
the essence can be succinctly summarized: the discretion that the profession once enjoyed has been 
increasingly circumscribed, with an almost bewildering number of parties and procedures participating 
in medical decision making” (Rothman 1991:1). 
 
 
                                                 
65 When seen from this perspective, an irony appears: During the constant pronouncement of “revolutions” that 
took place in and around the HGP, the question may arise: who is about to rationalise whom? Proponents of 
genomic medicine warn clinicians that if they do not catch up with the latest developments, they will be left 
behind. At the same time, molecular geneticists are under pressure for not catching up with the latest 
“revolution” in informatics. Are they talking the same languages? Do they propose the same revolutionary 
rationalisations? 
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I will return to this part of the story in the later chapter on autonomy and patients rights. For 
now, the main theme is the muddling up of rationalities and disciplines that took place 
between first and second modernity. There were other, related and parallel developments as 
well: due to revelations of not-so-ethical research practices, not the least during world-war II, 
the state also started to take an interest in experimental activity. Human rights, as manifest in 
the Helsinki declaration, entered as a central consideration for policy-makers.  
 
Then there are the issues of industry and the economy. As seen, medical research in the 1960s 
emerged as a main area of state investment, resulting in a radical growth of researches into 
basic physiology. The main (U.S.) actor in this process was the NIH. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
however, the economy changed and there was a general shift of focus towards applicable 
technologies intended to fuel a growing knowledge-based, global industry (Krimsky 1991; 
Wright 1994; Hughes 2001). We have seen how, in the 1980s, private capital came to make 
up a dominant part of research funding. A main worry of leading figures in the Human 
Genome Project, people like John Sulston, James Watson and Francis Collins, was, and 
remains, that private capital and restrictions upon exchange of information in the shape of 
intellectual property rights, will run off with the common goods.  
 
Hence, there are many ways in which we can say that the genome enters into second-order 
processes of modernisation, rationalisations of rationalisation: 
 
- The attempt to re-establish the scientific basis of physiology and pathology means a 
recasting of the medical knowledge-base. This recasting will be effected through the 
nexus of disciplines that make up the context of the genome 
- the necessity of legal and political intervention  
- the strong role of the economy and industry  
 
All these factors were present also during the therapeutic revolution. The difference is that 
they no longer reside in the periphery, but threaten to take the centre stage. Hence, we get a 
“muddling up of rationalities” that question the old models of legitimacy:  
 
“In dem Masse, in dem diese Gewissheitserosion der Rationalitätsgrundlage voranschreitet und 
anerkannt wird, kommen alternative Wissensformen ins Spiel, die möglicherweise immer schon latent 
Handlungen und Entscheidungen zugrunde lagen, aber als illegitim, weil unvereinbar mit dem 
jeweiligen Rationalitätsmodell angesehen wurden“ (Beck and Bonss 2001:35). 
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Second modernity is this intensification of first modernity rationality and action, in the sense 
that the modern distribution of knowledge production and action organisation transgresses its 
own borders. This happens because each discipline and each action system has repercussions 
beyond its own domain of acting and knowing, and so the modern production of knowledge 
poses problems that cannot be solved within the old figures of thinking, speaking, acting and 
organising. In terms of classical sociology: Functional differentiation creates problems that 
cannot be solved within the model of functional differentiation (Beck and Holzer 2004). We 
may also state the point using expressions from Sheila Jasanoff (2004): In first modernity, the 
production of scientific order would generally coincide with establishment of social order. In 
second modernity, social order and scientific order may be found to be at odds with each 
other. Indeed, the reservation of part of the Human Genome Project’s budget for research on 
legal, ethical and social issues is an expression of this fact.  
The genome between system worlds and life-worlds 
An overview of the situation cannot do without some understanding of that dimension in 
which the scientific object is thought to find its main application and legitimation: the life-
world of the patient. As seen in the policy documents dealing with the prospects of a genomic 
medicine, a thorough re-education of the public as well as the medical profession is a 
necessity if technology transfer is to be a success. Genetic information is not much worth if 
there is nobody to interpret it and to translate it into the language of ordinary life, and for this 
to happen there must also be a rudimentary understanding of genetics in the population. For 
the moment, things may not be moving in the desired direction:  
 
„Few medical schools adequately train their students to think mechanistically about disease; indeed 
the trend towards pattern-recognition medicine, away from basic science training, means that we are 
still far from educating the next generation of clinicians to apply the knowledge and tools bequated to 
us by the double helix“ (Chakravarti and Little 2003).  
 
And, according to Guttmacher and Collins, at the moment „confusion remains among health 
professionals and the public about the role of genetic information in medical practice“ 
(Guttmacher and Collins 2002). But is it just a matter of giving „the right information“ to 
people? In order for genetic information to become of value, it must also cross the barrier 
between two worlds (cultures): "It is evident that ordinary experience is almost entirely made 
up of secondary qualities. The fact that men of science have dwelt chiefly on something else, 
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something which ordinary men do not ordinarily consider, has separated them from their 
fellows” (Singer 1959:246). 
 
The justification for establishing a scientific basis for the study of disease is obvious: the 
techno-medical object presents us with the potential for diagnosing, preventing and curing 
disease. It is easy to imagine how the antibody must have strengthened the power of the 
physician immensely: it put him in the position of administering prevention and cures with 
directly measurable effects. The position (expertise) of the experimenter as well as the 
clinician was made manifest through the object of the antibody. Due to the high specificity of 
the antibody with its antigen, direct intervention became possible. The causal mechanism 
described by that counterfactual organiser called specificity corresponded directly with the 
single diseases it was set to act upon. Hence, the specificity of antigen and antibody was 
capable of organising a wide spectre of actions: from experimenter to clinician to patient to 
public health official; and all of it was possible because it had an easily demonstrable effect in 
the life-world. Indeed, much information was not needed; the (techno-medical) object spoke 
for itself through its almost magical capacity for the organisation of action. And so it is also 
easy to imagine how it became a highly efficient vessel for the integration of social action on 
the level of the medical action system. As such, it offers a prime example of the organisation 
of action in first modernity: the gradual removing of the basis of decision-making from 
traditional knowledge through professionalized and standardised knowledge, by Tönnies 
named the transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Lash 1996).  
 
The gene, on the other hand, is not (yet?) endowed with such blessed characteristics: its 
specificity is in most cases a dubitable phenomenon, insofar as it also relies upon interactions 
with other genes, with proteins, cell environment and so on. We have also seen that whereas 
the project of defining DNA structure may be unproblematic, the definition of the gene is a 
more complex affair (Fox Keller 2000; Carninci, Sandelin et al. 2006). Although there is a 
material basis to the concept of the gene, its value usually comes from its status as an 
immaterial object, information. Hence, in genetics, communication is essential to the proper 
administration of the object.  
 
In addition to the epistemic uncertainties that may continue to haunt the gene, comes the fact 
that it is itself defined in terms of future risks to the patient’s health, hence expressed in terms 
of probability rather than as certainty. This may seem a paradox: the advancement of 
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scientific certainty translates into uncertainty when communicated to the patient. This is 
particularly true with respect to multi-factorial diseases: the highest degree of certainty 
possibly attainable is by necessity expressed in terms of probability. 
 
In addition to this comes the already mentioned therapeutic gap: the ability to pose diagnosis 
outpaces the ability to cure. This means that in most cases, the administration of the gene 
directly transposes the responsibility for disease from the medical action system to the 
individual patient.  
 
These two features mark the gene as a prototypical object of second modernity: its character 
of being a risk object (Beck 1992) and its character of being a promoter of individualisation 
(Beck, Lash et al. 1996) of the responsibility for disease. In this context, the term “risk object” 
should be interpreted quite literally, insofar as genetic information about most diseases is 
transmitted, not in terms of certainty, but in terms of the probabilities that a certain state of 
affairs occurs in the future. Indeed, the goal of genomic medicine is to provide the patient 
with individually adapted genetic information, like the “$1000-genome” vision of Francis 
Collins. The information entailed is supposed to enhance the potential for therapeutic 
intervention through specifically manufactured and adapted drugs and changes of 
environmental influences that increase the risk of disease breaking out (Guttmacher and 
Collins 2002). For the gene to become an object on a par with the antibody, gene therapy or 
stem cell therapy have to become realities. So far they have failed to redeem the high 
expectancies invested in them.  
 
Somehow ironically then, the attempt at establishing scientific certainty through exact 
diagnosis, may issue in the creation of ontological uncertainty (Giddens 1990) in the life-
worlds. In order to prevent these effects we try to make sure that genetic diagnosis comes with 
proper counselling, either from a specially educated genetic counsellor or from a medical 
geneticist. This person finds him or herself as a mediator between two worlds, or cultures, that 
of the life-world of the patient and that of the world of exact knowledge, faced with the 
difficult task of integrating genetic information within the life of the patient. The gene crosses 
the border between two worlds, indeed also between two anthropologies, as described in the 
first chapter. The gene also has a different time and dynamic from that of the patient: the 
linear relation of genotype to phenotype is not the same as the circular time of the life-world 
(Heidegger 1962). I will return to these issues in more detail in the chapter on autonomy.  
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9. Patentability 
 
 
I ask, what would a man value ten thousand or an 
hundred thousand acres of excellent land, ready 
cultivated and well stocked, too, with cattle, in the 
middle of the inland parts of America, where he had 
no hopes of commerce with the other parts of the 
world, to draw money to him by the sale of the 
product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we 
should see him give up again to the wild common of 
Nature whatever was more than would supply the 
conveniences of life, to be had there for him and his 
family. Thus, in the beginning, all the world was 
America, and more so than that is now; for no such 
thing as money was any where known. Find out 
something that hath use and value of money amongst 
his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin 
presently to enlarge his possessions 
 
John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, 
Extent and End of Civil Government 
 
 
Patentability and intellectual property rights in general are continuations of the principle of 
the right to property as established by enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant in the 17th and 18th centuries. According to Locke, man has the right to 
anything that is refined by him, to anything that he has worked with his own body and thereby 
removed from the state of nature. One oft-cited passage goes as follows:  
 
“Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his 
own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his 
hands, we may say, is properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it 
hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men” (Locke 
1966:§27).   
 
The right to property, Locke said, is not fundamental, but rather derivable from the right to 
life and the concept of labour. Through his labour, man acquires a right in the material object 
as shaped and refined by him. The primary role (and legitimacy) of the state, Locke stated, is 
to protect man’s right to property. In the liberal tradition of thought, the contractual relation of 
right, property and state makes up central parts of the fundament. Due to man’s right to his 
own body, he transposes this right onto the material world through working and refining it. 
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Intellectual property rights (IPR) constitutes a slightly different matter, insofar as they 
introduce the time-limited right to the techniques or methods by which nature is refined. 
Although itself not aq US invention, the strong propagation of intellectual property rights in 
the late 20th century has been a particular concern of that country’s expansive industrial and 
foreign policies. It was first laid down in the U.S. constitution of 1787 in order to “promote 
the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”, quoted from (Krimsky 
199:145).  
 
As can be seen, the institute was intended as an incitement to innovate. This remains one of its 
main Raisons d’Etres and it is also the background of the most well-known economic theory 
about patents, the so-called invention-inducement Theory. Other theories tend towards 
emphasising the benefits of patents in promoting the disclosure of inventions (hence share 
information about new knowledge), the incitement they offer for investors to develop and 
commercialise inventions or their ordering function for the future prospects of an invention 
(Nelson 1997). No wonder, theories like these come very close to so-called economic theories 
of law, in which a law’s general legitimacy and quality is assessed due to its ability to induce 
economic growth (Posner 1983). As long as the law remains within the closed-off boundaries 
of industrial regulation, such reasons may be adequate to most people. However, when these 
models intrude on other areas of law, such as constitutional law, public law or health law, 
many people will feel that as an illegitimate intrusion of the economy into areas were it does 
not belong. To cast the problem within a Habermasian language: When economic incentives 
come to set the premises also within these other areas, a debate about substantial rationales 
for legislation has been exchanged for technical or formal rational reasons. This is one good 
way of getting at the critical issues cast up by patentability and genetics: many scientists, bio-
ethicists, lay persons, physicians and lawyers will argue vehemently against the intrusion of 
the economy into areas traditionally associated with the ethos of science, the medical oath and 
health care as a domain essentially belonging within the public sphere.  
 
An intellectual property right is basically a contract between an individual, the inventor, and 
society. Patents are but one among a number of intellectual property rights; copyrights and 
trade secrets are others (Eisenberg 1997). In what follows, however, I concentrate on the 
intellectual property right of patentability, as that is the institute that has come do dominate 
the debate concerning regulation of bio- and gene technology. The main rationale behind the 
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contractual relation of patentability is as follows: By granting to the inventor the exclusive, 
time-limited rights to the economic and industrial profits of the invention, an incentive is 
offered for the creation of objects, designs, writings or techniques that may become of value 
to society at large. The transfer of surplus value to society, it is projected, takes place along 
two pathways: 1) through the public disclosure of the relevant information about the 
discovery, which is normally part of the patent application. There is a time lag between the 
filing of the application and the public announcement of the patent, granting the inventor the 
upper hand in the competition for its use; 2) after the patent has expired, usually after twenty 
years, the invention is in principle out in the open for everyone to use (Eisenberg 1997).  
 
An important element in this process is that the information about the invention is made 
public, but not the monopoly on the use of the invention itself. Thus, the first “payoff” from 
the inventor to society comes in terms of (allegedly) useful information. Within traditional 
patent law, this non-restrictive sharing of information as opposed to the use of the actual 
object or material process has been a main rationale in the balancing of interests (Eisenberg 
1997). As can be imagined from this premise as well as the previous sections, problems arise 
when the genetic object itself takes the shape of information.  
 
Hence, I focus upon two problem complexes: one has to do with ethical and institutional 
concerns raised by the intrusion of industry and the economy into the general area of the life 
sciences; the other has to do with the institutional and regulatory problems arising from the 
attempt to apply traditional patent law to a fast-growing information economy. As before, the 
purpose is not to solve these questions in any detail, but rather to point to some general 
consequences that follow for the social organisation of action.  
 
In what follows I go back in the history already told about the gene, but now we must try and 
see it from a different angle, namely that of patenting as a way of balancing the interests of 
actors from large-scale industry, small companies, the scientific community and the public at 
large.  
Recombinant DNA technology 
Patenting has been part of U.S. industrial politics since the making of the Constitution, 
contributing significantly to a number of techno-social transformations like the industrial, 
agricultural and the chemical revolutions (Krimsky 1991). For that reason, patenting had been 
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known to researchers within applied fields like engineering, agriculture and chemistry from 
the beginning of the 20th century. To most molecular biologists and biomedical researchers in 
the early 1970s, however, the phenomenon of patenting was wholly foreign to their daily 
practice, and insofar as it was made a subject it was generally condemned as opposed to the 
general spirit of those sciences (Hughes 2001).  
 
There was a further legal reason for this: until the ruling in Chakrabarty v. Diamond in 1980, 
organisms or living matter were not considered patentable. This had been U.S. practice since a 
landmark ruling from 1889, in which the application for patent on a fibre growing in the 
needles of a pine tree had been rejected on the grounds that the composition of naturally 
occurring substances did not qualify as human inventions. “The commissioner’s ruling 
formed the basis for what came to be known as the “product-of-nature” doctrine: that while 
processes devised to extract what is found in nature can be patented, objects discovered there 
cannot” (Kevles 1998). Hence, up until the 1970s and the coming of the new techniques of 
recombinant intervention, there would be little reason for life scientists even to consider the 
possibility of patenting. There were not many reasons for doing so: until the scientific and 
industrial syntheses of biological materials became a real possibility, scientific and legal 
imagination remained restricted to their respective domains of thought and action. 
Patentability and the ethos of science 
As described in the earlier section on recombinant DNA technology: although primarily 
involved in basic biomedical research, the main scientists in the field were well aware of the 
potential inherent in the new techniques, and news of the industrial and economic prospects 
also leaked to the media. Stanford University had set up an “Office of Technology Licensing” 
in 1970 to function at the interface between the academic and industrial worlds. Upon reading 
about the new molecular advancements, the administrator of the office, Niels Reimers, 
contacted Cohen and Boyer immediately. Cohen, although fully aware of the potential of the 
new technology, was surprised by the new prospects: “I suppose…that my framework was 
that one patents devices, not basic scientific methodologies”, Cohen quoted in (Hughes 2001).  
 
Cohen had other reservations as well, one of which is especially worth mentioning: the basis 
of the application was three papers on cloning produced during 1973 and 197466. These were 
not the products of Cohen and Boyer alone: significant contributions were also made by 
                                                 
66 See chapter on recombinant DNA. 
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Chang, Helling, Morrow and Goodman. In addition, the work built upon the work of Paul 
Berg’s group that utilised the restriction enzymes developed by some other researchers, and 
so on. The point is: Whereas the papers that served as the basis for the patent application built 
upon the works of a whole community of researchers, only Cohen and Boyer were named as 
inventors of the new technology. The invention being as it was the outcome of a communal 
endeavour and not the sole achievement of two lone researchers,  Cohen felt uncomfortable 
that the honours and rewards would befall him and Boyer only (Hughes 2001). Here then, was 
an early sign of problems to come: whereas science is basically a common enterprise, patent 
law favours the inventor, and ascribes to him not just the honours, but also the rights to the 
new product. This represented a decisive break with the traditional research ethos as described 
by Robert Merton, in which science is basically a communal enterprise based upon the open 
sharing of results and data (Merton 1973). Correspondingly, it also broke with the ways in 
which research had actually been carried out: 
 
“For years we have sustained a flourishing biomedical research enterprise in which investigators have 
drawn heavily upon discoveries that their predecessors left in the public domain. Yet the nature of 
patents is that they restrict access to inventions to increase profits to patent holders” (Eisenberg 1997). 
 
Technology transfer as property transfer 67 
Concomitant with the scant attention paid to patentability by life scientists was the role of 
patenting in American universities in general. As described by Sally Hughes, the attitude 
taken by most universities to patenting was passive: even though the technology existed 
within campus, its promotion in industry was not actively promoted. The technology was 
there for those who wanted to develop it commercially, but by most academic researchers 
commercialisation was generally regarded as a lucky by-product of basic research and not as a 
prime goal. Reimers saw this as an under-developed resource for university funding, and it 
was under these conditions that Cohen eventually came to accept the proposal: he and Boyer 
would stand as inventors and formal applicants, but the economic rewards as well as the 
patentability rights were to befall Stanford University and the University of California, where 
Boyer was working. Boyer, wanting to keep the royalties for him self, seemed not to be 
worried by such doubts. He did, however, have one reservation, namely that publicly funded 
research (NIH) was to result in private property rights. But as long as the patent was kept in 
the name of Stanford and the University of California, this was not a problem: a federal 
                                                 
67 Technology transfer is “the process of converting scientific knowledge into useful products” (Office of 
Technology Assessment 1988). 
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agreement already allowed for transfer of ownership to inventions from the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare to universities, and the NIH already held patent agreements 
with 65 universities (Kevles 1998). This may be seen as one early expression of the rising 
amounts of state incitements to universities to channel research into more applicable projects 
(Hughes 2001). But the universities may also be regarded as forerunners and promoters of 
what would soon be official U.S. patent policy. In 1974, Harvard University received a $23 
million grant (over twelve years) from the Monsanto Chemical Company. The “donation” 
instigated what would soon come to be standard practice between industry and universities: 
universities received funding and property rights, industry receives exclusive license 
agreements on the resulting innovations (Kevles 1998).  
 
One central argument legitimating such property transfers went as follows: under conditions 
of heightened interest from industry and commerce, the universities would be able to monitor 
the use and development of technological products through the possession of intellectual 
property rights. Concerning recombinant technology in particular it will be remembered that 
the handling of biohazard risks also had become a hot scientific and political topic at the time. 
Entering into the general climate that shaped the Asilomar conference, the proposal to 
commercialise a basic scientific technique did not go unheeded, and large parts of the 
scientific community reacted with dismay towards the developments. Hence, whereas 
significant parts of the community were considering the risks and potential adverse effects of 
recombinant DNA, others were lobbying its commercial and industrial application. To the 
proponents of each cause the potential political turmoil caused by the other must have been a 
nuisance: Berg and colleagues, responsible for the moratorium on recombinant DNA research 
were astounded by the political responses to their scientific whistle-blowing and eager to find 
quick solutions and to get on with research. In that environment, Reimer’s intentions to 
further commercialise the technology even before it had been through a thorough risk 
assessment must have seemed contra-productive to the aims of many scientists. For Reimers, 
on the other hand, the political and public attention that came with the moratorium and the 
conference in Asilomar, was indeed bad news (Hughes 2001).  
 
Following the Asilomar conference, NIH issued a set of guidelines for the contained use of 
recombinant DNA technology (briefly described in previous chapter). But as the guidelines 
applied to governmentally (NIH) funded research only, these could not be used to safeguard 
practicing scientists or the public against adverse effects arising through industrial research. It 
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would also be too far fetched to expect that the universities would take it upon themselves to 
regulate the industrial use of the technology. Thus it was that the traditional defence for 
universities possessing patent rights in order to control the technology disappeared down the 
slippery slope of economic development (ibid.). 
Organising legal technicalities 
In legal terms there are three main criteria for the granting of a patent: Novelty, to secure that 
the invention represents a genuine contribution to the present state of knowledge by adding 
something that did not exist before; utility, which is meant to distinguish the invention from 
basic knowledge; and non-obviousness, adding a qualitative dimension to the novelty clause. 
Minor advancements in existing knowledge may not count as genuine inventions (Eisenberg 
1997). The Stanford and UCSF patent application on recombinant DNA obviously met with 
the criteria of novelty and non-obviousness. The utility of the procedures, however, required 
significant scientific and technological improvements (see previous chapter on recombinant 
DNA). Although the first application was filed in June 1974, the commercial utility of the 
technology was not properly demonstrated until 1977 with the successful expression of the 
hormone somatostatin. The political environment into which the application entered also 
contributed to the prolongation of the process of attaining the patent.  
 
But the most significant problem came from a more profound source of uncertainty. In the 
original application from Stanford and UVSF, three patent claims had been raised on two 
principally different grounds. According to the U.S. patent statute, potential objects of 
patentability are defined as “any process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter”, 
quoted from (Eisenberg 2002). The original claims in the application had been for the process 
of recombinant cloning, but it had also been made to imply the actual products thereby 
produced, hence the specific “material composition” that would result from the use of the 
technology. How could one patent the actual products arising from the use of the technology?  
 
In some cases, recombination techniques could be used to produce synthetic DNAs. This did 
not entail any specific problems, as it would offer up no issue that had not already been dealt 
with by the courts in cases involving the patenting of chemical compounds. A new chemical 
compound obviously constituted an invention; but what about hormones like interferon or 
insulin? How could you patent living things? 
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By 1976, Reimers learned that he would do better to withdraw the applications for product 
patents and to retain the process application only. Concerning the patenting of living 
organisms, the U.S. Patent Office awaited the decision of the courts concerning another case 
that had already caused a stir in the legal system. That other case, now famous for its statutory 
role in the commercialisation of biotechnology, was that of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.  
 
Ananda Chakrabarty, working for General Electric, had filed an application for a patent on a 
bacterium constructed to break down oil spills. The bacterium was not a product of 
recombinant DNA technologies, but the principal problem of patenting living things was the 
same. At first, the Patent office Board of Appeals had rejected the claim to ownership put 
forward by Chakrabarty and General Electric on the basis of the precedent established by the 
“product-of-nature” doctrine. This decision, however, had been reversed by the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals. In the end, the case went to Supreme Court, which passed its 
final judgement in 1980. The question came to hinge upon the interpretation of the patent 
institute as established in the 35 U.S.C § 101, where it is stated that “Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor”, quoted from 
(Jasanoff 1995:256).  Quoting a court decision from 1952, in which “anything under the sun 
that is made by man” had been made potential subject for patentability, the Supreme Court 
finally settled upon a radically expansive interpretation of the patentability statute.  
 
In allowing for the patentability of living things, the decision (of 5 to 4 judges) was a signal to 
scientists and industry to go ahead with the establishment of mutual relations (Jasanoff 1995), 
145. By so doing, the court affirmed and strengthened a general tendency in the regulation of 
the emerging recombinant technologies: from an initially sceptical attitude in the beginnings 
of the 1970s, to a shift of emphasis upon economic development and a down-grading of the 
original concerns about the inherent risks of the technology (Wright 1994; Jasanoff 1995; 
Kevles 1998; Hughes 2001).  
 
This also reflected the concerns of many scientists: although many were eager to protect 
biology from industrial and economic forces, they were even more eager to get on with 
research. As already stated, the conference at Asilomar in 1975 had resulted in the issuing of a 
set of NIH guidelines, but these were restricted to publicly funded research only, and not to 
industry. But worries like these were alimented as many had come to the conclusion that the 
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initial uncertainties over the risks of recombinant DNA had been exaggerated. In that way, it 
was the court that came to set the order, acknowledging its duty to foster technological 
progress in accordance with the general political climate. Simultaneously, the court also took 
a passive stance by claiming itself to be powerless in the face of technological progress. 
Hence, says Sheila Jasanoff, an “apparent contradiction between opposition to and acceptance 
of a theory of autonomous technological development” was manifest in the courts judgement, 
but the tension remained unsolved (Jasanoff 1995:145).  
 
There can be no mistaking the question of whose interest finally won out. At the time of the 
Supreme Court ruling, the case had gathered significant momentum, and strong groups were 
applying pressure to influence the decision. Among ten amicus curiae briefs that were filed, 
only one was in favour of the original rejection from the patent office, and that was the brief 
from the People’s Business Comission (PBC) fronted by activist Jeremy Rifkin. The rest of 
the letters, all in support of the patent, came from actors such as Genentech, the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the American Patent Law Association, the New 
York Patent Law Association and the American Society for Microbiology (Kevles 1998). The 
actors may be let to speak for themselves:  
 
In the amicus brief from Genentech, it was declared that revolutionary scientific 
developments were often controversial, and that it was not the business of the court “to 
attempt, like king Canute, to command the tide of technological development”, quote from 
(Kevles 1998). Chief Justice Burger on his side, articulating the view of the majority, stated 
that “legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from 
probing into the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides”, quote from 
(Jasanoff 1995:144-145). 
 
Clearly, Genentech and the Chief Justice spoke the same language. 
Releasing the economy 
Similar accommodations also took place along other pathways. During 1976 and 1977 the 
different issues concerning recombinant DNA were taken to higher levels of policy formation. 
After the application from Stanford, other universities followed, and so the problem was 
gaining in momentum. The director of NIH, the trustees of Stanford, and finally also Congress 
were eventually forced to decide on the complicated issues of commercialisation versus 
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potential biohazards. In 1978, the NIH came out as an outspoken supporter of the Cohen-
Boyer patent. 
 
The early recombinant debate arose in a time when public rights movements, 
environmentalists and other activists had succeeded in establishing a political agenda in which 
the adverse effects of new technologies loomed high (Wright 1986). As a consequence, in 
many states and on the federal level, politicians were considering strict security measures. In 
the state of California, a strict bill on regulation of all laboratories carrying out research on 
recombinant DNA was being planned (Hughes 2001). In 1976, senators Edward Kennedy and 
Jacob Javits made an appeal to president Ford to extend the NIH guidelines to industry as 
well, not just to publicly funded research (Jasanoff 1995). Tendencies like these caused a 
massive counter-campaign from scientists concerned that their research would be hampered 
by politics (Wright 1994). Berg and others who initially had been sceptical towards patenting 
now waged a strong pro-campaign for the general promotion of recombinant DNA 
technologies:  
 
“Berg, Cohen, Kornberg and others on campus, as well as scientists elsewhere, were mounting an 
active opposition. The lobbying effort, one of the largest ever waged over a technical issue before 
Congress, helped to persuade legislators that the scientific and commercial benefits of genetic 
engineering outweighed its potential risks” (Hughes 2001). 
 
 
As the biohazard issue was mainly considered solved, scientists now came out as sceptical 
towards stricter regulation: restrictive rules on patentability and private interests would also 
come down hard on the scientific community itself, and research had to continue. This did not 
mean that the question of patentability had been settled within the community, but it meant 
that for the moment a lid was being put on the issue for the sake of the common good.  
 
This also went well along with the general re-configuration of the economy under way, as 
well as university administrators’ wish to utilize the commercial potential inherent in the new 
technologies. Scientists who wanted to reserve themselves against commercial influences ran 
the risk of losing out on the main developments in their field, as both state and private funding 
were flowing steadily in the direction of the latest technology. The permissive ruling of 
Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty was an expression of this general tendency to 
adapt to the needs of science and technology.  
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Following the ruling in Chakrabarty, the Cohen/Boyer application was also granted. Thus, 
intellectual property rights had been established as a way of regulating research on living 
organisms. In the patent office, the Cohen-Boyer application and a stream of others that had 
awaited treatment could now be dealt with, and in December 1980 Cohen and Boyer’s 
application was granted (Hughes 2001). 
 
The Cohen-Boyer application had initially been broadly formulated: one patent for the 
process and two for the different protein products that would result (made by the use of 
respectively eukaryote and prokaryote DNA) (National Academy of Sciences 1997). What 
this implied was that the proprietors to the process and to the proteins would hold the rights to 
the essential tools and products of a whole new industry. The technology spread rapidly. 
Many smaller companies and research laboratories were already using the new technologies, 
now these had to pay a license fee to stay in business. The fees were not unreasonable, and 
were readily accepted by start-up firms and industry. The property holders found themselves 
in a unique position: the technology was easy in use and not expensive. Furthermore, it 
constituted the only available technology in the market and it was essential to further 
development. A non-exclusive patent was issued, meaning that anybody who paid the license 
fee would have the rights of use. This secured a wide dissemination of the technology. In 
contradistinction, an exclusive patent could have resulted in a situation of monopoly. Due to 
the wide-spread use even before the patent was issued, and because the technology was 
essential to anyone wanting to enter the business, there was little use in limiting the number of 
users. In 1995, the patents had earned its proprietors $139 000 000 in royalties (National 
Academy of Sciences 1997).  
 
No doubt, patentability was not incremental to the new industry; development would have 
taken place also without legal intervention. But the institute did provide a first guarantee 
concerning the potential and viability of the new industry. In those early days little was 
known to outsiders about the true commercial potential of the field, and in that environment 
every patent granted to industry and research served as confirmation of the economic viability 
of the field (Hughes 2001). The main importance of the Cohen-Boyer patent, then, may not 
have been so much its direct stimulation of new research, as it was its capacity for organising 
and stabilising the new relations between industry, commerce and academy that were already 
taking shape: “The biotechnology boom that followed the widespread dissemination of 
recombinant DNA technology transformed the way universities manage intellectual property. 
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It also fundamentally changed the financial environment and culture of biological research” 
(National Academy of Sciences 1997).  
 
For one set of actors, patentability was of prime importance. Those were the many small start-
up companies that popped up at the interface of academia and larger multinational companies. 
As stated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: 
 
“Patents are especially important for biotechnology firms as many of them have no activity other than 
R&D and therefore do not directly exploit their inventions: they sell them, or the right to exploit them, 
to other firms. A legal property right is therefore needed for the seller to be protected” (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 2003). 
 
The main engineering companies to emerge in the late 1970s were Genentech, Genex, Cetus, 
and Biogen, the three first were American, the latter was a European company. Among the 
scientific advisors to these companies were many of the central persons from the early 
developments in recombinant DNA technology. Academic resources were soon absorbed in 
the market: 
 
“In 1981, an investment company reportedly approached twenty researchers before it found one 
without a commercial tie. Since knowledge and experience were as critical to recombinant DNA 
ventures as capital, it was important to hire outstanding scientists before the supply disappeared” 
(Wright 1994:96). 
 
The new companies would typically be situated in locations near to campus, where they could 
easily pick up information and personnel. One important quality measure of the start-ups 
became the number of PhDs connected to the companies (Wright 1994).  
 
On the economic side, money came mainly from investment firms and venture capitalists. 
This meant that, in addition to personnel and economic resources, one of the most important 
assets of the start-ups would come in terms of rights to promising products. Holding patents 
became a means for negotiating one’s way in the emerging market. In many cases, the sole 
capital of the start-ups consisted of the knowledge of academic scientists and the venture 
capital of their investors. In that landscape, property rights came to be of prime importance in 
negotiating the terrain. Research and development contracts would get short-time money, but 
holding rights to valuable substances meant a strong hand in the market, in attracting the 
attention of the big companies. The multinationals, on the other hand, used the smaller 
companies to probe the market before they entered into serious business. Only when the 
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recombinant DNA business was well under way, would the companies carry out their own 
research within recombinant DNA (Wright 1994). 
 
But there was also the matter of a scarcity of natural resources and technical feasibility. As 
already mentioned, the main pharmaceutical and therapeutic aims of the new technologies 
centred on substances such as interferon, expected to be effective in the fight against virus and 
cancer, insulin for diabetes, as well as some other hormones (Wright 1986). The goal for the 
new start-up companies would be to achieve high-rate expression of substances like these. 
Next, when the technology and the rights were secured, they would contact one of the bigger 
pharmaceutical companies to discuss licensing or sale of the rights to the product. During 
1979 and 1980 most genes for interferon were cloned. At the time, following in the wake of 
President Carter’s “war on cancer”, it was widely believed that interferon would provide an 
efficient cure for the disease. The rationale for this was another widely held belief, namely 
that cancer is caused by virus. Interferon had worked on virus (in chicken). Hence, it was 
inferred, it would also work on cancer. In spite of these dubitable presuppositions: due to 
frequent announcements of cloned genes in the media, the hype was kept up, and interferon 
became an early symbol of the new industry. It did not, however, produce the desired effects 
in the treatment of cancer (Rabinow 1996). 
 
The first commercial product to emerge from the new constellations was that of human 
insulin, marketed by Genentech in cooperation with the pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly in 
October 1982. This did indeed prove the value of the new technology, but it also proved the 
proverbial instance of the single swallow that does not make a whole summer. Although 
expectations had been raised high, -by media, scientists and investors alike, the commercial 
outcome of the radically increased investments in the field remained scarce. Equity 
investments in the genetic engineering companies rose sharply in the years from 1979 to 
1982, but from then on the market cooled off (Wright 1994).  
Emerging patterns 
Regardless of what preceded what, the politics, the economy or the technology: it is hard to 
mistake the general trend of the early 1980s, when recombinant DNA technology became a 
major industry. It was a time of liberalising state control with the economy, in which science 
and technology came to be seen as resources for a new knowledge-based industry. In that 
situation, transfer of property rights from the public to the private sector was seen as one 
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important incentive for research, but also as a way of regulating developments. The state, it 
was argued in front of Congress, was not sufficiently aggressive in pursuing the commercial 
potentials offered by patenting regimes. Hence, property rights had to be transferred to the 
sites where invention and development actually took place. And if the universities were to 
deserve public money, they had to transform their production into commercially viable 
commodities, which could then be licensed or sold as intellectual property to private firms 
(Cook-Deegan 1994).  
 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, aimed to promote technology transfer through property transfer, 
was a paradigmatic outcome of this. In the years to come, the Reagan administration issued a 
number of acts to stabilise achievements and to provide incentives for coming developments: 
the Patent and Trademarks Amendments in 1980, the Trademark Clarification Act in 1984 as 
well as the Technology Transfer Act in 1986 (Cook-Deegan 1994). The amendments secured 
a gradual extension of the patentability institute: the Patent and Trademark Amendments were 
passed to secure small businesses and non-profit organisations receiving funding from 
government; the Trademark Clarification Act further removed restrictions on licensing, and 
by the Technology Transfer Act of 1986 many of the same rules were applied to large 
businesses. Federal agencies were also permitted to form consortia with private undertakings 
(Office of Technology Assessment 1988). The developments in biotechnology were paralleled 
by similar incentives directed at the more mature technologies of semi-conductors and 
computers. All these technologies were seen as essential to establishing the U.S. as a world 
market leader in the new knowledge-based economy (Doremus 1995).  
 
Indeed, for those who endorsed the new politics, developments looked good:  
 
“In the mid-1980s, private funding for biomedical research and development surpassed NIH’s; by the 
end of the decade, it was greater than federal funding from NIH and all other agencies combined. 
Catching hold of the best in new science became an important element in drug discovery, driving 
pharmaceutical firms to heavy research investments as a matter of financial survival” (Cook-Deegan 
1994:307).  
 
This also meant that the initial doubts concerning recombinant DNA had given way to the 
economic agenda of the day: the biohazard risk had been played down, and the scientific 
community adapted, some more willingly than others, to the newly established relations with 
commerce and industry. Concerning the question as to the patentability of living things, the 
ruling in Chakrabarty proved radical, and it lasted until 1988 until the patent office continued 
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to expand the policy of the court. This came with the so-called “onco-mouse” of Philip Leder 
(Harvard Med. School) and Timothy Stewart (Genentech Inc.), a transgenic mouse 
specifically engineered for the purposes of cancer research (Jasanoff 1995).  
Patentability and sequencing  
I will shortly turn to the question of the patentability of the human genome sequence. That is 
where many of the central issues of the recombinant DNA controversy are carried on most 
fervidly, and that is also where the story “ends”. As in the recombinant DNA controversy, 
patentability claims were raised and continue to be raised, towards both the process and the 
product, the sequence itself. No doubt, as also seen in the case of Chakrabarty, the issue of 
the patentability of the actual product, a living organism, aroused most controversy. These 
problems were further sharpened when it came to the question of patenting human DNA 
sequences. Part of the problem arise because of the principal doubt about the patentability of 
(human) nature, by many perceived as the common property of humankind, and not 
something to be sold at the market.  
 
But a significant part of the problem with DNA sequencing also arise because of the problems 
with applying traditional patent law to a product that has in the meantime turned immaterial: 
information. I will work my way into that problem-field by starting out with the patenting of 
technologies rather than the product. Hence, I focus briefly on some central “research tools” 
before I turn to the question of the sequence itself.  
Research tools: PCR and DNA sequencers 
It has already been mentioned how sequencing technologies were developed as a cooperation 
between a private company, Applied Biosystems, and a university, Caltech. Relating to 
patentability, here was an area of research that was actually accepted within existing practices, 
although residing in the periphery of the life sciences: patents were usually issued on tools, 
not on basic processes. That being said, it was not common for a research group to focus 
almost entirely on the development of new instruments; new techniques or technologies 
usually came about as by-products of research, or they were developed by instrumentation 
firms and companies (Hughes 2001). Leroy Hood at Caltech was one that spotted the 
direction of developments at an early stage. As part of the team that created the first protein 
sequencer in the late 1960s, he had continued to devote his work to the automation of 
experimental work. Under his lead, a group from Caltech consisting of engineers, biochemists 
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and molecular biologists, emerged as top in the field in instrumentation work. He was also the 
leader of one of the world’s largest biology research groups, working at the forefront of 
molecular immunology (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
 
DNA Sequencers. In the wake of the recombinant DNA industry, Hood’s group at Caltech 
evoked further interest in the field by sequencing the genes of the new products, like growth 
hormones and interferons. Many scientists became interested in the new sequencers and 
synthesizers developed in the cooperation between Caltech and by Applied Biosystems (ABI). 
At the time, Applied Biosystems had been among the few actors within the market to believe 
in Hood’s ideas, and so funding had been obtained on the premise of exclusive licensing to 
the company. Following the wide-spread marketing of automated sequencers at the end of the 
1980s, the technology has become incremental to research in molecular biology and to large-
scale sequencing, and at the time it gave a substantial push to the undertaking of isolating 
single genes. Although Applied Biosystems obtained the license from Caltech on condition of 
its sublicensing the technology on “reasonable terms”, after the marketing of the sequencers 
critics have contended that the sub-licensing practices of ABI has been anything but 
“reasonable”. Of course, ABI counters by claiming it’s right to a “reasonable return” on its 
investments (National Academy of Sciences 1997).  
 
Applied Biosystems has since become the world leader in synthesising and sequencing 
technologies, but they are not the exclusive holders to the rights of the technology. Other 
similar technologies were developed by other firms. In Europe and Japan, sequencing 
technologies developed along with research efforts. One other central actor in the field of 
large-scale sequencing machines has been the Swedish Company Pharmacia, founded in 1989 
(Cook-Deegan 1994). Other, smaller companies have filled niches in the market, for instance 
by focusing on smaller-scale technology for use in ordinary laboratories. For these smaller 
companies, the institute of intellectual property rights is incremental to their survival in the 
market:  
 
“DNA sequencing is more than just an instrument, it is a system. To make a viable product, all the 
disparate pieces need to be integrated. That makes for a challenging intellectual property and licensing 
exercise, unless you have the internal funds to do everything. You require instrumentation, software, 
chemistry and microbiology”, Harry Ostermann, director of molecular biology at LI-COR, a small 
instrumentation company, quoted from (National Academy of Sciences 1997). 
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Again: although it is hard to say what the market would look like without the introduction of 
intellectual property rights, there is no doubt concerning it’s centrality as a means for 
manoeuvring the terrain of the late modern knowledge economy. The landscape looks 
different to different actors, and as a consequence it may be hard to generalise the workings of 
intellectual property rights into any fully embracing theory, be it economic or otherwise 
(Nelson 1997), or into a total politics of technological and industrial development (Doremus 
1995). In many cases, for instance, the incitement towards inventors working within smaller, 
start-up businesses is conceived of as being at odds with the interests of the larger companies, 
supposed to put the products into large-scale production and market them over a broad scale. 
This is so because the intellectual rights required by inventors, which are usually formulated 
in terms of very broad claims on any product that might follow from the invention, may 
render the final product caught up in a web of intellectual property rights and licences that 
makes it too expensive for it to survive in the market. In other words: “upstream” incentives 
for invention hinders “downstream” development of industrial products, a mechanism 
described as a “Tragedy of the Anticommons” by Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg 
(Heller and Eisenberg 1998).  
 
In the case of sequencing technologies, however, the working group on Intellectual Property 
Rights and Research Tools in Molecular Biology put down by the National Academy of 
Sciences, concluded that intellectual property policies had turned out for the better to 
everyone: 
 
“One might argue that patent protection served both the large company (ABI) and the small company 
(LI-COR) in bringing their sequencing technology to the market. In the case of ABI, patent protection 
afforded them the opportunity to develop a complex system of technology in an orderly and efficient 
manner…In the case of LI-COR, patent protection of sequencing systems enabled it to negotiate the 
cross-licensing needed to develop its product fully. In both cases, private support has driven the 
development and dissemination of a research tool. The public and private sector seem to have gained 
equally” (National Academy of Sciences 1997). 
 
 
PCR. As mentioned above, the Cetus Corporation was one of the first start-up engineering 
firms to appear following the introduction of recombinant DNA. Only six months after 
Genentech registered on Wall Street as the first genetic engineering firm, Cetus followed its 
example, hitting the market in March 1981 (Wright 1994). The main target of the company up 
to that time had been interferon, but now most of the interferon genes had been cloned, and 
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prospects had to be sought elsewhere. They settled on another potential anti-cancer agent, 
interleukin 2. 
 
But by the end of the 1980s, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy, and the main tactic 
of pursuing interleukin seemed an increasing failure. Although this may have been just as 
much a consequence of miss-management, interleukin also failed to come through in clinical 
trials (Rabinow 1996). But at the same time, another product was emerging as a more 
promising possibility, namely PCR. Although Cetus had approached larger companies like 
Kodak and Du Pont, this had been done with the main purpose of promoting interleukin, 
thereafter to use some of the money from that for more research on PCR. After some failed 
negotiations, Cetus finally achieved a partnership with the pharmaceutical giant Hoffmann 
La-Roche. Roche’s prime interest, however, was not in interleukin, but rather in PCR, of 
which rumours were already circulating. In return for a contract on PCR, Roche would 
finance research at Cetus as well as give exclusive rights to the company on interleukin. This 
had been a problem for Cetus, as a Japanese company had already purchased the original 
patent rights for that substance. Roche, however, had purchased the rights from the Japanese 
company, and now could use it as a means of trade (Rabinow 1996). In 1991, the patent for 
PCR was sold to Roche for $300 millions. Although initially conceived as a diagnostic tool, 
PCR soon proved its usefulness in a wide variety of technologies. Significantly: In addition to 
creating the possibility to analyse genes from biological samples, it soon emerged as an 
essential tool for large-scale sequencing (National Academy of Sciences 1997).  
 
Compared to recombinant DNA, there was the similarity of the PCR technology being 
essential to a whole new branch of research, if not a whole industry. Those who wanted in on 
the business had to purchase PCR. However, there were important differences as well: 
whereas recombinant DNA had not been intended for commercial purposes, PCR had. This 
was also reflected in the licensing practices of Roche. Their prime target was not to license 
the technology, but to sell products using that technology. For research purposes, lower 
licensing fees were offered than for purely commercial applications, and for diagnostic 
purposes, the fees were even lower (National Academy of Sciences 1997). Still, many 
researchers complained about unreasonable prices, the main problem being the price on the 
enzyme TAQ polymerase. For instance, small companies would complain about being shut 
out from both the market and from science due to the price on the enzyme (National Academy 
of Sciences 1997). 
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Sequences of nature, sequences of information 
When the genome project was being planned, all of the above developments were reflected in 
the planning work. The report from the National Research Council, made by scientists mainly, 
restricted itself to the brief recommendation that “human genome sequences should be a 
public trust and therefore should not be subject to copyright” (National Research Council 
1988), 100. The report from the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, however, 
devoted a whole chapter to the issue of patentability and intellectual property rights. As 
remarked by one observer: “Because OTA performed assessments at the request of Congress, 
it generally avoided making recommendations in its report” (Walters 1998). In spite of this, 
maybe because of the closeness to political circles, the drive towards commercialisation of 
science was underlying the whole chapter: “Policymakers are shifting their attention to 
technology transfer as products derived from molecular genetics find their way to the 
marketplace, international trade imbalances worsen, and rising deficits intensify scrutiny of 
Federal budgets” (Office of Technology Assessment 1988). One explanation of the scarce 
attention to the subject offered by the NRC report could be that it was put together by 
scientists, not politicians, and that the views would differ between the groups:  
 
“Scientists fear that corporate participation will inhibit the free flow of information and impede 
scientific progress. Policymakers want to ensure that a large Federal investment in genome projects is 
translated into new products and services, ultimately creating new jobs and other economic benefits” 
(Office of Technology Assessment 1988). 
 
Perhaps no wonder, then, that clinical benefit was seen as equal to the commercialisation of 
genetic tests and therapies (ibid.), or that patentability as a tool for technology transfer was 
principally regarded as a win – win situation: “Legal protections balance the social good 
stemming from wide disclosure of new knowledge against individuals’ or companies’ rights 
to gain from what would not have existed without their effort” (ibid.).  
 
Hence, in spite of the descriptive and neutral tone alluded to by Walters (above quote), the 
report contained strong prescriptions for the policy of genome centres: “filing patent 
applications early and publishing data soon thereafter are optimal for encouraging rapid 
dissemination of knowledge, protecting inventors’ rights, and preserving economic benefits in 
the United States” (ibid.). Patenting would ensure the public use of new information at the 
same time as the “inventors” (not “scientists”) would retain their control with the product. 
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Because the patents would be granted in the U.S. first, they would also promote the U.S. 
economy by producing new products and services.  
 
Non-patenting, however, was a possibility not to be encouraged. “Investigators may decide 
not to apply for a patent because they wish to avoid substantial legal costs and bureaucratic 
entanglements or because they believe that science should not become commercially 
oriented” (ibid.). Many arguments were served against such a policy on the hands of the 
genome centres: it would inhibit the full exploitation of an invention; the inventor would lose 
control with the product; it would be detrimental to commercialisation because the invention 
could be used freely by all, and it would invite exploitation of U.S. taxpayers’ money from 
foreign companies. In impeccable American logic, the cases of penicillin and monoclonal 
antibodies were used as examples of inventions that had been exploited by a foreign nation: 
“In both cases, the United Kingdom claimed the Nobel Prize, but the United States reaped 
most of the profits” (ibid.). Finally, non-patenting was against federal intent, as recipients of 
public funds were required to report patentable inventions.  
 
A number of concrete proposals were put forwards in order to implement patenting in an 
optimal manner: 
 
- First, due to the stark increase in patent applications in biotechnology a considerable backlog 
at the patent office (PTO) had arisen. This problem was not peculiar to the genome projects, 
but as they would have to await treatment along with other biotech applicants, an upgrading 
of resources at the patent office was recommended (Office of Technology Assessment 1988). 
Already that same year, a new unit was created for the handling of biotech patent applications. 
In spite of the upgrading, the backlog continued to grow and companies and universities 
continued to complain about obstacles created by the regulatory bodies (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
 
-A coordination of patenting policies at the main agencies was recommended, as no such 
thing existed at the time:  
 
“At present, written material on patent policies at NIH, DOE, and NSF is difficult to obtain, and there 
is no single source of information on patent policies at all agencies involved in genome projects…The 
interagency nature of genome projects means that recipient institutions will often be funded by more 
than one agency. A clear presentation of patent guidelines at various agencies with explanations of 
early patent filing and the implications of doing so (and not doing so) might diminish confusion and 
promote commercial application” (Office of Technology Assessment 1988). 
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In this way policy-goals were clear: they followed the general direction of the Bayh Dole Act 
and the line of new legislation that followed in its trace. The question of what should be 
patentable, however, would prove much more difficult, and it would continue to haunt the 
genome projects until their end and beyond. In more recent times, evidence has been gathered 
to show that the complexity of the problem has backfired on the regulatory bodies meant to 
effectuate patent policy, as well as on basic medical research and its clinical application (Merz 
1999; Paradise 2005). On such accounts, central policy goals may even be described as being 
at odds with the prescribed means for achieving those goals. I will return to this topic. 
 
The OTA report, for all of the space devoted to the question of patentability, was less 
prescriptive than the short statement from the NRC report, in which the human genome 
sequences were simply declared public property. One obvious reason for this being so, was 
that this was also very much a legal matter, not for Congress to decide upon. It was a question 
for the courts and for case law to determine the scope of legal protection. Up until that point, 
there was no case law upon which to draw, and so the question had to be kept open. This was 
not least due to the novel character of the field, and the fast pace with which technology 
changed: “The principles for determining patentability do not depend on any particular type of 
technology, but interpretation of them does” (Office of Technology Assessment 1988). In 
general, the report assumed that the main inventions to flow from genome projects would 
relate to technology development and research tools, not to the sequences themselves.  
 
However, the possibility that researchers try and patent whole gene sequences could not be 
ignored: single genes had been patented for years, and in 1987 Walter Gilbert had caused a 
great stir in the research community when he announced his intention to start the Genome 
Corporation, and to copyright the resulting sequence information and to sell it to scientists and 
industry (Roberts 1987). The OTA report also made a reference to a 1982 article by Irving 
Kayton, in which it was argued that clones and sequences could be subjected to 
copyrighting68. Anyway, single genes that had been isolated and then cloned were incremental 
to the new biotech business, and had been patented for years. It was, therefore, recognised that 
                                                 
68 The possibility that sequences be regarded as trade secrets was also considered in the OTA report. However, 
the industrial practice of trade secrets does not go very well with the scientific tradition of free and open sharing 
of data (Office of Technology Assessment 171). But the fact that both copyrights and trade secrets were 
considered as forms of regulating sequence information does say something about the uncertainty of the field. 
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there was a “grey area…between invention of new methods and the data that result from 
them”, and that further research into the matter was required (Office of Technology 
Assessment 1988). For these reasons, it was recommended and expected that Congress kept a 
close eye on developments. Concrete legislature means, however, were made difficult by the 
fundamental uncertainty of the field:  
 
“Further study is needed to determine whether and how biotechnology demands special treatment as 
intellectual property before legislative reform will be in order. This suggests that patent policies might 
be high on the agenda for congressional oversight but low on the legislative calendar” (Office of 
Technology Assessment 1988). 
 
Although made topic of numerous discussions in ethics and DNA sequencing conferences, the 
issue regarding the patentability of human DNA sequences remained unsolved. Legal opinion 
varied: Rebecca Eisenberg argued that sequences could be patented according to traditional 
doctrine, raising the demand that the sequence (or the gene) be “isolated and purified”. Under 
the general conditions that “the claimed invention is the result of human intervention”, and 
that “the DNA sequence is identical to a sequence that exists in nature”, existing patenting 
practice should be sufficient to regulate future claims, quote from (Cook-Deegan 1994:310).  
 
Others argued that traditional patent doctrine would not suffice. Traditional doctrine could not 
simply be extended because the nature of genetic research had changed with the coming of 
(large-scale) sequencing. Knowledge of a gene’s sequence would yield no information about 
the overall function of that gene. The process of establishing whether a sequence was 
“identical to one that existed in nature”, therefore, was by no means a straightforward matter. 
If such a principle was to be interpreted literally by the PTO, it could halt patenting and 
research indefinitely due to the problem of determining the specific function of the DNA 
sequence. As is well known, this is one of the main challenges for post-genomic research.  
Hence, DNA sequences constituted a problem for existing patent practices, which mainly 
extended to the products coded for by specific genes, for instance insulin. Closely connected, 
there was also the legal claim for inventions to be of utility. In the case of insulin, establishing 
utility was straightforward. In the case of a sequence with unknown function, claims to utility 
would by necessity hang in loose air. In the words of Cook-Deegan: 
 
“At the root of the uncertainty was the new scientific process of discovering DNA sequences before 
knowing their function. It seemed intuitively clear that sequences, like mountains, could only be 
discovered, not patented. Yet it was equally clear that patents already protected the isolation and 
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purification of genes and developments of protein products encoded by them” (Cook-Deegan 
1994:311). 
  
Expressed sequence tags (ESTs) 
Although fervidly discussed, the above-mentioned problems did not surface in a policy-
context until 1991, when NIH scientist Craig Venter announced that NIH had filed patent 
applications for DNA fragments (“ESTs”) taken from human brain tissue. As earlier 
described, the ESTs were mostly extracted from previously existing cDNA libraries used in 
ordinary single-gene hunts or mapping projects. Although traces existed for establishing the 
functions of the sequenced genes, significantly maps of other species and existing human 
gene maps, the function of the genes filed for patenting was generally unknown.  
 
During the gene hunts of the 1980s and early 1990s in which the genetic basis of potentially 
useful products such as insulin, growth hormones and interferon had been found, there had 
been no problems establishing biological function and possible use of the genes. By the time 
the gene had been isolated and purified, its function, i.e. the proteins for which it coded, 
would also be known Indeed, in many early gene hunts, the genes were isolated on the basis 
of known function only (Strachan 1999). This distinction between the gene as such and the 
product resulting from its isolation and purification, constituted the main rationale for 
ascribing patents on genes. Because the gene had been isolated and purified (separated from 
the chromosome and inserted in a new medium), the in vitro production of a new substance 
useful for some diagnostic, therapeutic or research purpose became possible. It was the effort 
of this refinement that constituted the intervention necessary for patentability (Eisenberg 
2002) (Cook-Deegan 1994). Although deviating from pre Chakrabarty practice, strong 
analogies to cases involving patenting of chemical compounds existed (Eisenberg 2002).  
 
In the case of ESTs, however, the main problem was that the function of the isolated genes 
could not be known at the time of their discovery. Technical developments thus outpaced the 
legal system by providing cases for which there was no precedence. “Clearly, gene sequences 
has been patented before; what is different in this case is that NIH researcher Craig Venter, 
who is identifying and sequencing nearly a thousand of the gene fragments a month, has no 
idea what the vast majority of them are” (Roberts 1991). However, as the granting of patent 
claims had been liberalised during the 1980s and 1990s, there was indeed a chance that the 
newly discovered genes be deemed to satisfy the criteria of novelty.  
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Concerning non-obviousness the matter became even harder to settle, among other reasons 
because Venter had not been the first to consider the procedure of concentrating on the protein 
coding regions only. Among others, Sydney Brenner had proposed it for the genome project 
in England. What was new about Venter’s approach was the use of high-throughput 
technology to sequence the regions and the index system developed for the cataloguing of the 
data (Cook-Deegan 1994). Whereas this might get him some way with the process claims, it 
was more than uncertain if the sequences themselves constituted a significant improvement of 
the prior state of knowledge. As remarked by James Watson, a stark opponent of the patent 
application, the sequencing machines themselves could be “run by monkeys”, quoted from 
(Cook-Deegan 1994:311). 
 
Utility claims would also be particularly hard to satisfy, as the functions of the genes were not 
known. However, due to the liberalisation of patent criteria during the last decade, patent 
lawyer Reid Adler commented that: “there are a number of uses well short of biological 
function that [could] satisfy the law”, quoted from (Roberts 1992a). The fact that the 
application was articulated in very broad terms further increased the uncertainty: the 
application was for both the genes, the sequences, the proteins expressed by the genes and for 
any antibody reacting against the proteins (Cook-Deegan 1994). The main fear, both among 
researchers and industrialists, was that if the application was granted, future development of 
products involving any of the patented genes, gene fragments or proteins would be restricted 
by the NIH monopoly. Or, if patent claims on sequences were to become standard, then 
patents could be issued to anybody in the possession of an automated sequencer. Thus, a 
situation could be imagined in which intricate networks of patent claims and fear of litigation 
would stifle rather than promote invention and development. Furthermore, the risk was 
imminent that the patent claims would “foster secrecy among scientists, destroy the essential - 
and fragile – relations on which the Genome Project depends, and hamstring the biotech 
industry” (Roberts 1992a). The patent application definitely was seen as a further move in the 
direction of privatised science, in which secrecy, not openness would be the rule (Thackray 
1998). 
 
The idea of patenting ESTs did not come from Venter, but from Reid Adler, the NIH director 
of technology transfer, who had learned about Venter’s work through a patent counsellor at 
Genentech (Cook-Deegan 1994). Hence, the story begins in a similar fashion to that told 
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about the Cohen-Boyer patent. It also continued in a similar fashion in the sense of promoting 
wide-spread criticism from the scientific community. Both the American Society of Human 
Genetics and the International Human Genome Organisation filed complaints against the 
application. Opposition also came from other federal agencies, themselves bombarded with 
complaints, and from within the NIH itself. In a statement from the NIH’s own Advisory 
Committee for human genome research, the application was condemned on strong grounds:  
 
“We are unanimous in deploring the decision to seek such patents. The subcommittee is particularly 
concerned that the claims widely reported in the press extend far beyond the partial cDNAs themselves 
to include the genes from which they derive and the proteins they specify. We believe such claims are 
inappropriate and deleterious to science because they establish false end points for identifying genes 
and their function” (The Advisory Committee for Interagency Coordination of Human Genome 
Research 1992). 
 
However, the committee did acknowledge the importance of having the issue cleared for 
future policy and research, and so it was added that  
 
“…because such patent claims have already been submitted, we believe that it is in the public interest 
and in the interest of science to determine promptly whether such patent claims meet existing legal 
standards and whether such standards are appropriate to the present case” (ibid.). 
 
And indeed, this was a rationale on which to proceed that was shared by many. There was an 
urgent need to clarify the matter for the sake of a mounting number of similar cases in the 
future: “Indeed, one of the few things on which people agree is that lingering uncertainty is 
bad for industry and bad for international relations” (Roberts 1991).  
 
Reactions also varied in the business community: “Industry, too, is leery, said Richard 
Godown of the Industrial Biotechnology Association, though it believes that NIH had no 
choice but to file the applications” (Roberts 1992b). Typically, large pharmaceutical 
companies, although recognising the need for clarification, would be sceptically inclined 
towards broad patent claims on the hands of private researchers, start-up companies or 
universities. In terms of product development, the large companies were usually positioned 
well downstream of the initial research, gene discovery. Whereas discovering ESTs could be a 
relatively cheap and straightforward matter, it was (and remains) the actual research carried 
out in order to transform basic insights into commercial products that constituted the main 
challenge for research, hence also the most costly part of the technology transfer. Therefore, 
the Industrial Biotechnology Association (IBA), while approving of the patent application, 
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also recommended that it be placed within the public domain rather than licensed to some 
private actor. On the other hand, the Association of Biotechnology Companies (ABC), which 
consisted of mainly small firms, and also of patent law firms, recommended that the patents, 
if obtained, be licensed exclusively to one firm only (Cook-Deegan 1994). 
 
As argued by both Reid Adler and Bernadine Healy, the NIH application was not to be 
regarded as a step in some aggressive commercial enterprise on the hands of the NIH itself. It 
was a pre-emptive strike to secure that the patents were being kept within NIH were they 
could be distributed to industry in concomitance with the general trends in science policy. 
Hence the patent application for the ESTs was explained as the agency’s way of carrying out 
the policies of the 1986 Technology Transfer Act, and a socially responsible promotion of 
commercialisation: “NIH has a record of utilizing the patent system in a socially responsible 
way. When NIH moves into the patent arena, it is with the public good as a driving force and 
not because scientists want to get rich”, Healy quoted from (Roberts 1991).  
 
And, indeed, this argument had something going for it, in the sense that it seemed to confirm 
the general trends of politics, commerce and science since the early 1980s. One further factor 
to have spurred the politics of NIH, was rumours that the Medical Research Conuncil of 
England planned to keep its sequence data to itself (Roberts 1991). These rumours, however, 
were denied by the MRC (Roberts 1992a). Anyway: If the NIH did not move, it would only 
be a matter of short time until somebody else did: be it Craig Venter, England or Japan. Then 
the possibility of influencing further developments would be lost. In the opinion of Cook-
Deegan:  
 
“NIH acted reasonably in filing the applications before a broad public debate, because there was 
simply no time to carry on such a debate. Moreover, if NIH had not filed the patent application, under 
the 1986 Technology Transfer Act, Venter himself could do so if NIH waived its rights” (Cook-
Deegan 1994:334). 
 
 
On the side of policy-makers and industry then, a sort of determinism seemed to reign: the 
issue of EST patents was a logical outcome of the policies commenced in the 1980s, and it 
was a logical outcome of the scientific and technological drive towards large-scale automated 
sequencing. No doubt, the strongest protests were voiced from within the scientific 
community, which did not seem to perceive the case as a logical development, but rather as a 
threat to their very way of working and sharing results. Here is part of a Science report from a 
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public meeting arranged by an interagency group set up to clear the matters between the 
different federal agencies involved: 
 
“One by one, representatives from the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG), the American 
Institute of Biological Sciences, INSERM in Paris, the European Community, and others argued that if 
NIH is allowed to go ahead, it will start a patent stampede that will destroy international collaboration 
and hinder product development” (Roberts 1992b). 
 
Even Craig Venter conceded that: “The patent system wasn’t designed to give me and a small 
group of people ownership of half the genome” (Roberts 1992b). Which more or less returns 
us to the issue at hand: a hole in the legal system was opened up by technological 
developments, and a policy-response was urgently needed.  
 
As will be remembered from an earlier chapter, the case eventually caused both Watson’s and 
Venter’s resignations from NIH. Criticism mounted as NIH, in the midst of the furore, filed a 
second application, adding 2375 gene fragments to the ones initially applied for, leaving the 
total number at 6869. According to estimates at the time, this amounted to approximately 5 % 
of all human genes (Roberts 1992a).  
 
The issue between the NIH and the PTO was not “settled” until 1994, when NIHs new 
director, Harold Varmus, seemingly reversed the politics of Healey. On the grounds that 
patents on partial DNA sequences were “not in the best interest of the public or science”, 
Varmus and NIH withdrew the application for the ESTs (Anderson 1994). But, as can be 
surmised: the withdrawal, although a relief to many scientists, did not really settle the matter, 
it was just passed on to other actors:  
 
“It will now be up to private companies to test the legal waters, but their dealings with the PTO are 
likely to be much more secretive. Indeed, if their patents are rejected, they may keep that information 
to themselves, on the assumption that acknowledging defeat could depress the price of their stock” 
(ibid.). 
 
The EST debate set for a new stage in the patentability controversy, one that has continued to 
haunt both biomedical research and patent law. As many times remarked, the root of the 
problem was the underlying uncertainty concerning the biological function of the cDNAs. 
Eventually, this issued in a debate concerning the status of so-called “research tools”. The 
term “research tool” was defined by an NIH working group as follows:  
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“We use the term "research tool" in its broadest sense to embrace the full range of resources that 
scientists use in the laboratory, while recognizing that from other perspectives the same resources may 
be viewed as "end products." For our purposes, the term may thus include cell lines, monoclonal 
antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug 
targets, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines, 
databases and computer software” (National Institute of Health 1998).  
 
Following this definition, disease genes may be regarded as both “end products” and 
“research tools”. Or, in Rheinerger’s terminology: as epistemic or as technical objects. The 
definition will depend on the context in which the gene is being used.  
 
During the early days of the biotech industry, when patent law was first applied to the field, 
utility would be immediately known to reside in the therapeutic effects of the proteins made 
by the cloned genes. This was no longer so. Instead, the patenting of gene fragments or 
cDNAs now had to be justified on the basis of utility for research purposes; most genes 
patented could not any more be justified on the ground of being “diagnostic” or “therapeutic”. 
However, due to continually and rapidly improving genome maps, the identification of 
disease genes had become an easy task, and by 1995 diagnostics came to outpace therapeutics 
in terms of justifying utility criteria (Cho and Mertz 1997). This entailed a new stage in the 
story of patentability, insofar as the tools for the development of future products came to be 
debated, and not just the “end products”, the therapeutic or diagnostic products themselves. 
Concerns were raised that exclusive licensing agreements would stifle research by ascribing 
monopoly on important technology platforms (National Academy of Sciences 2006) to a 
limited set of actors only (National Academy of Sciences 1997). Again, it became a question 
of striking a balance between a complex set of actors: basic scientists, small start-up firms, 
clinicians, patent attorneys, government agencies and large companies of differing kinds.   
Expanding patentability 
As indicated in the previous section on ESTs, the problems provoked by new ways of finding 
genes not only sharpened the debate about patentability; it also split the field of actors in new 
ways and it provoked new alliances. This was primarily a result of the need for industry and 
invention to expand the scope of patentability as the science involved increased in 
complexity. As commerce found its way deeper into research and clinical practice, worries 
mounted that these practices stood to lose more than to gain from the new alliances (Merz 
1999). 
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As earlier described, patent law by and large reflects the policies instigated in the 1980s to 
commercialise university and public research, and, correspondingly, to turn research in a 
more commercial direction: “patents offer an additional incentive for researchers to pursue 
projects that have commercial potential” (National Academy of Sciences 2006). The ability of 
industry and commercial agents to set the premises of research was not just a side-effect of 
the effort to commercialise science, it was also a specified goal for research policy, which 
thereby also took a step in the direction of American industrial policy and foreign policy 
(Doremus 1995). This entails that, as with the ESTs, the tendency from the 1990s and up until 
today has been towards an expanding interpretation of patentability criteria on disease genes 
(Eisenberg 2002; National Academy of Sciences 2006). On the one hand, this is seen as a 
threat to the work of many scientists. The issuing of the Bermuda principles in 1996 was one 
reaction to this (Sulston and Ferry 2002). At the same time: As the complexity of the science 
and technology increases, the latest expressions of which is the science of proteomics, the 
incitement towards including private capital in research grows even stronger. Private capital, 
in many cases, will not let itself engage if patent rights are not issued in return. These 
developments are of direct relevance also to the expansion of genomic medicine. 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s gene hunters generally went after the genes coding for 
therapeutic proteins: interferon, insulin, growth hormones. Except from the barrier of 
patenting living things, these practices did not prove great obstacles to the legal mind: 
Analogies could be drawn from the chemical industry (Eisenberg 2002). Intellectual property 
rights were transferred, first to start-up companies and then to pharmaceutical companies, 
securing the first major industrial boom in the field. However, the number of commercially 
viable proteins was limited, and only a few companies made a profit (Wright 1994). 
 
With the coming of more advanced sequencing technologies and maps the possibility arose of 
finding genes without going by the way of biological function (“positional cloning”). During 
this second stage the genes discovered would prove themselves as diagnostic objects rather 
than therapeutic objects. The utility-claim of patent law thus had to be satisfied by reference 
to diagnostic rather than therapeutic potential. Whereas diagnostic patents were the fifth most 
commonly issued patent type in the years between 1981 and 1994, by 1995 diagnostic patents 
had moved up as number one on the list (Merz 1999).  
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In one further abstraction away from concrete utility, disease gene patents would now be 
justified in terms of their potential use as research tools. Insofar as disease genes became 
tools for the development of therapeutic products, there would be a therapeutic side to the 
utility claim, but it was no longer straightforward in the manner of the early technology. As 
the therapeutic potential was not obvious, it would have to be negotiated in order to satisfy 
utility criteria. Hence, these developments caused considerably more unrest in the biomedical 
community: 
 
“Patents on these discoveries, although similar in form to patents on genes encoding therapeutic 
proteins, played a different and less familiar role in the biomedical community, setting the stage for 
conflict between people and institutions that had barely taken notice of the first generation of gene 
patents” (National Academy of Sciences 2006).  
 
Although resistance had also been voiced in connection with the Cohen-Boyer patents, 
researchers and medical doctors now opposed patentability on the grounds that patents would 
interfere negatively with both research and clinical practice. On the side of researchers, the 
main fear was that the use of patented genes as research tools would constitute infringements 
of the patents, leading to liability for the researcher or the research institution (National 
Academy of Sciences 1997; Heller and Eisenberg 1998). On the side of clinicians, it was 
feared that tests would become out of reach due to exclusive license agreements, or even that 
the mere use of the knowledge of genes that had been patented would lead to infringement: 
“So-called disease gene patents claim the observation of an individual’s genetic makeup at a 
disease-associated locus when done for the purpose of diagnosis. They cover all methods of 
“looking at” that locus when done for the purpose of diagnosis” (Merz 1999). On this account, 
the mere use of knowledge about a disease gene in order to make a diagnosis may constitute 
infringement of the patent. In that case, it would not any more be the gene as such that 
infringes on the patent, but the use of the gene as information.  
 
During the period between 1995 and 2001, the number of patents on genes issued per year 
rose from about 200 to almost 900 (National Academy of Sciences 2006). The year 2001 
constituted a threshold, as the PTO issued new guidelines signalling a stricter policy, mainly 
through the introduction of the utility-criteria of “specific, substantial and credible” (Duke L. 
& Tech. Rev. 2001; Eisenberg 2002).  
With the coming of EST patents, the above tensions sharpened: “The most obvious value of  
ESTs was not the speculative value that particular gene fragments might have for therapeutic 
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or diagnostic uses, but the immediate value that collections of such fragments offered for use 
in gene discovery” (National Academy of Sciences 2006). Thus, gene patents took a further 
step in the direction of research tools and away from being end products. Thus, the danger of 
the “anti-commons” effect, where upstream incentives for gene discovery stifles downstream 
product development, increased (Heller and Eisenberg 1998). On the side of small companies 
and patent lawyers, expanding the scope of gene patents became incremental to business:  
“The more claims, the better. At the end of the day, they may be valuable as bargaining 
chips.'', Lewis Gruber, chief executive of biotech company Hyseq, quoted from (Abate 1999). 
On the other hand was the scientists’ worry that research gets tangled up in legal battles over 
patentability rights or that they were excluded from the use of important research tools. I give 
one example: 
In 2000, the PTO issued a patent on a gene coding for the gene receptor CCR5 to Human 
Genome Sciences (HGS). The function of the receptor was clear: it binds proteins called 
"chemokines" to the surface of specific leukocytes. The patent was for both the gene, the 
cDNA used to find the gene and for the protein coded for by the gene. But the function of that 
particular protein was not known, however, and so the patent application described its 
chemical structure only69. In spite of this, a patent was granted. 
The protein's function had been described, however, in 1996 by a group at NIH that had 
discerned the role of the receptor to be that of binding the HIV virus to the leukocyte’s 
surface. Even though the actual research on the receptor had been carried out by the NIH 
group, the patent was issued to HGS. This illustrates the fear of many scientists: although the 
NIH group did all the hard work, HGS possess exclusive rights to HIV tests applying 
knowledge of the receptor coded for by CCR5 (Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 2001; National 
Academy of Sciences 2006).  
What was more, ESTs are stored in huge databases and not in the traditional clone 
repositories, so-called “wet laboratories”. Although the tangible cDNA fragments upon which 
the information is built may be of scant value, the ESTs are valuable tools (probes) for 
searching out other genes. This is a propensity that they share with a number of other 
information sources stored in computers, like haplotypes, SNPs, and proteomic information 
                                                 
69 Indicative of another expansive trend in court decisions of the 1990s: novelty and non-obviousness were made 
dependent upon chemical structure rather than upon “the prior art”, i.e., what would appear novel or non-obvious 
to a practitioner skilled in the art (National Academy of Sciences 2006). 
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(National Academy of Sciences 2006). This raises the question of whether the information 
itself can be patented. If that be the case, a long-standing principle of patent law is up for 
negotiation: under traditional patent law, the patent is issued exclusively to the inventor in 
return for his publication of the relevant information about the invention. Says Rebecca 
Eisenberg: 
 
“The distinction between tangible molecules and intangible information may do little work today in 
delineating the boundaries of patent eligibility in the face of recent decisions deemphasizing the 
importance of physical limitations in establishing the patentability of computer-implemented 
inventions. This shift in emphasis is particularly clear in AT&T v. Excel Communications, in which the 
court explicitly declined to focus on the “physical limitations inquiry” that had played a central role in 
distinguishing between un-patentable mathematical algorithms and patentable computer-implemented 
inventions in prior decisions. Instead, the court asked whether the mathematical algorithm is applied in 
a practical manner to produce a useful result…This approach appears to merge the issue of patent 
eligibility with the issue of utility, opening the door to patent claims to information so long as it is 
“useful”” (Eisenberg 2002). 
 
As noted above, in 2001 the PTO issued new guidelines in an attempt at halting expanding 
patent practices. The restriction of patenting policy was meant to bring PTO practice into 
closer correspondence with recent court practice, especially the Federal Circuit’s ruling in the 
case of Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., where the court deemed 
the mere description of the method for isolating a gene or a DNA sequence to fall short of 
utility criteria. In short: the ruling constituted a move in the direction away from DNA 
fragments and genes as research tools, and in the direction of a practice in which molecular 
entities are first and foremost to be regarded as end products, in which physiological function 
has to be described in order to establish utility. Another reason behind the more conservative 
practice was the mounting criticism from the scientific community (National Academy of 
Sciences 2006). 
 
However, in spite of tendencies like these the issue is far from settled. The new guidelines, 
requiring the utility of DNA material to be “specific, substantial and credible”, may for the 
moment have sharpened the border between objects that are only valuable as tools for further 
research, and objects that are valuable for some more specific, practical application, such as 
therapy or diagnosis (“real world” utility). This does not mean, however, that the road to 
patenting ESTs is closed. What it means, however, is that applicants may have to sharpen the 
description given in the application in the direction of physiological function or some clinical 
potential (Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 2001; National Academy of Sciences 2006).  
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A hermeneutic of patentability 
 
While running the risk of oversimplifying, we may display the dynamics of patenting disease 
genes as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure is meant to display the balancing of interests among some central actors involved 
in patenting of disease genes. We may imagine two different ideological positions according 
to differing strictness of utility criteria:  
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Start-ups and small companies, having intellectual property rights and creative capital among 
their main assets, are typically interested in wide utility definitions in order to promote their 
survival in the market. In an important sense, these companies embody the ideal of innovation 
as a central driving force in the market. They are, according to Martin Kenney, what 
constitute the new biotech industry in the real sense of the word. They have made themselves 
particularly remarked in the United States, not the least because venture capital for many 
years remained a specific US phenomenon (Kenney 1998). Armoured with venture capital, 
they work closely with university scientists in order to create upstream innovations that can be 
patented and licensed to larger companies. However, in cases of too liberal patent policies, 
risks of “anti-commons” effects arise: “A proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream 
may be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and 
product development” (Heller and Eisenberg 1998). During the 1980s, when biological 
function was more easily foreseeable, the problem could be contained. In the aftermath of the 
NIH application for ESTs, private firms took over where NIH had left the business, and 
thousand of patent applications were filed. The increasing complexity of gene hunts led to a 
stronger opposition of interest in which the smaller companies sought patented research tools 
of yet unknown function (Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 2001). Typically, the space for the start-ups 
and the smaller companies will be wider in the early phases of a new technology when 
possibilities are still wide open. As the market settles, survival may get tougher: The true 
potential of the technology emerge and supply and demand enter a balance. This has been the 
case first with therapeutic proteins in the early 1980s, then with the genes responsible for the 
Mendelian disorders in the late 1980s and 1990s (National Academy of Sciences 2006).   
 
2. Conservative/social democratic 
In the more conservative alternative of patenting policy, upstream research is kept beyond 
patentability through stricter criteria of utility, novelty and obviousness. Although the 
patenting of therapeutic proteins in the 1970s and 1980s also were met with fierce opposition 
from the scientific community it was not until the more effective isolation of single genes in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s that the matter grew into a serious conflict. We might state that 
the debate expanded from a primarily moral debate over the patentability of living things and 
the ethos of science to a matter of institutional urgency: 
 
“Patents on these discoveries, although similar in form to patents on genes encoding therapeutic 
proteins, played a different and less familiar role in the biomedical community, setting the stage for 
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conflict between people and institutions that had barely taken notice of the first generation of gene 
patents” (National Academy of Sciences 2006).  
 
With the coming of the Human Genome Project and the EST debate, the conflicts intensified, 
and it came to accompany the project until its very end. After the fact, observers have noted 
that the Celera project was a commercial failure. In the words of Misha Angrist and Robert 
Cook-Deegan: 
 
“Both the public and private sequencing efforts garnered their share of headlines, but Celera’s 
genome-era business model failed miserably. In hindsight this is not surprising: Why would  
drug companies pay millions of dollars for sequence data that would be publicly available just months 
later? Within 18 months of the White House event [the joint declaration of the two finished projects], 
Venter was disposed as CEO of Celera, and the company refashioned itself as a drug discovery and 
development firm. The genome wars officially ended in April 2005, when Celera announced it would 
donate its sequence data to the public databases” (Angrist and Cook-Deegan 2006).  
 
But this outcome was not obvious at the time. Had Venter succeeded in his undertaking to 
outpace the public project, and had not the Genome Project speeded up drastically so as to 
place the genome within the public domain before it could be patented by Celera and Human 
Genome Services, the story could have ended differently. For instance, it could have gone 
with the genome (at least the commercially interesting parts of it) as with the BRCA genes, 
responsible for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer:  
 
The gene BRCA2 was discovered simultaneously in the United States, by Myriad Genetics, 
and in the United Kingdom, at the Institute for Cancer Research (ICR). Patents were issued in 
both countries in 1995. Myriad Genetics, which also possessed the IP in the related gene 
BRCA1, eventually won property rights over both genes in both the US and in Europe after 
long fought legal battles. The company immediately exercised its exclusive rights by 
threatening to sue any laboratory performing the tests based upon the BRCA genes. In the 
opinion of John Sulston: 
 
“By claiming property rights to the diagnostic tests for the two BRCA genes and charging for the tests, 
Myriad is adding to total health-care costs. Even worse, once scientists really understand how the 
BRCA1 and 2 mutations cause tumours to grow, they might be able to devise new therapies. But 
because of its patents, Myriad has exclusive marketing rights. Throughout the formidable task of 
sequencing the human genome, we were faced with the question of research-related proprietary rights. 
Although the full impact of Myriad’s aggressive approach was unclear in 1995, it was clear where a 
focus on commercial profit and patents would lead. What was needed was a commitment from the 
international sequencing community to make all genome information publicly available and not to 
parcel it out via individual deals between companies and researchers” (Sulston 2002 ). 
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However, in spite of talk of the genome being the common heritage of humankind, and of 
making it accessible for all, Sulston clearly realises that the genome in itself, far upstream of 
any practical application, is no good to humankind if not translated into therapeutic or 
diagnostic products. And so other actors inevitably enter the picture. Referring to the danger 
that ESTs be patented, Sulston recounts: 
 
“In 1994 a white knight had come along in the form of the pharmaceutical company Merck…The big 
companies weren’t any happier than the academics that upstart genomics companies looked like 
cornering all the rights to valuable genome information. Merck funded a massive drive to generate 
ESTs and place them in the public databases, where they would be freely available for all (Sulston and 
Ferry 2002). 
 
Of course, Merck was not doing charity work: 
 
“The company was worried about its freedom to operate in future years, since upstart companies like 
Human Genome Sciences and Incyte Genomics were filing patent applications on hundreds of 
thousands of snippets of genes. Such patents threatened to lock up exclusive rights to make, use, or 
sell the human genes of which the snippets were only a part, creating thousands of “toll booths” along 
the way to producing final products” (Angrist and Cook-Deegan 2006). 
 
For all the competence in drug development and downstream research on the hands of the 
large companies, the best scientists tend to be drawn towards the universities (National 
Academy of Sciences 2006). And so the big companies will remain dependent on the 
universities and the smaller companies. With those prospects, it is little wonder that many 
upstream researchers, working with processes less likely to be of direct commercial value, and 
the large companies share the interest of keeping data resulting from basic research within the 
public domain. 
 
Clearly, displaying the process from upstream research to downstream product development 
in the above schematic linear fashion proves too simple when it comes to the dynamic of 
patenting the genome. As indicated, many developments, technological, legal, economic, 
scientific and political go into defining the relations between the central actors involved, and 
the expansion of the field is accompanied by constant renegotiations between the actors. I 
have tried to display this dynamic through changes to the institute of patentability as an 
organising principle. As technological developments and political goals expand, so does the 
institute of patentability: from therapeutic proteins in the 1970s/1980s, to single genes in the 
1980s/1990s, to the whole genome in the 1990s and into the 21st century. As the single 
technologies settle into more or less stabilised relations, technological development is already 
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on its way to the next stage (National Academy of Sciences 2006). From the perspective of 
the new technology, prospects are still out in the open, intense innovation is required, and so 
there is a push towards liberalising utility criteria. In this race, proponents of more 
conservative patent criteria, like many scientists and drug companies, are fighting to keep 
basic physiological knowledge in the public domain and to secure that anti-commons effects 
do not occur to the process of knowledge and product development. However, the shear speed 
of the process leaves regulatory bodies struggling: 
 
 “Although the same patent laws apply to all fields of technology, new technologies inevitably present 
USPTO and the courts with new problems in the interpretation and application of old standards to 
determine such issues as patent eligibility, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and adequacy of 
disclosure. Because the resolution of legal disputes takes time, a lag between the emergence of new 
technologies and the resolution of disputed issues of patent law that the new technologies raise will 
occur. Most of the existing legal precedents involving genomic patents address technology that is at 
least a decade old. Important issues concerning the patentability of ESTs -a technology from the early 
1990s – are only now being addressed by the Federal Circuit” (National Academy of Sciences 2006). 
 
 
And, in the words of Rebecca Eisenberg: 
 
 
“One might expect that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the courts would have resolved 
this issue [ESTs] many times over as the industry has pursued and litigated patent claims covering 
biotechnology products; one might also expect that biotechnology patent law would now be entering a 
relatively mature phase in which fundamental questions have been resolved and the issues that remain 
to be addressed are incremental and interstitial. Instead, the patent system is struggling to clarify the 
ground rules for patenting DNA sequences, while years worth of patent applications accumulate in the 
PTO. What accounts for this persistent lack of clarity about how patent law applies to this technology? 
A significant part of the problem lies in the shifting landscape of discovery in genetics and genomics 
research. The patent system, which, inevitably, requires time to resolve even routine matters, has so far 
focused primarily on the discoveries of the 1980s” (Eisenberg 2002). 
 
 
Stephen Hilgartner, with a special regard to biotechnology, criticises intellectual property 
rights practices for not being up to the challenges of the late modern information economy. 
Being themselves central tools in promoting that economy, intellectual property rights were 
from the very inception incentives for technical innovation. Their primary technical character 
and narrow social and cultural scope leave intellectual property rights as particularly ill-suited 
tools for regulating the complex set of interests that the field has come to encompass: 
 
“Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, decisions about intellectual property became visible and 
contentious public issues. A variety of actors – including many NGOs, academics, scientists, industry 
groups, and governments – now view decisions about intellectual property not as rational outcomes of 
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autonomous processes of legal reasoning, governed by precedent and safely left to appropriate experts, 
but as political choices with profound stakes” (Hilgartner 2002). 
 
 
Hilgartner therefore proposes that the innovation-centric perspective of intellectual property 
be replaced by a rights-based perspective that is capable of articulating the central concerns of 
all the actors involved. The narrow intellectual property perspective blinds us to the fact that 
new intellectual property actually infringes on the territory of other actors: 
 
 
“The politics of intellectual property often involve conflicts between the new claims of IP holders and 
the established practices of other parties. In keeping with the notion of an endless scientific and 
technological frontier, innovation-centric theories treat IP as new property – truly novel holdings 
staked out at the leading edge of knowledge production. Because IP emerges at the frontier and 
conveys rights to previously unexplored territory, it cannot impinge on earlier rights. But the frontier 
metaphor should perhaps give us pause; for the history of colonialism shows that land that distant 
powers perceive as uninhabited is sometimes occupied by other people. If innovation-centric theories 
situate IP in an unpopulated landscape, a rights perspective positions it in a web of social relationships 
and practices. From the rights viewpoint, new IP does not simply fill a vacuum but is introduced into a 
field of social actors. Put otherwise, intellectual property not only conveys rights to virgin territory but 
also curtails existing rights and transforms social practices on the (already existing) ground” 
(Hilgartner 2002). 
 
Being no stranger to the mapping metaphor (Hilgartner 2004), Hilgartner draws a picture of 
the landscape into which intellectual property is wading. No doubt, there is an imminent 
danger of technical legal and scientific problems coming to intrude upon the public territory, 
significantly that of public health care.  
 
The two versions of patenting policies (ideologies) described above may both suffer the risk 
of contributing to this tendency, although the one more than the other. The liberal version 
basically seems to set innovation and commercialisation as equal to social benefit. The small 
start-up and biotech companies make up typical embodiments of this vision, but it is also to be 
found within many policy-documents of American public agencies. NIH has, since before the 
politics instigated by Carter in the late 1970s and continued by Reagan in the 1980s, been a 
promoter of innovation-based policies in the field of biotechnology. However, some of the 
problems with a too liberal policy seem to be dawning as the field expands to encompass 
more and more actors. The attempt to restrain patenting practice by issuing guidelines with 
narrower utility criteria in 2001 may be seen as one expression of this. However, this solution 
remains a technical, and not substantial one (Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 2001).  
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This leads us on to the more conservative version, which, in terms of known political 
ideologies may be aligned with a social democratic vision of patent policies. However, we see 
that the main worry within that vision also seems to focus on a rather narrow conceptual 
basis: First and foremost, it is a matter of securing that the genome remains within the public 
domain, accessible “to all”. But, obviously, this remains a truth of a highly conditional value: 
The genome as such, printed out as pure information, amounts to something in the vicinity of 
21 meters of book-lengths containing information that is incomprehensible to most. Even 
experts cannot understand it without recourse to heavy information technology and complex 
mathematical algorithms. Even when properly understood, the upstream information is a far 
cry away from most practical applications, and among “real world” applications therapy 
remains the most distant. Hence, also this version, although with a stronger emphasis upon the 
public good and health care, remains dependent upon heavy support from pharmaceutical 
industry and private investors if the potential of the genome is to be realised. Also this version 
remains dependent upon the articulations of the industrial-academic complex (Krimsky 2003), 
and as such finds itself within a somewhat expanded, but still linear vision of development 
and health care policy. The question remains open whether this policy-vision is capable of 
incorporating the sort of doubts concerning the “real-world” status of the genome described in 
the chapter on the clinical context. Is the information contained in the genome sufficient to 
offer a surplus of alternatives for diagnostic and therapeutic action? And if this vision prevails 
in the future negotiations on the interface of genomics and proteomics (translational research): 
what will be the costs of realising that potential? The genome project, and the effort to 
translate it into genomic medicine, naturally leads onto techno-scientific undertakings of even 
higher complexity and greater technical and economic demands: proteomics, haplotyping and 
individualised pharmacogenetics (Guttmacher and Collins 2003; National Academy of 
Sciences 2006).  In this process, the intellectual property landscape will have to change again: 
 
"Proteomics is far less advanced than the field of genomics because robust technologies to study the 
structure and prevalence of all proteins in a cell in a high-throughput manner are only now being fully 
developed. The challenge that proteomics faces is enormous because of the finding that many genes 
code for multiple proteins, and those proteins are modified post-translationally in complex ways" 
(National Academy of Sciences 2006).  
 
 
Which should push developments in the direction of innovation and developments again: “As 
discoveries stemming from genomics/proteomics are transformed into valuable items of 
intellectual property owned by universities, the new generation of biologists will yield ever 
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more influence” (National Academy of Sciences 2006). These developments, it is professed, 
may prove even more drastic to the pharmaceutical industry: 
 
“Until very recently the field of human genetics has been restricted to studying diseases whose 
etiology can be traced to mutations in a single gene (e.g. cystic fibrosis). However, few common 
diseases are monogenic…For statistical reasons, relatively large populations will need to be studied to 
define the relative contributions of each change in the DNA sequence or degree of methylation, 
mRNA expression level or protein concentration, and degree of post-translational modification. The 
opportunity to create intellectual property is rich, and it is possible that it will be difficult for one 
patent to block the development of these tests. For example, in gene expression arrays, many genes 
tend to show highly correlated expression levels; thus, it is often possible to substitute one gene for 
another without substantial loss of predictive power. Because of the need to conduct substantial 
clinical trials to prove the practical value of these polyanalytic tests, however, the companies that 
develop these tests will have proprietary products” (National Academy of Sciences 2006). 
 
 
These may be speculations about future developments. However, research has already been 
carried out to investigate and assess the influence of intellectual property rights on research 
and on clinical practice (Merz 1999; Merz 2002; Cho, Illangasekare et al. 2003; Henry, Cho et 
al. 2003; National Academy of Sciences 2006).  
 
During work on the 2006 report of the National academy of Sciences, investigating into the 
effects of patenting on research projects, sharing of research materials and clinical testing, it 
was found that: 
 
- Intellectual property did not cause significant concern among practicing scientists, leading 
them to cancel or change the direction of research projects. This finding, however, had to be 
balanced against a general ignorance about patentability issues among researchers, and the 
results are expected to change as intellectual property comes to make up more of the everyday 
of scientists. Not surprisingly, a higher awareness of patentability issues was found among 
industrial researchers than among university scientists. 
- The growing complexity of biomedical research is likely to cause greater problems with 
intellectual property, not the least due to the growing interdisciplinary character of the field, 
and because of the need to work in larger teams. 
- Intellectual property seems to have a certain (negative) effect on the sharing of materials 
among laboratories. Also this tendency may be rising in the future. 
- The decisively most significant effect, however, is to be found in the fields of clinical 
practice and diagnostic testing. Here, the results of the survey conducted by the NAS 
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corresponds to those found in (Merz 1999; Merz 2002; Cho, Illangasekare et al. 2003; Henry, 
Cho et al. 2003). For instance, in (Cho, Illangasekare et al. 2003) it was found that  
 
“Twenty five percent of respondents [among test laboratories] reported that they had stopped 
performing a clinical genetic test because of a patent or license. Fifty-three percent of respondents 
reported not deciding to develop a new clinical genetic test because of a patent or license. In total, 
respondents were prevented from performing 12 genetic tests, and all of these tests were among those 
performed by a large number of laboratories”. 
 
And in (Merz 1999), it was concluded that: 
 
“Monopolization of medical testing activities: (a) threatens to restrict research activities; (b) creates 
unacceptable conflicts of interest; (c) may reduce patient access to testing; (d) may lead to inequitable 
extensions of patent terms on tests and related discoveries; (e) grants to patent holders the ability to 
dictate the standard of care for testing, and to otherwise interfere with the practice of medicine” 
 
 
Now, my main point in referring these results is this: The most immediate effects on the 
practice of research and medicine are exactly those that occur on the downstream side of 
research and innovation. In the future, the costs of applying the insights from genomics to 
health care in general must be expected to grow at even stronger rates than today. This is not 
the least so because of the growing urgency for genomic medicine to produce therapeutic 
remedies for the most common diseases:  
 
“Prescription drug usage ultimately may be dictated by a given patient’s genetic makeup. Instead of 
trying to develop therapeutics to relieve symptoms, drug companies will come under increasing 
pressure to tailor therapies to individual groups of patients sharing a particular genomic/proteomic 
signature or fingerprint (as well as certain nongenetic traits). This sea change will first become 
apparent in the design and execution of clinical trials, in which genetic predispositions to therapeutic 
benefits and risks will be analyzed…Such advances will, however, come with a price for 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. The advent of personalized medicine may well bring an 
end to the era of so-called blockbuster drugs, because product development will be restricted to 
smaller target patient populations. To say the least, the current economics of drug discovery 
development, and marketing will change considerably” (National Academy of Sciences 2006).  
 
If this be the case, the social democratic version of patent policies may not be far ahead of the 
liberalist vision in terms of articulating the social issues involved in an adequate manner.  
 
We may now start to appreciate why it is that Francis Collins regards the issue of patentability 
as the main threat to his “$1000-genome” (Guttmacher and Collins 2003). We may also start 
to understand why he does not dream of an even cheaper genome: why not the $200 genome? 
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Personalised genomic medicine cannot be realised without substantial inputs from industry. 
Significant parts of the $1000-genome, therefore, are already reserved for the pharmaceutical 
companies, and Collins can only hope that the investments of these actors, in cooperation with 
the increasing complexity of the genome, will not consume all of his $1000 genome. 
 
Let me try and relate to the analytical framework put forward in the earlier chapters. In 
chapter three I attempted to give a hermeneutic reconstruction of the experimental context and 
the negotiations with the material gradually leading to standardised objects, possibly also to 
powerful technologies. Recall also how, in the chapter on immunology, Paul Ehrlich managed 
to stay in charge of the manufacturing process, perform clinical trials, keep control with new 
products and with the ties to industry. But already at that early stage, ties were strained and it 
took a person in a very privileged position to keep some control and to retain the totality of 
the process within the positivist research ethos. Still, in general, the products were not 
exposed to industry until they had reached a sufficiently stabilised and purified form, until 
they had become technological objects. Not so with the second modern project of genomics. 
As seen in the exemplary case of ESTs, commercial ties have made their way well into the 
laboratory. ESTs may find themselves in the stages of the research process between epistemic 
and technical things in Rheinberger’s sense when sought patented. The same will also be the 
case with other biological material, hence the discussion about the patenting of research tools. 
This is one outcome, adapted to the intersections of the experimental and the commercial, of 
the “rationalisation of rationalisation” taking place in second modernity. 
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10. Autonomy (we may all become patients) 
 
 
There is no sense in being interested in  
a child a group or in a society, 
there is no sense if one cannot see in them before anything else, 
the life it's capacity to founded upon itself 
there is no sense in being interested in an ill person 
or unwell a society if one cannot believe their readiness 
and the capacity for proper recovery; 
 
auto production organisation 
 
Stereolab, Spark Plug 
 
 
I now turn towards a description of the principle of autonomy as a central tool for regulating 
the relation of the patient to the growing health care sector. Central issues involved are 
research, basic and clinical, the diagnostic and therapeutic encounter, and the changes in 
decisionmaking that has taken place within medicine since the late 1960s. 
  
These are broad developments, relating to a wide scope of issues in the health care sector and 
beyond: civil rights movements, ecological movements, consumers rights, and public rights 
are all somehow related to each other within the wider political landscapes of post-war 
political dynamics. For the sake of oversight I start by relating the issues to some of the 
previously described developments in the relationship between laboratory, clinic and the life-
world of the patient. 
Assembling the issues of technology regulation within the horizon of the clinical 
encounter… 
Recall how we started out by considering the basic relationship between laboratory, clinic and 
life-world in first modernity. Following Claude Bernard we stated that it took the introduction 
of experimental action to establish the clinical encounter as specifically modern: the 
laboratory established the knowledge base for clinical interventions in the life-worlds. Thus, 
the laboratory so to speak inserted itself between the patient and the physician. As seen in the 
description of bacteriology and immunology, the program of experimental medicine was 
carried out with huge success by people like Louis Pasteur, Robert Koch and Paul Ehrlich. It 
has been noted how the organising principle of protein specificity by and large corresponded 
to the actions it was set to organise. This was not the least due to the basically therapeutic 
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character of the antibody, which proved itself instrumental in dispelling common diseases like 
tuberculosis and polio from western societies. Hence, we may state, the delegation of 
organisational powers to the techno-medical object was successfully carried out through the 
organising principle of protein specificity.  
 
Moving into second modernity, our basic relation between experimental action, clinical 
application and the life-worlds of the patients has been complicated to a considerable degree. 
Let me start by considering the techno-medical object of the gene as constituted through the 
organiser of the central dogma.  
 
The age of DNA research arose in the aftermath of the protein paradigm. Under the influence 
from that older principle, but also through the strong influx from the physical sciences and 
from strong programs of social engineering, the organiser of the central dogma was invested 
with the same specificity. The simple linearity of the DNA – protein relationship was invested 
with the same simplicity of causal mechanism as that of the foregoing antigen/antibody 
relation. However, in terms of technology transfer, the organiser of the gene, and later the 
genome, has not accomplished the same straightforward action-organising capabilities as its 
forerunner: more than fifty years have passed, and clinical applications are still modest. True, 
the discovery of single genes responsible for disease has been breathtaking. But so far 
discoveries have been restricted to that relatively minor subgroup called Mendelian diseases, 
and in terms of practical application that does not yet suffice to establish the gene as a 
globally organising principle of health care.  
 
Hence the expansion to genomics, which has yielded the possibility of analysing the total set 
of interactions taking place between all the genes of the genome rather than analyzing them 
one by one and in isolation. In terms of causality, this shift of emphasis has been accompanied 
by a change from relatively simple gene – protein interactions to a much more complicated 
picture in which causality cannot be determined directly (as envisioned by Bernard) but has to 
be conceptualised in terms of complex systems theory, and issuing in results of statistical 
probability and risk. These developments further point towards the need for even more 
complex modes of analysis: mapping and relating haplotypes, SNPs, and proteomics.  
 
Insofar as genomics have issued in concrete objects to be deployed in the clinical encounter, 
these have been of a diagnostic rather than a therapeutic character. A problem that has been 
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noted since the inception of the genome project, is that of the therapeutic gap, in which 
diagnostic ability outpaces therapeutic ability by far (Office of Technology Assessment 
1988). In terms of the patient – physician relationship this state of affairs is problematic: The 
medical system, it seems, generates risks that it cannot itself fully remedy. Hence, so far, 
individualised medicine seems to issue primarily in terms of the individualisation of risk 
(Beck, Lash et al. 1996; May 2004)70.  
 
We have also seen that there exist reasonable doubts concerning the scientific and 
technological potential of the genome when transferred to the clinical context (Holtzman and 
Marteau 2000; Vineis, Schulte et al. 2001). Hence, if we allow for a stronger sense of 
scepticism, in which we also include scientific and epistemic doubts concerning the general 
status of the genome qua global principle, we may also forward a stronger argument: genomic 
medicine, at the pace with which it is moving, not only implies a transfer of medical risk. 
Insofar as the status of the genome is still a matter to be negotiated among a complex set of 
actors, the fast transition to genomic medicine may even entail a transfer of epistemic and 
scientific uncertainty: from basic research through clinical application to the particular 
patient. In that case, there is every reason to consider genomics not just a scientific 
experiment, but indeed a social experiment (Beck and May 2001). Elmore and Gigerenzer 
have shown how practicing clinicians already have problems in coming to terms with present-
day risk diagnosis. This goes for understanding and interpreting the statistical findings as well 
as the actual communication of the findings in a comprehensible manner to the patient: 
“…most physicians are poorly equipped to discuss risk factors in a way that is readily 
comprehensible to their patients” (Elmore and Gigerenzer 2005).  
 
Hence, both the genome, considered as a global organising principle, and the techno-medical 
objects that issue from it, contain uncertainties when seen from the perspective of the clinical 
encounter and from the perspective of patients. The smooth delegation of organisational 
powers that seemed to accompany the antibody has not yet materialised, and the promises of 
the genome remain, by and large, outstanding claims still to be cashed in. If this state of 
affairs continues to accompany the developments of genomic medicine, individual patients 
                                                 
70 This statement should be read with some caution: whereas it is true that genomics, for the moment seems to 
transfer risk responsibility from the medical system to the patient, this is not to state that risk is individualised in 
every sense of the word. Genetic tests, especially for single gene traits, usually yield results that are distributed 
among the members of a family. But that aspect falls somehow outside the perspective of this analysis. 
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may even become the dumping ground of socially and scientifically produced risk 
responsibility. 
 
This should not be taken to imply that genomics research is, per se, wrong or false; but it 
means that it is fraught with a number of uncertainty elements that need time to be sorted out. 
One problem, when considering the transfer of genomics research, is that it seems to have 
gotten itself entangled in a race in which the one thing that we do not have, is time:  “For 
states, corporations, genomicists, technoscientific tools, and biomaterials alike, it has become 
a matter of survival of the fastest” (Fortun 1998). And, commenting upon the increasing speed 
of research in the genome project, Stephen Hilgartner writes that “a concerted effort to 
increase what came to be known in the genomics community as “throughput” was a- and 
arguably the- central theme of efforts to enhance genome technology” (Hilgartner 2004). 
 
As seen in the case of patentability as a legal tool for regulating genomic research, this state 
of affairs may constitute something of a paradox: patentability was introduced in order to 
stimulate innovation and the commercialisation of publicly funded research. The success of 
that project, however, has resulted in regulatory problems due to the speed of developments. 
Legal institutions by their very nature move at a different pace than do technology.  
 
If speed is a problem for the legal and political control with developments qua patentable 
product developments, which constitutes, after all, a narrow though important part of the 
social environment of genomic medicine, then we should expect the matter to be even more 
pressing when it comes to the complex clinic – life-world relations. This is so because the 
“technology transfer” to take place on that specific interface is subject to a much wider scope 
of social influences than is innovation for industrial purposes. Whereas the issues involved in 
industrial politics most certainly are complex, especially as they come to encompass a much 
wider set of influences and interests along with the growing number of actors involved, they 
still seem to be contained within the rather narrow scope of optimal product development.  
 
In the case of the clinical encounter, however, the influx of a wider set of social and cultural 
interests cannot be ignored. Whereas the institute of patentability grew out of a relatively 
narrow legal practice designed to promote innovation for industry, the regulatory issues on the 
interface of the clinic and the life-worlds have grown out of very basic and general socio-
political developments. Hence, the investigation into that problem complex will have to take 
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account of all of the hereto described developments as well as some that have only been 
briefly described in the chapters on methodology. The clinical/life-world interface, which can 
also be narrowed down to the somewhat simpler relation between physician and patient 
(Rothman 1991), has to be regarded in the light of very broad social dynamics.  
 
However, before we turn to those broader developments, let us continue to consider the 
genome as an organising principle within second modernity, and the gene as a second 
modernity techno-medical object.  
 
The problem can now be re-conceptualised as follows: there is a divide between the 
representation of the gene given us through the counterfactual principle of the unity of the 
genome and the actual accomplishments and consequences of the gene as applied to the 
clinical encounter. We have seen that there is no necessary relation between visions of 
genomic medicine and actual accomplishments, i.e. therapeutic outcome. In other words: 
social order does not follow automatically from scientific order (Jasanoff 2004). This is most 
clearly seen when contrasted to the organisational capacity of the antigen.  
 
If it is correct that the search for scientific certainty has also issued in the creation of new 
uncertainties for the patient, this may also be a valid statement concerning the role of the 
physician. In short: the hunt for simple solutions in science, i.e. the attempt to establish 
genomic certainty at the bottom of physiological and pathological explanation, may issue in 
greater organisational complexity. This indeed seems to be the case with genomic medicine, 
as the effort to establish the “$1000 genome” gradually includes more and more actors from a 
wider range of scientific disciplines, lawyers and politicians as well as the industrial and 
commercial worlds. In the chapter on patentability, I referred to research indicating that the 
part of health care most negatively affected by intellectual property rights and claims so far 
has been exactly that of clinical applications of genetic and genomic technology (Merz 2002; 
Henry, Cho et al. 2003; National Academy of Sciences 2006).  Where the utility of new 
products is higher, adversarial claims among the actors involved also seem to be rising.  
 
In general, the notion often implied by politics of technology transfer, stating that the utility 
and commercial value of techno-medical objects equals clinical benefit, is dubitable. Research 
has been carried out that question such notions of technology transfer: Utility does not 
constitute an “endless frontier” along which new technologies and knowledge co-develop 
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smoothly with that of clinical benefit Schei & (Strand and Schei 2001). On the contrary, good 
reasons can be offered for the view that there are certain marginal values to the utility offered 
by new technologies. Fisher & Welsh (1999) found that, covering a broad range of medical 
cases (i.e. not just genetics), where medical interventions were intensified, a majority of the 
cases turned out adversarial to patient’s health compared to cases where no further 
interventions were made (Fischer and Welch 1999; Strand and Schei 2001). And, having 
studied the utility of new medical technologies in the American health care system, Deyo and 
Patrick writes that  
 
“Many medical advances offer real advantages over older tests and treatments. Others offer little, if 
any, advantage, and many have alarming side effects. Even the effective medical innovations are often 
oversold and overused…Economists and decision-makers agree that new treatments are a major 
reason for ever-rising health-care costs…these new treatments are a double-edged sword. Some of 
them are good, some are bad, and most are only partly understood when they become widely used. As 
doctors and manufacturers introduce medical advances, good money too often trumps good science. 
Vested interests, marketing, politics, and media hype often have more influence on how new 
medical advances get used than the best scientific evidence” (Deyo and Patrick 2005:5). 
 
 
If we are to take these reservations about technology transfer seriously, we may become 
aware of a lack of institutions for assessing and regulating the un-intended long term effects 
of science and technology. Hence… 
…it emerges that organisational problems increasingly reside between domains of 
action… 
If these reservations about modern politics of technology transfer are valid, it is not primarily 
because of the science “itself” or because of the technology “itself”. That would amount to a 
degree of determinism that cannot be sustained (Rheinberger 1997). It may very well be that 
the main problems, rather than reside with science and technology, or with “politics itself”, 
reside somewhere in the spaces between these spheres of action.  
 
By recourse to Ulrich Beck I have argued that the “rationalisation of rationalisation” entailed 
by the intrusion of law, politics and the economy into medical practice constitute problems of 
a specifically second modernity character:  
 
For a long time, during first modernity, the above mentioned spheres of action would all 
reside within their own disciplinary and social domains. This is no longer so, one central 
characteristic of second modernity being that functional differentiation, the sharing of work, 
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becomes muddled up. The reasons behind these developments are complex and cannot be 
dealt with in a satisfactory manner here. Still, it does seem that the expansion of the economy 
as well as the expansion of technology throughout larger and larger segments of society has 
something to do with it. This does not return us to determinism: as seen, within the field of 
biotechnology, the accelerated developments in these fields were consequences of willed 
political interventions (in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s), and not of science and technology 
actually being autonomous spheres proceeding uninterrupted by external force.  
 
The rapid application of science and technology to new areas of life creates problems to the 
social order: domains of action, be they situated in the life-worlds (for instance pre-natal 
genetic diagnosis), or within the sciences and the professions, are interrupted by the attempts 
to re-establish the knowledge base for a new and more technically refined one. Let us take 
pre-natal genetic diagnosis as an example. For the coming mother, this diagnostic technology 
poses unprecedented choices. For instance, the question concerning abortion is not new, but 
the many factors that now enter into the basis of choice, are. Let’s say there is a chance of the 
child being born with cystic fibrosis. Does this constitute a sufficient reason for abortion? 
Obviously, the doctor, on his side, faces a corresponding dilemma, insofar as the giving of 
medical and scientific advice comes to have such grave implications.  
 
Regulatory bodies, by their very nature embedded within wide social structures, cannot work 
at the same pace as science and technology. This entails the risk that, even where satisfactory 
solutions seem to be found, we cannot assess the social good or bad of those decisions until 
years and years later. Because of the very speed of developments, technical rather than 
substantial solutions are sought. In matters genetic, where there is still no strong scientific 
consensus regarding clinical application, a widespread social understanding cannot be 
expected. In this context, the solution of giving to people (and doctors) the “proper 
information”, as for instance argued by Guttmacher and Collins (2002), is hardly satisfactory.  
 
The therapeutic gap of genomic medicine is one central example of these dynamics. In order 
to remedy the large gap between scientific and public understanding of genetic disease, we 
make sure that the genetic message comes across with proper information in terms of genetic 
counselling. No doubt, this is a necessary institution of the interface between 
genetics/genomics and society. But given the rapid advance of genomics into health care in 
general it is hardly satisfactory in light of the wider issues involved: (genetic) risk is 
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transposed from the medical action system, no longer capable of remedying the diagnosis, to 
the single patient. Following the therapeutic revolution (first modernity) the clinical encounter 
would be accompanied by some technology capable of ailing the condition of the patient. 
Now, the techno-medical object comes in terms of information rather than direct intervention, 
which leaves a surplus of alternatives for choice with the patient. In this situation, the legal 
and ethical institutes of autonomy and informed consent are called upon to regulate the 
situation: the patient is to be given full information about his or her condition, and he or she is 
expected to make a choice (autonomous) based upon that information.  
 
From a legal perspective, it is particularly interesting how the attempt to legislate scientific 
research inevitably also issues in a “scientification” of the legal domain: in biomedical 
matters, there is no longer an independent ground for the law upon which to establish its 
premises. The legal decision now has to include scientific knowledge in its basis for decision-
making (May 2004). In this sense, the legal and political agenda comes to be “determined” by 
that of scientific and technological developments.  
 
Because there is no time or space (no other institutions are available), the situation comes to 
resemble that of Max Weber’s iron cage of bureaucracy, in which only a limited set of 
technical solutions are available and wider questions of social value and consequence are 
excluded. One reason for this being so, says Beck, is that the categories in which we think are 
still characteristic of first modernity:  
 
“Wir leben in einer anderen Welt als in der, in der wir denken. Wir leben in der Welt des und, denken 
in Kategorien des entweder-oder. Dies haben wir nicht etwa einer allgemeinen Begriffsstutzigkeit zu 
verdanken, nicht dem Versagen, sondern der westlichen Modernisierung im Stadium ihres Sieges. Die 
stinknormale Weiter–und–weiter-Modernisierung hat einen Kluft zwischen Begriff und Wirklichkeit 
aufgerissen, die deshalb so schwer aufzuzeigen, zu benennen ist, weil die Uhren in den zentralen 
Begriffen stillgestellt sind. Die ”Moderne” (auch so ein Nebelwort, das die Sonne nicht aufgehen lässt) 
ist in ihrem fortgeschrittenen Stadium zur terra incognita geworden, zu einer zivilisatorischen 
Wildnis, die wir kennen und nicht kennen, nicht begreifen können, weil das monopolistischen 
Denkmodell der Moderne, ihr Industriegesellschaftliches, industriekapitalistisches Selbstverständnis, 
im Zuge der verselbstständigten Modernisierung hoffnungslos veraltet ist” (Beck 1993:61-62). 
 
Applied to the context of the clinical encounter, this means that the concept of autonomy, 
while introduced into an organisational void as an answer to a real lack of intermediating 
institutions, is not capable of remedying the space opened up by genomic medicine: 
information still is no good remedy for a cure. One important reason for this dilemma, I take 
it, is the rapid pace with which new technologies are introduced. This may even lead us to ask 
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questions about the science “itself” or the technology “itself”.  However, from the very 
beginning, it has been argued that the scientific enterprise and the scientific object cannot be 
regarded in isolation from the wider social context of which they are part. Thus it is that they 
find themselves at the centre of a general social problem… 
…which may be spelled out as a deterioration of trust in basic social institutions 
 
By this, I do not mean that there is, as almost by necessity, less trust in second modern 
societies than in simple modern or traditional societies: “…those who see their world as a 
‘risk society’ often find placing trust problematic; but it does not follow that they do not place 
trust, or even that they place no trust in those whom they claim to think untrustworthy” 
(O'Neill 2002:12). We are reminded of Wynne’s conception of “virtual trust”: often people 
may have no other option than to place their trust in a specific expert system (Wynne 1996). 
One central mark of second modernity is the phenomenon of individualisation, in which the 
individuals are set free from institutional structures established during first modernity (Beck 
and Bonss 2001). This, however, is not the result of personal choice per se, but rather an 
outcome of the Strukturwandel of second modern society (Beck and Bonss 2001).  
 
What is meant, then, is that along with this change of societal structure (Strukturwandel), trust 
is also de-institutionalised. It is no longer caught up in state-governed institutions and 
mechanisms of interaction, but dispersed throughout society, to be found in local 
communities, civil organisations and movements or the like (Lash 1996). This may have both 
positive and negative consequences: increased possibilities of action and choice for those with 
the necessary resources (social, intellectual, cultural and economic), or participation in  
communities and organisations committed to the common good, such as NGOs, civil rights 
movements or charity. But individualisation may also issue in a “dumping” of social problems 
in the poorer segments of the population (Lash 1996). Or, were modernisation is actively 
resisted, individualisation may issue in “counter-modern” movements, typically instigated to 
re-establish some pre-modern social order, legitimised through reference to tradition (Beck 
2002).  
 
In second modernity, trust is redistributed, no-body knows exactly how, renegotiated and re-
embedded within different configurations, be they primarily “public” or “private”. For public 
institutions, this entails that their continued trust within the populations increasingly has to be 
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negotiated, be that in the face of new technological or moral challenges, organisational 
complexities, or claims to rationality that compete with the previous authority of the public 
expert. 
 
“Where people perceive others as untrustworthy they may place their trust capriciously and anxiously, 
veering between trusting qualified doctors and trusting unregulated alternative practicioners, between 
trusting scientific claims and trusting those of greenish or counter-cultural campaigners, or modish 
therapies and diets, between trusting established technologies and medicines and trusting untested or 
exotic technologies and products. But they do not refuse to trust” (O'Neill 2002:12).   
 
Let me finish this section by quoting from the summary of Charter on Medical 
Professionalism, issued by the European Federation of Internal Medicine, the American 
College of Physicians – American Society of Internal Medicine (ACP – ASIM) and the 
American Board of Internal Medicine in 2002. The point is merely to make clear that the 
problem of trust, as described in this chapter, not just exists in the heads of sociologists or 
social philosophers71, but has moved to the center of attention also within the medical 
profession itself: 
 
“The practice of medicine in the modern era is beset with unprecedented challenges in virtually all 
cultures and societies. These challenges center on increasing disparities among the legitimate needs of 
patients, the available resources to meet those needs, the increasing dependence on market forces to 
transform health care systems, and the temptation for physicians to forsake their traditional 
commitment to the primacy of patient’s interests. To maintain the fidelity of medicine’s social contract 
during this turbulent time, we believe that physicians must reaffirm their active dedication to 
principles of professionalism, which entails not only their personal commitment to the welfare of their 
patients but also collective efforts to improve the health care system for the welfare of society”, 
Charter on Medical Professionalism (The Lancet 2002) 
 
So far, this chapter has been heading steadily down the slippery slope: starting out with the 
clinical encounter and the technology transfer projected by proponents of genomics in 
medicine, we noted the fundamental uncertainty, epistemic, social and legal, of the 
technology transfer to take place. The genetic object comes in terms of information about 
future risk, and so places a heavy responsibility on the patient. We then noted that this is not 
just a matter of proper transfer of technology, but that we are dealing here with generalised 
problems of social institutions in second modernity, problems that have to do with legitimacy 
and of trust. A smooth technological solution seems not to be in sight, especially since future 
developments in genomics are likely to be partial, never global (Brenner 2002). As seen in the 
                                                 
71 Although dealing with it almost all the time, the problem of trust as a distinct problem to be dealt with has 
received remarkably little attention from bioethicists (O’Neill 2002). 
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chapter on patentability, further sources of uncertainty are introduced as techno-medical 
innovations of high utility, -notably in therapeutics, are also the ones that are invested with the 
highest degrees of commercial interest. 
 
Changes in the ways in which we trust in experts in general, and in medical doctors and the 
health care system especially, is a useful horizon, or backdrop, against which to contrast the 
clinical encounter. As noted by O’Neill, the patient – physician relationship may be regarded 
as the “prototype of all professional relationships”, and as a “paradigm of a relationship of 
trust” (O'Neill 2002:17). However, as the question of trust is very broad, I return to the main 
line of argument of this project, namely that of action and choice in the context of the clinical 
encounter. I do so by turning to the history of bioethics as centred round the principles of 
autonomy and informed consent.  
Autonomy 
The concept of autonomy, or self-governance (Harris 1985), stems from liberal philosophers 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries like Locke and Kant, and was originally invoked 
as a legal guarantee for the protection of the individual against the powers of the state. In the 
ethical and legal philosophies of Kant, in which the concept is articulated with the greatest 
clarity, the ethical concept of autonomy is of essential importance as a blueprint for the legal 
and political drawing of boundaries for the powers of the liberal state. These boundaries, on 
the side of the citizens, issue in terms of legal and political rights (Locke 1966; Kant 1968).   
 
According to Locke, the „great teacher of the Enlightenment“ (Taylor 1989), the rights and 
duties of the citizens have their wellspring in the social contract, entered upon by equal and 
rational men, all of whom possess a basic right to property in their own person: „Though the 
earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own 
person. This nobody has any right to but himself“ (Locke 1966). The state is presumed 
consented to through the social contract, in which citizens make the joint commitment of 
submitting to the rule of law. Through the social contract the state is invested with the power 
to regulate the interactions of men in order to escape from the state of nature, in which 
everybody is against everybody in a state of lawlessness. Hence, the citizens have a legal and 
ethical duty to submit to the rule of law in the interest of the common good. Nevertheless, the 
relationship of rights and duties go both ways: the single citizen is to be protected from undue 
encroachments from his fellow citizens and from the state itself, and this relation is conceived 
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of in terms of the rights of the citizen. Hence, autonomy works in two directions 
simultaneously: it ascribes rights and it ascribes duties.  
 
If we turn to Kant, the rights perspective is grounded in the fundamental worth of the person:  
 
„der Mensch, und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen, existiert als Zweck an sich selbst, nicht bloss 
als Mittel zum beliebigen Gebrauche für diesen oder jenen Willen, sondern muss in allen seinen, 
sowohl auf sich selbst, als auch auf andere vernünftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen jederzeit 
zugleich als Zweck betrachtet werden“, (Kant 1968:BA 64-65).  
 
In what follows, I will focus on the application of autonomy as an action-regulating principle  
when applied to the sphere of health care in general and genetic/genomic medicine in 
particular. Fundamentally, this means that I take a look at how the autonomy principle 
emerges as an essential tool for the negotiation of new relations between patient and physician 
in the face of new technologies, a fast-growing health care system and intrusions of the 
economy. Complex issues of disciplinary boundaries come together with the question of trust, 
which is itself situated on the borders between the medical system, other scientific disciplines 
or systems of action, and, last but not least, the life-world of the patient. 
 
Autonomy as an organising principle for health care and research was not introduced until the 
late 1970s, following which it has come to make up a more and more central part of health 
care regulation in general, and the regulation of genetics in special. However, its pre-history 
in a medical context goes back to the transition from medical ethics to bioethics that took 
place during the 1960s. From its very inception concerned with the relationship between 
patient and physician in the face of technological and institutional changes, the discipline of 
bioethics has co-evolved with both scientific developments and social and political 
movements. It is therefore a good intake to the wider concerns we face at the threshold to the 
genomic era, some of which have been given a broad outline above.  
Transforming medical ethics 
For a long time, the only official articulation of the patient-physician relationship was found 
in medical ethics. However, the “official” status of that body of thought was peculiar, insofar 
as it was kept strictly within the domain of the medical profession itself (Rothman 1991; 
Jonsen 1998). Since the time of Hippocrates, in the 3rd and 4th centuries before Christ, medical 
ethics were firmly embedded in medical practice and experience, written by and for medical 
doctors. The ethics codes of the medical profession, often expressed in manuals of conduct on 
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a case-by-case basis rather than as the abstract principles of philosophers, thus corresponded 
closely with the actions in which they were embedded. This went for both the rules of 
conduct, the “bedside manners” of the physician, and for the more profound ethical duties 
stated in the Hippocratic Oath: “to benefit the sick and do no harm”, to help the poor, not 
exploit patients in any way and so on. In concomitance with the general authority ascribed to 
the physician by society, delegating the discretionary powers to decide upon most issues of 
public and individual health to the single doctor, medical ethics was also fully focused on the 
doctor’s role. In terms of more recent vocabulary: it was “paternalistic” insofar as most issues 
of health policy could be articulated in terms of the doctor’s duties.  
 
One particular asset of medical ethics has been that the above sketched characteristics have 
remained remarkably stable until quite recent times. Only in the 1960s did changes start to 
occur that signalled the demise of the traditional approach and the coming of the discipline of 
bioethics, through which the discretionary monopoly so long enjoyed by the doctor was 
challenged. Towards the end of that decade and even more so in the beginning of the next, 
processes of medical decision-making underwent drastic changes. Some of these changes may 
be seen as breaches of the socio-material contract described in an earlier chapter: Although 
the main authority of the medical doctor may have been his knowledge about physiology, for 
most practical purposes he also served as the main politician of health (Rothman 1991; Jonsen 
1998). This meant that it would be the business of the single doctor to decide upon moral 
dilemmas that arose during medical practice: who to prioritize in case of shortage of 
resources; which treatments to give; who should be given treatment; sometimes also which 
research to be done; and even which conditions and birth defects that should lead to a child 
being considered a “stillbirth” (Rothman 1991). In the 1960s and 1970s, however, this 
monopoly of the single doctor was replaced by models of communal decision-making, in 
which ethicists, lawyers, other medical doctors as well as community representatives and 
ethics committees were included in the decision-making process. Why did this change of 
policy occur at that particular time in history? Why was medical ethics, for so long the sole 
set of rules for the physicians’ behaviour, exchanged for bioethics within a time-span of only 
ten years?  
 
On a general basis, the transitions in question should be seen in the light of the classical 
sociological distinction earlier alluded to: that from Gemeinschaft, or community, to that of 
Gesellschaft, or society. From organisational structures in which social action is still regulated 
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by community norms, situated within particular communities, to professionalized structures of 
abstract knowledge and action.  
 
One main difference comes in terms of scale. Significantly, the hospital as a large unit of 
differentiated expertise, as well as the introduction of systems of health care, contributed 
strongly to significant changes in the encounter between physician and patient (Porter 1997). 
Although the old structures to a certain extent have been continued by general practitioners, a 
whole set of new actors have entered the arena: the specialist physician (only to be found in 
hospitals and clinics), the health economist, the health administrator, the politician, the social 
worker and the lawyer. This increase in scale as well as the organisational reconfigurations it 
accompanied must by itself be regarded as an important reason why medical ethics and 
medical decision-making had to change: no longer a matter of the face-to-face encounter 
between physician and patient, but now also a matter of complex negotiations between 
different professions. The whole seat of medical knowledge was, physically and 
geographically transformed: from the local community doctor known by most, to a 
differentiated and abstract system situated within that sealed-off domain called the hospital, in 
its turn situated within the administration and organisation of the growing health care system 
and the national state (Rothman 1991; Porter 1997). The encounter between patient and 
physician, for so long situated within the local community, was removed and de-personalised. 
For instance, the question of which doctor to see would traditionally be limited by which 
doctors were available within the particular community. Within the hospital, the question 
would rather be determined according to which was the diseased organ: if you have problems 
with the heart, you go see a cardiologist; if you break a leg, you go see an orthopaedic. Hence, 
although the modernisation of medicine came late: when seen from this perspective, the 
medical encounter has evolved along with the modernisation of traditional structures of social 
organisation, and pretty much in accordance with the development from community structures 
to societal structures of action organisation as described by Beck and Giddens (Giddens 1990; 
Beck, Lash et al. 1996). Says David Rothman:  
 
“As the social distance between doctor and patient, and between hospital and community, enlarged, a 
sense of trust eroded. When one could no longer assume that the physician shared the same values as 
the patient, it seemed vital to devise and implement new mechanisms, preferably formal or even rigid, 
to further patients’ particular wishes. It became appropriate to post on hospital walls a copy of the 
Patient Bill of Rights, as though the facility were a factory and its users, rank-and-file labor. Even 
more notably, as doctor and hospital moved apart from patient and community, the practical wisdom 
that the practitioner had accumulated over years of clinical experience seemed less impressive than the 
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wisdom that the philosopher or the lawyer had accumulated through the study of first principles. In 
effect, bedside ethics gave way to bioethics” (Rothman 1991:11). 
 
Closely connected to these broader developments, we find the ones that have been particularly 
emphasised in this project, namely the scientific and technological developments. Here, we 
may start more or less within the same historical and experimental context as that alluded to 
in the description of bacteriology and immunology. As partially described, these 
developments were by themselves of immense importance: 
 
“By the middle of the twentieth century, the medical treatment with which this traditional medical 
morality [medical ethics] was associated bore little resemblance to the healing practices of prior 
centuries. During the previous one hundred years, scientific discoveries in physiology and 
bacteriology had radically changed the understanding of health and disease and had begun to improve 
the ability of physicians to diagnose and treat their patients. Immunization prevented the deadly 
epidemics that had devastated populations for centuries; anaesthesia and aseptic surgery enabled direct 
attack on diseased organs. In 1921, insulin was discovered and quickly applied to forstall the lethal 
effects of diabetes; in the late 1940s the first antibiotics cured infections that had often been fatal. New 
mind-altering drugs attacked the most serious mental disorders. Other drugs provided new control over 
human reproduction. Radiology viewed the body’s interior. Dramatic improvements in surgical 
technique, stimulated by military medicine during World War II, emboldened surgeons to enter the 
brain and the heart. In the 1950s, kidneys were transplanted, opening the era of organ transplantation. 
Over the decades 1930-1960, clinical medicine, based on a stream of scientific advances and armed 
with powerful diagnostic and therapeutic capacities, flourished” (Jonsen 1997). 
 
Up until the coming of the Second World War, research remained of low relevance to the 
community at large. This was a question of scale, but it was also a question of technical 
feasibility: only in the pre-war period did medical technologies emerge that would be of broad 
social and medical significance. David Rothman comments that: 
 
“Until World War II, the research enterprise was typically small-scale and intimate, guided by an ethic 
consistent with community expectations. Most research was a cottage industry: a few physicians, 
working alone, carried out experiments on themselves, their families, and their immediate neighbours. 
Moreover, the research was almost always therapeutic in intent; that is, the subjects stood to benefit 
directly if the experiments were successful. Under these circumstances, the ethics of human 
investigation did not command much attention; a few scientists, like Claude Bernard and Louis 
Pasteur, set forth especially thoughtful and elegant analyses. But for the most part, the small scale and 
potential therapeutic character of research seemed protection enough, and researchers were left to their 
own conscience, with almost no effort to police them” (Rothman 1991:18-19). 
 
The war changed all this: research was intensified and large-scale projects were instigated in 
direct connection to the war efforts. As is not unusual in wars (Porter 1997), extraordinary 
opportunities for medical experiments, especially surgical, existed for the medical doctors 
positioned close to the battleground. But organised experiments to determine physiological 
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function also rose sharply during the war years and, as already described, the amount of 
resources invested did not go down, but rose sharply in the years following the war (ibid.). 
For the sake of the biomedical sciences, the war marked the beginning of the era of large-
scale research.  
 
A central asset of the new experimental medicine was that of experimenting on humans. 
Already Claude Bernard had noted the necessity of research directly carried out on human 
subjects:  
 
“It is our duty and right to experiment on man whenever it can save his life, cure him, or gain him 
some personal benefit. The principle of medical and surgical morality, therefore, consists in never 
performing on man an experiment which may be harmful to him to any extent, even though the result 
might be highly advantageous to science, that is, to the health of others” (Bernard 1957:101-102).  
 
However: as research in the Nazi camps proved beyond doubt: such research may turn very 
ugly indeed. Although the example of the Nazis pose a particularly grim example, issuing in 
the Nürenberg code and the Helsinki declaration on research on humans shortly after the war, 
reality proved to be far more messy than presupposed in Bernard’s rather optimistic account 
of experiments on man. What’s more: Bernard, for all his prescience, did not foresee the 
radical challenges that would be posed to the traditional medical ethics by new invasive 
technologies, or, for that matter, the lengths to which certain researchers would go in order to 
serve science, but not the patient. During the course of post-war research, practices were 
allowed to continue which, when revealed, would seriously question the smooth co-existence 
of the interest of science and the interests of the patient: 
 
“Long after peace returned, many of the investigators continued to follow wartime rules. Utilitarian 
justifications that had flourished under conditions of combat and conscription persisted, and principles 
of consent and voluntary participation were often disregarded. This was…the Gilded Age of research, 
the triumph of laissez-faire in the laboratory. Yet between 1945 and 1965 very few investigators or 
their funders took note of the changed circumstances. The thrust of public policy was not to check the 
discretion of the experimenter but to free up the resources that would expand the scope and 
opportunity for research” (Rothman 1991:51).  
 
One reason for this has been hinted at already: prior to the war, research had been mainly 
therapeutic, sometimes also diagnostic. But experimentation on humans for the sake of the 
abstract and objective body of physiological knowledge: that was a new phenomenon, and 
most scientists did not spot the slippery slope until scandal hit the media (Jonsen 1998).  
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One significant event was the publication of a paper called “Ethics and clinical research” by 
Dr. Henry Beecher, professor at Harvard. In that paper, which did not go home well in the 
biomedical research community, Beecher gave examples of 22 cases in which “unethical” 
experiments had been carried out on humans without their expressed knowledge of the risks 
involved, and without the giving of informed consent. These, however, were mere examples 
of what Beecher estimated to be “widespread problems”. In the face of grave critique, 
amongst them that of “blocking progress” (Beecher 1966), Beecher argued that the old ethics 
code had transgressed it’s borders and that informed consent be made obligatory to research 
on humans. Beecher began his article by referring to the shear growth in public funding that 
had taken place in the post-war era: between 1945 and 1965 NIH funding of research 
multiplied by 624 (ibid.).  
 
In 1962, the Thalidomide scandal hit the media, revealing severe adverse effects of sleeping 
pills to the off-spring of mothers who had used the pill to ameliorate minor afflictions of early 
pregnancy. Merrell Pharmaceuticals was forced to withdraw the product from the market the 
very same year. And in 1972, the Tuskegee affair was announced by The New York Times: 
600 men of Afro-American origin, most of low income and education, coming from Tuskegee 
in Alabama, had been used as guinea-pigs in research on syphilis. The men had been 
promised rewards like free meals and medical care, but were not informed that they had 
syphilis and were not offered any treatment (as that would interfere negatively with the design 
of the research) (Jonsen 1998). 
 
Although both the rapid growth of scale in research and health care and revelations of 
experiments on humans were strong promoters of an ethical awareness, one will have a hard 
time arguing that they were sufficient conditions for the changes that were about to take place. 
They should also be seen as part of very general tendencies following the war in which human 
rights came to heightened attention, increasing wealth in western societies, and so on. But 
there were also “purely” technological developments that, as if by themselves, radically 
expanded the scope of medical interventions and so opened up for a range of unprecedented 
(moral) choices. I mention two: 
 
- In 1961, the dialysis machine was introduced into medical practice. By inserting a 
plastic tube (well-known from every modern hospital), the machine would substitute 
for impaired kidney functions in the patient, allowing for lives to be prolonged. 
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Although a highly useful invention, the procedure was expensive and scarce, and so 
the question of how to prioritise among patients arose. In addition came the hard 
question of how long to prolong life when the patient was no longer responding to 
external stimuli: life and death had to be redefined for the sake of medical decision-
making. In this process, medical doctors were not the only obvious authorities, and so 
contributions from theologians and philosophers gradually came to be accepted, and 
after a while even required (Rothman 1991; Jonsen 1997).  
- Some of the previously described developments within immunology had solved the 
problem of graft rejection in cases of organ transplantation, leaving the way open for 
matching types of tissue to be transplanted to patients in need of new organs. In terms 
of moral dilemmas and medical policy, this case proved even harder to settle: Was it 
right to remove organs from dead or dying persons? And, as can be imagined, here 
resources were even scarcer: who were to be given the few organs that became 
available? In addition came the fact that early experiments on transplantation were of 
an experimental nature, and so could imply serious risks for the patient (Jonsen 1997). 
 
A political consciousness? 
As many of the infringements through human experimentation were directed at minorities, 
they went hand in hand with the broadened political consciousness and activism of the late 
1960s, and with the rights movement in particular:  
 
“In fact, the agitation over human experimentation quickly became linked to the rights movement that 
were gaining strength in the 1960s, largely because the great majority of research subjects were 
minorities, drawn from the ranks of the poor, the mentally disabled, and the incarcerated. This linkage 
ensured that the rights of research subjects (or, conversely, the felt need to restrict the discretion of the 
researcher) would not only capture but hold public attention” (Rothman 1991:10). 
 
 
Many parallel developments, political, institutional and technological, contributed to an urgent 
need for rethinking the relation between patient and physician, patient and system, patient and 
research. Not only was the medical ethics of old conceptually inadequate; both patient and 
physician had been thrust into a new and more complex situation, one in which the old face-
to-face ethics could do little to help the many difficult choices and restructurings that would 
have to follow. Through specialisation, up-scaling and rationalisation, the doctor had become 
“a stranger at the bedside” (Rothman 1991).  
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With increasing specialisation and with more resources invested in basic research, more and 
more doctors would go into research. In many cases, i.e. where research was aimed at 
establishing an objective body of physiological knowledge rather than helping therapeutics or 
diagnostics in the concrete case, developments risked positioning the interests of the doctor, 
and of objective scientific knowledge, against the immediate interest of the single patient. As 
this transformation was not conceptualised, but rather tacitly introduced under the supposition 
that the doctor-researcher would by himself be capable of overseeing and regulating the 
ethical, legal and political issues involved, revelations of misconduct in the name of science 
struck hard within academic, public and political spheres. Clearly, the medical researcher was 
not up to the challenges of the new policies of health, and clearly his time as sole authority in 
questions of health policy had to come to an end. Something very similar also went for the 
new moral dilemmas created by developing technologies.  
 
Hence, what took place was very much that the old political and ethical problem of the 
individual’s relation to society in general found its way into the medical arena, where it had to 
be re-negotiated. In the words of the philosopher Hans Jonas, one of the strongest and most 
original contributors to the debate: 
 
“…we require a careful clarification of what the needs, interests, and rights of society are, for society – 
as distinct from any plurality of individuals – is an abstract and, as such, is subject to our definition, 
while the individual is the primary concrete, prior to all definition, and his basic good is more or less 
known. Thus the unknown in our problem is the so-called common or public good and its potentially 
superior claims, to which the individual good must or might sometimes be sacrificed, in circumstances 
that in turn must also be counted among the unknowns of our question…” (Jonas 1969). 
 
In terms of the socio-material contract, the medical doctor had been invested with political 
responsibilities, and so the main legitimacy of this investment stemmed from the domain of 
the natural, and not from the political sphere. As medical and technological possibilities 
expanded drastically, the discretion given to the doctor in defining the central issues of health 
policy was also challenged. In that way, the doctor was driven in the direction of his main 
area of expertise, namely the technical and scientific domain, whereas other groups would 
increase their influence over what came to be seen as the ethical domain. These developments 
went hand in hand with the increasingly strong scientific basis for the understanding of 
disease. Science and technology, -for all the good they have accomplished, have also worked 
hard to dispel sources of uncertainty, -among them the patient, from the domain of the 
medical doctor. Modern medicine, in endorsing a scientific basis, may do itself a disservice if 
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scientific and technical developments should persist to dispel the humanistic side of the 
profession. In the view of one prominent practitioner and philosopher: 
 
“The uncomfortable fact remains that doctors cannot get at diseases without dealing with patients – 
doctors do not treat diseases, they treat patients. Further, the same disease in different individuals may 
have a different presentation, course, treatment and outcome depending on individual and group 
differences among patients – from personal idiosyncrasies to genetic or anatomic variations. The 
scientific basis of medicine does not recognize nor provide a methodology to deal with such individual 
variations on the level of patient-doctor interactions. Such issues were relegated to the “art” of 
medicine or to individual judgement” (Cassell 1991:19).  
 
 
During the 1960s, a growing number of theologians, physicians and philosophers had started 
to concern themselves with the ethical dilemmas of medical decision making. The issues 
brought forward were often very broad, sometimes speculative, and more often than not ill-
suited to supply solutions to a field in which demands were continually raised that decisions 
be made fast or not at all. Not the least, this was a consequence of the practitioners from these 
fields struggling to adapt abstract and theoretical disciplines and concepts to the realities of 
the clinic or the laboratory. If bioethics was to replace the scientific and medical definitions of 
“the public good”, it had better be done in terms that could actually cast a light upon concrete 
cases so as to facilitate and improve decision-making. 
 
During the 1960s, organised attempts at doing bioethics would generally stretch to arranging 
conferences in which wide arrays of topics were aired and discussed, often in close 
connection to the political climate of that period. As already mentioned, the close vicinity to 
the civil rights movement was particularly important. But in terms of concrete 
recommendations for policy-making, the outcome was modest (Ach and Runterberg 2002). 
However, by the end of that decade, developments took place that would eventually lead 
bioethics towards firmer disciplinary grounds, thus also leading its practitioners to establish 
more stable and concise vocabularies and working methods. Most important in that respect: 
the problems generated in medical research and clinical practice, and the increasing public 
attention received by these developments were noted and responded to by politicians.  
 
In 1968, developments in genetics and heart transplantation led Senator Walter Mondale 
(Democrats Party) to instigate political hearings to probe the grounds for establishing a 
Presidential study commission The mandate of the commission would be to study “organ 
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transplantation, genetic engineering, behaviour control, experimentation on humans, and the 
financing of research” (Jonsen 1998, 91). Whereas the actors already involved in these 
questions would be positive (i.e. theologians, philosophers, sosiologists, lawyers), the invited 
scientists and medical doctors were generally reluctant, where not downright hostile, towards 
the idea. Because of stark opposition from these groups, the 1968 proposal came to nothing 
(Rothman 1991). 
  
Mondale, however, did not give up, and so raised the issue again in 1971. Also this time, 
opposition was strong, and Mondale remained perplexed by the reception of his proposal:  
 
“all we are proposing here is to create a measly little study commission to look at some very profound 
issues…I sense an almost psychopathic objection to the public process, a fear that if the public gets 
involved, it is going to be anti-science, hostile and unsupportive”, Mondale quoted from (Jonsen 
1998:94). 
 
Eventually, Mondale’s views won out and his attempts issued in the creation of the Advisory 
Commission on Health, Science and Society in 1973. The expression of “ethical, legal and 
social” consequences, later to be found in the periphery of genomic research, stems from 
Mondale’s efforts to establish this commission (ibid.).  
 
1973 saw another political hearing, initiated by Senator Ted Kennedy, who was expressing 
concerns similar to those raised by Mondale. At this stage, the issues of genetic engineering, 
reproductive technologies, research on foetuses and un-knowing subjects had ignited the 
attention of other senators and politicians as well. Hearings were held, involving central 
scientists (among them James Watson) and bio-ethicists (such as Dan Callahan), and other 
hearings were devoted to specific issues, like human experiments and the Tuskegee 
revelations. A National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research was instigated (ibid.).  
 
I now turn to the development of regulatory bodies instigated to replace the traditional 
structures of medical decision-making that followed in the wake of the above political events. 
Centrally, I give a description of some of the concepts developed in and around these new 
institutions, concepts that would come to play important roles in the future structure of 
bioethics. As we have seen also in other young disciplines, the development of a (more or 
less) specific method, of a conceptual framework as well as proper institutions, went hand in 
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hand with the development of the discipline as such. Of special importance: towards the end 
of the 1970s, autonomy emerged, not as the Archimedean point around which everything else 
revolved (we are dealing with language here, and not with a technological object), but still as 
the central organising principle of bioethical thought and action. 
Defining the concepts, defining the discipline 
The many revelations of unethical research, both in the laboratory and in the clinic, forced the 
NIH, as the main funding agency of biomedical research in the United States, to take decisive 
steps in order to counter criticism and to improve the situation. In 1966, under the lead of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, a set of guidelines were issued in which the 
responsibility for research was delegated to the single institutions receiving the funding and 
carrying out the research (Rothman 1991, 89). Importantly, the institutions themselves were to 
control that the informed consent of the research subjects or the patients was given. The 
concept of voluntary consent had been defined in the Nuremberg code: 
 
“…the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able 
to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, 
duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make 
an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of 
an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, 
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all 
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which 
may possibly come from his participation in the experiment”. 
 
 
In the Helsinki declaration, the conception of informed consent was used expressly. However, 
in terms of social organisation it remained abstract, i.e. it was not connected to any 
institutions in particular. The concept was first deployed for purposes of public decision-
making in a court ruling in 1957, in which it was ruled that physicians “have the duty to 
disclose any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the 
patient to proposed treatment” quote from (Jonsen 1998:355).  
 
In the above cited cases, however, it had been the responsibility of the researcher or the 
clinician to see to it that the correct procedures were followed. As seen, this was not 
sufficient. In this respect, the issue at stake was not that of accepting informed consent or not, 
but rather on whom the responsibility was put for the right procedure to be followed. The NIH 
and the Department of Health came up with the idea that the institutions themselves be made 
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responsible, and that this responsibility was to be shared among a group of individuals, a 
committee or the like, acting on behalf of the patient:  
 
“Safeguarding the rights and welfare of human subjects involved in activities supported by grants or 
contracts from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is the responsibility of the institution 
which receives or is accountable to the DHEW for the funds awarded for the support of the activity. In 
order to provide for the adequate discharge of this institutional responsibility, it is the policy of the 
department that no grant or contract for an activity involving human subjects shall be made unless the 
application for such support has been reviewed and approved by an institutional committee” 
(Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1971). 
 
By this move, the transfer of discretional powers from the physician to a larger community 
was officially undertaken. However, the responsibility had not really been moved out of the 
physicians’ domain: the committee in question was to be composed of peer scientists or 
clinicians. As described by Rothman: although ground-breaking, the move had something 
defensive about it. It could also be regarded as an attempt to respond to public scrutiny while 
still keeping discretion within the medical and scientific community. Hence, the guidelines 
“…retained an investigator’s scepticism about the ultimate value of the procedure, a position 
that was widely shared in the research community.” (Rothman 1991:91).  
 
However, the political initiatives already under way would see to it that groups and 
professions outside of the biomedical communities would soon be instigated as guardians of 
patients’ rights. Following the Kennedy hearings in 1974, the National Research Act was 
signed by President Nixon. The act instigated the aforementioned National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research in a direct position 
towards the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The Secretary of that department 
was to respond directly to the recommendations of the commission. If the secretary chose not 
to do so, he would have to answer to the Commission (Jonsen 1998). The commission 
consisted of lawyers, theologians (among them Albert Jonsen), philosophers, physicians, 
biologists and one representative from the public (ibid.). The eleven members were instructed 
to “recommend to the Secretary of DHEW regulations that would protect the rights and 
welfare of human subjects of research, particularly with regard to informed consent and 
institutional review of research” (ibid., 100).  
 
Hence it was that a new balance was sought out between society and research in which the 
respect for individual rights was instigated as the main point of reference. Furthermore, the 
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rights of individuals were to be conceived in terms of ethical principles. The mandate of the 
commission was to “identify the basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of 
biomedical and behavioural research involving human subjects and develop guidelines that 
should be followed in such research” (ibid.). In the years to come, a number of guidelines 
issued from the Commission, dealing with subjects such as institutional review boards, 
research involving children, prisoners and the mentally ill; health services in general, and 
disclosure of research information. The commission would typically work by hearing both 
public opinion and expert advice, discussing the relevant issues among its members, finally to 
settle upon the best solution as they saw it. Significantly, their working methods distinguished 
themselves from ordinary academic deliberation and analysis by the practical-political 
dimensions involved: concrete solutions to concrete problems had to be arrived upon within 
given time schedules (ibid.). 
 
The most significant outcome of the commission’s work was instigated in 1976 when they 
were asked to comment on the principles that should underlie biomedical research in general. 
The initial report was finished the same year, but it continued to be revised throughout the 
next three years. In 1979 it issued as The Belmont Report, which has since become a 
cornerstone of bioethics and the regulation of biomedical research. 
The Belmont Report 
In accordance with what has previously been stated about legitimate sources of knowledge in 
modernity: technological and institutional progress brought to the fore sharpened principles of 
universality in both the natural and social domains. This, in turn, facilitated a sharing of work 
in which the technical and scientific was separated from the ethical decisions involved in 
medical decision-making. The Belmont Report specified three ethical principles in order to 
provide “a basis on which specific rules may be formulated, criticized and interpreted”: 
Respect for persons, Beneficence and Justice. These three basic principles were regarded as 
leading to three corresponding requirements of practical application: informed consent, 
risk/benefit assessment and selection of subjects for research.  
 
The first thing to notice here is the explicit endorsement of ethical principles rather than rules 
and precepts, a transition best explained by recourse to the increasing complexity and value 
pluralism of modern societies. Recall how, in the chapter on methodology, I referred Ronald 
Dworkin’s critique of Herbert Hart’s picture of law: defining law as dealing mainly with rules 
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of conduct, it leaves out a number of more complex situations in need of interpretation and 
judgement. Hart’s picture, says Dworkin, has to be complemented with a basic understanding 
of the role of principles in organising human action. The distinction made by Dworkin should 
not be seen as analytic only; it may also be regarded as a sociological distinction emerging 
along with the increased complexity of society in the twenty years or so after Hart wrote his 
book. Something parallel may be stated about ethical codes of conduct for research and the 
clinical encounter. Referring to the Nurnberg Code, the National Commission wrote that: 
 
“The codes consist of rules, some general, others specific, that guide the investigators or the reviewers 
of research in their work. Such rules often are inadequate to cover complex situations; at times they 
come into conflict, and they are frequently difficult to interpret or to apply. Broader ethical principles 
will provide a basis on which specific rules may be formulated, criticized and interpreted” (National 
Comission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979). 
 
 
The first principle of the report was that of “respect for persons”. Through this conception, 
strongly reminiscent of Kant’s categorical imperative72, the institute of informed consent was 
given a firmer philosophical foundation, namely “respect for persons”. The conceptions of 
respect and personhood, however, were not clarified, but rather directly translated into the 
concept of autonomy: 
 
“Respect for persons incorporates at least two ethical convictions: first, that individuals should be 
treated as autonomous agents, and second, that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to 
protection. The principle of respect thus divides into two separate moral requirements: the requirement 
to acknowledge autonomy and the requirement to protect those with diminished autonomy. An 
autonomous person is an individual capable of deliberation about personal goals and of acting under 
the direction of such deliberation” (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Research 1979).  
 
In practice, respect for autonomy spelled out as the giving of the proper information to the 
research subject, that he or she comprehended the relevant information, and that he or she 
entered into the research project voluntarily. The language of the report was influenced by 
philosophers like Hans Jonas, Paul Ramsey and H. Tristram Engelhardt, who all sought to 
elevate the single individual above the utilitarianism of research in the 1960s and 1970s: one 
                                                 
72 The categorical imperative was given in many different versions by Kant. One articulation that captures the 
motivation of the early bioethicists particularly well is the following: “Achtung geht jederzeit nur auf Personen, 
niemals auf Sachen“, KpV, A 136. Translated into the problem of research on human subjects, this principle of 
respect denies the ascription of value to abstract bodies of knowledge, while endorsing the value of the “concrete 
individual” (Jonas). 
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individual’s worth was not to be subordinated to the (allegedly) greater goal of common 
welfare through research. Obvious to philosophers: Kant’s dictum to treat the subject as an 
end, and never purely as a mean, exerted strong influences on the solutions found by these 
early bioethicists (Jonsen 1998). Hence it was that autonomy was instigated at the centre of 
the bioethical discourse. What had been initiated as a demand for informed consent from 
research subjects had been given a more philosophical and principled foundation. 
 
The three principles in question had been selected out from a rather long list of possible 
candidates, for instance: “respect self-determination, benefit individual research subjects, 
benefit other individuals and groups present and future, minimize harm to individual subjects, 
minimize consequential harm to others, and attend to distributive justice and to compensating 
justice” (Jonsen 1998:103). Although not stated in the report itself, one reason for excluding 
these and to keep those of respect, beneficence and justice, was that these were seen as 
universal principles proper (ibid.). Furthermore, they were comprehensive and “stated at a 
level of generalization that should assist scientists, subjects, reviewers and interested citizens 
to understand the ethical issues inherent in research involving human subjects” (National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research 1979).  
 
The principle of Beneficence had been derived from the Hippocratic maxim to “do no harm”. 
Claude Bernard was cited as bringing the principle into the domain of experiments on human 
subjects. Now, the principle was translated as obliging researchers and their institutions to 
“give forethought to the maximization of benefits and the reduction of risk that might occur 
from the research investigation. In the case of scientific research in general, members of the 
larger society are obliged to recognize the longer term benefits and risks that may result from 
the improvement of knowledge and from the development of novel medical, 
psychotherapeutic, and social procedures” (ibid.). When applied to practice, then, the 
principle of beneficence, itself derived from the older precept of doing no harm, spelled out as 
the proper assessment of risks and benefits:  
 
“The requirement that research be justified on the basis of a favourable risk/benefit assessment bears a 
close relation to the principle of beneficence, just as the moral requirement that informed consent be 
obtained is derived primarily from the principle of respect for persons” (ibid.).73  
                                                 
73 Philosophically speaking, this inference is problematic. In terms of positive precepts for action, nothing can be 
derived from the principle of autonomy itself; it is a wholly negative and limiting concept (Wellmer 1986). In 
short: whereas we may use the concept of autonomy or respect for excluding actions and reasons as not 
respecting autonomy, we cannot, strictly speaking, derive anything from these principles. 
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Although the limitations of quantifying risk/benefit analyses were noted, it was stated that the 
“idea of systematic, non-arbitrary analysis of risks and benefits should be emulated insofar as 
possible” (ibid.) in order for the communication of risks and benefits to proceed as smoothly 
as possible between the involved actors, notably the members of the review boards and 
investigators.  
 
This transformation of the precept to do no harm into the principle of beneficence, which was 
next translated into the practical precept of proper risk/benefit analyses, illustrates a general 
point of this project: during the process of modernisation, basic categories of action and 
choice lose many of their “traditional” qualities and properties, which are then transformed 
into more or less standardising principles. Heightened efficiency may come at a price, namely 
to strip basic ways of understanding and acting of their commonly shared properties in favour 
of counterfactual presuppositions about agency. In the case of bioethics and its central 
concepts, this inherent mechanism of modernisation constitutes something of an irony: 
initially instigated to empower the individual in the face of an increasingly powerful medical 
system, demands for disciplinary consistency and efficacy in the face of decisions needing to 
be made fast requires conceptual tools that are universal and quantifiable. But this raises the 
demand for new kinds of expertise to help the individual assess the risks and the benefits of 
the situation, and so the democratic problem is reproduced. In one early statement of what 
bioethics was supposed to be, Daniel Callahan wrote that:   
 
“…it is of the essence of moral decision-making to be couched in ordinary language and dealt with by 
ordinary, non-professional modes of thinking. The reason for this is apparent. An ethical decision will 
not be satisfactory to the person whose decision it is unless it is compatible with the way in which the 
person ordinarily thinks about himself and what he takes his life to be” (Callahan 1973) 
 
At the same time, Callahan, somehow unintentionally, gave testimony to the tangle in which 
bioethics and its central concepts (already) found itself:  
 
“My contention is that the discipline of bioethics should be so designed, and its practitioners so 
trained, that it will directly – at whatever cost to disciplinary elegance – serve those physicians and 
biologists whose position demands that they make the practical decisions” (Callahan 1973). 
 
Hence, we see that bioethics, although seeking to articulate the interests of the patient, early 
on came to rely upon the understanding of reality as offered by scientists and medical doctors. 
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It is understandable that Callahan, in 1973, would argue like this, -his main purpose perhaps 
not so much to reinvest the experts of the biomedical community with the power to define the 
interests of the patient, as to free the nascent discipline of bioethics from its mother discipline, 
philosophy, in which argumentative rigour and abstractness were (and are) cultivated for their 
own sake:  
 
“If ethics was nothing other than seeing to it that no logical fallacies were committed in the process of 
ethical argumentation, it would hardly be worthy of anyone’s attention. It is the premises of ethical 
arguments, the vision behind ethical systems, the feelings which fuel ethical (or non-ethical) 
behaviour, which make the real difference for human life. Verbal formulations are only the tip of the 
iceberg. An ethicist can restrict himself to that tip; he will be on safe enough professional grounds if 
he does so. But I see no reason why he can’t dare more than that, out of a recognition that the source 
and importance of his field lie not in the academy but in private and public human life, where what 
people think, feel and do make all the difference there is…” (Callahan 1973).  
 
Last, there was the principle of justice, of which I will not say much. It was introduced to the 
Committee by Tom Beauchamp (Jonsen 1998), who was building upon John Rawls idea of 
distributive justice: “An injustice occurs when some benefit to which a person is entitled is 
denied without good reason or when some burden is imposed unduly” (National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research 1979). In practice, this principle was to see 
to it that subjects of research were not selected in an unjust manner. Specifically, as in the 
Tuskegee scandal, it was important that the subjects were not taken from poor segments of the 
population or from minorities poorly situated to make their interests noted. This does, 
however, remind us of the context in which the Belmont Report arose, of which I will have 
something more to say in what follows. 
Some legal interventions 
The increased political attention devoted to the rights of research subjects found its 
counterpart in legal developments that would make their way into the clinical encounter more 
directly. Whereas the issue of research on humans gradually came to revolve around the rights 
of the single patient to be protected by communal modes of decision-making, i.e. ethical 
review boards, the courts now instigated themselves as protectors of the patients’ welfare.  
 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the legal relationship between physician and patient, 
and between hospital and patient, came to the fore with particular force in cases of life-
sustaining technologies. In the perhaps most well-known case, Karen-Ann Quinlan was kept 
on respiratory machinery and nourished through a tube while in a comatose state. According 
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to technical jargon she was not brain-dead, and so it was decided that she be kept alive. The 
decision was opposed by her Catholic family as well as the community to which they 
belonged, claiming for her father to be instigated as her guardian and that she be granted the 
right to die. In the ruling, it was judged that Karen-Ann had a right to privacy and that her 
father had the right to be instigated to make decisions on her behalf. Furthermore, and most 
important for the present purpose: the court, realising the complexity of the matter, set forth 
the proposal that future decisions in right-to-die cases be delegated to ethics committees 
composed by a wide variety of members, such as lawyers, theologians, social workers and 
theologians (Jasanoff 1995). In the years to come, a number of cases were raised in which the 
principle of autonomy and ways of communal decision-making were negotiated. American 
courts actively interfered in order to strengthen the rights of the individual. Although thereby 
provoking new problems, Jasanoff concludes that  
 
“On balance…the courts dealt with the social impacts of life-sustaining technologies in ways that 
furthered the development of collective norms and of new institutional arrangements with respect to 
death and dying. Following Quinlan, courts successfully delegated to ethics committees the 
responsibility for micromanaging right-to-die decisions” (ibid.,202). 
 
Also according to David Rothman, the incision of the courts and ethics committees into the 
clinical relationship was to be seen as a necessary and legitimate move in the face of growing 
technological possibilities and an increasingly powerful medical profession, rather than a 
professional take-over:  “…lawyers and judges had not pursued some imperialistic imperative 
and invaded medicine’s domain but, rather, were in alliance with patients in an effort to right 
an imbalance of power and establish the principles of patient autonomy” (Rothman 
1991:232). 
Bioethics as a discipline 
During the 1970s, the rudimentary character of the bioethics debate of the preceding decade 
was replaced by more ordered and scholarly disciplined institutions of biomedical research. 
Following Albert Jonsen, I here refer the development of two central institutions, namely 
those of The Kennedy Institute and The Hastings Center. 
 
The Hastings Center was founded in 1970 by Daniel Callahan. Originally trained as a 
philosopher and working for a Catholic journal, he got himself involved in bioethical matters 
while trying to come to terms with the question of abortion. Receiving generous support from 
organisations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the National Endowment for the 
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Humanities as well as single donors, the Center soon grew to encompass a highly resourceful 
and interdisciplinary staff, consisting of philosophers, physiologists and theologians (Jonsen 
1998), 21. Due to the funding, the center remained independent of academic institutions, an 
important factor for the success of the institution in its operations on the interface between lay 
public and experts, and between theoreticians and practicing physicians and scientists. 
Sharing work between them, four study groups were established, one of which dealt 
specifically with genetic engineering and counselling. The others were on population control, 
death and dying, and on behaviour control (ibid.). In 1971 the publication The Hastings 
Center Report appeared, which to a large degree served to shape the discipline to come: “The 
index of the Hastings Center Report over the next years defines the range of topics that were 
becoming bioethics and constitutes a roll call of the authors who would become its 
proponents” (ibid.). In 1971, the center contributed to the organisation of a conference on 
“Ethical Issues in Genetic Counselling and the Use of Genetic Knowledge” (ibid., 22). 
 
Also the Kennedy Institute, which was founded in 1971 by André Hellegers, grew out of a 
mixture of theological and philosophical concerns with abortion and the new possibilities 
offered by reproductive medicine. The name was chosen because of the source of its funding, 
the Kennedy Foundation. In contradistinction to the Hastings Center, the Kennedy Institute 
was closely connected to an academic institution, Georgetown University, and so the institute, 
from the outset run by theologians, came to take the more scholarly path of the two. 
Significantly, a library consisting of bioethical texts was collected (by Leroy Walters), and 
every year a bibliography of newly published texts was published. Eventually, these sources 
issued in a national reference center for bioethical literature, securing for the first time a 
collected body of bioethical works. A graduate program was also instigated in cooperation 
with the philosophy department, and by the end of the 1970s bioethicists were regularly out-
examined from the institute (ibid.).  
 
The most significant work to come out of the Kennedy Institute was Beauchamp and 
Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics, the first edition of which appeared in 197774. 
Since that time, the book has become something of a standard in bioethics (Jonsen 1998). The 
book states four main principles as the basis of bioethical discourse and deliberation: 
autonomy, nonmalificience, beneficience and justice. As seen, three of the principles are the 
                                                 
74 The following remarks will not be based upon that edition, but on the revised (fifth) edition from 2001.  
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same as those given in the Belmont Report; only nonmaleficience has been added. The set of 
principles, the authors tell us, is not intended to serve as a coherent moral theory; in many 
cases they may be at odds with each other. As the purpose of the book is practical rather than 
theoretical, this state of affairs is not attempted resolved, but rather taken as an expression of 
the often contradictory and incoherent character of real-life moral decisions and of common 
morality: “A set of principles in a moral account should function as an analytical framework 
that expresses the general values underlying rules in the common morality. These principles 
can then function as guidelines for professional ethics” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001:12).  
Furthermore, either of the principles is intended as prior to or overriding all of the other 
principles. Concerning autonomy, the authors specifically underlines this point in order to 
counter allegations of them being promoters of the “triumph of autonomy” (Veach 1984).  
 
Be that as it may: quite independently of how Beauchamp and Childress intended their own 
work to be perceived, there can be little doubt about the central position of the concept in the 
following years (this is especially so for the American context, but parallel developments 
have also taken place in Europe). Autonomy, and its counterpart informed consent, emerged 
at the centre of biomedical practice: in institutional review boards, ethics classes, ethics 
committees, in the laboratory and in the clinical encounter (Veach 1984; Dworkin 1988; Ach 
and Runterberg 2002; O'Neill 2002).  Thus, in many ways, the history of bioethics, especially 
up until the eighties, was a story of success. During a span of ten years, the medical decision-
making process was transformed. Here was an example of a social order being established by 
a number of groups, -scholars, lawyers, politicians, medical doctors and activists, in the face 
of new technological and ethical challenges. Perhaps most importantly, the movement 
initiated through bioethics corresponded with and responded to wide social concerns of the 
times: 
 
“In the end, the initial commitment of bioethics to patient rights helps account for its extraordinary 
accomplishments in the decade from 1966 to 1976. The fit between the movement and the times was 
perfect. Just when courts were defining an expanded right to privacy, the bioethicists were 
emphasizing the principle of autonomy, and the two meshed neatly; judges supplied a legal basis and 
bioethicists, a philosophical basis for empowering the patient. Indeed, just as when movements on 
behalf of a variety of minorities were advancing their claims, the bioethicists were defending another 
group that appeared powerless – patients” (Rothman 1991:245), 
 
One particular fact, says Rothman, also secured the continued acceptance and legitimacy of 
the demand for increased patient autonomy, -and singled it out as a special case among many 
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other causes championed by the rights movement in general, -namely its applicability across 
class lines: “Not everyone is poor or a member of a minority group or disadvantaged socially 
or economically; but everyone potentially, if not already, is a patient” (ibid., 246). Hence, the 
language in which the bioethicists articulated their agenda found wide acceptance among 
differing social groups and classes. The typical bioethicist may not greatly have resembled the 
average social activist of the day; bioethicists often came from academic and catholic 
backgrounds, and many would go to great lengths to distance themselves from what they 
perceived to be leftist activism. Still, the case remained that there were also strong parallels 
between the two movements and that these went well with the political and legal climate of 
the time. Bioethics gained in strength and relevance from these shared structures of public 
action and discourse (Rothman 1991; Jonsen 1997; Ach and Runterberg 2002).  
Bioethics and the genome 
I now continue by connecting the above discussion to the one carried out in the chapter “The 
genome and the clinical context”. The significant point is how the principles originally 
designed to guide research on human subjects also came to exert their influence on other 
fields, significantly that of the clinical context. As stated by Albert Jonsen about the general 
significance of The Belmont Report: “Its principles found their way into the general literature 
of the field, and, in the process, grew from the principles underlying the conduct of research 
into the basic principles of bioethics” (Jonsen 1998:104). However, as will be seen, there are 
reasons for doubting the adequacy of the concepts of autonomy and informed consent when 
transferred to the clinical encounter. This is especially so with genetics and genomics, as the 
problems posed by these disciplines are of such novel and, in many cases, un-precedented 
character. These cases, I take it, are particularly powerful inducers of the dilemma instigated 
by the socio-material contract and the following delegation of discretionary powers to experts: 
in the case of doubt and uncertainty, the main sources of legitimacy in modernity are called 
upon to facilitate decision-making. These, however, are articulated in terms of universal 
principles of physiological function (nature) or universal ethical principles, i.e. counterfactual 
organisers. But how can decisions based upon such premises, as prescribed by Callahan, be 
“satisfactory to the person whose decision it is”?  
 
The Belmont Report started out by clarifying a distinction that had underpinned the bioethical 
debate from its inception, namely that between “clinical application” and “research”. The 
relevance of the distinction has already been indicated. In the above quote from Hans Jonas, 
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we saw that he specifically forwarded “the individual as the primary concrete”. It was the 
establishment of abstract bodies of objective knowledge through biomedical research that was 
in need of justification when positioned towards the concrete individual. The main rationale 
behind this shift of emphasis was that the public or common good could no longer be equated 
with scientific knowledge.  
 
“It is important to distinguish between biomedical and behavioural research, on the one hand, and the 
practice of accepted therapy on the other, in order to know what activities ought to undergo review for 
the protection of human subjects of research…For the most part, the term “practice” refers to 
interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or client and 
that have a reasonable expectation of success. The purpose of medical or behavioural practice is to 
provide diagnosis, preventive treatment or therapy to particular individuals. By contrast, the term 
“research” designates an activity designed to test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and 
thereby to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge (expressed, for example, in theories, 
principles, and statements of relationships)” (National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research 1979). 
 
The committee clearly realised that in many cases the boundary between the two would be 
blurred. But in practice, it was surmised, this did not constitute a major obstacle: “if there is 
any element of research in an activity, that activity should undergo review for the protection 
of human subjects” (ibid.).  
 
For the purposes of this project, the above distinction is of importance: the notions of 
informed consent and autonomy entered the policy scene as mechanisms for regulating 
research on human subjects. Clinical practice, mainly regarded as therapeutic in character, 
was not subjected to ethical review. In spite of this: In a previous chapter (“The genome and 
the clinical context”), we saw how, in the late 1970s/early 1980s, the concepts of autonomy 
and informed consent were already emerging as boundary-regulating tools in the new 
constellations of the clinical encounter offered through genetic screening and testing. It was 
clearly recognised that these practices were experimental in character, and so their 
socialisation required that one proceeded in a cautionary manner. However, in the 1983 report 
Screening and Counselling for Genetic Conditions: A Report on the Ethical, Social, and 
Legal Implications of Genetic Screening, Counselling, and Educations Programs, there is no 
mention of submitting these practices to ethical review boards. In stead, responsibility is left 
by and large to the professionals: 
 
“Much of the responsibility for establishing and enforcing performance standards for a particular test 
will fall to the professions themselves. Nevertheless, public officials, including those who fund 
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programs or regulate screening products, share responsibility for seeing that the test is used in a way 
that will maximize benefit and minimize harm” (The President's Comission 1983). 
 
 
In all the three cited reports on genetic screening, the regulatory problems connected to those 
practices are underlined in the introductory passages. To quote the most recent, Assessing 
Genetic Risks: Implications for Health and Social Policy: 
 
“The committee took its starting point from the wise advice of the 1975 National Academy of 
Sciences Study Genetic Screening: Programs, Principles, and Research: [quote 1975 report] 
Screening programs for genetic diseases and characteristics…have multiplied rapidly in the past 
decade, and many have been begun without prior testing and evaluation and not always for reasons of 
health alone. Changes in disease patterns and a new emphasis on preventive medicine, as well as 
recent and rapid advances in genetics, indicate that screening for genetic diseases will become more 
common in the future. These conditions, together with the mistakes already made, suggested the need 
for a review of current screening practices that would identify the problems and difficulties and give 
some procedural guidance, in order to minimize the shortcomings and maximize the effectiveness of 
future genetic screening programs [end of 1975 quote]. These words, written almost 20 years ago, 
remain just as valid today for genetic screening and diagnosis” (Institute of Medicine 1994). 
 
 
Thus, it could hardly have been that problems connected to genetic screening and testing were 
not recognised. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that these practices would not qualify as 
containing elements of “research” according to the definition of the Belmont Report: already 
the 1975 report stated the necessity of proceeding in an “experimental mood”. Developments 
in genetics and health care emerged during the same period as ethical review boards were 
instigated to take care of the interests of the patient in research facilities and hospitals. Still, 
the general rule that discretional power be transferred from the physician to review boards and 
patients did not seem to apply fully to the cases of genetic screening and testing. Here, the 
responsibility was left more or less in the hands of the clinician, the genetic counsellor, and 
the patient. One reason for so doing lay in the fact that the early transgressions and mistakes 
made in screening programs were regarded as mistakes made by individual researchers in a 
new and developing field: 
 
“Most of the mistakes, most of the ethical transgressions, most of the failures to observe people’s 
rights, most of the breaches of confidentiality and informed consent and so on occurred early on when 
screening was being done by individual investigators or by interested lay groups, when it was being 
done in inappropriate places, and before the network of educators, counsellors, physicians, health 
officers, and the like were set up” (The President's Comission 1983). 
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One further reason no doubt resided in the positive value generally ascribed to genetic 
information and the optimistic view of people’s capabilities of making autonomous and 
informed choices based on that information:  
 
“Genetic screening and counselling have the same central purpose: to make people into 
informed decisionmakers about their genetic constitution, to the extent that it is relevant to 
their own well-being or that of their family” (ibid.).  
 
In the context of genetic medicine, then, the concern that the patient be threatened from an 
increasingly powerful medical system seemed to have evaporated. Again, the individual and 
his/her autonomy were invoked, but this time the function was not defensive; it was rather 
affirmative. The autonomy of the patient as well as proper professional procedures would see 
to it that genetic screening and testing would turn out for the better: to society, to the patient 
and to science and medicine. Was this a return to pre-Belmont conditions, or was it rather a 
harbinger of things to come, of problems not articulated within the fast established bioethical 
cannon?  
 
I will let Albert Jonsen answer the question. Speaking of bioethics’ relation to technical, 
social and medical developments in the period 1987 to 1997, he states that: 
 
“During the decade since 1987…the discipline and discourse have…changed direction in 
significant ways. Any field that comments on actuality, as bioethics does, is necessarily 
moved by events and inventions, and the decade has been filled with advances in medical 
science as well as new forms of health care delivery and policy, that called for commentary. 
At the same time, the leading ideas that form the discipline have come under scrutiny; the 
theory, principles and practices that evolved during the first decades do not seem to measure 
up to the new questions” (Jonsen 1998:406). 
 
 
Not surprisingly: among the new questions referred to by Jonsen we find those connected to 
the launching of the human genome project. When regarding autonomy and informed consent 
in a wider social and political setting, it becomes clear that these concepts, when uncritically 
transposed to new contexts, such as that of genetics and the clinical encounter, takes on 
different functions from those originally intended. The reason for this, as marked by Jonsen, is 
as simple as it is complex: the surrounding context has changed significantly, and so there 
seems to be an increasing gulf between concept and reality. As also seen in the chapter on 
patentability, this is connected to the changes within the sciences themselves, to the scientific 
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object becoming information, and to the objects’ new role within an ever faster-moving 
information economy: “…the contexts in which consent or dissent might be sought or given 
are changing in ways that may stretch, strain and perhaps overwhelm individuals’ capacities 
to give informed consent” (O'Neill 2001).  
 
Centrally for our purposes: the concepts of autonomy and informed consent were conceived 
of within a context of research. Where expanded to the clinical context, it was mainly 
conceived of within an understanding of the clinical encounter as mainly therapeutic in 
character. Hence, in Principles of Medical Ethics, it is held that “An informed consent is an 
individual’s autonomous authorization of a medical intervention or of participation in 
research” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Within this understanding of the clinical 
encounter, the information part of the definition is still conceived as directly related to some 
physiological intervention to be undertaken. But how does this look when the information is 
the intervention? 
 
Informed consent was initially instigated to replace the exclusive authority of the medical 
researcher for communal forms of decision making, a task that by most measures was well 
performed (Rothman 1991; Jasanoff 1995; Jonsen 1998). However, within the context of 
genetics (and genomics) these concepts may even be said to have the exact opposite effect, 
namely that of ascribing to the patient, qua rational decision maker, the moral responsibility 
for the risks of his or her condition. If that is the case, bioethics cannot be said to counter or to 
make problematic technological and medical developments, but rather to confirm and 
strengthen them. As long as the autonomy of the patient is respected through the taking of his 
or her informed consent, the ethical responsibility of the medical doctor or the health care 
system has been taken care of. What remains is the scientific and technical responsibility of 
providing correct information as the basis of the decision to be taken by the patient. The 
intrinsic norm of non-interference of the geneticist or counsellor with the patient’s decision 
confirms this new sharing of work. Hence: because genetic information is regarded mainly as 
a good, the institute of informed consent promotes and projects the construction of the single 
individual as an “informed decision maker about his or her genetic constitution”.  
 
The problematic status of autonomy and genetic information 
It thus seems that autonomy and genetic information end up by working together in projecting 
the patient as a rational decision-maker, one capable of making autonomous choices based 
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upon proper information about his or her genetic constitution. Although in this project that 
transfer of responsibility is regarded as problematic, this may not be the prevailing view in 
policy formation or mainstream bioethics. As seen from the above quote from The President’s 
Comission: presupposing the general utility of genetic information as well as the capacity of 
the patient for autonomous choice, this state of affairs is to be promoted rather than resisted. 
This will also be the case according to much of the bioethical literature. To take one central 
(but also much criticised) example: according to bioethicist John Harris, choice will be 
sufficiently autonomous when not restricted by  
 
“(1) defects in the individual’s ability to control either her desires or her actions or both; 
(2) defects in the individual’s reasoning; 
(3) defects in the information available to the individual, upon which she bases her choice; 
(4) defects in the stability of the individual’s own desires” (Harris 1985) 
 
Hence, autonomous choice consists in drawing the correct inferences from the correct factual 
premises under conditions free from undue influences and social pressures. Here, the 
conception of autonomy is directly linked to the actors’ possession of correct scientific 
knowledge. Although less rigid, similar conclusions can be drawn from Beauchamp and 
Childress, by whom autonomy is defined as action in “accordance with a self-chosen plan, 
analogous to the way an independent government manages its territories and sets its policies”. 
This action, furthermore, should be allowed carried out free from “interference by others and 
from limitations, such as inadequate understanding” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001:58). 
Beauchamp and Childress do not connect the notion of autonomy directly to scientific 
information, as does John Harris. To show respect for autonomy, they say, may also entail the 
negative obligation to respect individuals’ choices when they are wrong about the situation at 
hand. However, there also exists a positive obligation: “Respect for autonomy obligates 
professionals in health care and research involving human subjects to disclose information, to 
probe for and ensure understanding and voluntariness, and to foster adequate decision-
making” (ibid., 64).  
 
Hence, on this account, the main task of health care workers, lawyers and bioethicists alike 
will be that of creating and fostering a space of autonomous decision-making in which the 
individual is to be left more or less to him or herself. It is a space that, once created, is to be 
protected but not interfered with. I will have something more to say about spaces of decision-
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making and their relation to time for decision making in the following section. As should be 
clear by now I do not think we should be satisfied with the above version of good decision 
making. I take it to be abstract and negligent of the wider context of choice. In the worst case 
scenario it will not foster autonomous choice and it may even take on a coercive character.  
 
Let me briefly recapture some arguments from previous chapters.  
 
First of all, I have underlined the transfer of risk responsibility that accompanies the 
therapeutic gap. Because therapies are lagging behind the ability to diagnose, responsibility 
for health is transposed from the health care system to the individual patient, supposed to turn 
his or her genetic profile into a rational planning project. This character and tendency of 
genomic medicine, fitting well into the fold of preventive medicine, will make itself 
increasingly marked with the projected expansion from genetics to genomics.   
 
As therapeutic objects are scarce, more comes to hinge upon information as such. Proponents 
of genomic medicine, such as (Bell 1998; Khoury 2000; Guttmacher and Collins 2003), argue 
that the genomic era is already upon us, and that we better start transforming the health care 
system rapidly in order to adapt to the developments propelled forward by the Human 
Genome Project (and other projects succeeding it). However, even these authors recognise the 
decisive discrepancy and time-lags between genomic researchers and the knowledge and 
understanding of health-care workers, a problem they seek to overcome by rapid and large 
scale re-education of medical doctors and other health care workers as well as the general 
population. I have quoted research (in this chapter) showing how medical doctors already 
have problems coming to terms with statistics, risk analysis and communication within the 
present state of knowledge in preventive medicine. Can we realistically expect a fast up-grade 
of genetic and statistical literacy among health care workers? Do we know that such a 
transformation will be in accordance with the everyday concerns and problems of most health 
care workers? And how would this be accommodated and adapted to demands within other 
important fields of medicine, simultaneously demanding from medical doctors that they be 
up-to date on the latest information? (Strand and Schei 2001).  
 
And if we should also include the wider population of possible patients, it should be clear that 
the above mentioned problems, restricted to the organisation of the health care system, are 
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only the top of the ice-berg. For how do you turn whole populations into genetically informed 
decision-makers?  
Overwhelmed by complexity? 
Articles promoting genomic medicine on a general basis, like (Burke 2002) and (Guttmacher 
and Collins 2002), will often contain a last section on social and legal consequences in which 
the importance of informed consent is forwarded as a means of caring for both social 
consequences and the autonomy of the patient. However, as argued above, these visions of 
health care tend to regard scientific developments and technology transfer in terms that appear 
simplified from the perspectives of the social and humanistic disciplines, not to say from the 
perspectives of health care workers or from patients’ point of view. It is a top-down 
perspective in which the many complexities of the clinical encounter, social and cultural 
developments and the life-worlds of the patients are projected in accordance with a linear 
vision of technology transfer and clinical utility. From the perspective laid down in this 
project, the following account, given by Onora O’Neill, may be more adequate and up to the 
actual situation: 
 
“…problems arise…not because most members of the public have limited understanding of science, 
nor because most scientists are poor communicators, but rather because the matters to which consent 
are sought are more numerous and more complex, and sometimes rendered increasingly opaque by the 
very structures of accountability that are supposed to protect the public. Even those with a high level 
of scientific training and culture are challenged by the ways in which information is now organised. 
The answer to this problem cannot be to provide more information, more regulation and more fine 
print: there is often all too much information provided, and more fine print around than anyone has 
time to deal with” (O'Neill 2001). 
 
 
We may envision overwhelming complexities on two sides: that of the health care system and 
that of the life-world of the patient. On the side of the health care system, a cadre of medical 
doctors, scientists and health personnel have replaced the model of the intimate face-to-face 
encounter of patient and physician. It is this state of affairs that is captured in the title of 
David Rothman’s book Strangers at the Bedside (Rothman 1991), and which has been 
described as the expansion of the health care system earlier in this chapter. When treated by a 
number of different specialists and health care workers: To whom should consent be given? In 
the opinion of O’Neill, the entrance of heavy information technologies coupled to genetics 
into medicine is accelerating this tendency: 
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“We have left behind a world of I-thou doctor-patient relationships, and now inhabit one in which the 
individual patient and the individual doctor draw many others into complex forms of connection. In 
medicine, as in many other parts of life, we constantly deal with many-many relationships. Nowhere 
are the implications of this basic and uncontroversial fact about contemporary medicine stronger than 
in those parts of life in which genetic data are collected, stored, used and disclosed” (O'Neill 2001) 
 
 
To grasp the meaning of this quote, it may be useful to return to Francis Collins’ vision of the 
$1000 genome. Within that vision, genetic knowledge is deployed to establish the genetic 
profile of the single patient in order to individualise treatment and drug therapy. Even though 
we grant the many positive effects this could have, regulatory challenges will be great. In 
short, problems are likely to aggregate as even more people, more professions and more 
procedures to safeguard the privacy of the patient will get involved. It will not be sufficient 
that the patient consents to the taking of his or her genetic profile to one single doctor. A 
genuine informed approval will also entail that the patient consents to the institutional rules 
laid down to protect his or her privacy, i.e. rules about data access and protection. The amount 
of information required for informed consent is drastically expanded, no longer dealing with 
the exchange of information between physician and patient, but should also be taken to 
include consent to the rules and procedures for data protection. The importance of this is 
underlined by the interests that third parties, such as police, insurance, government and 
employers may take in the same information (ibid.). Concerning institutional rules for 
safeguarding information, however, Beauchamp and Childress admits that patient autonomy 
may yield to competing interests:  
 
“We should evaluate institutional rules not only in terms of respect for autonomy but also in terms of 
probable consequences of imposing burdensome requirements on institutions and on professionals. 
Policies may legitimately account for what is fair and reasonable to require of health care professionals 
and researchers, the effect of alternative consent requirements on efficiency and effectiveness in 
delivering health care and advancing science, and the effect of consent requirements on the welfare of 
patients. Nevertheless, we take it as axiomatic that the model of autonomous choice…ought to serve as 
the benchmark for the moral adequacy of institutional rules” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001:79). 
 
 
This last reservation, however, will be rendered close to meaningless in a situation in which 
the context has changed radically: 
 
“Genetic information on this scale would be held on a smart card or in a central database. Any hope 
that such information was private would have to depend less on professional codes governing the 
action of individual doctors and more on intricate regimes of data protection. Any thought that 
individuals could determine how such information should be held and used would prove implausible if 
the complexity of the information exceed what individuals can grasp or interpret. Any thought that 
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individuals could understand their genetic profiles and decide just which data they would disclose to 
which others or for which uses looks implausibly demanding” (O'Neill 2001) 
 
If we are to follow the recommendations of Beauchamp and Childress in this matter, we end 
up close to absurdity: the autonomy of the person may be overridden by the greater interest of 
growth in science and health care. But as far as possible we should also attend to and observe 
the autonomy of the individual, which should, in the last resort, serve as the blueprint for 
institutional rules. Both these arguments, however, are close to senseless given the demands 
placed on the informed consent of the patient in the face of increasing information. The 
autonomy part of the argument, intended to balance the interests of the system will, in effect, 
be cancelled out from the very beginning by the shear amount of information: 
 
“From the point of view of individuals who are working out whether to give or withhold informed 
consent, complex regulatory systems can look more like another hurdle than a safeguard. The 
difficulties will grow as genetic data become more and more readily available, and as the construction 
of electronic databases combining genetic, medical and other information becomes more and more 
feasible. Individuals could not be expected to develop an adequate grasp of their own genetic 
information, or to give any but the most general, -that is, minimally informed –consent to the 
collection, storage, uses or disclosure of parts of that information” (ibid.). 
 
In that case, what remains is the institutional perspective, and we will be back to the situation 
attacked by Hans Jonas and the early bioethicists in which the interests of “the concrete 
individual” is sacrificed to those of abstract systems of action and knowledge. 
 
These may be imagined scenarios, projections of a possible future. But this future may not be 
distant. Here is how two patients interviewed about decision making during cancer treatment 
experienced the decision to undergo genetic testing: 
 
“The 2 patients who were offered a test during medical treatment had a sense of being part of an 
unstoppable chain of medical processes. Metaphorically on a conveyor belt, they experienced the test 
decision as submerged in a context of numerous other interventions. By the time of interview both of 
these interviewees felt that they had never actively decided to have a test” (Scully, Porz et al. 
Forthcoming) 
 
Research on consent to use of genetic material in biobanks may also confirm the description 
given by O’Neill: in many cases, the donors do not know to what it is that they have 
consented (Hoeyer 2003). In a survey of donors to a french biobank, Ducournau and Strand 
found that many (about 1/3) simply chose to delegate responsibility to researchers and 
administrators of the projects, thus investing these actors with a “natural trust”. Others (ca. ¼) 
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signed the consent form while openly distrustful of scientists, for instance in order “not to 
leave the matters to scientists alone”, whereas about 1/3 consented in the way more or less 
intended by legislators (Ducournau and Strand Forthcoming).  
 
The parallel to consent in biobanking may tell us something about the ability or the 
willingness of lay persons to perceive complex scientific information. However, the 
difference is also great, as the context in which consent is given is drastically altered for the 
patient undergoing genetic diagnosis. As noted by (Hofmann 2006), in genetic diagnosis the 
risk situation is radically altered: whereas participation in biobanking may be said to 
constitute almost no risk at all, the repercussions of a genetic diagnosis may be grave, and so 
serious emotional pressure will alter the planning capabilities as well as the cognitive 
functioning of the patient. As frequently argued, illness and disease are exactly those states in 
which we are not autonomous, at least not in the sense ordinarily intended in models of 
rational choice: 
 
“…to suffer or to be in pain is to lose one’s full sense of self. We cannot function normally as 
individuals when we are sick, and thus our ability to be a self is compromised. Medicine must be 
committed to restoring that integrity, or at least protecting it, when the patient is clearly unable to 
make decisions” (Tauber 2000:67). 
 
In an excellent study on patient’s experiences with genetic testing, Scully, Porz and Rehmann-
Sutter found that many patients under severe emotional pressure actively choose to split 
decision-making into manageable parts, or “microdecisions”. This was especially so with 
women undergoing prenatal diagnosis, as these patients had to decide much faster than other 
patients (for instance those undergoing predictive testing for Huntington’s). Facing possibly 
very hard decisions following diagnosis, many said they “mentally excluded this knowledge 
when thinking about the test, restricting their focus of attention to the immediate weeks or 
even days ahead”. According to the authors, however, this should not be perceived as a letting 
go of agency:  
 
“To preserve moral competence, they chose not to draw on some information they had…Our 
interpretation suggests that a situation where a woman has agreed to testing without seemingly 
thinking about the consequent possibility of termination, is not necessarily irrational, nor due to errors 
of comprehension or communication, but might in fact be necessary for her moral agency” (Scully, 
Porz et al. Forthcoming). 
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If it is the case that patients actually manipulate the field and the time of decisionmaking in 
accordance with their own preferences (their life-world), bioethical accounts of autonomy and 
informed consent, while not being altogether wrong, may still be missing central aspects of 
moral agency. Information processing does not take place according to definite rules, as for 
instance referred in the above quote from (Harris 1985).   
Concluding. The socio-material contract revisited 
In this section, I have given reasons why the notions of autonomy and informed consent, 
when uncritically applied to genetic/genomic medicine may end up by seriously 
misconstruing moral agency as well as the context within which that agency is supposed to be 
carried out, i.e. the clinical encounter. Before that, I also argued that the socio-political 
context as well as technological possibilities has also been seriously altered, so that medical 
risk is increasingly transferred, from the medical system to the individual patient (this 
argument is strengthened by its convergence with Beck’s theory of individualisation). The 
strong emphasis upon autonomy and individual choice is likely to strengthen this tendency 
rather than alleviate it. This may sound like harsh criticism, and obviously many will disagree, 
bioethicists as well as others. However, it is also quite remarkable how much of this criticism 
is constantly repeated by central actors within bioethics itself. Some of these criticisms have 
been alluded to above in quotes from Albert Jonsen, Onora O’Neill and others.  
 
Robert Veach, while acknowledging the important historical role of informed consent, 
ascribes to the concept a transitory status only: “Consent may be what can be called a 
transition concept, one that appears on the scene as an apparently progressive innovation, but 
after a period of experience turns out to be only useful as a transition to a more thoroughly 
revisionary conceptual framework” (Veach 1995). In the face of growing complexity, social 
as well as scientific and technological, the exclusive emphasis upon autonomy and informed 
consent has come to make up what Daniel Callahan terms “ethical reductionism”. The main 
target of criticism is the “principlism” forwarded in Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics: 
 
“The reductionist drive of principlism has had some debilitating effects on the field. One of them has 
been to make ethical analysis easier than it actually is, offering a kind of handy shortcut to the making 
of decisions (which may also explain its attraction to busy physicians who are looking for more 
simplicity, not more complexity, in their clinical lives)…At its worst, ethical reductionism dotes on 
the language of rights, wants clean and uncluttered principles, and flees from pressing larger questions 
of the relationship between medical possibilities and long-range human welfare, matters thought best 
dealt with (if they cannot be avoided) procedurally rather than substantively” (Callahan 1999). 
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How did this come about? How could the initially legitimate role of bioethics be transformed 
from a socially conscientious and politically relevant movement to a discipline in which most 
of the pressing social, political and ethical issues are substituted for principlism?  
 
Presuming that the question is accepted in the first place there may still be many and various 
answers, perspectives, and, guaranteed, many further questions. We must, however, return to 
some of the premises laid down in this project, and try and make sense of it from that 
perspective.  
 
If we observe the common trajectory of autonomy and informed consent we notice how they 
so to speak issued in the laboratory, addressing the problem of research on humans. From 
there, it grew to encompass also other contexts, significantly that of the clinical encounter. By 
including more groups and individuals in the decision making process a more socially robust 
form of knowledge production was sought out. Significantly, resources from philosophy and 
political theory were deployed in order to come up with alternative bases of decision making. 
But it could also be argued that the discourse never really left the laboratory.  
 
In chapter 3 I described how the socio-material contract was constituted at the base of the 
modern production of knowledge and organisation of action. According to that agreement, the 
natural order was to be represented to science whereas the social order was to be represented 
by politics. However, describing the situation as a mere out-differentiation of qualitatively 
different domains only reveals part of the story. As described in the section “Two 
anthropologies”, the mechanistic notion of the universe came to set its definite marks also on 
the ethical, later also political, domain. Within the Cartesian world-view, ethics is what’s left 
(i.e. freedom) after the scientific has spoken: first, establish the facts of the matter, then decide 
how to use that knowledge in the most useful manner (Taylor 1989). In this way, the scientific 
came to set its definite mark upon the language of ethics and politics. Says Stephen Toulmin: 
 
“From the mid-seventeenth century on…an imbalance began to develop. Certain methods of inquiry 
and subjects were seen as philosophically serious or “rational” in a way that others were not. As a 
result, authority came to attach particularly to scientific and technical inquiries that put those methods 
to use. Instead of a free-for-all of ideas and speculations  - a competition for attention across all realms 
of inquiry – there was a hierarchy of prestige, so that investigations and activities were ordered with an 
eye to certain intellectual demands. Beside the rationality of astronomy and geometry, the 
reasonableness of narratives came to seem a soft-centered notion, lacking a solid basis in 
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philosophical theory, let alone substantive scientific support. Issues of formal consistency and 
deductive proof thus came to have a special prestige, and achieved a kind of certainty that other kinds 
of opinions could never claim” (Toulmin 2003:15). 
 
The issue alluded to by Toulmin has been noted over and over again during this project: 
formal ways of reasoning came to set their definite marks also upon ethics and political 
thought, domains traditionally dealing with social action in non-formal ways more in 
accordance with the ways in which action and agency are normally perceived, what Aristotle 
termed practical reasoning. The supreme discipline of practical reasoning, Aristotle held, is 
politics. Politics deals with what is good and desirable in life, and so cannot be but a partial, 
inconclusive and in-exact science:  
 
“…in discussing subjects, and arguing from evidence, we must be satisfied with a broad outline of the 
truth; that is, in arguing about what is for the most part so from premises which are for the most part 
true we must be content to draw conclusions that are similarly qualified…it is a mark of the trained 
mind never to expect more precision in the treatment of any subject than the nature of that subject 
permits; for demanding logical demonstrations from a teacher of rethorics is clearly about as 
reasonable as accepting mere plausibility from a mathematician” (Aristotle 1955:Book One). 
 
To remain in philosophy a little longer: in Kant’s account of theoretical and practical reason, 
the two domains of science and ethics are sharply separated. However, theoretical and 
scientific reasoning had already set their definite marks upon ethics, upon politics and law. 
The benchmark of correct action and moral agency is no longer situated within any 
conception of the substantially good, but is rather conceived of in terms of universal 
rationality, i.e. the categorical imperative. In Kant, then, we end up with a notion of moral 
agency and morally good action which is precisely as emptied of content as it is universal 
(Wellmer 1986).  
 
But the theories of philosophers were, of course, only articulations of what simultaneously 
took place in society itself, more concretely in the formation of scientific disciplines and 
professional systems of action (Parsons 1954). As described by Toulmin: “The seeming 
certainty of Galileo’s mathematical methods had a natural appeal, and they soon took hold. In 
theory and practice alike – philosophy and jurisprudence, as much as the training of infantry – 
Skill gave way to Technique, Artisanry to Artisanship” (Toulmin 2003:32). This gradual 
replacement of the basis for action, from art to science, also makes up a central part of Beck’s 
theory of reflexive modernisation, which I see as a central point of convergence between 
Beck’s theory and hermeneutics. It has also been noted in the partial exposition of the 
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development of medicine: the introduction of the counterfactual organiser as a way for 
dealing with increasingly more and more cases according to the same rationally and 
experimentally established principles of action. Along with the gradual expansion of the 
medical system, it sees, corresponding notions of universality are imported from politics and 
philosophy in order to regulate developments.  
 
After a period of initial social engagement and political attention to the issues raised by 
bioethics, not the least triggered by the political and social movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
in which a reference point independent of the language of science and technology was sought 
out, the discipline has more or less returned to “ethics as normal”. This may not constitute 
much of an historical, or even sociological “explanation” of the present shortcoming of 
bioethics, but it does, I think, say something significant about the sources of legitimacy upon 
which we call in times of uncertainty. Within this understanding, it may come as no big 
surprise that the rational agent, autonomy, is called upon in order to regulate the fast-
expanding fields of genetics and genomics.  
 
For the notion of rational agency does indeed reside at the very core of the modern project. 
Not only as a philosophical ideal, but also very much as social and cultural ideal. If it was not 
for the scientific project, the notion of rational agency would no doubt look very different. As 
the socio-material contract was established, the rational observer and decision-maker travelled 
from the laboratory and into society at large: he was efficiently socialised under conditions of 
great social and political strife and uncertainty as a neutral mediator between incompatible 
notions of natural and social order, as found within scholasticism of the 17th century or within 
revelatory or natural religion. Historically speaking, the scientific world view was early on 
exported, from the laboratory and to the wider social context, in the Royal Society in London 
(Shapin 1999). One central mediator was John Locke, one of the main architects behind the 
notions of liberal democracy.  
 
Indeed, the autonomous actor may very well have arisen in the laboratoty itself, then as the 
impartial observer of scientific experimentation. Locke himself, both a medical doctor and a 
political scientist, drew many of his thoughts from central experimentalists and natural 
philosophers such as Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton. With the reservation that Locke himself 
did not use the word autonomy, but rather rational self-governance or the like, we may still 
accept the following description given by Alfred Tauber: 
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“A self-consciousness among scientists of the period grew from a concern about how our perceptions 
determine our knowledge of the world and how our minds influence our perceptions. These early 
scientists well appreciated that rationality (our cognitive functions) and empiricism (our perceptual 
faculties) are interwoven in such ways that separating the two is impossible. As much as one might 
want to perceive the world objectively with no projection of prejudice or subjectivity, it is literally 
impossible to do so. At the same time, it became clear that description and experimentation demand 
just such a divorce, because the scientific method was ostensibly based on a scrupulous objectivity in 
which the observer would simply report his data and draw the logical inferences. Thus observer-
autonomy was a key precept of the nascent scientific method, and philosophers struggled to establish 
the basis on which claims of objective knowledge could be made…The problem of autonomy 
migrated from the laboratory to the political arena and became central to Locke’s philosophy. 
Throughout the Enlightenment philosophers continued to wrestle with with both the implications and 
the philosophical basis of his position, which pervaded both the judicial and the scientific discussion 
of this period. For Locke the political theorist, autonomy served as a crucial, one could say the crucial 
fulcrum for a society struggling to transform itself from the subject of the divine rule of monarchs to 
self-government ruled by the democratic rights of the individual, seen as both the sole agent of his 
pursuit of happiness and arbiter of the social will” (Tauber 2000:30). 
 
This may indeed have been the main reasons why the socio-material contract emerged at the 
core of the social and political debate of the 17th century, namely its ability to ascribe 
cognitive as well as social functions to different domains of knowing and acting, and at the 
same time remaining within a relatively unified notion of the natural and political order, one 
that was mainly founded in the scientific project. This analysis is also confirmed by recourse 
to Charles Taylor well-known analysis of the sources of the modern self:  
 
 “what probably made Locke the great teacher of the Enlightenment was his combination of these two 
factors: that he offered a plausible account of the new sciences as valid knowledge, intertwined with a 
theory of rational control of the self; and that he brought the two together under the ideal of rational 
self responsibility” (Taylor 1989:174). 
 
 
With these historical and philosophical reflections in mind, we may cast a new glance upon 
the dilemmas of bioethics. The necessity of establishing bioethics as a discipline with its own 
methods and in relative independence from the methods of scientific reasoning was noted by 
many of its early proponents. Indeed, to get in the position to be able to communicate with 
scientists, medical doctors and patients alike, it was necessary to re-establish philosophy as a 
practical and public discipline, far removed from the abstract and indeed anti-social meta-
ethics of the day (Jonsen 1998). We may reiterate an earlier quote from Daniel Callahan: An 
ethical decision will not be satisfactory to the person whose decision it is unless it is 
compatible with the way in which the person ordinarily thinks about himself and what he 
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takes his life to be” (Callahan 1973). And, in a well known article, Stephen Toulmin wrote 
that  
 
“By reintroducing into the ethical debate the vexed topics raised by particular cases, they [bioethicists] 
have obliged philosophers to address once again the Aristotelian problems of practical reasoning, 
which had been on the sidelines for too long. In this sense, we may indeed say that, during the last 20 
years, medicine has ‘saved the life of ethics’, and that it has given back to ethics a seriousness and 
human relevance which it had seemed – at least, in the writings of the interwar years, to have lost for 
good” (Toulmin 1982) 
 
 
And, in the words of Albert Jonsen, thanks to bioethics, “The spirits of the antique casuists 
inhabit the modern hospitals” (Jonsen 1986). But, as seen in the discussion on informed 
consent, and, as argued by Daniel Callahan, “principlism” has substituted this basically 
practical and judgement-based way of reasoning for a set of ready-made principles, 
significantly that of autonomy. One reason for this, then, should be seen as residing in the 
“fact” that the practical sciences, like politics, ethics and jurisprudence, never really wrestled 
themselves free of the influences from the natural sciences (cf. earlier discussion of 
methodological dualism). It seems that is it indeed very hard to secure a relatively 
independent position outside of the world-views of these sciences. Another reason, which I 
would like to explore in the following, is of a more sociological kind. Under conditions of 
“intensified modernity”, such as constituted in and by the Human Genome Project, the speed 
with which new technologies are introduced becomes so high that the decision making 
becomes almost compulsory (Beck and Bonss 2001). In times of greater uncertainty, it seems, 
we come to rely upon ever-more simple principles of decision making. But this is exactly one 
of the reasons why we the second modern production and distribution of knowledge comes to 
result in ever more non-intended side-effects: “Handlungen haben genau dann nicht 
intendierte Nebenfolgen…wenn unser Wissen bezüglich einer der gennanten Faktoren der 
Entscheidungssituation unvollständig ist” (Sellmaier 2004). 
 
One significant factor in promoting this state of affairs is the strengthened role of the 
economy in the new production of knowledge (Nowotny, Scott et al. 2001). Although not 
visible at first sight, this state of affairs can also be led back to early modernity and the 
enlightenment.   
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While not wishing to forward the absurd notion that the theories of liberal philosophers were 
directly translated into action, they most certainly went well along with, and articulated many 
of the central concerns, operating in the formation of modern society. As such, the renewed 
sense of mastery and control gained through the scientific method was fast transported into 
hospitals, the military system, schools and the bureaucracy (Taylor 1989; Toulmin 2003) 
(these developments have also made up the particular focus of many of Foucault’s analyses). 
In Locke’s philosophy we also find the preamble to and an early legitimation of the modern 
political economy, and also this was grounded in the notion of the rational self, which was 
intimately connected to the right of property. Because man has the property in his own body, 
and because he transforms nature through his bodily labour, he also establishes his right to the 
products of nature as refined by him (Locke 1966). Through the notions of labour and 
property, Locke refined the social contract as initially articulated by Hobbes (cf. chapter on 
methodology). In Hobbes philosophy, the sovereign was instigated as the sole poitical 
authority in order to avoid the tumultuous state of nature in which everybody stood up against 
everybody. In the philosophy of Locke, however, sovereignty is transformed and 
redistributed: from the single sovereign at the top of the political system and to the single 
individuals, now to be regarded as self-governing (“autonomous”) agents. By consenting to 
the social contract, men agree to come together under the rule of law in order to protect the 
results of their labour, i.e. property. The protection of property, therefore, is the prime, and for 
many liberalists, sole legitimate task of the state. Justice consists in nothing but the protection 
of the individual’s property, a notion that has been revoked in more recent times by Robert 
Nozick. It is, says, Locke, the notion of labour that introduces value into the world: by 
refining nature we also become capable of storing up, of accumulating. Hence, the labourer 
creates surplus value for society, which may next be exchanged for other goods or for the 
universal medium of money (Manent 1995). The common interest of men, and the basis of the 
social contract, becomes that of securing the just and fair exchange of goods and money. 
Hence, rather than having the sovereign at the top of the political system, the state is now 
instigated in order to protect the legitimate and rational interests of man: the working of 
nature and the accumulation of wealth. Rather than fight amongst themselves, citizens now 
turn towards nature as their primary object of action. Hence, we get an early identification of 
two domains supposed to be neutral, hence also sufficient for establishing a common ground 
for acting and thinking. Those two domains are science and the economy:  
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“The same movement that brings the sovereign state to forbid men to exercise personal power over 
each other is going to lead the members of society to turn progressively away from each other, to 
avoid the encounters in which they experience mortal dangers. They are going to seek a neutral ground 
for their actions, one where they do not meet upon their fellow men and where they do not encroach 
upon sovereignty. Up to the constitution of the sovereign state, the primary object of each person’s 
action was the other man. Henceforth, that object will be nature. Men turn away from men and in 
stead turn themselves towards nature so as to understand and control it. Science is neutral and its 
conclusions are imposed on everyone. It is above the particular interests and partisan passions of men, 
not unlike the sovereign, at least in principle. The economy, closely linked with science, tends to 
become the arena par excellence of human activity because, in its finality, the economy is directed 
towards nature and not towards other men. The development of absolute sovereignty within the 
framework of civil society, have the same motivating force” (Manent 1995:47). 
 
Hence, we see that the call for the rational agent is deeply rooted in western culture; he is 
indeed pervading all the domains of science, economy, politics and ethics. He is also likely to 
be called upon in order to serve the interests of all of these domains.  
 
As noted in an earlier chapter (referring to Heidegger), both technology and economy share 
the common propensity of a “storing up”, of resources and of values. Referring to Locke, we 
also see how science and the economy found themselves at the centre of the establishment of 
the modern order. We should, therefore, not be too surprised when the two, in late modernity, 
come to intertwine in new and more powerful ways through the shared medium of 
technological development. Technology, it seems, comes to constitute the connecting medium 
between the hidden hand of the market and the hidden principle of nature, in the case of 
medical genetics that of physiological function.  
 
The “rationalisations of rationalisation” represented through the intrusion of ethics and the 
economy into the biomedical sciences could thus be regarded as the realisation of the modern 
project. As such, it may seem that the three principles of the central dogma, patentability and 
autonomy may indeed enter into a greater unity promoting health and wealth for all. However, 
these are principles, concepts residing at the top of very complex practices. In each of the 
three cases, it seems, as says Beck, increasing gaps between concept and reality, between 
simplicity and complexity. The counterfactual organisers of the central dogma and autonomy 
seem to become increasingly abstract as they are turned into information by technological 
developments, and, at the same time, increasingly invested with speed and demands for fast 
decisions as they become deeper entwined in an accelerating globalised knowledge economy. 
At the same time, these counterfactual organisers do, in some sense or other, refer to real 
objects in the world: in terms of the biomedical researcher, the central dogma refers to the 
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genome as the basic principle of physiological function. For the investor, the different parts of 
the genome are more likely to be perceived in terms of commodities, as such part of the ups 
and downs of the global economy rather than essential parts of physiological function. And, 
for the clinician on his side, genomic information may be but one among many competing 
theories of causal explanations invoked in order to promote the health of the ultimate object of 
attention: the patient. The patient is of course also a subject, worthy of respect and autonomy; 
but he may, however, also be conceived of as a consumer by the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
“Wie durch eine Brennglas”, say Ulrich Beck and Stefan May, “bündeln sich die neuen 
gesellschaftlichen Probleme in der Entwicklung der medizinischen genetik”(Beck and May 
2001). One way to understand this quote would be this: genomics, if realised, would pose an 
ultimate realisation of the modern project if the many spheres of knowing and acting would 
come to constitute a higher unity promoting all of the above mentioned goods. With recourse 
to the notion of counterfactuality a central asset of the project is attempted highlighted: most 
of its rewards lay in the future, but it is demanded of us that we act upon the possibility of 
many rationalities coming together, a massive co-production of social and scientific order, 
now, if the potentialities of the project are to be realised. Such a co-production ultimately 
hinges upon the realisation of the genome as a successful technology. It also hinges upon this 
technology not becoming more cost-demanding than being capable of offering technology and 
health for all, or at least those capable of paying up with $1000, or those finding themselves 
within a welfare system willing and capable of paying for their genetic profiling.  
 
Presupposing that this is realised, the state and its welfare system will have to compete with 
industry and commerce about the property rights and, ultimately, the cost-efficiency of the 
genome project, proteomics and the like. This may be a tough call, also for industry, insofar 
as it will have to readjust: from standardised and industrialised mass-production, to tailor-
made and individualised pharmaceutical products. In the absence of these visions coming 
through across a broad scale (individualised medicine becoming a possibility for the rich 
only), much of the responsibility will end up where it seems to be heading at the moment: 
with the individual patient or citizen. In that case, the genome project will have issued in a 
perversion, rather than a promotion of, the Enlightenment project: to enrich society through 
empowering the individual. 
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Concluding projections 
 
more time for leisure 
more time for pleasure 
more time for education  
more time for recreation 
more time to contemplate 
more time to ruminate 
more time 
we need 
more time 
 
Linton Kwesi Johnson, More time 
 
 
From the previous analysis it appears that the Genome Project is really, in Beck’s terms, the 
embodiment of ”the modernisation of modernisation”: from within the confusingly complex 
meeting of rationalities of science, technology, economy and politics it appears that some very 
old and, at the same time, very modern sources of knowing, acting and producing are coming 
together within new and sharpened configurations: The rational agent, the accumulation of 
wealth, science as the rational exploitation of the neutral domain of nature (the notion of 
hyper-modernity springs to mind).  
 
If that is the case, and bearing in mind Heidegger’s notion of science as technology, the 
question also announces itself: did I really appropriate Heidegger, or was I appropriated by 
Heidegger? Is modernity basically Gestell after all?  
 
Luckily, I do not think the question needs answering. However, it seems that although we 
(rightly) may criticise Heidegger for his ignorance of the social dimension, his philosophy of 
technology still has something going for it. We also saw how, in the chapter on Heidegger, his 
philosophy of technology does not imply determinism, but that it may easily be interpreted as 
doing so. Nevertheless: In applying a derivative and sociologised version of Heidegger to the 
production of the genome, the role of politics and the economy in promoting science and 
technology was also highlighted: the acceleration and up-grading of research in the 1980s 
were not simply a question of technological development, i.e. recombinant DNA as a properly 
useful deployment of genetics; it was also a matter of a willed political intervention in the face 
of changes in industrial production and economic situation. 
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For Heidegger, living with technology is not simply a matter of (rational) choice, but rather a 
real-time happening. As briefly discussed in the section of trust: within this happening a 
number of attitudes are possible towards technological developments, also that of an active 
and autonomous stance. Still, whether one finds oneself passively at the mercy of technology 
or is able to deploy it actively, will depend strongly upon the context, socially, politically, 
culturally, physically, in which one finds oneself.  
 
Still, it seems, people (patients) may increasingly find themselves in situations in which they 
will have to choose, autonomously or not. Individualisation is not, in that respect, chosen by 
people in general, it is more a consequence of deeper changes within the structures of 
knowing, producing, working and acting, what Beck terms Strukturwandel. Therefore, 
although we accept the necessary expansion of the analytic framework also to include 
economy and politics, the determining forces are very strong. Indeed, from the present 
analysis it may even seem that it is exactly the coupling of science through technology to the 
economy which may produce impressions of determinism, i.e. a development that is not really 
chosen in the democratic sense of the term. This, I take it, is also an important reason why 
theories of deliberative democracy and justice should be handled with some care in analyses 
of science and technology: in focusing exclusively upon the political and deliberative 
dimension they may run the risk of covering up a whole spectre of happenings taking place 
before politics or ethics have their say.  
 
It emerges that the rationalisation of rationalisation may take on at least two different 
meanings: first, it may mean the intensification of modernity’s forces under the aegis of ever-
more rationalising, ever-more wealth-maximising modes of producing and organising (Beck 
and Bonss 2001). This should come as no surprise, as the instigation of the socio-material 
contract had the character of ascribing many of the same values and ideals of rationality 
among different actors and domains of action. Within hyper-modernity, what has previously 
been separated seems to be pulled tighter together: science, technology, economy and the 
rights of the individual. We have seen how science and the economy meet through ever-
stronger technologies, and how bioethics, in spite of its initial success, constantly runs the risk 
of being drawn into the fold of science and technology. Second, the “rationalisation of 
rationalisation” may be taken to mean the introduction of alternative modes of knowing, 
producing and organising, coming to the fore as the integrating forces of modernity come to 
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yield non-intended side-effects to the social order, one consequence of which may be the 
deterioration of trust in expert knowledge, in science and in the medical profession.  
 
The new ways of knowing and producing represented by genomics as a hyper-modern mode 
of knowledge production, generates and re-distributes forms of knowledge, economical 
resources and technological know-how on the hands of exclusive groups: scientists, 
corporations, universities, and research centres. To a large extent, these are the groups that 
make development happen, whereas to most others, development simply happens. I have tried 
to describe this difference by frequent allusions to the time in which developments take place. 
The intertwining of science, technology and economy undoubtedly speed up developments to 
an unprecedented pace. This is not unproblematic: the time required to make a business 
transaction is not the time that it takes for a physician to make a diagnosis, not to say conceive 
of a good treatment. And the speed with which new diagnostic technologies are introduced to 
the market or to the health care system is not the time it takes for a patient to come to terms 
with a devastating diagnosis:  
 
“Faster testing is generally seen as benefiting both patient and the healthcare provider. But we might 
need to bear in mind that just because the test results come faster does not mean that the information 
they provide has also become trivial or more easily absorbed by patients…it may also be that a longer 
testing process offers unexpected benefits in giving extra time, not solely for rational consideration of 
the issues, but to safeguard their agential capacity…As the mechanisms of testing speed up, time for 
reflection may have to be built into the test process artificially” (Scully, Porz et al. Forthcoming). 
 
 
In finishing off I would like to expand and generalise this point to the general production and 
distribution of knowledge: slowness, reflection and understanding will have to be built into 
the generation of new knowledges if they are going to retain their social and cultural 
legitimacy. For this we will have to deploy a wider range of sources than those mainly 
considered at the present.  
 
When we are to assess the broader value of technological development to the promotion of 
health care, we should ask: is it articulated in a language that is capable of addressing the 
central concerns of the most important actors involved in the negotiation of health promotion? 
This should mean that it must be able to address: 1) patients and patient’s organisations, 2) 
medical doctors in general (not just medical geneticists) 3) health care workers in general, 4) 
the legal profession and policy makers, and 5) other groups, centrally future generations. 
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But language is not an isolated matter. It is situated in bodily action. Social action is also 
situated in institutions. Thus, we need institutions in which a sufficiently “thick” 
understanding and articulation of social, cultural and bodily action can be embedded, what 
Roger Strand has termed “thick complexity” (Strand 2002). We need institutions that can 
bring a wider range of cultural sources into the production and distribution of new, 
knowledge-based practices. The negative alternatives entail institutions incapable of handling 
anything but “information”, “innovation” and “novelty”.  
 
If we take it that technological development, when seen from a broader social perspective, has 
more the character of a happening than something that is autonomously chosen, it also 
emerges that adapting to technological change is not simply a matter of finding the correct 
political or ethical procedures. As put forward by both Beck and Heidegger, it is more a 
question of finding ways of living with and coming to terms with technology (Heidegger 
1977; Heidegger 1978b; Beck 1993). I am not going to try and enumerate all the things that 
would have to happen for such a process to come about. However, as academics, we should 
try and project other ways of producing knowledge. In order to develop sufficiently “thick” 
institutions we will have to bridge the gap between the two cultures of science and culture. At 
the present, it seems that we are producing technical competence and capability but without 
sufficient accompanying understanding of that very knowledge. Many things may be seen as 
standing in the way of improved understanding: first, a general ignorance of questions 
concerning science and technology on the side of the humanities, but also of the social 
sciences. Second, a nearby total lack of reflection upon the social consequences of science, 
and of the historicity of the single disciplines within the science curricula. Third: deeply 
ingrained habits of thought, promoting science and technology as neutral and culture and 
society as rest-categories that, in cases of importance, are allowed to have their say only after 
the scientific has spoken. Ethics cannot by itself bridge this gap, as its sources remain too 
dependent upon notions of agency taken from the experimental sciences, frequently exported 
through economics and organisations theory. Let us (again) turn to the diagnosis of C.P. 
Snow, this time as reconstructed by Steve Fuller: 
 
“Although Snow himself supposed that the two cultures suffered from mutual incomprehension, his 
speech clearly left humanists with the impression that the burden was primarily theirs…However, 
Snow was making a much more even-handed point, namely, that while scientific skills are singularily 
necessary for the survival of humanity, scientific training fails to instruct the moral imagination, 
especially the facility with alternative futures that is typically developed by the humanities. Snow’s 
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ideal civil servant would thus be equipped with a humanist’s sense of ends and a scientist’s sense of 
means” (Fuller 2000:325-26). 
 
Hence, we should put our energy and resources into imagining new inter-disciplines for future 
research administrators, politicians of research as well as researchers and educators 
themselves. The purpose of this would be to establish new and better regulatory bodies aiming 
at more sustainable and socially viable production and distribution of knowledge. 
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